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Abstract 
This PhD submission consists of twelve articles and six reviews published over 
the period 1999 to 2007, together with a context statement that seeks to draw out 
the dominant themes, methodologies and results of my research. 
Essentially, I have examined the impact on the risk management of certain areas 
in science and security, of two significant trends that emerged and merged within 
contemporary society over the last 25 years. 
These are; processes of 'individuation' and of lde-politicisation'. Together, they 
have helped shape a new culture for policy-making and communication in most 
fields which, I suggest, has adverse consequences. 
'Individuation' refers to the gradual breakdown of social bonds of solidarity and 
community which, while hardly new in capitalist society, accelerated in their 
reach and consequence over this period. Individuals isolated from strong social 
networks are ultimately weak. 
'De-politicisation' refers to the loss of interest and participation in mainstream 
politics, which has also been widely noted and commented upon. This reached 
new heights (or lows) in the current period, and is distinct from the 'politicisatiorí 
of both science and security. 
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These themes are explored further elsewhere, but it is my contention that their 
convergence has led to the creation of a new culture of risk management and 
communication which I have sought to critique. 
My research, presented in the accompanying papers, has utilised a diverse set of 
methodologicai approaches, focusing primarily on the reinterpretation of existing 
data and analysis through a series of case-studies. 
Intelligence, in both the general sense and in the world of security, consists of a 
combination of information and interpretation. My purpose here has been to 
present an alternative framework for contemporary debates. 
My work has revealed the impact of these key processes and the new culture 
and identities - vulnerable victims and assertive advocates - that have been 
created by them. I have examined numerous manifestations and limitations of 
these. 
My articles confirm the rise of a culture more worried over possibilities than 
probabilities. The precautionary principie in science and pre-emptive action in 
relation to perceived security threats are examples of this. 
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I conclude by noting that this has led to society being reorganised around risk. By 
miscommunicating risk - to connect with isolated individuals - politicians and 
officiais will further exacerbate the trends identified above. 
By implication, I point to the possibility of an alternative - a debate about risks 
that maintains a sensé of perspective and proportion, thereby rekindling the 
social bonds that generate confident individuals and purposeful politics. 
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CHAPTER 1 
7 
Introduction 
The concept of risk has risen to significant prominence in a period encompassing 
less than twenty years. Risk assessors, risk managers and risk communicators 
now play a central rôle at the heart of most organisations. Senior Risk Officers 
now sit on or advise the Boards of large corporations, as well as having 
significant rôles in public sector institutions. 
Référence to the phrase 'at risk' in British broadsheet newspapers exploded from 
just over 2,000-a-year to almost 20,000-a-year over the period 1994 to 2000 
alone (Furedi 2002a, p.xii). There are now numerous conférences, courses and 
centres devoted to exploring particular aspects of risk, from the technical to the 
social, as well as jobs and journals relating to thèse. 
This expansion in profile and debate has been paralleled in other, related, areas 
such as the greater prominence, and contestation, surrounding as apparently 
straightforward a term as 'accident' (Green 1997, Adams 2002). 
Thèse developments beg our understanding. Does society face more risks today 
than ever before? Is it that the risks we face are of a différent type to those 
encountered in previous times? Or, rather than there having been a change in 
the quantity or quality of the risks that we face, have we somehow become more 
conscious of thèse? 
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If the latter is true to any extent, then an exclusive focus on the standard tools of 
risk management for dealing with problems - identification, assessment, 
management and review - is neither sufficient, nor in certain instances 
necessary. If we fail to be critical, of both the objective évidence for threats, as 
well as appreciating how they are perceived subjectively, risk management can 
readily add to the problems rather than being part of their solution. 
In particular, risk communication designed to assuage perceived or projected 
public concerns may end up driving thèse concerns. What's more policy based 
on élite perceptions of public perception readily become a hall of mirrors within 
which original aims and purposes are lost and subsumed to the dominant 
presumption of the need to manage risk or reassure the public. In certain 
instances public perceptions can be extremely volatile - focusing unduly on one 
issue for a while before moving on to another - so policy made in relation to this 
may only serve to déstabilise matters further. 
The articles appended to the overarching framework presented in this context 
statement explore thèse thèmes in greater détail from a variety of angles. For 
instance, in Poisonous Dummies: European Risk Régulation after BSE (Durodié, 
1999) I examine some of the immédiate drivers of institutional nervousness, as 
well as their responses. The Demoralization of Science (Durodié, 2002a) 
developed some of the broader conséquences of this, identifying thèmes 
9 
revisited in Limitations of Public Dialogue in Science and the Rise of New 
'Experts' (Durodié, 2003b). 
More detailed and specific case studies are provided in The True Cost of 
Precautionary Chemicals Regulation (Durodié, 2003a), Facing the Possibility of 
Bio-Terrorism (Durodié, 2004b) and Risk and the Social Construction of 'Gulf 
War Syndrome' (Durodié, 2006a), with the latter highlighting some of the new 
identifies created when risk becomes fetishised. 
I have sought to explain some of the wider social aspects in The Concept of Risk 
(Durodié, 2005a), a paper commissioned by the Nuffield Trust. Inevitably, there is 
some répétition, particularly in my key writings on security; Cultural Precursors 
and Psychological Conséquences of Contemporary Western Responses to Acts 
of Terror (Durodié, 2005d), What can the Science and Technology Community 
Contribute? (Durodié, 2006b) and Home-Grown Nihitism: The Clash within 
Civilisations (Durodié, 2007a). 
This last paper has since been expanded upon and published as Fear and Terror 
in a Post-Political Age (Durodié, 2007b) in the journa! Government and 
Opposition, although this is not included in the présent collection. 
A number of significant, though shorter, revrews are interspersed between these 
key articles. Together these form a persuasive literature pointing to some 
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important lessons for the management of risk. Above-all, my intention is to 
encourage those involved to stop miscommunicating risk and focus rather more 
on the need to develop greater clarity of purpose in dealing with the problems of 
society. 
This PhD submission aims to get to the heart of a concept that impacts on the 
understanding and actions of countless politicians, officiais, regulators, 
entrepreneurs and activists. It touches on the full range of human endeavour, 
from science and technology, through social policy and human relations to 
security and defence. Above ail it examines the fine balance between 
exaggerating threats and dealing with real risks, as well as the role of robust and 
effective communication in both of thèse. 
This is not to critique attempts at communication per se, but rather to identify that 
exercises such as 'GM Nation?' (whereby the government, in June 2003, 
appeared to seek views from the 'public' as to the deployment of genetically 
modified crops into the UK), as well as, for instance the establishment in the 
same year of the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM) 
(again ostensibly a listening exercise between appointed 'experts' and the 
supposed 'public'}, smack more of image management and the need 'to be seen' 
to be communicating and listening than really purposeful dialogue. 
U 
As I identify elsewhere, real dialogue means having the courage to offend people 
and présent them with a view they had not thought of. Much risk communication 
today serves rather more as a blâme deflection mechanism for institutions 
lacking the confidence to promote a clear agenda - or worse - lacking any 
agenda at ail. 
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CHAPTER 2 
13 
Theoretical Framework 
The articles appended to this context statement are neither contributions to 
science nor to security studies. Rather, they serve to examine, and seek to 
confirm, certain cultural trends that, while graduai in their genesis, have corne to 
the fore of decision-making in thèse areas only over the last twenty years. This 
is, of necessity, an interdisciplinary study using a range of méthodologies -
primarily re-evaluating existing évidence through an alternative framework of 
analysis that draws, for its main intellectual and theoretical insights, from the field 
of sociology, and in particular political sociology. 
Political sociology is where political science and sociology intersect. The field 
looks at how major social trends, outside of the formai institutions of political 
power, can affect the political process, as well as exploring how various social 
forces work together to shape policy (Orum 2000). Social norms and 
expectations, as well as cultural values and beliefs, inevitably form a broader 
context that orient and médiate policy-making in ail areas of human endeavour 
and which, while not solely determining the outlook and actions of officiais and 
experts, can still play a considérable role in supportïng or supplanting thèse. 
Accordingly, my work also makes use of, but serves to critique, the limited social 
construction theory of Berger and Luckmann (1966), suggesting that their 
conceptualisation of the social was too narrow. Primarily, they understood this to 
dérive from the cumulative effect of numerous individual interactions, and their 
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work has thus tended to lead others into an examination of the various motives -
primarily seen as economic or psychological - that such individuals might hold. 
But it should be noted that, as early as 1895, in his classic work The Ruies of 
Sociologies! Method, Emile Dürkheim, the founder of modem sociology, indicated 
that; 'society is not the mere sum of individuals, but the System formed by their 
association represents a specific reality which has its own characteristics' (p. 129, 
1992 édition). He went on to suggest that; 'every time a social phenomenon is 
directly explained by a psychological phenomenon, we may rest assured that the 
explanation is false'. 
The same might be said about explaining social phenomena in terms of narrow 
economic motivations - such as profit or greed. For Dürkheim, this error was akin 
to using physics or chemistry in order to understand biology. It is not merely a 
question of picking the wrong tool of analysis, or of misunderstanding the scale of 
the System involved, but rather of failing to appreciate the fundamental qualitative 
'break in continuité between such disciplines. 
Social Construction 
It is ironie, in an âge when, for instance, the social construction of science has 
become an established idea - drawing in large part on Thomas Kuhn's analysis 
in his work The Structure of Scientific Révolutions (1962) - that so few seem to 
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inquire as to the social, cultural and political trends that shape the sociology of 
science - as opposed to science - today. There are numerous tracts exposing 
some of the influences impacting upon scientists - such as the pursuit of profit or 
prestige - but few, if any, seek to examine the forces that draw policy-makers 
and sociologists into problematising science at this moment in history. 
My answer, is that the sociology of science - and likewise new théories of 
security that seek to emphasise a supposed human dimension, as typified by the 
so-called Copenhagen School in International Relations of Ole Waever and Barry 
Buzan (1991) - are themselves social constructs, shaped by the social, cultural 
and political circumstances within which they have emerged. In other words, we 
need to understand the wider social construction of social construction théories. 
My writings seek to go to the heart of this problem. 
Models of science, security, or anything eise, do not simply émerge from society. 
They reflect its dominant modes and préoccupations. It is not possible, for 
example, to simply explain science or international relations, purely in their own 
terms. Frameworks of explanation rely, in large part, upon existing social 
structures as linguistic and conceptual metaphors (Appleton 2007) - although in 
science at least, their ultimate validity and use are then dépendent upon rigorous 
testing against reality. 
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Hence Newton's Laws served to reassure - at a time when the existence of God 
was being opened to question - that there still were invariable laws that have to 
be observed, as well as refiecting the simple mechanistic laws of cause and 
effect familiär to the period of early manufacturing. Faraday's idea of an electric 
field drew its conceptual strength from a period when the notion of lines of force 
operating throughout space reflected the military and commercial reality of his 
world. In a similar vein, Darwin's theory of évolution relied for its descriptive 
power upon the wider language of compétition in advanced capitalist societies 
that could make certain bodies obsolete. 
Drivers 
What then, are the dominant social, cultural and political drivers today, that act as 
the prism through which science and science policy, as well as security and 
security policy, are now viewed and re-conceptualised? These have their own 
laws and patterns of évolution that are quite distinct from the subject matter of 
science or security themselves. To work towards addressing thèse is the core 
purpose of this work. Economie forces and a désire for personal acclaim are not 
new. If, as I contend, there has been a sea-change in our understanding of 
science and security, as well as how society has sought to shape and regulate 
thèse over the récent period, then there must be some contemporary forces that 
we ought to be able to identify and examine in order to understand what it is that 
has changed in society to make this so. 
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My work draws on two core trends, identified by others, that have emerged and 
merged within society over the recent period. Together, they have helped to 
shape the new culture within which policy-making occurs. Indeed, the rise of risk 
management and risk communication - the ostensible subjects of this PhD 
submission - as new frameworks of analysis with which to regulate most forms of 
human activity are themselves an outcome of these processes. These are the 
emerging impact of 'individuation' and of 'de-politicisation' in the world today. 
1. Individuation 
'Individuation', as the term is used by the sociologist Frank Furedi (1997) is 
effectively a combination of isolation and alienation. It derives from the gradual 
breakdown of social bonds of solidarity, or community cohesion which, while 
hardly new, have accelerated quite dramatically in their reach and consequence 
over the recent period. Notably, Furedi distinguishes this from 'individualism', 
which he sees in more positive terms noting that; 'The process of individuation 
has not produced a culture of confident individualism' (p.147, 2006a edition). 
For Furedi then, despite the talk by many of a rise in 'selfish individualism' over 
recent years - as exemplified through supposed excesses, hubris and greed -
individuals isolated from strong social networks are ultimately weak. This point is 
further emphasised by Heartfield (2002), who states that; 'To individuals who are 
18 
isolated, society ceases to be an extension of themselves, and becomes instead 
a vast impersonal force'. He continues; 'By contrast, confident and gregarious 
individuais will tend to sensé the possibilités of social action' (p.56). 
Furedi goes on to identify 'the diminished importance attached to subjectivïty" as 
'one of the defining features of contemporary social and political life' (p. 149). By 
this he means that our conceptualisation and understanding of the individual, as 
a freely Willing, independent agent who is the subject of human history has, 
through a growing discourse of failure and limits over the course of the twentieth 
Century, become attenuated. His work explores the processes through which thîs 
state of affairs has corne about, as well as some of its conséquences (Furedi 
2001,2004, 2006b). 
More ominously, Heartfield notes that; 'In certain historical circumstances the 
possibilities of the free individual corne into being. By implication, thèse 
circumstances can be expected to pass into the historical pasf (p.24), although 
he concludes more optimistically that 'human subjectivïty persists in déniai of its 
own existence' (p.239). In effect, individuais today are not so much the active 
subjects of history as perceiving themselves as having become the passive 
objects of it, and then increasingly acting and organising accordingly. 
The diminution in our view of the impact and importance of human agency is not 
just of linguistic interest. It reflects and reinforces key aspects of the societies we 
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live in and shape. We see ourselves as being 'ai risk' from forces that are 'either 
entirely externa! to us, or so innate!y internal that there is Utile we can do about 
theni (Durodié, 2005, p.4). Leading sociologist Anthony Giddens has also noted 
'a pronounced tendency to naturalise social problems' (Giddens, 1994, p.220). 
A heightened sensitivity towards risk has led policy-makers to focus unduly on 
perception and emotion. This explains the tendency among many writers today to 
explain varying attitudes towards risk through psychological rather than 
sociological terms. The confusion is compounded by the fact that many of these 
individuals describe themselves as sociologists. Even when, as we shall see, a 
model known as 'Cultural Theon/ is deployed (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983), 
this revolves largely around categorising the behaviour of people into différent 
groups, rather than seeing the conséquences of the shifts in any broader social 
forces that might affect all. 
2. De-politicisation 
'De-politicisation' refers to the widely recognised trend across most advanced 
capitalist économies towards a loss of interest and participation in mainstream 
politics, particularly over the last couple of décades ( P O W E R Inquiry 2006). 
Exceptions, such as the récent Presidential élections in France, serve to confirm 
the rule, as well as being dépendent upon an outdated polarisation between, and 
emotional attachment to, supposedly Left- and Right-wing parties. 
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In fact, few today are active, or even passive, members of political parties or 
trade unions as their forebears were, and there is little evident desire, in many 
quarters, to engage in, or raise the standard of, debate. When people do vote, it 
is often out of a sense of duty, or on a negative basis - against a candidate, 
rather than for the alternative (Rosenthal 1997). This effect is most striking 
among younger age groups. 
This means that there is little loyalty, and accordingly predictability in the 
outcome of many contemporary elections. Marginal events, largely disconnected 
from the actual process - such as a terrorist attack, environmental incident, or 
claims as to the personal character traits of particular contestants - can have a 
disproportionate impact. As the turnout is split between several main parties, the 
mandate of those put into office can be very low. 
For the political elite, this disengagement of the masses from the electoral 
process is highly problematic. It exacerbates their own sense of isolation and 
insecurity, as their political legitimacy become questionable. This has been made 
worse by the loss of any clear vision and direction (Saatchi 2006), which became 
particularly pronounced through the gradual demise of the political divide 
between Left and Right (Giddens 1994). Today, these categories have been 
expunged of their traditional associations and meanings (Furedi 2006). Voters 
are often unable to distinguish between the pronouncements of the various major 
parties. 
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'De-politicisatiori must be distinguished from the apparent ' politicisatiori of 
debates relating to both science and security. Political interference in these 
disciplines is quite different from engaging society in democratic debate. Indeed, 
what is portrayed as 'politicisation' is often, in fact, a narrow form of 
' managerialisrri or professional intervention by supposed 'experts', that has 
replaced the pursuit of social goals through political principle with more 
technically-oriented operational targets. 
'De-politicisatiori demands new ways for politicians to re-connect with and 
manage their electorates. Accordingly, new regulations have been sought to 
protect people, increasingly through so-called 'public dialogue' (Durodie 2003b). 
But this dialogue is an instrumental goal which, apart from not always being 
appropriate, serves more to create the semblance of engagement and cover for 
an absence of principled debate over purposes and goals. 
Consequences 
These two trends - Individuation' and 'de-politicisatiori - emerged quite 
gradually over the course of the twentieth century, being kept largely in check 
through the exigencies of the Cold War, which presented the Left as a threat to 
the state both externally and internally. As relations became resolved over the 
course of the 1980s however, rather than opening society up to a new realm of 
possibilities, so these twin processes have encouraged an almost catastrophic 
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crisis of confidence among the elites, encouraging them to repackage 
themselves in a more populist guise (Walden 2002). 
After a brief period of triumph spanning the years between the publication of 
Francis Fukuyama's End of History essay in the National Register in 1989 and 
his expansion on the theme into a book in 1992, only now did academics such as 
Robert Putnam at Harvard begin to survey more rigorously the process of 
individuation. His exposition of the erosion of informal social bonds; Bowling 
Alone: America's Declining Social Capital appeared as an essay in 1995, and 
was similarly expanded upon and published as a book in 2000. 
At the same time, other writers were beginning to explore the consequences of a 
world from which traditional political associations and meanings had been 
expunged (Laidi, 1994). And, as we shall see in the next section, these 
conceptual changes were replicated almost precisely by the trends that occurred 
in the risk management literature over the same period, thereby confirming their 
existence as more widespread social shifts. 
These developments have profoundly altered the cultural context within which 
debate now occurs - a culture more worried about possibilities than probabilities 
and which, increasingly has led society to reorganise itself around the concept of 
risk. The precautionary principle in science and its corollary, pre-emptive action 
in relation to perceived security threats, are examples of this that I examine in my 
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work. But by enforcing thèse politicians and officiais have often exacerbated the 
trends identified above. 
Above ail, thèse processes have given rise to two of the more striking 
manifestations of the 'risk perception society - the création of an identity for 
people as 'vulnerable victims' to make effective daims within the new political 
domain, and the demand for intervention by 'professional experts' promoted by 
an élite desperate to re-connect and discover a new purpose for themselves. It is 
thèse aspects that form a unique contribution to the literature by my work. 
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CHAPTER 3 
25 
Literature Review 
This review focuses primarily on the risk management literature, as other, more 
conceptual literature informing my articles and context statement have been 
covered in the theoretical framework section. 
The Rise of Risk Management and Communication 
The evolution in our understanding of risk - as well as how this embodies 
changes in society and leads to particular forms of risk management and 
communication - is probably best captured in the publication of two reports by 
the Royal Society, almost a decade apart (Royal Society 1983 and 1992). Both 
study groups were chaired by the eminent chemical engineer Sir Frederick 
Warner. But, reflecting a change in emphasis over this period, the second of 
these had many more panellists from social science related disciplines who 
drafted specific chapters on these aspects. 
Confirming my theoretical framework that such shifts represent broader social 
trends and are not just the preoccupations of particular individuáis, an almost 
identical sequence of events occurred in the US , over a largely similar period, 
across two publications on risk produced by the National Research Council, the 
latteredited by Paul Stern and Harvey Fineberg (NRC 1983 and 1996). 
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The first report, from 1983 in both cases, ¡n keeping with the origins of the 
concept of risk - which primarily emerged from the development of the insurance 
industry (Bernstein 1996), as well as having considerable use in engineering -
put forward what some may consider to be an overly objectivist account. This 
largely takes the form of a mathematical equation proposíng that risk can be 
measured and quantified as the product of likelihood and impact. Depending on 
the literature, other factors may be taken ¡nto account, such as threat and 
vulnerability, but these are harder to quantify. 
While serving as a useful heuristic, the límitations of this formulation are well 
documented. Primarily these consist of difficulties in obtaining repeatable and 
commensurable data in order to derive probabilities, as well as problems in 
quantifying impacts, which can be highly subjective in character. Rather than 
dealing with risk management, where data is required to appreciate likelihood, 
many cases are actually dealing with uncertainty, the term used when such 
figures are unavailable. 
Regardless of these inherent limitations, the dominant paradigm for risk 
management, as exercised by many organisations in both the public and prívate 
sectors today, can be characterised by attempts to quantify likelihoods and 
impacts, with a view to developing a hierarchy of risks necessitating attention. 
These are then situated in the kind of matrix shown below; 
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CUMULATIVE RISK MATRIX 
L IKEL IHOOI ) I M P A C T 
A R A R E 1 INSIGNIFICANT 
B UNLIKELY 2 MINOR 
C POSSIBLE - \K)[)I R A II 
D LIKELY 4 MAJOR K CERTAIN 5 CATASTROPHIC 
F 
I) 
C J 
B 
A 
1 2 3 4 5 
Figure 1 - typical 5 x 5 cumulative risk matrix mapping onto 'traffic light' diagram 
Management is then charged with dealing with the various risks placed into such 
a grid according to their relative importance as highlighted by the traffic light 
colour scheme. The possible actions are described as; treat, transfer or tolérate, 
with treatment consisting of either reducing the likelihood or mitigating the impact 
of the risk under consideration. Transfer consists either of insurance or passing 
responsibility to another entity, although the latter can appear as an abdication of 
responsibility. There is a vast literature replicating such schemas for all-manner 
of organisations. 
The other standard tool in the objectivist risk manager's repertoire is described 
as the 'risk management cycle'. This usually consists of a four-part process of (1) 
identifying risks - a qualitative assessment leading to the creation of a 'risk 
registe^, (2) assessing risks - a quantitative task yielding a sense of priorities, (3) 
managing risks - an active task requiring political judgement, and finally (4) 
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reviewing what has been achieved with a view to starting the whole process all-
over again, as shown on the diagram below; 
RISK MANAGEMENT CYCLE 
REVIEW IDENTIFY 
MANAGE ASSESS 
Figure 2 - typical schematic of risk management cycle 
Typically, technical experts undertake risk assessments, whilst bodies broadly 
accountable to elected representatives are charged with risk management or 
making the final decisión, based upon the advice or assessments they receive. 
These elements are usually separated from one another due to widespread 
concern as to the dangers of conflicting interests and valúes should one body 
control both aspects. 
Risk assessment is assumed to be the objective or evidence-based part of the 
process, whilst risk management is considered to include a more subjective 
element. Risk management decisions may, or may not, reflect the advice 
provided in risk assessments. This is because ultimately, the degree of risk 
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people are prepared to accept is culturaily determined and it is assumed that this 
is best reflected by the views of their elected représentatives rather than 
appointed experts. 
Such a distinction however, is not quite accurate (Stem and Fineberg 1996). 
After ail, even if the process of risk assessment were to be broadly objective -
itself a possibility disputed by some - the décision to perform a risk assessment 
in the first place may be driven by social and cultural concerns. 
Cultural, Psychological and Sociological Considérations 
Although risk management has never pretended to be a value-free or purely 
technical process it was not until the 1980s that a growing number of critiques, 
emanating from various directions, started to demand that such values be made 
more explicit. 
The Germán académie, Ortwin Renn and others have examined the limitations of 
what they describe as 'the rationa! actor paradigm' (Renn, Jaeger and Webler 
2005), as well as mapping the contours of alternative risk théories and models. 
Foremost amongst thèse are cultural, psychological and sociological influences. 
As others have reviewed the strengths and limitations of thèse, it is not my 
intention to do so here again, other than in a perfunctory way. Needless to say, it 
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is largely from the latter school, as représentée! primarily by the likes of John 
Adams (1995), as well as Frank Furedi (1997), that my analysis draws upon. 
Cultural theory ensued largely from the work of the British social anthropologist 
Mary Douglas (Douglas and Wildavsky 1980), and has further been developed 
by her former research student Steve Rayner (1992), and others. A s Renn notes, 
while this approach - based on a typology of social groups according to 
particular rôles and outlooks - yielded some interesting insights, it is not obvious 
how to apply this in a prédictive manner. 
Psychological models of risk have been far more influential and are currently 
extremely fashionable (Hilson and Murray-Webster 2005). Thèse dérive mainly 
from the work of the American, Paul Slovic who, over a period encompassing five 
décades, has conducted countless experiments into risk appetite and behaviour 
according to various psychological and fixed social indices, including sex, race 
and socio-economic grouping (Slovic 2000). 
In essence, Slovic identifiée! a number of factors that affect people's attitudes 
towards, and propensity to take, risks. Foremost amongst thèse are; control, 
dread and equitability. So, for instance, people prefer to take charge of a 
situation, even when this présents greater risks, than be at the behest of others, 
as evidenced by the inordinate response witnessed subséquent to rail accidents, 
whereby people immediately take to the roads. 
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Similarly, cáncer, terrorism or some other such 'high salience' ¡ssue produces 
responses disproportionate to the actuality of the dangers ínvolved. Likewise, a 
risk that targets a particular social group, such as children or people with a 
particular gene, is also usually dealt with differently to situations where, even 
though the risk may be absolutely larger, it is perceived to be fairer in its targeting 
or distribution. 
While there is nothing inherently wrong with these conclusions, they have, over 
recent years, come to form an unquestioned mantra seeking to explain all 
variation in risk-taking attitude in society. But in fact, while these may have some 
explicatory powers as to variation between individuáis, they do not begin to 
address the huge rise in risk awareness and risk management across society 
identified earlier, which emerged in less than a generation. 
For this, we need to use sociological insights to clarify how people themselves 
have changed. These show how social ¡nstitutions, and accordingly identities, 
mores, valúes and expectations, were transformed in the period leading up to 
and subsequent to the end of the Cold War in 1989. 
In fact, as I identify in one of my papers, the rise of psychological explanations 
and models in the contemporary period is entirely predictable and explicable. I 
suggest that; 'friere is now very little awareness of the extent to which many 
phenomena are shaped and determined by social forces. Instead, there has 
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emerged a growing emphasis on nature and individuáis as the presumed root of 
mostissues' (Durodié 2005a, p.4). 
This, 1 go on to propose, further diminishes our view of ourselves and our 
willingness to act with a view to transforming the world as; 'such an outlook 
presents our world and our responses to it as being increasingly determined by 
impulses either entirely externa! to us, or so innately interna! that there is little we 
can do about them' (ibid). I continué with an exploration of how these forces 
came to shape contemporary altitudes towards science. 
It is our reduced sense of agency which in turn leads to the elevation by some of 
supposedly 'naturaf processes and producís over the 'man-made'. This also 
explains the recent focus in risk management on hazard - the potential effect of 
a situation - as well as uncertainty, over risk and knowledge. Essentially, the 
former downplay our understanding, competence and wül, and ignore the fact 
that we can only ever move towards an appreciation of what we do not know by 
actively starting from what we do know. 
It would be remiss of me to conclude this section without some mention of the 
work of the Germán environmental sociologist, Ulrich Beck, who has been hugely 
influential in the development of this field, if not always in a positive way. Beck 
largely rose to prominence subsequent to the translation of his book 'Risk 
Societ/ into English in 1992. This coincided with a greater questioning of the 
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received paradigm of risk and so fed into countless debates at the time and 
since. 
There are numerous critiques of Beck's outlook and work (Mythen 2004), but I 
shall restrict myself to simply making one point. That is, that through his fatalistic 
célébration of nature, as well as chaos and ambiguity, Beck effectively feeds into 
a growing anti-human discourse that became dominant in the closing years of the 
twentieth century. This fin-de-siecle pessimism, as identified above, merely 
refiects social reality today. But rather than Ottering any way through this, Beck 
prefers to laugh at our 'optimisée futilité (2006). 
On occasion his analysis appears unbelievably simplistic, as for instance, when 
he suggests a simple probabilistic duality whereby terrorists either acquire 
weapons of mass destruction, or they do not (ibid, p.335). At other times, his 
loose writing style allows some important insight into the modem world to slip 
out, whether he means this to or not. So, when he suggests that; 7n risk society 
relations of définition are to be conceived analogous to Marx's relations of 
production', he points to a need for identity and meaning, which takes the form of 
attempts to construct a 'new narrative' by others (Omand 2006). 
Ultimately, as his work can be read through the prism of whatever priority a 
particular researcher wishes to apply, and indeed as he himself seems to 
oscillate playfully between the various polarities he identifies or imagines, his 
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work cannot be considered as a constructive framework upon which to base 
research. 
In closing, what should have emerged from the last two sections is a sensé that 
risk is not simply something that can be quantified and dealt with, but that its very 
expression today is socially contested. Inevitably, as society changes so too 
does its attitude towards risk, reflecting an assessment, conscious or otherwise, 
as to our role in shaping the future. Unfortunately, this reflexivity of risk, has 
allowed certain presumptions to prevail in the contemporary period, the 
conséquences of which may serve to further erode our optimism towards the 
future and henee serve to encourage a negative attitude towards risk. 
Politicisation and Professionalisation 
Management suggests the need to corne to terms with problems, rather than to 
résolve them. A s a discipline it has come of age in proportion to the decline of the 
old political frameworks, both reflecting the loss of a broader, stratégie vision for 
society and further reinforcing this. 
In my papers I suggest that; 'The management of risk fulfils the need for a new 
organising principie. Politicians, concerned as to their legitimacy have then 
sought to repackage themselves as societal risk managers' (Durodié 2005d). In 
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other words risk management provides contemporary politicians with political 
capital through a new, if somewhat fragile, form of moral purpose. 
The need to be seen to be doing something - anything - in relation to perceived 
contemporary problems, is paramount today, leading, as noted earlíer, to a 
constant churning of policy in the absence of firm principies. Of course, whether 
any of the measures implemented are truly effective, in an age when image 
would seem to matter somewhat more than insight, remains to be determined. 
Risk management has also become big business, with considerable profits to be 
realised. This combination of both political and economic value has important 
conséquences for risk communication. As shall be discussed, there is a fine line 
to tread between assuaging concerns and driving them by highlighting problems 
in order to promote purported solutions. 
At a meeting 1 attended at the Royal United Services Institute in 2002, I was 
informed by a représentative of a security Company that; 'the supply side of 
respirators' (that is gas-masks to ordinary people), was 'all ready and waiting'. All 
that was 'needecf now was 'for the demand to be stimulatecf. 
This unguarded comment reveáis the tension and confusion between private 
profit, or political gain, with what is in the public interest, that lies at the heart of 
many of the examples explored through my case studies. Others have noted the 
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proliferation of 'snake-oil merchants' or 'junk science' that now exists in such 
debates. 
It is not my intention here to deconstruct these labels, but rather to note that the 
reason these may abound is due in no small part, as identified in the papers that 
ensue, to the growing confusión and conflation of risk assessment with risk 
management, the dangers of which were noted earlier. 
This elisión of technical goals with polítical purpose, driven primarily by the 
absence of the latter, is what has allowed the politicisation of both science and 
security, as examined through my work. No doubt, market torces have facilitated 
this process, but it is primarily driven by political forces - or to be precise, the 
absence of these. 
Politics, in the sense that I use it here and throughout my work, is taken to be the 
process of mobilísing majorities, usually through a battle of ideas, in order to 
effect change. Sadly, as identified by much of the literature I use as the 
theoretical underpinnings of my work, the popular perception of the term today is 
rather different. In the absence of ideas, or any ambition for change, it has come 
to represent petty and often personality-oriented squabbles. 
Burgess talks of this in his work as 'symbolic politics' (2004), in other words an 
attempt to appeal to the mass of ordinary people by identifying with their 
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apparent concerns, rather than seeking to convince them otherwise. In my own 
work I have talked of the increasing use of 'totemie gestures' (Durodié 2005d), 
used to be seen to be placating people's assumed concerns. Both of thèse serve 
to conceal the real absence of principle at the heart of such debates. 
Much of my work also explores how marginal concerns or, as shall be identifiée!, 
rare and extreme events, have become the driving force for policy change. This 
results from a combination of not having any other policy, due to an absence of 
vision, and the fact that such events or minor préoccupations, often promoted by 
unrepresentative lobby groups, fit a pre-determined outlook. This latter aspect is 
explored in the next section. 
Failing to lead and to win over the majority to a particular point of view, only 
further promotes the drive towards shallow technical, regulatory or legislative 
solutions. An example of this, explored in my work, has been the case of animal 
testing, whereby dissent, rather than being debated, is simply countered through 
increasingly draconian measures. 
As I suggest; 'Without forcing a broader public debate on the matter and 
engaging wider support, the authorities will continue to lack real resilience in the 
face of a handful of activists and cave in too easily' (Durodié 2004d). More 
recently, in a différent field of activity, the writer John Gillott (2007) has identified 
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the need for scientists to engage in a robust debate about their work if they are to 
be able to pursue it. 
Another conclusion of my work is that when communication with the public is not 
bypassed, or reduced to a simplistic formulation in order to be accessible and 
inclusive, then it reveals an incohérence of aims that reflects both the absence of 
direction from the top and the conflation of différent aims and modes of 
communication targeted at différent audiences. 
Précaution 
In a récent contribution Sir Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies at 
King's Collège London, has noted that; 'advocates of particular stratégie choices 
develop théories of vulnerability to rationalise their préférences and then seek 
intelligence estimâtes which add weight to their théories' (2004). This approach, 
identified as 'advocacy research', is confirmed in a number of my papers. It is, in 
effect, a conclusion in search of data. 
It is a basic error in both science and the social sciences and yet, in many of the 
cases I have examined, it had remained unidentified, no doubt because the 
dominant assumptions appeared so persuasive. Accordingly, 'hypothesis 
confirmation' as opposed to hypothesis testing, exerts inordinate sway in the 
world of security, as well as in scientific policy-making. 
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But not questioning the framing of basic assumptions can serve to harden 
existing préjudices and, at the same time, fail to challenge the core of an 
argument. I have shown in one paper the manner in which, even the scientists of 
the Royal Society have been misled and, in turn, further entrenched populär 
fears, by just such a fallacious approach (Durodîé 2006b). 
False framing has been the root to numerous failures, both in the worlds of 
science and security (O'Brien 2000). In both thèse arenas, intelligence is best 
understood as a product of both information and the interprétation of that 
information. In many instances it is not the former that is lacking, but the latter 
that is fundamentally flawed. Accordingly, problems are increasingly confronted 
at face-value, rather than rigorously interrogated with a view to understanding, 
analysing and eventually treating their real cause, or meaning. 
At the same time, the 'act now, find the évidence iatef imperative of the 
precautionary principle has further clouded matters. In many policy areas this has 
now become the guiding framework of our times. As noted in my work, this 
approach migrated from the realms of environmentalism, where it was first 
formulated in the 1970s (Lofstedt 2002), towards increasingly encroaching into 
every other field of human endeavour. 
The precautionary principle captures perfectly the convergence of the old political 
left and the old political right in the new, post-Cold War, world order. The logic 
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and language used by those who talk of the need for pre-emption being identical 
to that of precaution. 
As I have noted elsewhere (Durodie 2004e), at the heart of the precautionary 
approach lies the uninterrogated assumption that invariably prevention is better 
than cure. But preventative measures are, of necessity general and long-lasting, 
whereas cures tend to be targeted and discrete. In addition, prevention is only 
better than cure when the probability of what you are seeking to prevent is high 
and the proposed preventative measures are effective. 
In most of the risk debates in this collection neither of these last two 
requirements is met, nor are they more generally. My work has coincided with a 
time frame whereby a growing number of critiques of the precautionary principle 
have emerged (Marchant and Mossman 2005, Sandin et al. 2002), and defensive 
ripostes have emerged accordingly, although it is worth noting that at the 
beginning of this period this was not at all so. 
A less remarked upon aspect of this phenomenon which I examine in my work 
has been the growing use of self-regulation over government controls. This 
reflects the widespread climate of anxiety that encompasses everyone in society, 
not just the authorities wishing to impose diktats from above. Apart from 
impacting adversely on science policy-making this is also likely to have very 
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serious conséquences for freedom of expression, which it is my hope to go on to 
explore aspects of in the future. 
Trust and Resilîence 
I have explored the issue of trust in a number of my contributions (Durodié 
2003d). The essential point to be made here is that genuine trust requires the 
suspension of reciprocal calculation between parties. Acting in codified or 
predefined ways does not allow for the granting of trust. Rather, real trust 
requires récognition of the freedom of others to act as they wish. In short, as I 
suggest; 'trust is a fundamental part of risk-taking', and accordingly it is 
unsurprising that a society that has become obsessed with regulating risks is 
unable to grant or to restore relations of trust. 
Unable or unwilling to trust the public, or even its own experts, society 
increasingly reorganises around its presumptions as to how people are likely to 
behave in particular situations (Poortinga and Pidgeon 2003). Invariably, this is 
viewed in négative terms. Yet, as identifiée! in a contribution not contained here, 
Simon Wessely and 1 have explored how assumptions about, for instance, panic 
in adversity, are simply not borne out by the actual évidence (Durodié and 
Wessely 2002). 
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What is far more corrosive however, is the graduai heightening of levels of 
anxiety that poorly managed risk communication can engender. Belief Systems 
have a profound impact upon, not only how people view and understand the 
world, but also their level of well-being within it. I have shown how, for instance, 
cases of 'Gulf War Syndrome' were effectively socially constructed through a 
process of presumed vulnerability, amplified by élite confirmation by both the 
légal and médical professions (Durodié 2006a). 
Such Jree-floating' anxieties can, at the margins, make people truly ill and at that 
stage ail attempts to provide reassurance are likely to prove to be counter-
productive. Returning to the previous section, it is the overall framing of the 
problem that needs to be challenged if people are to develop a more 
proportionate appréciation of the risks they face. 
In other words, effective communication should encompass both, the objective 
évidence as it is best understood, and an explanation as to why our subjective 
appréciation of this may be heightened through the process of social 
fragmentation I have described. But in an âge when challenging people's 
perceptions and beliefs is held to be unnecessary if not offensive, this is unlikely 
to occur in many instances. 
Real resilience, as described in my work (Durodié 2005b), is the ability of an 
individual, institution, System or society to recover from, and develop subséquent 
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to, some kind of shock, in order to continué or expand upon their ¡ntended 
trajectory. This encapsulates more than the processes of preparing for, 
responding to and recovering from adversity as it is commonly understood by 
others. Resil ience also requires the need to identify and shape a course well 
before any difficulty arises. 
It is this latter, conscious element that is missing from engineering and 
environmental definitions of resilience (Holling 1973). But it is these formulations 
that have migrated into contemporary use subsequent to the terrorist attacks in 
America of 11 September 2001. The preparedness element has largely been 
shaped through the prism of risk management, but is almost entirely technica! in 
its content. 
But the will to recover from a shock and continué is necessarily dependent upon 
cultural attitudes. Clarity of aims and purposes are just as important to ensuring 
societa) resilience as are degrees of preparedness and competencies in an 
emergency. It is this clarity that is most lacking in many debates about risk 
management today. Unfortunately, by acting to tackle what appears to be the 
immediate problem at hand, much risk management and its associated 
processes of communication fails to address the real issues at hand. 
It is worth reflecting upon how the world carne to be as it is today without an army 
of risk managers and communicators advising us on how to do everything. Aside 
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from the greater tolerance towards adversity, which undoubtedly was forced 
upon people in the past, I suspect the key transformation has been in terms of 
our orientation to the future based upon how we view humanity. 
In the past, the ability to deal with risks emerged as a by-product of a desire to 
expand our horizons and enhance our abilities. By facing forwards towards an 
unknown future we uncovered many problems, but also acquired new tools for 
dealing with these. 
Today, we seem to be facing history backwards, fixated upon the risks that we 
have uncovered and concomitantly unable to move forwards, thereby developing 
new methods for handling risks, we seem paralysed by our fears and accordingly 
our already low view of the human project is further reinforced through our 
inability to shape change. 
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CHAPTER 4 
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Contribution to Knowledge 
My primary contribution to knowledge emerges from the articles appended to this 
context statement as part of my overall contribution. This largely consists of a 
critique of risk management and communication as it currently exists. By 
examining existing debates within the fields of science and security through an 
alternative analytical framework, I have demonstrated that much of what is 
discussed as a 'risk' issue is largely a 'risk perception' issue framed by a crisis of 
confidence affecting particular sectors of society. 
Rather than repeating the spécifie éléments of my literature here, I have chosen 
to examine how the problem is understood in one of the more récent government 
related publications on the matter. This helps me to draw out the key findings and 
contributions of my work - that are similarly identifiable in the appended articles -
in a more practical and policy-oriented manner. 
Preamble 
In October 2006, the Better Régulation Commission - an independent advisory 
body to the UK Government - issued a document entitled; Risk, Responsibiiity 
and Régulation - Whose risk is it anyway? (BRC 2006). This examined the 
increasing pressures put upon government to regúlate risks, and pointed to 
problems and purported solutions to alleviate thèse. 
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It followed soon after the widely reported and somewhat exasperated sounding 
comment urging people to 'get a Ufe' made by Bill Callaghan, Chair of the Health 
and Safety Commission, at the launch of his Executive's publication; Five Steps 
to Risk Assessment on 22 August 2006 (HSE 2006). This argued to the ettect 
that people should learn to take 'sensible' risks. 
On one reading then, it would seem that a number of significant institutional 
players in the risk management process, including the Prime Minister (Blair 
2005), nave, over the recent period at least, woken up to the possibility that an 
exaggerated perception of risk has emerged within society, leading to excessive 
expectations and regulation that are counterproductive for people and 
government alike. 
At the same time however, one could point to a wealth of examples pushing in 
the opposite direction. Just one that emerged over this period was the request by 
Bristol City Council sent in a letter entitled 'Health and Safety Issues -
Hazardous Mats' to all of its many thousand properties, that tenants remove such 
items - held to have caused numerous tripping and slipping injuries - from 
doorways by 18 September 2006 (Butt 2006). 
So just because the Better Regulation Commission, Health and Safety Executive 
and others have identified a problem, does not mean that they are necessarily in 
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a position to rectify it, especially if, as I shall suggest, their analysis as to the 
causes of the problem are deeply ftawed in the first place. 
Rather than viewing debates over risk management and communication as 
representing some fundamental tension between competing government 
agencies, the public and the media - a conflict represented by the 'something 
must be done' brigade at one end of the spectrum, and those who oppose a 
'nanny state' at the other - the papers in this collection point to ail sides reflecting 
similar core trends and attitudes in society. 
Accordingly, this opening section will explore the limitations of the analysis put 
forward by the Better Régulation Commission. This will allow me to examine the 
theoretical underpinnings of this discourse and to then introduce the core thèmes 
identified in my own work over a seven-year period. 
Risk Management - the Officiai View 
According to Rick Haythornthwaite, the Chair of the B R C (Better Régulation 
Commission); 'We have ail ... oeerj complicit in a drive to purge risk from our 
Uves and we have driñed towards a disproportionate attitude to the risks we 
should expect to take' (BRC 2006, p.3). 
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His Foreword to his organisation's publication goes on to emphasise; 'the 
importance of resilience, self-reliance, freedom, innovation and a spirit of 
adventure', as well as the need for 'separating fact from émotion' in assessing 
fevels of risk (ibid). 
Whilst we may well agrée with the sentiments expressed in thèse latter points, it 
is instructive to understand the processes and agents he holds to be responsible 
for the former. After ail, if the analysis presented by the B R C is found wanting in 
its interprétation as to causal drivers, then it is most likely that its conclusions, or 
recommendations, will also be limited, if not downright problematic. 
As in many of the instances of risk management and communication I explore 
elsewhere in this submission, it is the solutions proposed that often exacérbate 
the situation as the interprétative framework for the initial problem is weak. 
Notably, the B R C 'do not seek to blâme the Government for where we are today, 
indicating that; 'The Government may not have led us single-handed into this 
situation', and proposing that it would be for Government to 'take the first 
définitive steps to lead us out (ibid). 
Unsurprisingly then, the Better Régulation Commission appear to be arguing for 
- better régulation - although ironically, this is likely to take the form of new, in 
other words more, régulation. So much for regulatory streamlining then. 
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More significantly though, ¡t is the process identified by the B R C whereby the 
current state of affairs has come to pass that ought to be of interest. This is 
outlined on pages 7 and 9 of the document, and fleshed out throughout, including 
across a number of interspersed case studies. 
In essence this 'regulatory spiraV is characterised as a 'no-wirí situation for 
politicians and summarised in a small number of steps, of which the key 
elements are held to be that; (1) perceptions of risk emerge over time, (2) 
misperceptions are amplified by the media, (3) the public look to government to 
manage the risks, (4) the government responds to public pressure and, (5) the 
government is then blamed, either for unnecessary interference, or for the 
unintended consequences of its actions. 
The solutions then proffered include the need to; (a) provide more information, 
(b) provide more training for all parties on the assessment, communication and 
management of risk, and (c) target those held to be 'most at risW - also labelled 
'the most vulnerable' - for support. 
An Orwellian-sounding array of plans, panels and procedures are then put 
forward as the logical means for reorganising society around these newly 
identified needs. These include; (i) a Fast Assessment of Regulatory Options 
Panel, (ii) an Annual Simplification Plan, and (iii) an Administrative Burdens 
Measurement Exercise. 
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It may seem cynical at this stage to suggest that the road to hell ¡s paved with 
good intentions but, in light of the weak analysis presented by those charged with 
reducing the regulatory burden on society, which nevertheless is held to 
necessitate such far-reaching organisational consequences, it is hard to 
conclude otherwise. 
Miscommunicating Risk - Some Lessons 
Usefully, the Better Regulation Commission document highlights a number of 
failings which are examined at greater depth through the various articles 
appended to this context statement, A number can be highlighted here as these 
point to the theoretical underpinnings of the dominant literature on risk 
management, as well as the limitations of these. 
1. Agency 
The first step assumed by the B R C in its 'regulatory spiraf is that 'risk perception 
emerges'. This is a remarkable formulation of the problem pointing to a passive 
understanding of social processes, which explains little. Why would perceptions 
emerge? Where from? And, do they emerge any faster today than previously? 
In his work on risk, the sociologist Frank Furedi has identified the evolution from 
an understanding of risk as an active engagement with reality, in the sense of 
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'taking a risk? (which may yield opportunitîes and benefits as much as problems 
and costs), towards the more passive formulation of simply 'being at risk' (a 
condition that requires us to reduce the likelihood, or mitigate the conséquences, 
of particular threats), as one of the defining features of our contemporary 
consciousness of risk (Furedi 2002a, p.xiii). 
This in turn reflects a wider shift that has occurred among the gênerai public from 
being active citizens, engaged in the political arena, to becoming passive 
consumers, increasingly more focused on privatised concerns, as evidenced by a 
wide variety of social, cultural and political indices. 
The articles in this PhD submission draw on such conceptual insights as 
elaborated in the work of Richard Sennett (1977), and Christopher Lasch (1979). 
But while thèse writers identified the potential for a radical shift in our sensé of 
personhood as early as the late 1970s, it was not until the unfreezing of the post-
Second World War - Cold War - world order, a décade later, that such trends 
could be given full vent and become manifest at a broader societal level. 
Accordingly, risk perceptions have not simply 'émergea". The idiom 'nothing 
ventured, nothing gained has not straightforwardly been replaced by that 
suggesting that we are 'better safe than sorr/. Rather the very meaning and 
content of what it is to be human at the beginning of the twenty-fîrst century has 
changed, and this, in turn, has shaped perceptions. 
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One of the key outlooks encompassed by ail of the accompanying articles is that 
a diminished sensé of social solidarity, as finally shaped by the exhaustion of the 
political left and the political right at the end of the twentieth century, as well as 
the more graduai érosion of other community networks and bonds that used to 
provide a cohérent sensé of identity, purpose and meaning, has left individuals 
with an exaggerated sensé of insecurity stemming from their real isolation. 
It is not simply a distorted and disproportionate sensé of risk that stems from 
thèse conditions, but more importante a diminished sensé of self. When people 
no longer conceive or project themselves as being the subjective agents of their 
own history, then they can become the passive objects of it (Heartfield, 2002). 
From this it is an easy step to identifying risks as simply emerging. But what such 
an analysis misses is the fundamental transformation in society and our own self-
consciousness that has shaped it. 
As indicated in one of my articles; 'What may really have changed is not so much 
the scale of the problems that we face, but the outlook with which society 
perceives its difficultés, both real and imagined (Durodié 2003a, p.396). 
Accordingly, as I suggest elsewhere, 'it may be that, rather than living in a Risk 
Society, we nowlive in a Risk Perception Society' (Durodié 2005, p.2). 
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The solution to this will not be one that criticises risks or even risk perceptions by 
taking them at face-value, but rather one that appréciâtes the deeper social 
undercurrents that produce both thèse and the discourse that ensues. 
2. Mediation 
The second Step presented by the B R C in their 'no-wiri schéma is that of media 
amplification. This concept draws upon the work of Roger and Jeanne Kasperson 
who have examined a process they identified as the social amplification of risk 
(1996). This has further been developed by the former in association with Nick 
Pidgeon and Paul Slovic (2003). 
But while the media does appear to have a disproportionate significance and 
influence in contemporary society, such an insight again fails to identify why this 
is so, or how it has corne about in such a relatively short period of time. Whether 
people believe the media at any particular moment in time is dépendent upon 
other factors. 
In fact, it is because ail of the other social and cultural institutions (such as 
famîlies, communities and neighbourhood networks, political parties, trade unions 
and religious congrégations, as well as out-of-hours clubs, teams and 
associations - which used to provide people with alternative sources of 
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information and meaning) have been so eroded, that the rôle of the media now 
seems dominant. 
Rather than blaming the media, and looking for ways to attenuate the impact and 
domination of its various components, it is the sublimation and weakness of ail of 
the other social networks that really needs to be addressed. What is required is 
to build-up such alternative webs of authority and action, not to lambaste the last 
institution left standing. 
While the media undoubtedly do have a rôle in amplifying and promoting 
particular fears, they are only rarely the instigators of such debates. It is usually 
nervous élites and their weakened institutions that are identified in my articles as 
the original culprits. Their fears and concerns then resonate with those of an 
isolated and individuated public. 
In addition, as identified in my review of Adam Burgess's book (2004), a 
diminished sensé of self leads people to seek to create new forms of identity for 
themselves. Journalists are no différent to other people in this regards and the 
staunch, socially-responsible campaigner provides a readily assumed persona 
for those who do not want their careers shaped by the need to cover celebrity 
gossip. 
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Likewise, some of the other articles présentée" here examine the search for 
identity - in what some have characterised as becoming; 'a world without 
meaning' (Laïdi 1994) - from various other perspectives; regional institutions 
trying to establish themselves as alternative poles of authority to central 
government (Durodié 1999), military personnel identifying themselves as having 
been victims of 'gulf war syndrome' (Durodié 2006a), and young men with no 
connection to the Middle East or beyond keen to be part of a 'global jihad' 
(Durodié 2007). 
This 'search for meaning' (Frankl 1959), is raised here as an essential 
component of my conceptual framework. Failing to understand how individuals 
have changed in a very short period of time leads the B R C , and others, to 
présume a growing influence from social institutions, such as the media, whereas 
in fact it is our weakened sense of identity, as well as a growing sense of 
purposelessness in our concomitant organisations, that have allowed the media 
to appear, and on occasion to be, so dominant. 
However, if we are not to miscommunicate risk, by counter-posing one pereeived 
fear with another - as was the case in relation to UK government attempts to 
fend off fears over having children inoculated with the M M R vaccine by 
highlighting the conséquences of not being vaccinated - then we need to 
understand how real risks are mediated through fragile individual and institutional 
identifies. 
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These need to be built-up if we are to regain a proportionate sense of risk and 
not drive people's fears through a process of poor, reactive and unnecessary 
communication. 
3. Pressure 
One of the key factors which the B R C identify as putting governments under 
pressure to respond is that; 'Action is often based on emotion' (BRC 2006, p.11 ). 
This is undoubtedly true in many instances, although again, this fails to identify 
why this should be any more so the case today than it would have been in the 
past. Is it that somehow we have become a more emotional society? Or have the 
forces of rationalism, which would previously have encouraged a greater sense 
of objective distance between incidents and policy, somehow been forced into 
abeyance? 
In another of his key works, upon which the papers in this collection draw upon 
for intellectual insight and inspiration, Furedi (2002b) has examined the 
processes through which this has come about. 
Undoubtedly, individuals in a more atomised society develop a heightened sense 
of their own frailty, and this has encouraged a greater focus on their immédiate 
self, accompanied by an élévation of emotion. Other writers have noticed this 
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trend too, and have examined the new moral codes that have developed in a 
society that seeks to trade transparency for trust (Rosen 2004). 
It is certainly true that a society that fails to perceive itself as such has great 
difficulty with a concept such as that of the 'public gooa". Indeed, this may go 
some way towards explaining our heightened sensé of horror towards those who 
are prepared to sacrifice themselves as 'suicide bombers' in pursuit of what they 
see as greater goals and objectives. 
Over the course of the period spent preparing the papers for this PhD, I 
appeared in the B A F T A award-winning BBC documentary séries, produced by 
Adam Curtis (2004); 'The Power of Nightmares: The Rise ofthe Politics of Fear1. 
It is worth quoting my closing remark there in füll; 
'in a society that believes in nothing, fear becomes the only agenda. 
Whiist the 2Ćh Century was domtnated by a conflict between a free-
market Right and a socialist Left, even though both of those outlooks 
had their limitations and their problems, at ieast they believed in 
something, whereas what we are seeing now is a society that believes 
in nothing. And a society that believes in nothing is particularly 
frightened by people who believe in anything, and therefore we label 
those people as fundamentalists or fanatics, and they have much 
greater purchase in terms of the fear they instil in society than they 
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truly deserve. But that's a measure of how much we have become 
isolated and atomised rather than of their inherent strength'. 
It is also the case that prioritising emotions (Sjöberg 2000) accompanies another 
of the clear trends and conclusions identified in my work - that ¡s, a tendency in 
contemporary culture to focus on extreme, though highly unlikely events. But 
while it is reasonable for those with specific risk mitigation responsibilities to 
consider improbable events or public concerns, it is not evident that this should 
form the basis for formulating policy aimed at informing the actions of millions 
<Cox 2007). 
Most of the papers in this collection identify a shift in policy-making from being 
shaped by 'what is', or probability-based evidence, towards a more speculative 
focus, on 'what if?', or possibility-oriented worst-case scenarios. 
It is now the case that governments and local authorities are expected to prepare 
their risk management strategies to deal with the worst that can be imagined 
(Durodié 2005e). This is the logical outcome of demands to dwell on the 
'unknown unknowns' of risk, a formulation which, as noted elsewhere, is now 
favoured by both American neo-conservatives and the environmental movement 
(Durodié 2004e). The fact that there is nothing new about uncertainty or 
unknowns, and indeed that these may yield opportunities and benefits as much 
as problems and costs, seems to escape them. 
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A focus on extremes according to Furedi (2005), 'suggests the absence of a 
meaningful way of comprehending an event'. It is also, not only potentially 
alarming, but also serves to distract attention and divert resources from where 
they might more fruitfully be deployed. 
One of the lessons from my work is the need for social science and policy to 
move away from analysing and reacting to extreme or difficult cases towards a 
greater focus on less glamorous norms. Otherwise we risk normalising extremes 
and marginalising normality. 
4. Response 
If, as the B R C indicate, government then feels itself obliged to respond to public 
pressure (or, to be more précise its perception or projection of public pressure), 
this would suggest a remarkable crisis of confidence and leadership that receives 
little comment in the mainstream discussion of thèse issues and which hopefully, 
the papers presented hère will go some way towards redressing. 
The pertinent contributions here are those examinîng the contemporary trend to 
demand so-called 'public dialogue' in matters pertaining to scientific policy and 
decision-making. As I identify in my critique (Durodié 2003b); 
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'the pubfic are neither particularly insightful in such matters and ñor are 
they particularly stupid. They are quite oñen ignorant of the facts and 
usually unmediated in their responses to them, displaying an 
understandable proclivity to prioritise emotion over reason. We should 
accordingfy neither condemn or dismiss them; ñor, however, should 
we celébrate their views or pander to them. The greatest résped you 
can pay anyone in any form of debate is to challenge their 
understanding with a view to transcending it or moving it orí. 
However, in this, and a number of other instances, it would appear that the 
government and its experts have increasingly lost sight of any broader goals or 
aims that they are pursuing. Accordingly, it is easier, and apparently more 
democratic, to be seen to be listening to, and incorporating the concerns and 
prejudices of the population at large into policy. In reality, this form of populism, 
as opposed to popular support, represents a quite remarkable abdication of 
responsibility and leadership. 
Responsiveness then, filis the gap where strategic visión and purpose ought to 
lie. Dissenting views are either marginalised or encouraged to leave (Ball 2005). 
And, as has been identified, the dominant framework for risk management - a 
process of risk identification, assessment, management and review - both allows 
and encourages a narrow, technical view of risk which, while suited to auditing 
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and meeting narrow targets, does not encourage any broader sensé of polîtical 
direction to emerge. 
An example of this occurred in the aftermath of the bombing of the British 
Consulate in Istanbul in November 2003. The Foreign Office launched a risk 
management exercise to examine the security of its 230 overseas missions. Like 
the Americans before them, subséquent to attacks on their offices in Nairobi and 
Dar es Salaam in 1998, this was expected to lead to the relocation of a number 
of embassies (Durodié 2004f). 
But, in effect, this allows a risk management process to díctate policy. If this 
approach were to be taken to its logical conclusion, British diplomats would have 
little choice but to corne home, for their own safety. This would simply encourage 
all-manner of cranks, loners, hoaxers and lwannabe' terrorists to have a go. It 
also reveáis the fact that at the heart of any risk management process there 
ought to be the stratégie imperative to clarify one's overarching objectives. 
Unfortunately, this trend to allow either the public or the process to shape the 
agenda does not look likely to go away any time soon, despite clear public 
opposition to it (Eurobarometer 2007). In a récent opinion pièce, about the rising 
frequency and diminishing period between Government policy U-turns, I 
commented that what this approach reveáis is; 'a governmenî increasingly 
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organisée! around endiess streams of fieeîing and réversible policies raîher than 
a smali number offirm and enduring principles' (Durodié 2007b). 
It is not that the Government are overly-responsive, as the B R C and others now 
critical of our exaggerated consciousness of risk now see it, but rather that policy 
without strategy is doomed. Populism and focus groups cover for an absence of 
vision and direction. But they are also fickle and readily have a change of mind or 
can be undone. 
5. Blâme and Conséquence 
There is a burgeoning literature on blâme that views it eitherfrom the perspective 
of some kind of rational game between competing policy actors (Hood 2002), or 
that seeks to examine, and occasionally critique, what is now seen as a rising 
culture of litigation in British society that is held to hamper the ability of 
govemment and other agents to take calculated risks (Lee 2002). 
However, the scale of this may be exaggerated, leading more to a chilling effect 
on innovation than to large-scale daims. This has allowed others, who see 
compensation as a new, radical form of démocratisation to dispute ils 
significance (Monbiot 2004). 
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The papers in this collection do not go into any detail on such matters, although it 
is worth noting here that Furedi (1999), whose conceptual framework has been 
adopted throughout, holds the cost of compensation culture to be difficult to 
quantify as it operates largely, through out-of-court settlements, at an informal 
level by those reluctant to see their reputations damaged. 
This point was confirmed over the course of my studies through the attempt by 
the European Commission to ban the inclusion of non-edible products (primarily 
toys wrapped in cellophane) from food-items, such as cereals and crisps. Based 
on a very small number of uncorroborated and somewhat dubious instances, 
major food manufacturers preferred to settle claims discretely than have the 
evidence verified in Court (Durodie 1999, p.15). 
Furedi considers blaming and claiming to be primarily another consequence of 
the erosion of those other social networks which, in the past, would have offered 
support and meaning to those in adverse situations. 
As others have noted, there is now an emerging cultural reluctance to accept 
random adversity. Famously, the British Medical Journal, discussed in June 2001 
whether to ban use of the word 'accident' in future articles (Adams 2002). It was 
proposed to replace this by reference to 'preventable injuries', a change which 
presumably would put; 'Acts of God, at risk of being banished by the insurance 
industry too. 
65 
That government régulation should yield 'unintended conséquences' is not a new 
insight (Turvey and Moiduszka 2005). However, rather than treating thèse as; 
'risk versus risk tradeoffś (Graham and Wiener 1995), what is proposed here is 
that such regulatory responses further drives people's concerns rather than 
assuaging them. As I noted in relation to the phthalate plasticizers debate, if left 
unquestioned such fears 'wili simply be îransferred onto their proposed solutions' 
(Durodié 1999, p.3). 
A confirmation of this was identified by Burgess (2002), who in response to the 
establishment of the Independent Expert Group on Mobile Phones to placate 
concerns relating to the deployment of mobile phone télécommunications 
technology, noted that; 'even balanced public information on negligible risks 
tends to increase anxiety, on the assumption that there must be something to 
worry about if the government is taking action'. 
Indeed, another astute commentator at the time suggested that; 'in its rush to be 
open about communicating risk to the public, the government has simply 
forgotten that there was no risk to communicate' (Kaplinsky 2000). 
A more récent example of the same process at work occurred in relation to the 
scare surrounding the accidentai inclusion of the banned Sudan 1 dye in food 
items in the UK in 2003. The widespread product recall and consumer alert put in 
place by the Food Standards Agency seemed to bear no relation to the actual 
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scale of the risk présentée! which, according to most experts, was either 
negligible or non-existent. 
The strength of thèse respective sociological analyses into such matters, 
including my own, is revealed by the fact that it is only now that some of thèse 
insights are being corroborated scientifically, a récent survey confirming that 
government risk communication can make matters worse, not better (Barnett et 
al. 2007). But it takes time to organise such robust évidence. 
This shows the use of my social science methodology in being able to 
understand and explore trends that have yet to be explained and accepted 
through more rigorous scientific methods. 
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CHAPTER 5 
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Discussion 
The erosion of collective forms of social association, both in the formal sphere of 
political conviction and participation - 'de-poiiticisatiori - as well as in the 
informal sphere of everyday life - 'individuation' - have had a dramatic impact 
upon how people view themselves and the world around them (Giddens 1991). 
In the past, social networks and norms may have imposed seemingly arbitrary or 
authoritarian structures and rules upon people, but they also provided meaning, 
conferred identity, and facilitated social processes. Being less connected leaves 
people less corrected. It allows their subjective impression of reality to go 
unmediated or unmoderated through membership of a wider group or trusted 
community. Without a sense of the possibility of social solutions, and divorced 
from trusted networks or webs of association by which to provide meaning and a 
sense of belonging for themselves, people can increasingly become inclined to 
view events as being random, out of control or inevitable. 
Views which, in the past, would have been filtered and scrutinised through 
various layers of public knowledge and private insight, often come today to form 
unchallenged personal frameworks for understanding the world. In such a 
climate, individual obsessions can grow into all-consuming worldviews that are 
rarely open to reasoned interrogation or debate. In part, it is this that explains the 
recent proclivity to emphasise or exaggerate all of the supposed risks that are 
held to confront us. 
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From B S E (bovine spongiform encephalopathy, more commonly known as 'mad-
cow disease') to G M O s (genetically modified organisms), from the assumed risks 
presented by mobile phones or their telecommunications masts to the purported 
link between the M M R (measles, mumps, rubella) triple-vaccine and childhood 
autism - many developments are now viewed through the prism of a heightened 
and individuated consciousness of risk. Nor are our fears restricted to the realms 
of novel scientific or technological products and processes. Many age-old 
activities and agents have also been reinterpreted through our growing sense of 
social isolation and fear. Abduction, bullying, crime, doctors, the environment and 
food, form just the first few letters of an ever-expanding lexicon of new concerns. 
Even relationships and sex are viewed as risky, and assessed and managed 
using an instrumentalist form of risk calculus - to the detriment of both. 
But, rather than the world changing any faster today than in the past, or 
becoming a more dangerous, unpredictable or complex place, it may be that a 
diminished, more fragile and isolated, sense of self has altered our confidence to 
deal with change and the problems it gives rise to. Far from it being the inevitable 
reflexive consequences of manufactured risks in a 'risk society impacting upon 
us (Beck 1992), it is our sense of isolation, absence of direction and associated 
distorted perceptions that lend themselves to identifying everything as a risk. 
The erosion of a social perspective may also lead to a diminished sense of the 
possibility that if there truly is a problem needing to be addressed then it is 
70 
together - with others - that this can best be altered or challenged (Heartfield 
2002). In turn, thèse developments reduce the likelihood of our acting for some 
greater common good and end up making us less résilient, both as individuals 
and as a society. 
AH of thèse developments have a quite devastating and stultifying impact upon 
society. The breakdown of collectivities has, in the absence of any cohérent 
replacements, enhanced the sensé which isolated individuals have of 
themselves, as being frail and vulnerable. And an exaggerated perception of risk 
lends itself to increasing demands for greater régulation and social control (BRC 
2006). Accordingly, people increasingly look to those in authority to enhance 
their sensé of security by mitigating the worst effects of the natural world and 
human society, as well as the actions of those who seek to change thèse. 
In an âge characterised by an absence of political vision and direction, the 
politics of fear, or risk-regulation, have provided a hésitant and isolated élite with 
an agenda and a new, if limited, sensé of moral purpose. The authorities have 
willingly embraced this rôle (Altheide 2002). Latching onto the generalised 
climate of isolation and insecurity, politicians have learnt to repackage 
themselves as societal risk managers. 
But whilst there is a growing understanding that governments have, over récent 
years, increasingly made use of such a politics of fear, there is little appréciation 
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of quite how widespread this has become (Furedi 2006b). Usually, the phrase is 
related to certain actions and proposais - such as extending periods of détention 
without charge, deporting detainees to their countries of origin, introducing 
identity cards or increasing airport security - for dealing with the on-going 'war on 
terrof. These measures have all been discussed, at various times, in terms 
suggesting a degree of suspicion towards those seeking to introduce them. 
Politicians and officiais are presented as having an interest in inflating the 
perceived risks posed by terrorist attacks in order to push through what, at any 
other time, would have been seen as being unpopulär législation. 
But that is only the half of it. What critics miss is the extent to which the same 
arguments have been deployed right across ail policy agendas today. The 'acf 
first, find the évidence latef logic of precautionary thinking has been mainstream 
in environmental and public health circles for quite some time (Morris 2001), 
where it is widely supported by the same individuals decrying its use in relation to 
terrorism. 
As has been noted elsewhere, when Donald Rumsfeld famously talked of the 
difficultés he faced in dealing with 'unknown unknowns', he was in fact using 
language that was already widely used by those at the opposite end of the 
political spectrum (Durodié 2004e). The demand that science should emphasise 
uncertainties and unknowns is now widespread, despite the fact that thèse are 
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not new and that we can only ever learn about what we don't know by starting 
from what we do know. 
Radicals too now often view the State as an enabling mechanism of social 
protection. People who might have been expected to seek to organise their own 
affairs and build their own institutions - in the absence of any sense of social 
solidarity or an ability to deal with problems collectively - now turn to the state to 
résolve matters on their behalf. Even those environmental and consumer lobby 
groups with the most vehement anti-state rhetoric, look to the State to act as the 
ultimate regulator and enforcer. 
Accordingly, politicians pose as the people who will protect us from our fears and 
regulate the world accordingly. But the démise of any positive sense of the 
possibility and desirability for social transformation has also led to a réduction in 
what it is that politicians actually offer the public today. The petty lifestyle 
concerns they focus on, reflected in incessant debates about smoking, smacking, 
eating and drinking are unlikely to inspire and engage a new génération of voters 
{Durodié 2004g). Nor - at the other end of the spectrum - do doom-laden 
prédictions relating to global warming and terrorism. 
Indeed, the more such concerns are highlighted, the more it becomes difficult for 
the authorities to satiate the insecurities that they have helped to create. Hence, 
alongside disengagement and aliénation, has corne a concomitant 
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disrllusionment and mistrust in ail forms of authority, whether political, corporate, 
or scientific, as thèse invariably fail to live up to new expectations (Seligman 
2000). This corrosion of trust may replace healthy skepticism with unthinking 
cynicism. 
As expertise itself has, in certain quarters, come to be perceived as elitist, and 
knowledge as biased or unattainable, in many situations today, the public are 
encouraged, and have become accustomed, to assuming the worst and 
presuming a cover-up. In the absence of the old structures this has generated 
new demands for the attribution of blâme and compensation (Guzelian 2004). 
Image and rumour come to dominate over insight and reason. Myths and 
conspiracy théories increasingly abound, encouraged by the demand to include 
public perceptions in decision-making. 
Focusing on people's perceptions has become the new mainstay of 
governments, activists, the média, and even risk consultants. Thèse suggest that 
our perceptions of risks are as important - if not more so - than the actuality of 
the risks we face, as perceptions often détermine behavior. Thus, it is held, that 
irrespective of the basis for such fears in scientific fact, their effects are real in 
social conséquence, leaving governments with little choice but to take such 
concerns on board and to regulate accordingly (Worcester 2006). 
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Such an approach beneflts from appearing to take ordinary people's views very 
seriously. In an âge when few participate actively in political life, it seems 
commendably inclusive and démocratie. It is also a godsend to governments 
bereft of any broader dynamic or direction. But, assuming or adapting to popular 
perceptions is as contemptuous, and as patronising, of the public, as dismissing 
them outright. It may also be more damaging. 
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CHAPTER 6 
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Conclusion 
In a récent contribution to the literature, Burgess (2006, p.334) noted that 'it 
would appear to be the exhaustion of the traditional social and political forms that 
has allowed risk culture to flourish'. This supports my analysis. 
Each article included as part of my submission includes its own conclusions, 
either explicitly or implicitly within the text. In addition to thèse, I would make the 
following generic remarks that dérive from my work; 
1. The érosion and fragmentation of key social bonds has encouraged the 
development of an exaggerated consciousness of risk driven by a diminished 
sensé of self. 
2. The diminished sensé of self has impacted on the cohérence of ail key social 
institutions thereby enhancing the import and impact of the media 
disproportionately. 
3. An absence of clear aims and purposes established through robust 
démocratie dialogue leaves government reacting overly-responsively to 
emotional or extreme events. 
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4. Processes of dialogue with the public have encouraged the influence of 
unrepresentative interest groups, as well as presenting évidence in an overly 
simplistic form. 
5. Risk communication to the public often émerges as a means to deflect blâme 
but also ends up further driving social fears as the roots of problems are 
rarely questioned. 
6. Dominant models of risk management are conscious of, but still allow the 
confusion and conflation of technical risk assessment with political risk 
management. 
7. There has been a shift in récent years towards understanding that risk has an 
important cultural dimension, but the diminished sensé of social forces 
encourages psychological framing. 
8. The advent of the precautionary principie confirms the convergence of left 
and right wing politics, as well as further diminishing our sensé of the human 
potential. 
9. A crisis of trust has emerged as a necessary concomitant of the régulation of 
risk, thereby accentuating tensions between governments, experts and the 
public. 
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10.The dominant framing of contemporary risk issues assumes aspects of 
Problems that ought to be interrogated and confuses professional advice for 
political direction. 
Ultimately, a more proportionate approach to dealing with risk will only emerge in 
a more confident society. The building blocks of this are purposeful individuals 
who necessarily encompass and reflect broader values such as autonomy and 
the freedom to experiment. 
The 'Risk Society or to be more precise the 'Risk Perception Society is just one 
manifestation of a wider crisis affecting society and the individuals within it. It is to 
these that l hope to turn my attention to in the future. 
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European Risk Regulation after BSE 
Bill Durodie 
William. durodie@new. oxford.ac. uk 
E x e c u t i v e S u m m a r y 
Environmental activists and consumer protection groups claim that phthalates, 
organic Compounds added to hard PVC to make it more flexible, are responsible for 
numerous adverse health effects, including cancer and damage to the human 
reproductive System. Governments, the European Commission, the media and 
retailers have taken these Claims seriously. In this latest European Science and 
Environment Forum working paper B i l l Durodie, researching at the London School 
of Economics and Political Science, shows how using a carefully timed and crafted 
sequence of stunts, press releases, and often unsubstantiated scientific papers, 
campaigners have managed to play off these major interested parties against one 
another. As a consequence, reams of scientific and Statistical documents have been 
commissioned and produced in evidence, raising concerns and unnecessarily 
exacerbating fears amongst consumers. Yet in more than 40 years of phthalate use, no 
researcher has ever demonstrated any harm. 
More broadly he situates this campaign, along with another opposing the inclusion of 
toys in food products such as crisps, cereals and chocolate eggs, within the context of 
the far-reaching reactions to the European BSE ('mad cow') debacle. The paper 
examines the work of the European Commission Scientific Committee for Toxicity, 
Ecotoxicity and the Environment, and its Committee on Product Safety Emergencies, 
which met twice to discuss these issues in 1997. The rise of a more consumer-
oriented social agenda is discussed, along with the growing use of the 'precautionary 
principle' in assessing environmental health risks. Both are held to be problematic, 
assuming in the former that consumers hold homogeneous interests, whilst the latter 
reverses the bürden of scientific proof, thereby effectively paralysing social 
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development. 
Suggesting a common dynamic to thèse matters stemming from claims that everyday 
activities, or products, are problematic, he explores how campaigners gain support for 
their views by generating waves of adverse publicity. Then through a process he 
labels as 'advocacy research', which often produces unspecified and uncorroborated 
évidence, the problem can be redefmed or expanded. This 'évidence' is usually used 
to confirm that it was correct to identify the problem in the first place thereby 
encouraging self-regulatory behaviour amongst a target audience, and in turn using 
this to pressurise others into introducing more formai restrictions. 
A number of tentative conclusions are drawn and recommendations made, ranging 
from a critique of the increasing trend to pre-publish research outcomes to the need 
for the media to acquire and promote higher levels of scientific and technical 
expertise. Further, it is shown that the cost to society of not heeding thèse warnings 
will be far greater than a narrow economic one. Already the campaign against 
phthalates in children's toys has turned into one opposing their présence in médical 
devices such as intravenous tubing and blood bags. Whilst many companies are now 
being pressed into using alternatives the inévitable logic of thèse irrational ideas is 
coming to the fore: the European Commission has instigated investigations into the 
toxicologically less-well documented replacement products, thereby showing that the 
fear of phthalates wil l simply be transferred onto their proposed solutions. The 
conclusion drawn is that it is a broader loss of trust within society which will need to 
be addressed, i f a génération of young people are not to be brought up questioning the 
ability of science and reason to cast light upon their lives. 
1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 
On 29 t h March 1999 three Greenpeace campaigners were freed from a Japanese jail. 
They had been arrested 11 days earlier for abseiling down the side of a building at the 
Tokyo Toy Fair to unfurl a banner that read 'Play Safe, Buy P V C Free'1. This 
repeated a stunt played out the previous year on 13 t h February, at the opening of the 3 
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International Toy Fair in New York, and became just the latest high profile twist in a 
two year worldwide campaign by environmentalists and consumer protection groups 
against esters of o-phthalic acid, more commonly known as phthalate esters, or 
phthalates. Phthalates are liquid organic compounds which are added to hard 
polyvinyl chloride, or PVC, to act as softeners or 'plasticisers'. These make the 
compound more malleable and hence more versatile. 
Despite substantial scientific evidence to the contrary, the activists' claims that 
phthalates are responsible for numerous adverse health effects, including cancer and 
damage to the human reproductive system, have been taken seriously by 
governments, the media, retailers and even by the increasingly defensive plastics 
industry. Co-ordinated and well-crafted stunts, press releases, often promoting 
unpublished scientific papers, have enabled the campaigners to play off all the major 
interested parties against one another. As a consequence reams of scientific and 
statistical documents have been commissioned and produced in evidence, raising 
concerns and unnecessarily exacerbating fears amongst consumers. 
Yet phthalates have been in widespread use for almost 50 years, and have had 
particularly close scrutiny and attention paid to them over the last 25 of these.2 Due to 
their low cost and excellent performance characteristics, including flexibility, which 
they impart to P V C , they are found in products as common and diverse as medical 
devices, particularly fluid containers, tubing and gloves; children's toys including 
teethers, rattles and bathtime rubber ducks; and household and industrial items such 
as wire and cable coating, flooring and clothing. The vast majority of phthalates 
(about 97%) are used in the production of flexible P V C . The remainder are used in 
conjunction with other polymers and to a small extent in the production of printing 
inks and perfumes. Now, regardless of the quality of the evidence in their favour, and 
as a direct result of the campaign against them, several formal and informal bans are 
coming into operation across the world. 
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This paper seeks to explore how this could have come about, focusing upon the 
specific role of the European Commission, and in particular its Committee on Product 
Safety Emergencies, which met twice in 1997. Among other issues, this Committee 
discussed the issue of softeners in plastic producís intended for children, as well as 
the supposed problems related to an entirely separate matter, that of non-edible items 
in foodsruffs. Both thèse investigations are examined here in some detail, in order to 
explore those mechanisms that have encouraged a tendency towards self-regulatory 
behaviour. 
The examples suggests a common dynamic stemming in part from the new credence 
afforded to environmentalists and consumer protection groups in the aftermath of the 
European BSE ('mad cow') débâcle. In the first instance such groups claim an 
everyday activity, or product, to be problematic. They then gain support for their 
views by generating a wave of adverse publicity. Evidence is produced, through a 
process probably best defmed as 'advocacy research'. This 'research' is often 
unspecified and uncorroborated, allowing for the redéfinition or expansion of the 
problem, i f needed, at a later date. In each case however, findings are used as an 
affirmation that it was correct to identify a problem in the first place. Finally, self-
regulation begins amongst a target audience, and this in turn is used to pressurise 
others into altering their behaviour. 
That such a frenzy could have been stirred up around phthalates, which from a health 
and environmental viewpoint must qualify as among the most studied and understood 
family of Compounds, should serve as a dire warning to scientists and industrialists, 
and even retailers and consumers. It would appear that the real poisonous dummies in 
the whole affair are not necessarily the plastic teethers which so many are still 
seeking to ban. 
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2. M a d c o w s 
2.1 The stampede 
The impact upon the contemporary European imagination of the scare surrounding 
the suggestion of possible links between bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), 
commonly known as 'mad cow disease', and its transmission to humans in the form 
of new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (nvCJD), should not be underestimated. 
Subsequent to parliamentary statements giving credence to a possible link by the then 
health secretary, Stephen Dorrell, who quoted from an official report by the 
Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) in the U K House of 
Commons on 20 t h March 1996, (a view then echoed by agriculture minister, Douglas 
Hogg), attitudes to consumer protection and public health services across Europe 
have undergone a momentous and total transformation. It would be fair to say that the 
issue of British beef herds occupied much of the European Commission's time over 
the course of 1996 and 1997. 
Grasping the impact the then British prime minister, John Major, speaking at the 
height of the mad cow panic in April 1996, described it as 'the worst crisis a British 
government has faced since the Falklands'.4 For the European Community's 
agriculture and rural development commissioner Franz Fischler, speaking in 
September 1996, it was 'the biggest crisis the E U had ever had'. 5 According to Scott 
C Ratzan, introducing an authoritative collection of papers on the subject, the 
BSE/CJD problem was 'arguably one of the greatest human-made disasters in 
history',6 whilst for food policy professor Tim Lang, it 'provided an object lesson in 
how not to manage risk' 1 
Regardless as to the evidence of the proposed link to CJD, 8 (after all the jury in the 
form of the BSE Enquiry is still out on the matter, and there are also a small number 
of dissenting voices),9 it is undeniable that the scale of reaction was quite 
unprecedented, revealing a new low in levels of public confidence. At the time a 
death rate as high as 500,000 per annum was predicted - to date the actual figure has 
been 39. Also, the cumulative total of confirmed BSE cases in Great Britain has now 6 
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reached 174,433, however, only 38,975 of those have been subséquent to the 
introduction of the ban on ruminant protein in cattle feed,10 suggesting to some that 
the actions taken by ministers and officiais prior to the panic had already been wholly 
sufficient.11 
The débâcle has acted as a catalyst for a more profound reorganisation of the industry 
and beyond. Subséquent developments, referred to by the European Commission 
variously as 'farm to fork', 'plough to plate', or 'stable to table', to indicate hovv all-
encompassing they are expected to be, will allow for faster and tougher responses to 
perceived problems, food-related or otherwise. They look set to have far-reaching 
implications long after the destruction of the last suspect beef herd has been 
completed. 
2.2 The Commission 's reaction 
The European Commission, the executive body of the European Community, is 
generally regarded as the guardian of European treaties and the interests of the 
Community. It was shocked into action by BSE. Over a two year period hardly a 
single speech by the président at the time, Jacques Santer, numerous commissioners 
and their officiais, failed to refer to the crisis. These speeches ail pointed towards the 
need for substantial organisational and legislatory reform. This reorganisation was 
then formally established on 12 th February 1997,12 and publicly launched by Jacques 
Santer who made 'a plea for the graduai establishment of a proper food policy which 
gives pride of place to consumer protection and consumer health'. 1 3 
The potential for the Commission to intervene more within the fields relating to 
human health protection, consumer protection and the environment, had been 
contained within Articles 129, 129a and 130r respectively of the 1992 Treaty on 
European Union (Maastricht Treaty). The BSE crisis triggered thèse into action. It 
has been argued for instance that 'nobody could have predicted how public health at 
EU level would be plucked from obscurity and thrust into the political Spotlight as a 
resuit of the BSE affair'.1 4 Now, a new, more substantial Article 153, within the 1997 
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Amsterdam Treaty, further expanded the remit, placing consumer policy and health 
protection more centrally as 'rights', 1 5 although this has been criticised 'as a sudden 
and political response to the BSE crisis'. 1 6 
The Consumer Policy Service at the Commission which had itself only became 
established as a new directorate-general (DG X X I V ) in 1995 was, on l s t April 1997, 
expanded to take on health protection matters and has since witnessed a truly 
astonishing pace of transformation. The number of staff has risen from 96 to 322 
officiais, absorbing 94 staff from other areas, including the Food and Veterinary 
Office, which relocated to Dublin. 
Under the stewardship of high-profile commissioner Emma Bonino, the directorate, 
which expects to further rise to a füll staff complément of 350 before the end of the 
millennium, became responsible for providing scientific advice, risk analysis and 
control, whilst other directorates maintained their legislatory rôles. 
Over the course of 1997 a wave of landmark documents was produced, including, on 
30 t h April, a communication on 'Consumer Health and Food Safety',1 7 and a Green 
Paper on 'The General Principles of Food Law in the European Union' . 1 8 An * Inter­
Services Operations Manual establishing coopération procédures between Directorate 
General III, V , VI, and X X I V followed on 4 l h July. This represented the interests of 
the industrial policy; employment, industrial relations and social affairs; agriculture 
and rural development; and consumer policy and consumer health protection, 
directorate-generals respectively. 
A Multidisciplinary Scientific Committee (MDSC) set up in 1996 to deal specifically 
with BSE, 1 9 was replaced by a Scientific Steering Committee with a far broader 
mandate.20 Some 131 leading European scientists (selected from a pool of 1,126 who 
had applied),21 were then co-opted to sit on its eight new scientific sub-committees,22 
thereby replacing the six former scientific committees. 
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Most notably the Commission established a Rapid Alert System and a Risk 
Assessment Unit within D G X X I V , and overtly adopted the 'precautionary principle' 
as the basis of its approach to ail future investigations. The latter is popularly 
understood to imply that in ail matters involving uncertainty, one is to err upon the 
side of caution. More recently a unit responsible for international affairs has been 
created,23 indicating no doubt the désire to have an even more global reach. 
2.3 The UK parallels 
Similar adaptations and transformations have occurred within the U K , which has also 
had to handle a well-publicised fatal outbreak of the e-coli bacterium over the same 
period. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, and the Department of 
Health Joint Food Safety and Standards Group (JFSSG) was formed on l s t September 
1997. A Risk Communication Unit has been established within this, and décisions 
were already being based on a 'safety first' principle prior to the establishment of a 
national Food Standards Agency, 2 4 which whilst substantïally delayed in its genesis, 
is still expected to further transform the British regulatory landscape. 
3 . C h o k i n g f e a r s 
3.1 Triggers 
In February 1997 the Belgian authorities notified the European Commission of two 
(non-fatal) incidents involving children choking on parts of toys contained in food 
products. By Royal Decree from 27 l h May 1997, Belgium banned ail such non-edible 
items from inclusion in food products.25 The introduction of this new national 
technical standard required the Commission to be notified as it created a non-tariff 
barrier to the free movement of goods within the internai market.26 
This reached the Commission's Committee on Product Safety Emergencies which 
had been set up in 1992 through the directive on General Product Safety,27 and had 
during the course of 1996 relocated from DG III (industrial policy) to the new D G 
X X I V (consumer policy and consumer health protection). Now, subséquent to its 30 t h 
June 1997 meeting it decided to issue a 'serious and immédiate risk to health* 
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warning. It requested ail 15 member states to examine the risks associated with the 
inclusion of unwrapped non-food articles mixed with food products, (typically toys in 
chocolaté eggs, crisps and cereal packets), review national policy on such matters, 
and report back to the Commission by September 1997 so that it could consider 
-y fi 
'further steps' at its October meeting. 
Little over a year earlier the Belgian minister for public health, Marcel Colla, had 
already tried to ban similar items after the (on this occasion fatal) suffocation of 68 
year old pensioner, Susanne de Rieck from Gentbrugge, on a 'flippo' (or 'pog') 
contained in a packet of crisps. At the time this had led to a satirical response, 
which compared the regulatory haste to ban 'flippos' in crisps with the minister's 
more léthargie and bureaucratie approach to what were considered to be more 
pressing health issues.30 
Over the intervening period however, BSE had exploded onto the scène followed by 
its concomitant expansion of activity to D G X X I V and relocation of the Committee 
on Product Safety Emergencies. The public mood was now more attuned to safety 
issues, and the relevant Commission staff more numerous, prepared and expected to 
react. But there is little évidence relating to incidence and incidents of choking which 
could justify the measures now being sought. 
3.2 Incidence 
Research presented to the Commission into the acrual numbers of such choking 
events included a key paper by Dr. Elena Petridou of the University of Athens 
Médical School from Apri l 1997, entitled 'Injuries from Food Products containing 
Inedibles', (FPCIs). Dr. Petridou indicates that 'accidents represent now the most 
important cause of childhood morbidity and mortality', a sentiment echoed by the 
Commission communication of 14 ,h May 1997 establishing a Common Action 
Programme relating to the prévention of injury.31 
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But the figures, based upon the Emergency Department Injury Surveillance System 
developed by the Athens-based Centre for Research and Prévention of Injuries, which 
specifically recorded such incidents from September 1996, are unconvincing. They 
suggest a mortality rate from FPCIs lower than 2 per annum across the E U , which 
tallies with research commissioned in 1996 by the U K Department of Trade and 
Industry.32 The latter built upon a previous four-country analysis conducted by the 
Child Accident Protection Trust, as well as data from the Home Accident 
Surveillance System. It encompasses all the European Community's member states 
with the exception of Luxembourg, and provides a rich source of counterpoints 
against overreaction. 
Whilst choking fatalities are undoubtedly tragic, they are fortuitously rare. Of the 
over 550,000 deaths per annum in England and Wales for example, 6,000 involve 
children under the âge of 10. Three quarters of thèse are under the âge of one. Of the 
total deaths 16,000 can be attributed to external factors, and after excluding road 
accidents and suicides there remain approximately 6,000 accidentai deaths among 
people of ail âges, of which about 5% involve choking. Approximately 200 of the 
accidentai deaths involve children under 10 and 15-20% of thèse (some 30 to 40 
cases a year) are the resuit of choking. 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, the vast majority (84%) of deaths by choking involves food 
items. Sweets, peas, sausages, bananas, apples and nuls are ail cited as potentially 
hazardous. Of the non-food items leading to choking incidents, coins form by far the 
largest single category. 'The remaining accidents are caused by a wide variety of 
items not many of which involve toys'. Cotton wool, conkers, stones, silver foil, 
tissue paper, even a child's dummy and half a penicillin tablet have proved fatal. 
Very few incidents ever involve toys, let alone toys associated with food products. 
3.3 Incidents 
In the U K for instance there have only been three recorded child fatalities relating to 
toys enclosed with food items over the last 15 years: Roddy Breslin from Northern 
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Ireland, aged 3 in May 1985, Jennifer Ashton, from Birmingham, also aged 3 in 
November 1989, and Caren Day from Beighton, near Sheffield, aged 4 in November 
1991. 
The association between the toy and the food item was not even central to each of 
thèse. For instance, the first was caused by the wheel and axle of a toy lorry which 
had already been assembled by the child's father, and mostly cleared up by his 
mother subséquent to having been broken during play. As was argued by the 
responsible Minister in response to Parliamentary questions on the matter at the time, 
all fatalities are regrettable, but the world is fiill of small objects which can cause 
death by choking 3 4 While the death of the little boy was very regrettable, it would be 
of no conséquence to prohibit the sale of such producís. 
During Court proceedings surrounding the second incident caused by the foot of a 
Pink Panther model, Ferrero, manufacturers of Kinder Surprise eggs, pointed to 
worldwide sales in excess of 4,600 million since 1974, 218 million of which had been 
in the U K , and 58 million of those in the preceding 12 month period.3 5 It was 
suggested that Birmingham City Council, which had issued a suspension notice 
against the eggs, had reacted emotionally rather than rationally. Legislating on such 
matters would prove futile as well as being irrational. 
It is just such reasoning which ought to have led the Committee on Product Safety 
Emergencies to conclude that there was little risk and no need to issue a warning to 
all member states in the ñrst instance. 
3.4 Précautions 
Of course due caution is taken in preventing choking incidents where possible. 
Children under 3 years of age are particularly vulnerable as, after 1 year when they 
learn to use their thumb and first finger as a pincer, they experiment by placing 
objects into their mouths, yet do not have a coughing reflex or a fully developed 
cricoid (the narrowest part of the larynx and trachea), until they are over 2 years old. 
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In this regard reasonable actions have in the past been taken, such as the labelling of 
toys containing small parts as unsuitable for those under 36 months of age, or the 
creation of ventilation holes in the tops of pen caps. The 'small parts cylinder test' 
provides a reliable guide as to the potential hazard proffered by such items. 
As the DTI report pointedly indicates, 'putting objects in the mouth is an important 
part of learning and should not be restricted',36 and further that it is 'unrealistic to 
segregate toys at all times, and in all circumstances'.37 With respect to those children 
who are outside the main danger zone, the report asks the question, 'is it realistic or 
practical to stop three and four year olds from playing with marbles, small building 
bricks or tiddlywinks?'. 
3.5 Confusions 
Dr. Petridou's paper however suggests that 'a minute probability is never negligible', 
and, presumably concerned by the small numbers recorded due to 'reporting 
limitations', proposes that in future there should be 'epidemiological investigation of 
events, that are more frequent than those that represent major health risks but sharing 
the same risk profile (in the way near misses are studied to identify risk factors for the 
very rare air-crashes).' 
She remarks that 'there is little information concerning the incidence of non-fatal 
injuries because most injury classification systems in existing large databases in the 
European Union have been developed before these objects became widely used'. For 
instance the European Health and Leisure Accidents Surveillance System (EHLASS) 
had, until 1997, recorded incidents involving FPCIs within the category for incidents 
involving non-identified objects. 
However scientifically, it is vital to clearly differentiate choking incidents, caused by 
the ingestion of a food or non-food item from other similar yet substantively different 
problems. In particular these are, (a) choking on a regurgitated food item, (b) external 
13 
Bill Durodié 
blockage of the nose and mouth, (c) external compression of the ehest, and (d) 
blockage of the Oesophagus leading to a restriction on the passage of air. 
The first of thèse is usually not disaggregated from other causes of choking in 
morbidity statistics, whilst the others are commonly confused with choking in non-
fatal accidents which do not necessitate a post-mortem. Choking itself involves the 
prévention of the passage of air to the lungs. When fatal the victim is usually 
unconscious within one minute, and by two minutes will have suffered irreparable 
brain damage. They would be dead shortly after. 
Such differentiation is extremely important i f Elena Petridou's suggestion of 
recording 'near misses' is to be considered, especially as in addition the swallowing 
of foreign bodies or their complète inhalation into the lungs, which is rarely fatal, are 
also commonly confused with choking amongst accident reports. These latter are, 
'less serious, even trivial, and, though alarming to a parent, are probably not life 
threatening',39 and further 'from the descriptions in HASS it appears that accidents 
are often classified as choking when a foreign body or pièce of food in the mouth 
causes concern or discomfort even i f it has no more than very temporarily obstructed 
the airway.' 4 0 
The recording of 'near misses' then, far from providing a wealth of new scientific 
évidence, would only serve to confuse the issue and raise anxieties. Choking is 
extremely rare and sometimes fatal; most other incidents involving ingestion of 
foreign bodies are neither choking nor potentially fatal. These sets of circumstances 
should never be allowed to become confused, yet it is easily done, even by medically 
trained Professionals, when there is no need for a post-mortem. 
3.6 Concessions 
When the Committee on Product Safety Emergencies met to discuss the outeome of 
their investigations they concluded that sufficient protections were already in place. 
For a number of years already, non-edible items contained in food products within 
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most European states, had been separately wrapped, and those countries outstanding 
were soon to harmonise their procédures. 
However despite the évidence, consumer groups vowed to continue their campaign to 
see all such producís, including those under wraps, removed from the market place. 
More recently the parents of the three U K child fatalities have been encouraged to 
pétition the European Parliament to introduce mandatory safeguards.41 
Similar pressures have elsewhere already led to the introduction of self-restriction, as 
evidenced by the withdrawal from the American market almost two years ago of 
'Nestlé Magic', a chocolate ball containing Disney characters, even before any ruling 
had been reached as to whether it satisfied the far more stringent food régulations 
already in place there.42 
Despite the product, whose parts are substantially larger than those found in 'Kinder 
Surprise' eggs, subsequently being found to satisfy Food and Drug Administration 
requirements and the Consumer Products Safety Commission who undertook 'small 
parts' and 'use and abuse' tests on it, protests against it had corne from the 
Consumers Fédération of America and the US Public Interest Research Group, 
amongst others. 
More recently it would appear that Nestlé has agreed to pay out $1.5 million in 
compensation after being approached by 13 attorneys representing the families of 
children supposedly distressed through choking incidents related to the product.43 
However there appears to be little évidence for such purported incidents, especially as 
'Nestlé Magic' continues to be widely available outside the United States. Further, as 
has been well exposed elsewhere, the seulement of claims is often a defensive 
reaction by businesses unwilling to be exposed to adverse publicity, even when they 
feel confident in their product.44 
Such developments should serve as a salutary warning to others such as Kellogg, 
Smiths, Ferrero and Westimex, who may also find themselves on the receiving end of 
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an irresistible wave of demands for self-restraint marshalled by the increasingly 
vociferous and self-appointed representatives of consumer interests. 
One can only be left wondering how it was possible for previous generations of 
young children to have survived being brought up by the apparently thoughtless 
parents who encouraged them to hunt for the three-penny coins once concealed in 
traditional British Christmas puddings, or the feve in the French Galette des Rois! 
4. P o i s o n o u s d u m m i e s 
4.1 Phthalates 
Polyvinyl chloride or P V C is a rigid material which can be made soft by the addition 
of plasticisers. These compounds generally have a high boiling point and, when 
incorporated into polymers, cause a greater workability of the material, by increasing 
the flexibility of the individual polymer chains. The most commonly used compounds 
for this purpose are esters of o-phthalic acid, which are more generally known as 
phthalate esters or phthalates. Several of these are used as plasticisers in P V C and 
their general structure is shown below, where the group R is usually the same 
aliphatic (carbon chain) or aromatic (carbon ring) side chain, varying in length for 
different compounds. 
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o 
o 
N a m e A c r o n y m R 
Dibutyl phthalate DBP 11-C4H9 
Dipentyl phthalate DPP n - C 5 H M 
Butylbenzyl phthalate BBP n - C 4 H 9 and - C 6 H 5 
Di(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate DEHP -C2H4 (C2Hg)C4H9 
Di-iso-octyl phthalate DIOP 
Di-n-octyl phthalate DNOP n - C 8 H I 7 
Di-iso-nonyl phthalate DINP - C 9 H 1 9 
Di-iso-decyl phthalate DIDP -C]oH2i 
Phthalates, including DEHP, DINP, DIDP, DNOP, DBP and BBP, which became the 
objects of the European Commission's investigations, have been in widespread use 
for almost 50 years. Particularly close scrutiny and attention has been paid to them 
over the last 25 of thèse. 4 5 Due to their low cost, and the flexibility they impart to 
PVC, they are found in products as common and diverse as médical devices, 
particularly fluid containers, tubing and gloves; children's toys including teethers, 
rattles and bathtime rubber ducks; and household and industrial items such as wire 
and cable coating, flooring and clothing. They are also used to a more limited extent 
in printing inks and perfumes. 
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As a result of their diverse and widespread use and relative resistance to degradation, 
phthalates are ubiquitous in the environment.46 Yet, compared to many other 
commonly used products, such as solvents, they can readily be removed by 
photochemical, oxidative and biological processes.47 They also break down in low 
oxygen environments such as sediment, but at a lower rate,48 and levels in natural 
waters are reported to be decreasing.49 
The quantity of phthalate plasticiser added to a P V C product can be determined by 
measuring weight loss after diethyl ether extraction. For example, at the Laboratory 
of the U K Government Chemist over 100 plastic teethers and toys have been assessed 
for plasticiser content. In these, and other investigations including those by 
Greenpeace, losses of up to 50% are found to be fairly common, with DEHP, DINP 
and DIDP identified as major components, (DNOP is not produced on a commercial 
scale and is difficult to detect in the presence of the multi-component product DINP). 
DBP and BBP are usually found at levels below 1% and are taken to arise as 
impurities or by-products not intentionally added. However, whilst it is not difficult 
to extract phthalates from P V C using a suitable solvent, it is problematic to determine 
the level of migration of phthalates from PVC into saliva. 
4.2 Concerns 
Since August 1996 Greenpeace has been contacting major toy manufacturers around 
the world requesting meetings to discuss concerns about P V C toys.5 0 This formed 
part of a wider Greenpeace agenda against PVC in particular and the chlorine 
industry in general. Then, on 2 3 r d April 1997, the European Commission services 
were approached by the Danish authorities regarding three emergency notifications 
taken out five days earlier upon the recommendation of the Danish Environmental 
Protection Agency, 5 1 and concerning various teething rings manufactured in China 
for the Italian company 'Chicco - Artsana 1. 5 2 
According to these notifications the analyses carried out showed that the articles 
released certain phthalates in quantities considered to be unacceptable for babies. The 
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Danish importer had thus withdrawn these products from the market. The 
manufacturers, who considered that the teethers were in conformity with Community 
legislation,53 and did not present any danger, nevertheless on a preventative basis, and 
awaiting the results of their own analyses, also decided to voluntarily withdraw them 
from the market. The results of their analysis, which took into account the latest 
working draft proposing a test method to determine the migration of phthalates in 
articles destined for child-use and care, conflicted with those of the Danish 
authorities. 
Reactions by other member states to these notifications indicated important 
differences regarding test methods used to measure phthalate migration, focusing 
specifically on such assumptions as period of exposure, contact area, and type of 
stimulus. An experiment in the Netherlands which led to reported doses marginally 
above the tolerable daily intake (TDI) has been criticised by others for its 
methodology of mimicking chewing through the use of an ultrasonic bath which 
produces a 55,000 Hz vibration.5 4 Not what one would expect from a child's mouth! 
Some took account of the TDIs fixed by the Scientific Committee for Food, in its 
Opinion on phthalates in infant formulae, expressed on 7 t h June 1996.55 However 
Belgium and the U K in particular, required the Commission's services to ask for the 
opinion of experts and/or relevant scientific committees at the European level, prior 
to proceeding with the matter. 
Hence unable to issue a 'serious and immediate risk to health' warning, as it had done 
over the issue of non-food articles mixed with food products, the Committee for 
Product Safety Emergencies would have to refer the matter on to the new Scientific 
Committee on Toxicity, Ecotoxicity and the Environment (CSTEE). Due to 
reorganisation, this did not meet for its first plenary session until 17 th November 
1997. 
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4.3 The Greenpeace campaign 
Encouragea by the Danish notification to the Commission and its impact upon the 
Italian owned distributors, as well as the results of the Dutch 'in vitro' experiment 
and longer standing Swedish concems regarding PVC use, Greenpeace began 
approaching the Commission on the matter.56 Frustrated by the prévarication caused, 
unnecessarily in its view, by the need to substantiate and corroborate scientific data, 
Greenpeace continued independently to approach politicians and officiais in member 
states at a local, regional and national level, as well as manufacturers and retailers and 
their professional associations. It sought to use the various notifications, voluntary 
withdrawals and early investigations as proof of a wider concern. 
On 17 lh September 1997 - 100 days before Christmas - Greenpeace launched the 
'Play Safe' campaign in New York and London. 5 7 This included a list for parents of 
PVC and non-PVC infant toys as well as a message outlining the supposed adverse 
health effects - purported to be liver and kidney damage leading to cancer, the 
mimicking of sex hormones and reproductive abnormalities. 
The campaign was set to target major toy manufacturers such as Mattel, and retailers 
such as Toys 'R ' Us, who were refiising to conform to the scare which had by now 
affected a number of retailers in Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, as well as 
clients of the Italian suppliers in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy itself. 
Greenpeace claim that they 'first drew attention to the problem by releasing a 
58 
scientific study'. This actually amounted to no more than a Technical Note 
identifying the types and amounts of phthalates contained in P V C . 5 9 But the level of 
phthalate contained by a Compound is not an indication of the amount which actually 
leaches from it, and even i f this latter quantity can be determined, it remains to be 
proven whether this poses a risk to human health. 
By October however, no doubt concerned by increasingly alarmist pronouncements 
and responses, a number of prominent politicians entered the fray. Austrian 
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Consumer Affairs minister, Barbara Prammer, stated that 'based on precautionary 
consumer protection, P V C toys are not désirable', 6 0 whilst Belgian minister for Public 
Health, Marcel Colla (who had previously tried to ban 'flippos' from crisp packets), 
urged retailers to 'voluntarily discontinue marketing thèse products' 6 1 
This added further pressure upon retailers in those countries, such that subséquent 
Greenpeace direct action against Toys 'R ' Us in Austria led to the company's top 
management agreeing to withdraw ten specific P V C toys from the shelves,62 although 
thèse were subsequently reinstated at the behest of their US head office. In Belgium, 
FEDIS, the retail fédération, agreed to immediately withdraw all soft P V C producís 
designed ío be chewed by young children.6 3 
Each of thèse steps however, simply fuelled further activity and alarmist press 
releases by the campaigners. In Italy acíivisís enlered the Ministry of Health in Father 
Christmas costumes carrying boxes füll of PVC toys.6 4 Three weeks later Health 
minister, Rosi Bindi, was also encouraging manufacturers to look into alternative 
materials. 
In Germany it was íhe Associaíion of Toy Reíailers, Vedes, which in December took 
the lead and called upon its members to withdraw such producís, whilst the Federal 
Institute for the Proteciion of Consumer Health and Veterinary Medicine, B g V V , 
urged manufacturers and industry io act responsibly by doing likewise. This was then 
prediciably followed, with Statements from the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of 
Family Affairs suggesting lhat ií would be highly désirable for indusíry ío voluniarily 
refrain from selling such producís. 6 5 
Nor was it simply to be trade and retail associations, in addition to Greenpeace, who 
would now put pressure upon national ministries. The municipality of Bilbao, in 
Spain, introduced its own ban,6 6 a measure to be widely repeated amongst other local 
and regional assemblies, including many in Italy, no doubt keen to be seen to be 
taking a greater iníeresí in íheir electorales' well-being, than that taken by central 
government. 
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Revealing its own uncertainties, the European Commission itself, in February 1998, 
removed ail soft PVC teething toys from its childcare facilities,6 7 prompting a new 
and understandable round of calls from campaigners that if the products were not 
good enough for the Commission, then they should not be inflicted upon the rest of 
the population. 
Relentless pressure by Greenpeace, including the placing of adverts in newspapers 
seeking to 'name and shame' firms who would not comply led individual businesses 
such as Dutch retailer, Bart Smit, to order its shops to remove ail Hsted soft P V C 
. 68 
toys. 
Effectively governments and retailers across Europe had removed soft P V C products 
from their shelves and markets on a voluntary basis recognising, in one instance at 
least, that whilst the daims against such products had 'not been scientifically 
substantiated' nevertheless 'we choose to give our customers the benefit of this 
doubt'.6 9 
4.4 The CSTEE investigation 
It is within this evolving climate that the European Commission had invited its new 
Scientific Committee on Toxicity, Ecotoxicity and the Environment (CSTEE), at its 
first plenary meeting in Brussels on 17 ,h November 1997, to give its opinion as to; 
• the impact on children's health of the use of soft P V C containing phthalates in 
child-care articles and toys, which children of a young âge could put in their 
mouth; 
• the limits which ought to be respected in relation to the migration of phthalates 
from thèse products; 
• the test method to be followed and the standards or parameters that should be taken 
into considération to measure the phthalate migration level. 
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The CSTEE established a working group which first met on 8 t h December 1997 and 
formulated a preliminary position expressed at the Second CSTEE plenary meeting 
held in Brüssels on 9 t h February 1998. This related to the six phthalates; DEHP, 
DNOP, DINP, DIDP, DBP and BBP found in infant teething rings, and was based on 
the documents and literature available to it at that time. This confirmed the existence 
of différent méthodologies and highly variable results for the estimation of émission 
of phthalates from toys. Nevertheless, true to the precautionary approach, it used the 
highest reported émission levels as a baseline and sought to homogenise ail available 
research évidence to an équivalent exposure dose. 
The exposure dose was initially based upon the maximal amounts extracted over 12 
hours, from a phthalate containing PVC-toy Surrogate of 10 square cm, by a saliva 
solution under dynamic conditions, and assuming an infant body weight of 5 kg for 
the risk assessment. This was changed at the time of the expression of its formai 
opinion on the matter by the CSTEE at its third plenary meeting in Brüssels on 24 t h 
April 1998, to a more realistic extraction for 6 hours using an infant body weight of 8 
kg-
A margin of safety was estimated for each phthalate by dividing the No-Observed-
Adverse-Effect-Level (NOAEL) values obtained through animal expérimentation, by 
the worst predicted exposure dose. A level of little concern was assumed for exposure 
situations with margins of safety in excess of 100. This figure is taken to dérive 
(according to a récent US study)70 from allowing an extra factor of 10 for variation 
between species, and a further factor of 10 for variation between individuals. 
A further opinion expressed as answers to four new questions put to the committee on 
the occasion of the CSTEE fourth plenary meeting in Brüssels on 16th June 1998, 
emphasised the need to wait for the outcome of an 'in vivo' Dutch study using adult 
human volunteers, expected later that year. This was expected to provide more 
realistic estimâtes for the quantities of phthalate leached, as well as the duration of 
exposure. 
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Predictably however, Greenpeace used the launch of investigations by the 
Commission and the publication of preliminary opinions as a further stick to beat 
récalcitrant governments, manufacturers and retailers. Under increasing pressure to 
be seen to be taking action,71 the Commission agreed the need for a directive 
specifically to address soft P V C toys intended for young children and babies. 
Consumer Policy and Consumer Health Protection commissioner, Emma Bonino, 
drew up proposais for an emergency ban, reducing its scope to objects designed to be 
put in the mouth.72 However fearing that an outright ban might be successfully 
challenged in court, the Commission voted against it on 10 th June 1998, adopting 
instead a non-binding recommendation on l s l July 1998. 
The recommendation covered child-care articles and toys made of soft PVC 
containing phthalates and intended to be put into the mouth by children under the âge 
of three.73 It invited member states to take appropriate safety measures whilst 
Community législation for permanent protection was under way. Indicating that such 
products 'are considered to be liable to provoke négative health effects at high level 
of exposure', it also requested member states to check levels of phthalate migration, 
comparing thèse to limits now proposed by the CSTEE. It also effectively conceded 
the importance of non-scientific factors by indicating that; 'Other Member States had 
announced that they would act on their own if the Commission does not find a 
Community solution'. 7 4 
4.5 The moving safety margin 
One of the major problems throughout this process has been the adoption of 
continuously shifting baselines and data. The margin of safety, arbitrarily considered 
as needing to exceed 100, is determined by dividing the N O A E L value by the 
exposure dose. Yet each of thèse quantifies has varied according to particular 
experiments or has been the subject of systematic revision or reinterpretation. Even 
samples from parallel batches of PVC and using identical techniques, yield low 
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correlative precision due to the uneven release of phthalate particles from within 
them.75 
In all instances the worst data or the worst-case approach was adopted in order to err 
on the side of caution, even i f this meant variations as great as four orders of 
magnitude (5 10,000) between experimental data! Such an approach was considered 
reasonable as no account was being made for exposure to more than one phthalate in 
a toy, and for additional exposures through food, air or dermal contact. Nor was there 
any allowance for the assumed enhanced sensitivity of young children to these 
products. The possibility that the phthalates could be hydrolysed or broken down by 
saliva into simpler compounds was also not considered,76 nor the fact that young 
children do not swallow all their saliva. 
The various opinions did recognise however, that where calculable, intake from toys 
was not the only, nor indeed the major, source of exposure. A European Committee 
for Standardisation draft report in 1997 estimated exposure from toys to be 10% of 
total exposure for a given phthalate.77 For at least one such compound (BBP), 'Food 
is by far the major source contributing over 90% of intake'. 7 8 A U K Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) information sheet indicates that far from 
being caused by plastic containers or wrapping, the presence of phthalates in food is 
due to general environmental conditions, as core content levels of phthalates in food 
items often exceed surface content levels.7 9 Indoor air provides most of our remaining 
exposure to phthalates. 
In all, well over one hundred documents have now been presented to the CSTEE in 
evidence over the issue of phthalate toxicity. Whilst some are merely member state 
notifications of intended action, others are of a more scientific nature. One of the key, 
and shifting, areas for debate and experimentation has been over what is assumed to 
be the critical end point of phthalate toxicity. This means an indication as to the type 
of adverse effect to be expected from each compound. 
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N O A E L values are determined by administering phthalates in varying concentrations 
to the diet of test animals, usually rats. Typically concentrations go up in factors of 
ten, and after a specified period the animals anaesthetised, terminated, and analysed 
for abnormalities with respect to a control group. The N O A E L value is then taken to 
be the highest dose producing no statistically significant variation, whilst the critical 
end point is the type of variation first noticed. In certain instances Lowest-Observed-
Adverse-Effect-Level (LOAEL) values were taken, where appropriate data did not 
exist. These were for the two phthalates DBP and BBP, which occur as contaminants 
at low levels, and in consequence a further factor of 5 was incorporated in 
determining their safety margins. 
From early on in the proceedings the two phthalates to come under most scrutiny 
were to be DEHP and DINP. This is because they had been the most commonly 
found phthalates in toys and various child-care articles, but also because they each 
had a margin of safety determined right from the start as being below 100. These 
particular margins were based on the least reliable available data, provided by 
Greenpeace and the Danish authorities who had initiated the matter, and varied by a 
factor of 2,500 and 10,000 respectively from other experimental sources. 
Initially DNOP also produced a margin of safety below 100 and in its preliminary 
position 9 t h February 1998 the CSTEE declared all three phthalates as giving cause 
for concern. Later revisions to N O A E L values and exposure doses removed DNOP 
from the list. By the time of the formal opinion expressed on 24 t h April 1998 the 
CSTEE had concluded that only the very low margin of safety for DINP (8.8) caused 
concern, 'since humans appear to be less sensitive towards the critical effect of DEHP 
(hepatic peroxisome proliferation)80 identified in rats'.81 
4.6 Are phthalates carcinogenic? 
DEHP has been found to be hepatocarcinogenic (liver cancer inducing) in rats and 
mice,8 2 and it is accepted that after long-term exposure, peroxisome proliferation (an 
increase in those parts of cells which generate or break down hydrogen peroxide), 
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which is the most sensitive change found, acts as an early indicator of this. However 
there is a marked species variation in response to peroxisome proliferation. Rats and 
mice are very sensitive, whereas guinea pigs and monkeys appear to be relatively 
insensitive or non-responsive at dose levels that produce a marked response in rats. 
There is no indication of human sensitivity.84 
Yet now, based upon figures 2,500 times greater than from other sources, scaled up 
by a further safety margin of 100, using the most sensitive critical end point of 
dubious relevance, and despite the fact that a 1996 risk assessment of DEHP, which 
reviewed more than 500 studies, concluded that the threat of human liver cancer is 
extremely unlikely under any anticipated exposure dose,85 DEHP was considered as 
giving cause for concern. 
Campaigners against phthalates have attached great importance to the fact that the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) classified DEHP as a 'probable human 
86 
carcinogen'. But this decision was taken over 10 years ago and has not formally 
been re-evaluated since. Not only has the relevance to humans of liver tumours in 
rodents induced by peroxisome proliferation become more questionable, but our 
understanding of carcinogenic processes themselves have evolved. Nevertheless in 
the mid 1980s the US toy industry had removed DEHP from children's products to 
maintain consumer confidence until further scientific research could be conducted.87 
Regulation of carcinogens in the United States is still based on the 'no-threshold' 
assumptions adopted over thirty years ago.88 Since then however, not only have we 
become more conscious of the various non-zero doses which the body can tolerate, 
but our understanding of the biological processes involved, particularly in relation to 
mitogenic and mutagenic carcinogens,89 have allowed for a far more sophisticated 
view than the 'one hit, one cancer' approach which used to determine E P A policy. 9 0 
In addition according to the biochemist who developed the primary test for 
carcinogenic substances, Dr Bruce Ames, about one-half of all chemicals tested, both 
natural and man-made, are toxic when tested at high doses in either rats or mice. 9 1 
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Recently the head of the EPA's Science and Policy Staff stated in a section of an 
article published in the Journal of Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology that, 
'No evidence exists to suggest that these agents (peroxisome proliferators) are 
carcinogenic in the human liver'. 9 2 Health Canada has classified DEHP as 'Unlikely 
to be Carcinogenic to Humans',9 3 the European Commission's own official decision 
states that DEHP, 'shall not be classified or labelled as a carcinogenic or an irritant 
substance',94 whilst the World Health Organisation (WHO) Environmental Health 
Criteria document for DEHP concludes: 'Currently there is not sufficient evidence to 
suggest that DEHP is a potential human carcinogen'.95 
For DINP there is a recognition that 'different commercial products may vary in 
composition',9 6 which might explain the factor of variation in excess of 10,000 
between experiments to measure the exposure dose. It has also been found to cause 
hepatic peroxisome proliferation in rats, but an even more sensitive critical end point 
has been established. This is an increase in liver and kidney weight after feeding 
significant dietary levels of DINP for up to 2 years.97 Scaled up to human levels this 
is equivalent to a child consuming a sizeable chunk (50 grams) of plastic each day.9 8 
As Michael Fumento, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, has said, Tf your child 
EATS toys, phthalates are the least of your worries'! 9 9 
4.7 Are phthalates endocrine disrupters? 
If the potential carcinogenicity of phthalates, in high doses and over long periods of 
time on rodents, were not relevant to obtain desired restrictions upon their use, 
campaigners had already prepared themselves to move onto a more emotive critical 
end point. This shifting of the argument had begun through focusing media attention 
onto the most extreme possible outcome, presenting phthalates as so-called 
'endocrine disrupting chemicals' (EDCs), calling them 'gender benders',1 0 0 and 
claiming that they mimic oestrogen. This approach successfully generated shock 
headlines such as 'Human sperm count could be zero in 70 years',1 0 1 and 'Sex change 
chemicals in baby milk'. 
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The endocrine system is held to be that complex of processes whereby a number of 
fundamental bodily functions are kept in check through the action of an appropriate 
balance of hormones. An endocrine disrupter is then held to be any chemical which 
interferes with the synthesis, secretion, transport, binding, action or elimination of the 
natural hormones which are responsible for homeostasis, reproduction, development 
and/or behaviour.103 
The popularity of this hypothesis, and the belief that artificial hormones released into 
the environment through human activity are responsible for the identification of 
unexplained phenomena upon the endocrine systems of various organisms, in 
particular aquatic-related life forms, stems from the publication in March 1996 of 
'Our Stolen Future' by Theo Colborn, Dianne Dumanoski, and John Peterson 
Myers. 1 0 4 
This book, built upon previous work by Colborn with some of her earlier 
collaborators,105 has a foreword by US Vice President AI Gore, and has now been 
cited as the first reference to the recently released CSTEE Opinion on E D C s . 1 0 6 Yet 
its so-called scientific content has been extensively refuted by those who, amongst 
others hold that 'none of the authors is a real scientist who conducts scientific 
research or publishes peer-reviewed studies'.107 
A review of 'Our Stolen Future' by Professor of Environmental Toxicology, Michael 
Kanvin, at Michigan State University, appeared under the title 'The Mismeasure of 
Risk', in the September 1996 issue of Scientific American.m This described the book 
as 'not scientific in the most fundamental sense', arguing that 'the authors present a 
very selective segment of the data that has been gathered about chemicals that might 
affect hormonal functions', and further that 'it obscures the line between science and 
policy to the detriment of both', echoing a view expressed some months earlier in 
Business Week Magazine where it had been suggested that 'with its selective use of 
data, dubious logic and relentless hype, 'Our Stolen Future' ends up doing a serious 
disservice to its own cause'. 1 0 9 
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Nevertheless based upon the Colborn book, Greenpeace released their own version a 
month later under the title 'Taking Back Our Stolen Future: Hormone disruption and 
PVC plastic'. 1 1 0 This also repeated a widely criticised study published in the British 
Medical Journal earlier that year which claimed to provide evidence of a serious 
decline in the quality of human semen in the U K . 1 1 1 Yet even i f this widely disputed 
claim were to be proven true,112 it would remain to be demonstrated whether this had 
any causal connection with the release of artificially produced endocrine disrupting 
chemicals. 
The authors of the 1992 study considered to provide the most conclusive evidence of 
declining sperm counts, Niels Skakkabaek and Richard Sharpe, have since indicated 
that the implications of their work have been overstated. In the July 7, 1995 of The 
Independent newspaper, the two accused Greenpeace of 'taking something which is a 
clearly stated hypothetical link and calling it fact'. 1 1 4 
Others meanwhile have indicated that 'the major human intake of endocrine 
disrupters are naturally occurring oestrogens found in foods (Safe, 1995). This 
exposure is several orders of magnitude higher than the exposure to pesticide 
E D C s ' . " 5 Such naturally occurring phyto-oestrogens, commonly found in plants and 
vegetables such as soya, hops, peas, beans, sprouts and celery, appear to be 
overlooked by environmental campaigners. Yet Safe calculated daily human intakes 
of such oestrogens, based on potencies relative to 17 p-oestradiol. Oral contraceptives 
are found to represent 16,675 ^g equivalent per day, and postmenopausal oestrogen 
therapy would provide 3,350 ng per day. By contrast oestrogen flavonoids in food 
represent 102 Mg per day, whilst daily ingestion of environmental organochlorine 
oestrogens a mere 0.0000025 ng! 1 1 6 
Rather obviously then, substances designed to be endocrine disrupters, such as the 
contraceptive pill, are, whilst those which are not, such as phthalates, are not. 
However, presumably recognising the sensitivities of potentially alienating over half 
the constituency they seek to influence, Greenpeace and other environmentalists 
30 
Poisonous Dummies 
chose tactically, not to highlight the extent to which the presence of such substances 
in the environment, in addition to naturally occurring substances, actually stems from 
the widespread use of oral contraceptives. 
The supposed oestrogenic properties of phthalates have recently been thoroughly 
examined, both 'in vitro' and 'in v ivo ' . 1 1 7 This research indicates that whilst some of 
the shorter chain esters (e.g. DBP, BBP) display a weak effect in some 'in vitro' 
assays at high concentrations, none of the eight phthalates elicited 'in vivo' 
oestrogenic effects based upon both uterotrophic and vaginal cornification assays, 
which determine the response of the uterus to hormones as well as their ability to 
induce the oestrous cycle. This suggests that metabolic events may inactivate the 
oestrogenic activity of certain phthalates, thereby indicating that whilst ' in vitro' 
assays may allow prioritisation for further testing, they should be used as a 
complement to 'in vivo' testing which can more accurately model sensitive processes 
and interactions."9 
In addition, numerous multi-generation fertility studies have been carried out on 
several different phthalates. Again phthalates with short carbon chains include known 
reproductive toxicants and have produced teratogenic (causing birth defects) and 
embryotoxic effects at doses well in excess of the N O A E L in continuous breeding 
studies upon mice, which are known to be more sensitive than rats.1 2 0 Very few 
teratogenicity studies have been performed in other species. However the most recent 
two-generation studies demonstrate that exposure of rats to DINP and DIDP in utero, 
during lactation, puberty and adulthood does not affect testicular size, sperm count, 
morphology or motility, or produce any reproductive fertility effects.121 
4.8 The CSTEE Opinion on EDCs 
The European Commission's Scientific Committee on Toxicity, Ecotoxicity and the 
Environment (CSTEE) within D G X X I V has set up a Working Group which 
published in March 1999 its own 'Opinion on Human and Wildlife Health Effects of 
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Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals, with Emphasis on Wildlife and on Ecotoxicology 
Test Methods'. 
Unfortunately the tone of this document is set from its opening line; There is 
growing concern on possible harmful conséquences of exposure to xenobiotic 
Compounds that are capable of modulating or disrupting the endocrine System'. 
Thus 'growing concern' of 'possible' effects now suffices to obtain Commission 
level action, a trend more recently repeated elsewhere.123 Indeed the document 
somewhat self-consciously justifies itself in part on the basis that 'the media and 
consequently the public at large have (therefore) developed an interest on the 
subject'.124 
Apart from citing the widely discredited work of Theo Colborn, the document also 
lends further credence to the disputed claims over falling sperm counts and the rising 
incidence of prostate cancer. No doubt Greenpeace and their allies, who have been 
responsible for a substantial élément of the 'growing concern', wil l draw upon the 
document itself as further évidence as to the objectivity of their claims. 
Whilst the original intention of the work, as revealed through the various CSTEE 
plenary meeting minutes, was 'to finally produce a report that Covers human health 
and environmental effects of E D C s ' , 1 2 5 the final product placed a far greater emphasis 
upon wildlife, 'due to the fact that it is where the greatest impact is feit. The human 
health effects part was therefore correspondingly reduced'. 1 2 6 In other words unable 
to corne up with sufficient évidence for effects upon humans, the committee simply 
decided to play this down rather than highlight the fact. 
The document accepts that for humans 'a causative rôle ... has not been verified', and 
that 'for most reported effects in wildlife (however) the évidence for a causal link 
with endocrine disruption is weak or non-existing',1 2 7 adding further that 'the 
mechanisms of pollutant-induced reproductive toxicity observed in wild mammalian 
species generally remain unclear but could also involve endocrine disruption'. 1 2 8 
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Needless to say, many of the purported effects upon wildlife are themselves 
spéculative. Two récent studies in the journal Science for example, have concluded 
that defects found in frogs throughout the Western United States, cited in the CSTEE 
document,129 may be caused by a trematode, a simple parasitic flatworm, which 
infects tadpoles and leads to multiple or malformed hind legs. 1 3 0 No doubt some will 
now argue that chemical pollution was responsible for the increase in water snails 
which act as a key host of the parasite. But this is to reveal such views as based upon 
simple association, rather than the scientific analysis necessary to provide insights 
into causal mechanisms and metabolic pathways. 
4.9 Réactions to the Dutch 'Consensus Group ' study 
The only logical outcome of adopting the precautionary principle is to accommodate 
the lowest common denominator. This effect was perfectly exposed by reactions to 
the outcome of the Dutch 'Consensus Group' study into the oral leaching of 
phthalates by adult human volunteers.131 This coincided with a review of other data 
made available to the CSTEE subséquent to April 1998, such as an Austrian 
investigation which appeared to corroborate the results of the Dutch study, and a US 
Consumer Product Safety Commission report on DINP which showed that the high 
levels of release that had previously been used could not be reproduced.132 
The final report by the Dutch 'Consensus Group' study, indicated that the possibility 
of a baby exceeding the recommended limits was 'so rare that the Statistical 
likelihood cannot be estimated'.133 It also revealed that previous estimâtes as to the 
amounts of time spent chewing on soft PVC products by children had been grossly 
exaggerated reducing this from 6 hours to a maximum of 3 hours exposure. A joint 
press release issued by Toy Industries of Europe, the European Council of 
Plasticizers and Intermediates, and the European Council of Vinyl Manufacturers, 
assumed that their position had now been vindicated.1 3 4 
The Greenpeace view on the Dutch study at this stage was predictably antagonistic, 
arguing not only that it had failed in its task to develop a standardised procédure for 
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measuring the quantities of phthalates leached from P V C , but also, and more 
pointedly, questioning the integrity of the study group for having representatives 
from both the toy industry; Mattel, and the chemical industry; Exxon, upon its 
technical committee.135 Exxon production facilities in particular had been 
systematically targeted by activists during their campaign, due to the company being 
the world's single largest producer of phthalates.136 
A little over 2 months later however, the CSTEE announced its own views on the 
new research,137 and now Greenpeace announced itself to be in full agreement.138 A 
new and less extreme determination of the N O A E L value for DINP had been made 
available,1 3 9 but as this yielded a value four times greater than that derived from the 
earlier research,140 the CSTEE decided 'from a precautionary standpoint',141 to 
maintain its use of the pre-existing value in its revised assessment. In other words the 
new evidence was quite simply ignored. 
In addition, a study which had examined the effects of exposing female rats to DEHP 
in drinking water from day 1 of pregnancy to day 21 after the delivery, indicated 
damage to the testes of the offspring.1 4 2 Despite water intake not having been 
accurately measured, the N O A E L derived was taken to substantiate an earlier low 
N O A E L value which had, at the time of the 24 April 1998 opinion, been ignored in 
favour of that derived from 'a well-performed study'. 1 4 3 Now however, the critical 
effect was taken to be the testicular effects which, although known at the time of the 
earlier opinion, had not been used. 1 4 4 
The recalculated margin of safety for DINP, whilst providing improvement due to the 
reduction in exposure time, remained below 100, thereby suggesting continued cause 
for concern. That for DEHP was now both lower than the previous value and also had 
a critical end-point assumed to be of greater relevance than hepatic peroxisome 
proliferation, thus actually raising the level of concern. These views were submitted 
to the DG X X I V Risk Evaluation Unit who in January 1999 suggested 'that the 
Commission should be looking for a phase out of phthalates as soon as possible'. 1 4 5 
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4.10 Ever decreasing circies 
The officiai view from the Commission was, by now, hardly contentious as a number 
of member states had, since the issuing of the last formai opinion on the matter in 
November 1998, finally been convinced by the various voluntary restrictions in 
opération, as well as pressed through the actions of environmentalists and consumer 
groups, to take matters into their own hands. They had started notifying the 
Commission of their intentions to introduce formai restrictions on such products, 
particularly those aimed at children under 3 and intended to be placed in the mouth. 
Thèse included Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Norway and Sweden, who 
were ail expected to have formai bans in place by the middle of 1999. 1 4 6 
Whilst not the subject of this essay, it is interesting to note how the graduai collapse 
by member states across the European Community increased the pressure on America 
to follow suit. Despite one commentator's view that, 'Multinational companies are 
under attack everywhere - but nowhere more than in Europe', 1 4 7 it may yet prove to 
be the case that Europe is just a stepping stone to actions further afield. In the US the 
Greenpeace campaign took a longer time to become effective, in part due to the fact 
that DEHP had already formally been withdrawn as a precautionary measure in 1986. 
Also most pacifiers on the American market are made of latex rather than P V C . 
Nevertheless concerned by the direction of events in Europe, the US Ambassador to 
the European Community, Vernon Weaver had sent a blunt letter to the E U 
Directorate General for Exteraal Affairs in February 1998, stating that 'a sudden ban 
on products which have been sold for years and which is based on incomplète and 
perhaps erroneous information could cause trade misunderstandings between the US 
and the E U ' . 1 4 8 
With widespread restrictions in place across most of Europe by the autumn however, 
Greenpeace accelerated its American campaign, releasing a new report on phthalates 
in November 1998. This amounted to little more than a press release with 
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footnotes,149 but led to a flurry of toy manufacturers, including Toys *R' Us, issuing 
assurances, as to their intentions to phase out the products.150 
Three days later, Health Canada, a Governnient consumer protection body, issued an 
advisory calling for soft P V C teethers and rattles to be removed from shelves and 
calling on parents and childcare facilities to immediately dispose of these toys. 1 5 1 
Then, on 2 n d December 1998, when the US Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(CPSC) released its latest results of a study on DINP which showed that 'the amount 
ingested does not even come close to a harmful level', it also reąuested industry, 'as a 
precaution while more scientific work is done', to remove phthalates from soft rattles 
and teethers.152 
In those countries where there had been regulatory successes against toys, the 
campaign now moved onto medical devices. P V C softened with phthalates provides 
amongst other products flexible tubing, intravenous bags, catheters and protective 
gloves. It allows hospitals access to ąuality disposable items which are durable, 
flexible, inexpensive and safe.153 
Yet building upon their earlier gains Greenpeace and others, such as Health Care 
Without Harm in the US, are seeking to limit or prohibit the use of P V C in healthcare 
facilities despite there being no evidence as to adverse effects, even amongst patients 
receiving dialysis for kidney disease, the group most exposed, and hence supposedly 
at risk, from such products.1 5 4 
PVC plasticised with DEHP is the only flexible materiał approved by the European 
Pharmacopoeia for life-saving medical devices such as blood and plasma transfusion 
eąuipment. 1 5 5 The safety of these materials has been confirmed by more than 40 years 
of use, with five to seven billion patient days of acute exposure and one to two billion 
patient days of chronić exposure without any indication of adverse effects.'56 But 
again companies with a vi tal interest at stake, both private and public, have proven to 
be remarkably defensive in their stance. 
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Baxter Healthcare's own environmental manager in Sweden, Birgitta Lindblom 
admits for example that (It's unfortunate that [the Stockholm County Council] have 
taken a décision that may have tragic conséquences for many people. We probably 
have to shoulder part of the blâme ourselves as we have not succeeded in informing 
the politicians in the County Council about the necessity for P V C in médical 
products'. Yet Baxter, a world leader in healthcare products, has corne under 
increasing pressure to develop alternative materials to P V C by its own 
158 
shareholders, despite seeking to indicate that ' in many applications, P V C remains 
the material of choice'. 1 5 9 Unfortunately one of those new materials is currently 
recognised as having odour problems and causing skin irritation. 1 6 0 
Unsurprisingly therefore the European Commission's CSTEE has already initiated 
investigations into the potential problems associated with their possible replacements. 
1 6 1 Both adipates and citrates which have started to be used as substitutes in countries 
where phthalates are no longer available, have been criticised, not least for appearing 
to offer little toxicological documentation in the literature.162 In this, the inévitable 
logic of the precautionary principle has corne to the fore. The fear of phthalates has 
simply been transferred onto the supposed solution. 
Finally, it should be noted that the campaign against phthalates forms part of a wider 
Greenpeace agenda against P V C specifically and the chlorine industry in gênerai. 
Greenpeace has made it clear that it has no intention of calling a hait to its campaign 
subséquent to the démise of phthalates, having argued explicitly that ' P V C is a 
poisonous plastic - replacing phthalates won't solve the problem'. 1 6 3 
Thèse views are based upon the fact that through the technical synthesis of certain 
chlorinated organic compounds, dioxins can be produced as a by-product. Thèse have 
often been referred to as the most toxic man-made chemicals known, although this 
accolade is considered by many to be a gross exaggeration.164 Only exposure to quite 
substantial doses has ever posed a threat to human health. 
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Substantial scientific évidence supports the view that dioxin contamination in the 
environment has dramatically decreased over the last twenty years to their lowest 
levels this Century, 1 6 5 despite a three-fold increase in P V C production.1 6 6 This has 
been helped by the more advanced technology now used for cleaning the products of 
combustion prior to release into the atmosphère. 1 6 7 Nevertheless part of the campaign 
against P V C médical products consists of highlighting the contribution which 
hospital waste purportedly adds to atmospheric dioxin levels. In fact P V C forms but a 
minor contribution, as the vast majority of dioxins are released through natural 
buming processes, such as forest fires or other wood combusting processes. 
5. R e t r e a t f r o m r e a s o n 
5.1 The consumer agenda 
In her speech to the Joint European Parliament and Commission Conference on Food 
Law and Food Policy in Brüssels on 4 t h November 1997, Consumer Policy and 
Consumer Health Protection Commissioner, Emma Bonino, placed great emphasis on 
the increasingly important agenda-setting rôle of consumers. Suggesting that 
'pressure from public opinion and interested bodies has often appeared to be the 
strongest driving force to guarantee that ail necessary measures to protect public 
health are effectively taken', 1 6 9 she endorsed the enormous boost which such 
organisations had received over the course of the BSE débâcle. 
Earlier that year Agriculture and Rural Development Commissioner, Franz Fischler, 
had actively encouraged this approach in direct relation to BSE, indicating that, Mt is 
time we heard from the consumers. These are the most important people of all in this 
équation' . 1 7 0 Environment Commissioner, Ritt Bjerregaard, too has echoed this line, 
commenting in addition that, 'Retailers can play a crucial rôle. They are ecological 
gatekeepers'.171 Clearly then, the consumer voice, in ail its guises, is actively being 
sought and promoted across the board. 
But whilst the advent of a better informed and more questioning attitude by 
consumers could be welcomed as long overdue, there appears to be a lack of serious 
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debate as to who 'the consumers' actually are. Such views appear to express an 
inhérent assumption that there is a singular, or at least majoritarian, consumer voice 
or interest, which finds expression through existing consumer groups. It is worth 
noting that support for this approach as being either potentially effective or truly 
représentative is not without criticism. 1 7 2 
Also, the broader climate within which the new structures, rôles and procédures are 
arising should be recognised as one which prioritises caution over production, and 
risk over opportunity.173 This is not to suggest a wilful désire to engender panics or 
impose restrictions, but rather that society as a whole has become increasingly risk-
conscious, and even risk-averse.174 
It has been argued that, 'We no longer choose to take risks, we have them thrust upon 
us', 1 7 5 and further that, 'Society becomes a laboratory, but there is no one responsible 
for its outcomes'.1 7 6 As a conséquence the drive to regulate, or re-regulate, to restore 
a form of moral responsibility, has become a strong one in the 1990s. But there is also 
a growing aversion to officiai régulation, which suggests that to be effective 
régulation may need to occur more informally, at the level of the firm or the 
individual, through self-imposed restrictions, which may be externally-monitored.177 
Echoing this mood, Emma Bonino herself has suggested that, 'there are times when 
législation does not happen, and we need to ask ourselves whether it is better to have 
nothing at ail or self-regulation in some form or other'. 1 7 8 Again, in a similar vein, the 
Financial Times columnist Lionel Barber has astutely observed in relation to the 
Commission, that 'the flood of EU législation accompanying the single market has 
slowed to a trickle. Today, Brüssels is using peer pressure and voluntary codes of 
conduct to encourage minimum standards of compliance'. 1 7 9 
As a conséquence a climate has been created whereby social control is increasingly 
exercised, or moderated through self-restraint, and marshalled by the explosion of 
highly vociferous, and inevitably self-appointed représentatives of consumer 
interests. If left unchecked this can only lead to instances of overreaction and 
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unnecessary interférence, justified through an appeal to a supposed consumer 
mandate. 
5.2 The décline of rationality 
Of even greater concern however, is the suggestion that 'consumers are not easily 
convinced by scientific évidence and advice'. Indeed the Commission's own 
Consumer Committee,1 8 1 responded to the 'Green Paper on The General Principles of 
Food Law' by proposing the application of the precautionary principle 'even where 
there is no known scientific uncertainty'.182 Furthermore it argued that when the 
scientific évidence, which it recognised to be necessary, was available, that 'too great 
an emphasis on this may be undesirable from the consumer's point of view' . 1 8 3 These 
views again raise questions as to who 'the consumers' are, and how their interests are 
to be represented. 
More damagingly they présent science as just one of many 'readings' of the world. 
This suggests that no amount of expérimentation or évidence would ever suffice to 
détermine the outcome of an issue, and effectively recognises that the assessment of 
risk is a social, rather than a scientific, exercise. Such an approach merely extends 
that proposed by the officiai Commission documentation itself, which had called for 
the precautionary principle to be highlighted, and had even gone so far as to suggest 
that, 'there may be demands ... to go further in the area of the health protection 
measures than the scientific évidence suggests is necessary'.184 
The 'First biannual B S E follow-up report', communicated to the European 
Parliament in May 1998, took this approach to its logical conclusion, suggesting the 
need for 'the possibility of taking into account minority scientific views' , 1 8 5 in other 
words of accepting worst-case scénarios regardless of what the majority of scientists 
say. But when hard facts and analysis are replaced by individual views, emotion can 
take over from reasoned debate, and in a climate of heightened sensitivity to risk, the 
only possible outcome is to adapt to the lowest common denominator. 
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Reflecting the growing confusion and what has elsewhere been dubbed a 'retreat 
from reason', 1 8 6 Jim McQuaid, Director of Science & Technology for the U K ' s 
Health and Safety Executive, has suggested, in a general guest editorial about risk for 
a new journal, that 'there are then great difficulties in seeking a rational debate -
rational in the sense of being based on a consensus on the evidence that matters and 
on the implications for a course of action that will engender support'. 
But a notion of reason as depending on 'consensus' and 'support', is not one which 
would have been recognised by Galileo or Darwin. It effectively allows for the 
eventual rejection of science altogether. The hard-done-by consumer has become the 
alternative voice which now has to be taken into account within all decision making. 
Such views, supported by the supposed authority of the precautionary principle, and 
endorsed by environmentalist and feminist critiques of science, have increasingly 
become accepted by all social actors. They look set to have a profound impact upon 
the scientific community, as well as the business and social worlds dependent upon it. 
If scientific reason based upon quantifiable and repeatable evidence, is just one 
amongst a number of competing views, then it need no longer be the arbiter for 
decision-making, particularly when the concerns of consumer-groups or 
environmentalists have been raised. As Environment Commissioner, Ritt Bjerregaard 
rhetorically asked in a speech given at a brainstorming workshop on chemicals in the 
EU, 'Should a lack of sound scientific evidence stand in the way of action?' 1 8 8 This 
echoed a similar call for action expressed by Dr. Ann Soto, an early collaborator of 
Theo Colborn, during a 1996 B B C Horizon programme on EDCs, when she 
exclaimed, 'The stakes are so high here that I don't believe we can wait ' . 1 8 9 
5.3 The precautionary principle 
The precautionary principle departs from the usual scientific rationale in that it 
reverses the burden of proof. Science proceeds on the basis of evidence, which is a 
positive finding that is reproducible. The precautionary principle on the other hand, 
postulates that all assumptions can be considered valid unless the contrary has been 
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demonstrated. This negative proof is impossible to ascertain. The precautionary 
principle thus contributes to the deconstruction of the process leading to scientific 
opinion, since it distances conclusions from evidence-based rationale. It further 
considers that valid décisions can be made on beliefs without requiring solid 
évidence. 
An international agreement on the precautionary principle was reached during the 
United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio 
de Janeiro in 1992, becoming part of Agenda 21. This is laid down for environmental 
matters within the European Community, in the Maastricht Treaty under Article 130r. 
Recently the Commission's Consumer Committee has argued for the principle to be 
extended into the realm of food law. 1 9 0 
A Commission communication of December 1996,191 announcing the review of 
directive 90/220/EEC concerning the deliberate release of genetically modified 
organisms into the environment now seems set to bring a much needed process of 
clarification about thèse issues to a head. A detailed communication on the 
precautionary principle is also expected shortly. 
The principle is subject to much debate, particularly in relation to the tension between 
demonstrated actual risk and anticipated plausible risk, as well as the problems 
associated with enforcing what are inevitably variable standards.192 A further problem 
of using the precautionary principle is that all results inevitably become 
provisional. 1 9 3 Targets are relative, and no conclusive outcomes can ever be reached, 
as situations continuously await clarification through further analysis. In this respect 
the investigations into phthalate toxicity have been perfect exemplars. 
Such an approach has also inevitably encouraged the release and use of results prior 
to peer reviewed publication. In addition, frank and open discussions held by 
interested parties are increasingly entering into the public domain through a désire for 
greater 'transparency'. But the views expressed through both of thèse means are not 
the same as reasoned reflection or verified évidence, and should therefore not be used 
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in the establishment of policy, as was for instance the case in the then U K Agriculture 
Minister's décision to ban beef on the bone.1 9 4 
Of more direct concern to the main subject of this paper has been the fact that some 
supposed research into the endocrine disrupting properties of phthalates was released 
through the media, rather than the académie literature. Indeed in one such high-
profile instance, a füll peer-reviewed version of the work had still failed to appear 
over two years after raising significant concerns through articles in the populär 
press,195 despite assurances that the work 'is still in the phase of being written u p \ 1 9 6 
Dr. André Prost, Director of Non-Communicable Diseases for the World Health 
Organisation Headquarters in Geneva, has also expressed réservations as to the use of 
the precautionary principle arguing that, 'précaution becomes a political instrument 
used on a sélective basis by certain sectors of Society in support of their own 
beliefs'. 1 9 7 He goes on to suggest that situations can only be made worse through the 
advent of a 'victimisation culture', concluding that, Tf the dilemma facing the policy-
makers results in a systematic application of the precautionary principle, it will lead 
to abstention and paralysis in innovation and technology development'. 
Implicit within the Commission's approach however, is the assumption that the 
precautionary principle is a zero-cost, or something-for-nothing option. In reality, 
apart from the narrow economic costs to those businesses directly concerned, there is 
a far greater social cost which has yet to be taken into account. At an immédiate level 
replacing plastic médical devices or toys, opens the door to the dangers of injury and 
infection from replacement materials, which are either less flexible or have been 
subject to less scrutiny. Phthalates are amongst the most understood of organic 
Compounds. There is simply not a single shred of évidence that they have ever 
harmed any human being. Similarly, banning toys from chocolaté eggs or crisp and 
cereal packets would quite simply make bad law. The Statistical évidence and logic 
show that it is the food items themselves which should be banned, or alternatively ail 
small objects. 
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More important has been the amount of time and effort, let alone cost, expended by 
all sides of this dispute. Whilst the attention of large numbers in the scientific 
community and others has been turned onto these products countless numbers of 
people, right across the globe, continue to die of diseases for which cures might be 
found if only the resources expended elsewhere were to be made available. 
Finally, the panic and hysteria which has been created around these issues reflects a 
far wider loss of trust within society rather than any inherent problem with the 
products themselves. The real cost will be that of a generation of young people 
brought up to live in fear from the dangers posed by harmless products, and 
ąuestioning the ability of science to cast light on such issues. A broader climate of 
fear is being created which in turn will lead many to an even more misguided 
assessment of risk and greater inflexibility towards innovation and change. 
6. C o n c l u s i o n s a n d R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s 
1. A widespread and paralysing sensitivity to 'risk' has entered the consciousness of 
politicians, public officials, the media, manufacturers and retailers. The 
continuous elevation of risk over opportunity, and caution over production, can 
only damage business, reasoned debatę and ultimately, consumers. Further 
research into, and public debatę about, this phenomenon, to which there can be no 
easy solutions, is needed with a view to countering it. 
2. The BSE debacie has catalysed a sea-change in the way that the European 
Commission handles consumer policy and consumer health protection matters. In 
particular the 'precautionary principle' has explicitly been adopted as a guide to 
analysing such issues, but this is not a zero-cost option either financially or 
socially. An urgent, multi-national and public critique is needed to explore the 
usage, limitations and costs of this approach. 
3. Growing aversion to official regulatory interference is creating a climate whereby 
social control is increasingly exercised, or moderated, through self-restraint. This 
'hidden' self-regulatory framework is beginning to have an affect as real as its 
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formal legal counterpart Efforts need to be made to measure and assess the impact 
of this, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. 
4. The attack upon scientific rationality stemming largely from environmentalist and 
feminist critiques needs to be rigorously examined. In particular, more 
investigations need to establish the limitations of consensus, the plausibility of 
holding simultaneously competing views on an issue, and the relationship between 
individuals, society and the natural world. 
5. There is a growing tendency, amongst a range of social agents, to pre-publish 
outcomes of scientific inquiries (some of which never achieve peer review), or to 
release the frank and open délibérations of scientific committees in the pursuit of 
'transparency'. If we are not to curtail such discourse, the views thereby expressed 
need to be more clearly promoted as opinions rather than as facts. 
6. In the absence of a wider and more polarised political debate, the media has found 
itself promoted to a rôle of increasing social significance as a source of comment 
and opinion. As a conséquence, far higher standards of journalistic compétence 
are to be expected than previously, particularly within areas requiring technical 
and/or scientific expertise, i f the media is to be perceived as establishing a degree 
of objectivity. 
7. Existing consumer groups are far from représentative and therefore the agenda 
they express needs to be weighted accordingly. Research is needed to présent 
alternative and counter-balancing arguments from those who perceive the benefits 
of development. This would prevent consumers from being used as an 
ideologically driven stage army and, in many instances, allay unnecessary 
anxieties. 
8. The interests of private firms have increasingly corne under the scrutiny of public 
bodies, and their behaviour affected in accordance. This process is 'one way', as 
attempts by the private sector to influence public debate are perceived as self-
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serving and hence unbalanced. Attention needs to be given as to how counter-
balancing views from private actors and agencies can effectively enter into public 
discourse. 
9. The existing civil liability system should be reviewed with a view as to its 
appropriateness for dealing with those instances when firms are found to be acting 
negligently with respect to consumers. This system should handle matters 
efficiently and at a scalę commensurate to the problems created. Any proposed 
new regulatory mechanisms should first be examined for their hidden social, as 
well as economic, costs. 
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THE DEMORALIZATION OF SCIENCE 
Bill Durodié 
New College, University of Oxford 
Paper presented on 5 April 20002 to the 
Demoralization: Morality, Authority and Power 
conference held at Cardiff University, UK 
'[WJhenever society is in trouble it begins to moralize'. (1 ) 
The title of this paper may seem perverse. It could be argued that both 
science and the scientific establishment today are more moral - or at least 
conscious of the need to become so - than at any previous time in their 
history. It has been suggested that the old paternalistic formula labeled DAD 
(decide - announce - defend), is gradually being replaced by a more inclusive 
approach that seeks to engage with the public on science and scientific 
decision making issues at all levels. 
Cal ls for greater inclusion of public views or 'values' within the scientific 
process have come from many quarters including, in the UK; the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution (2), the House of Lords (3), the 
Parliamentary Office for Science and Technology (4) and the authors of an 
influential Economic and Social Research Council publication (5). Such 
inclusivity, it is held, will make for ideas and institutions that are more people-
centred and ethical in their outlook. 
More recently M P s on the Commons Science and Technology Committee 
announced that they were to examine the Royal Society over allegations that 
Britain's top scientific body is too 'elitist' and 'out of touch' (6). A plethora of 
new ethics committees, commissions and codes of conduct have also been 
established to assess both the content of the science that is carried out as 
well as the purposes of those who undertake it. 
Sc ience, it appears, is breaking out of a reductionist paradigm to examine 
more global, holistic processes pertaining to its interface with society. 
Parenting, pollution and public health form as much an element of the content 
of scientific investigation today as do genetic engineering, inorganic chemistry 
or particle physics. These, more social and ethical orientations, are held to be 
both good for society and good for science. 
But the consequences of this sea-change in outlooks and attitudes has yet to 
be assessed. Some have questioned the purported effectiveness of 
negotiated dialogic processes (7). Others have argued that these changes 
have been driven in large part by fear and confusion rather than confidence 
and direction. If so, then they may end up contributing to a more widespread 
disorientation and demoralization in science and society, rather than 
generating a new sense of purpose and trust. 
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Science and Society 
Technological change, enhanced longevity and social development are all 
testament to the tremendous impact science has had upon society. In addition 
modern societies are necessarily dynamie and science is often at the forefront 
of upsetting the status quo. But - even when its benefits are questioned - the 
emphasis usually given as to the importance of science for effecting social 
change is one-sided (8). 
Science, as well as transforming society, is itseif a product of society. Newton 
understood this when he wrote in his famous letter to Hooke of 1676; 'If I have 
seen further it is by standing on the Shoulders of Giants' (9). Sc ience comes 
with a history. Its advances, as well as being limited by material reality, are 
circumscribed by the state of the society it develops within - including its 
ambition and imagination - or lack of thèse. 
The world of antiquity yielded many intellectual insights, but constrained by its 
social structures thèse proved to be of limited practical conséquence (10). 
Then, from 400 AD to 1000 A D Europe was, in scientific terms, a backwater. 
Some of the high points of Greek science were kept alive and developed in 
the Arab world but the feudal order was largely static, positing a relationship 
between humanity and nature that was coneeived as fixed for all eternity (11). 
It was the Italian Renaissance that first began to change and then challenge 
the old order. Built largely upon the development of trade, it raised new 
demands on individuáis and society, encouraging invention through the 
merger of intellectual activity with practical needs. With the discovery of 
America in 1492 trade routes began to shift to the Atlantic seaboard. England, 
Holland and France now began to accelerate as important centres of 
innovation driven by their own commercial interests. 
Within a few centuries in addition to the development of the use of perspective 
in art and the construction of Brunelleschi's Dome in Florence, the world had 
been circumnavigated, its largest continents discovered, the compass, 
télescope and printing press invented. The world would never be the same 
again (12). 
By 1660, when what was to become known as the Royal Society was founded 
in London, the ecclesiastical domination of the Holy See in Rome had been 
broken, whilst the trial and exécution in 1649 of the monarch, Char les I, was 
fresh in people's minds. Accordingly, its founders adopted the Latin phrase; 
'Nullius in Verba ' ('On the Word of No One'), from the Roman poet Horace -
the son of a freed slave - as their motto. 
This was a bold statement of intent, as well as reflecting the political mood of 
the time. The champions of the new philosophy wished to emphasise the 
'Experimentall Learning' that was central to their outlook - but also their 
reluctance to take any pronouncement upon trust. The dogma of Pope and 
King once dispensed with, acquired insight could henceforth truly aspire to 
replace received authority (13). 
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Science now formally established itself as a new source of authority. A s well 
as delivering remarkable achievements it was to be a practical battering-ram 
with which to challenge perception, prejudice and power. But this was a 
reflection and pronouncement of faith in humanity itself rather than merely in 
science. Social development had raised human expectations as to what was 
possible. It had given humanity confidence in the power of its own reason - a 
factor that then proved of significant importance to the development of 
science. 
The Scientific Revolution represented the triumph of rationality and 
experimentation over the superstition, speculation, diktat and domination that 
had gone before. It was more than simply an advance in scientific knowledge 
- it was part of a wider shift in attitudes and beliefs. The Scientific Revolution 
was the product of dynamic social progress, as well as becoming an essential 
contributor to that progress. But just as the initial dynamic behind science was 
social change, so social change, or more particularly the lack of it, could 
circumscribe it too. 
The vision of nature and humanity now developing, was driven by aspirations 
for freedom and equality. These concepts represented the needs of a new 
elite - the commercial, and later industrial, capitalist c lass. But as such, 
society would now encounter new constraints, both from the on-going and 
vociferous rejection of the old religious and monarchical orders it had 
supplanted, as well as from the inherent limitations of this new social system 
and the particular world view of its proponents. 
From 1789, at the time of the revolution in France, and later due to a growing 
threat from the d ispossessed, promises of freedom, equality and progress 
came to be seen as highly problematic as they highlighted the failure of 
society to live up to those promises. The new establishment, in addition to 
social and political reformation, now needed to circumscribe the claims and 
effects of scientific enquiry, reason and progress upon society. 
A model of science developed known as positivism, which consciously sought 
to facilitate the restoration of order (14). Reflecting the simple mechanical 
processes emerging in industry, it posited that science operates on objective, 
absolute and ascertainable facts connected by rigid links of cause and effect 
(15). But this view of a clockwork universe with its uniform rules and truths 
being revealed by pristine individuals disinterestedly recording the underlying 
workings of invariable natural laws does not stand up to simple scrutiny. 
It was a model of science still worthy of esteem - but robbed of any 
association with historical change and development. The link between the 
advance of science and that of society was lost. Many of today's confusions 
about science stem from the misapprehension that this approach, rather than 
being a limiting constraint, somehow continued the Enlightenment tradition. 
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Through the Victorian age a compromise was effectively reached whereby 
science could still develop - quite rapidly at times - but it no longer 
systematically challenged the oíd authorities. Darwin's secular universe 
cohabited that of the bishops but did not seek to tread on their patch. 
Scientists were held in high regard, but science was now decoupled from the 
political aspiration to transform society - although its conséquences continued 
to do so. 
Over the course of the twentieth Century, philosophers of science gradually 
placed greater emphasis on the uniqueness of individual expérience. This 
corresponded intellectually to the tremendous changes, impasses and 
uncertainties they found themselves caught up in. Two world wars, a 
dépression and continuing poverty and conflict in the developing world 
generated doubts as to the possibility of universal human progress and a 'fear 
of the future' (16). 
Accordingly, those seeking to défend science - including many in what we 
might now consider to be the scientific establishment - sought to separate it 
further from social and political transformation by increasingly placing it into a 
narrowly technological or reductionist straitjacket. Harnessed to the pursuit of 
American security through the Manhattan project and the Apollo missions, 
science also created opponents for itself amongst its old allies. The political 
left, that had traditionally supported the liberatory potential of scientific 
advance, now came to view it with increased suspicion. 
They argued that aspiration itself, rather than its failure - as evidenced in the 
collapse of confidence in social progress - had turned nature into 'mere 
objectivity' for humanîty (17). This attitude could then be found reflected in the 
subordination of people and countries and was increasingly facilitated through 
the use of instrumentalist technologies. Science was seen as the amoral 
steamroller of a dispassionate new modernity crushing communities and 
tradition. 
What is so poignant about the modem disenchantment with science is that it 
has emerged at a time when its achievements are without précèdent. But 
without social progress the direction and purpose of science has become 
uncertain and once science had slowed down in relation to what it could do, 
society began to lose faith in it. Behind the current crisis of sc ience, lies a 
collapse of confidence in humanity and the possibility of social progress. 
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Risk and Morality 
Clearly, science is far from being value free. It invariably retlects the dominant 
values of the historical period it finds itself in. But if, as Marx would have it; 
'The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas' (18), then it 
is worth reflecting upon what might happen to a society within which the 
establishment no longer holds distinct ideas and values. The unprecedented 
convergence of the political left's loss of faith in science and social 
transformation with the political right's traditional misgivings have lent 
themselves to a pessimistic outlook leading to the rise of an exaggerated risk 
consciousness (19). 
Despite being two sides of the same coin, risk is now continuously 
emphasised over opportunity and as a conséquence safety and précaution 
have become new organising principles. Although the world has become more 
complex and the pace of change much faster, the perception of losing control 
has been accentuated by a society that rejects uncertainty and change. 
The convergence of left and right and the ensuing depoliticisation and démise 
of political debate has also coincided with and facilitated the breakdown of 
many forms of social organisation. With the décline of families, 
neighbourhoods, communities, religious congrégations, informai associat ions, 
trade unions, political parties or other institutions to be part of, it has become 
far easier for people's subjective impressions of the world to hold sway (20). 
Some have argued that old style moral panics driven from the top-down with a 
view to cohering society appear to have been replaced by more nebulous 
social anxieties involving a wider range of public interests and constituted by a 
vast number of free floating threats, 'with new threats always lurking in the 
background' (21). Unsurprisingly therefore, the authorities increasingly seek to 
provide assurances against those they believe to be self-serving or 
incautious, from profit-seeking multinationals down to feckless individuals. 
It is commonly assumed that the media have a significant rôle to play in such 
matters by making us more aware than previous générations of the various 
hazards we face. Certainly, in the absence of political debate, the media do 
have a more prominent rôle, but what is often overlooked is the extent to 
which it is politicians, regulators and even scientists themselves who -
charged with ensuring our safety - have now adopted a more ambiguous 
attitude to the value of scientific évidence as against public opinion. 
Our heightened awareness of risk now latches on, not just to new products 
and processes, but also reinterprets âge old activities that were once 
unquestioned. The sheer range and number of issues now perceived as risky 
- from beef to bullying and from sex to sun-screen lotions - suggests an 
underlying process beyond their intrinsic properties that we should seek to 
understand. It would appear that such problems are in abundant supply, 
limited only by our imagination. 
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Socia l and institutional erosion is often presented in an uncritically positive 
manner as a celebration of identity, choice and personal preference. 
Patronage and conformity have, quite rightly, been consigned to the past. But 
there is now a danger that the old culture of unthinking deference will be 
replaced by an equally incapacitating culture of unnecessary fear. Without the 
discipline of, and an active engagement in broader concerns, individuals have 
also been left incredibly isolated. This social and political disengagement has 
been reflected in and further fed public disenchantment with science. 
This mood of cynicism has in turn driven official concerns. But rather than 
recognising that a healthy scepticism in science is born of an active body 
politic, there is now a conscious attempt to artificially restore trust in science 
and scientists through enhanced participation with a view to relegitimising 
democratic processes across society. Foremost amongst the new 
mechanisms proposed to regulate society and attenuate our fears has been 
the precautionary principle. This latter suggests that in the absence of 
definitive scientific evidence to the contrary, measures to protect the 
environment or human health should be taken whenever any threat of serious 
or irreversible damage to either may be present. 
Critics have countered that, as scientific certainty is never possible and that 
irreversibility is inevitable, the application of the principle is a recipe for 
paralysis. Further, defining the extent of evidence necessary to justify 
concern, as well as what measures should be invoked and by whom, are 
considerations lending themselves to significant political, commercial and non-
governmental manipulation. Nevertheless, due to the inflated perceptions of 
risk, the principle is set to play an ever-increasing role in scientific decision-
making. 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, under permanent attack and held open to constant 
questioning, many institutions and experts now seem to lack self-belief, or 
even a clear vision or purpose. This has led many into overzealous reactions 
to events or perceived fears. Policy reversals appear increasingly 
commonplace, thereby sending confusing signals to an already sensitised 
public. 
The Slovenian philosopher and psychoanalyst, Slavoj Zizek, has 
characterised 'endless precautions' and 'incessant procrastination', as 'the 
subjective position of the obsessional neurotic'. Far from indicating a 
respectable 'fear of error' he suggests, this approach 'conceals its opposite, 
the fear of Truth' (22). But a pursuit of truths, however temporary, lies at the 
very heart of scientific inquiry. Scientists do not just record and measure, they 
assess , infer and prioritise as well as experimenting and transforming. It is 
these active and judgemental modes that are most at risk of being dissolved 
and lost today. 
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Ironically, to the extent that social life has increasingly become reorganised 
around risk, it has recreated a limited sense of moral purpose (23). By using 
the technical language of risk assessment this new morality does not 
announce itself as such. Whilst not preaching in an old fashioned way, the 
new prescriptions for personal and professional conduct administered by 
unaccountable agencies and regulatory bodies are no less intrusive than the 
moral codes of previous generations. Unlike scientists however, these new 
bodies have a more direct relationship to the state and by encouraging 
caution and self-limitation they set themselves against the very motive force of 
science - a desire to explore and experiment. 
Equivocation and Inclusion 
Nowadays, even when the scientific evidence is fairly categorical, scientists 
have learnt to be much more equivocal about the outcomes of their research. 
Emphasis is increasingly placed upon the uncertainties rather than the 
potential benefits of products and procedures. This has occured because of 
the onslaught of calls for scientists to show 'more humility' than in the past. It 
is also due to the perceived need to incorporate 'lay and local knowledge' as 
well as 'wider social interests and values', as identified earlier (24). 
Such developments had been evolving steadily over the previous decades but 
were catalysed to a new level by the B S E (bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy) debacle of the mid-1990s. They were then consolidated 
through the process of preparation and prompt endorsement of The Report of 
the BSE Inquiry, also known as the Phillips report (25). In the interim a 
number of other major risk episodes achieved public prominence and 
notoriety, including the Stewart inquiry into the safety of mobile phones, the 
release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into the environment and, 
more recently, the furore over the M M R vaccine. 
The Phillips report marked the acceptance of the precautionary principle as a 
central tenet of future scientific policy making within the UK. Irrespective of 
which formulation is used (26), the precautionary principle has the 
consequence of emphasising worst case scenarios thereby encouraging a 
tendency to overreact to events and, more insidiously, elevating public opinion 
over professional expertise and subordinating science to prejudice. 
Accordingly, debates over 'strong' or 'weak' versions of precaution, or over 
whether it is a 'principle* or merely an 'approach' fall wide of the mark (27). 
B S E is remarkable for acting as the basis and justification of much that has 
happened since, in many other, often unrelated areas. Yet, to this day both 
the evidence and the outcomes remain essentially inconclusive, in the history 
of the relationship between humanity and nature this episode is unlikely to 
merit more than a footnote. Domesticated animals have been a potent source 
of infectious disease before, with measles, mumps, whooping cough, 
smallpox and tuberculosis all crossing the species barrier at some stage with 
intermittently catastrophic consequences and mortality rates of around 90 
percent (28). 
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The link between B S E and variant C J D (Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease), a 
degenerative brain disorder in humans, has yet to be proven and what little 
evidence there is suggests there to be no connection. It is almost as if, 
desperate in their attempts to show the public their will ingness to act, both the 
government and many leading scientists sought to pander to the popular 
mood in the belief that this would restore some kind of trust. Thus, since 
neuropathologist Sir Bernard Tomlinson announced in December 1995 that he 
had stopped eating hamburgers and health secretary Stephen Dorrell 
announced a possible link between B S E and v C J D to the U K House of 
Commons in March 1996, concern about contaminated beef has been rife. 
Significantly, public concerns about B S E and its transmissibility to humans 
bore little relation to its actual incidence. The Phillips report itself recognised 
that actions taken by Ministers as early as 1988 had - if not necessari ly being 
comprehensive or completely enforceable - stemmed the epidemic. Thus the 
ban on ruminant protein in cattle feed led to the number of B S E cases by year 
of birth falling from a peak of 36,861 in 1987 to 1 in 1996, the year of the 
panic (29). Despite early predictions of as many as 500,000 cases of v C J D 
per annum there have to date been approximately 120 cases with evidence of 
a tailing-off. It is also not entirely evident that all of these can be directly 
attributed to eating beef. 
In a remarkable article in the British Medical Journal on 13 October 2001, 
George Venters a public health consultant from Scotland queried much of the 
prevailing orthodoxy (30). Using the standard epidemiological criteria of 
plausibility, strength of association, consistency, quality and reversibility -
analytical tools established by Austin Bradford Hill and Richard Doll 's famous 
observations on the link between smoking and lung cancer in the 1960s -
Venters questioned much of the evidence for a link between B S E and v C J D . 
If anything, experiments have suggested there to be a barrier between the 
transfer of prions from cattle to humans, whilst the incidence of v C J D would 
have been expected to rise anyway since systematic monitoring for it first 
started in 1990. The authors of the Lancet article that first described the new 
variant recognised this latter point, noting that the 10 index cases 'would not 
ordinarily have been referred to our Unit' (31). 
Venters has suggested that there was 'a process of hypothesis confirmation 
rather than hypothesis testing' and further that 'evidence that has been 
awkward or contrary, has either been played down or just outright ignored', 
accusing scientists and health experts of falling for 'the belief that multiple 
pieces of suspect or weak evidence provide strong evidence when bundled 
together'. 'It is' he continues, 'almost like they made up their minds about a 
link between B S E and nvCJD and so they set about confirming it' (32). 
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Irrespective of the évidence then - or the lack of it - both government and 
scientists reorganised their opérations according to the worst prédictions. The 
Report of the BSE Inquiry is quite explicit as to this, arguing that despite the 
lack of évidence for a link between B S E and v C J D , T h e importance of 
précaution a ry measures shouid not be played down on the grounds that the 
risk is unproven'. Certainly B S E acted as the catalyst to a major restructuring 
and policy reorientation both at the heart of the European Commission and 
within the UK and the new approaches developed therefrom have already 
begun to encroach into other areas (33). 
But such an approach will itself have a dramatic social cost. A s the U S risk 
expert Chauncey Starr argued in a récent article; 'some of today's 
hypothetical fear-based issues could develop into long-term doctrines that will 
be politically enduring, difficult to modify, and seriously destructive', 
comparing thèse to historical situations 'arising from the amplification of a 
minor populär concern into an apocalyptic dogma' (34). 
One of the other distinctive features of the B S E inquiry was the prominent rôle 
it gave to the relatives of the victims of variant C J D . Though this innovation 
attracted little comment and less criticism, it was a significant development, 
reflecting the préférence for sentiment over rationality. It is not at ail clear how 
the expérience of losing a relative yields a privileged insight into the nature of 
a d isease, or any great wisdom into how to prevent or treat it. While officiai 
récognition of the families of victims reflects public acknowledgement of the 
particularly distressing effects of C J D , their involvement in the wider aspects 
of the inquiry implicitly dévalues scientific, clinical - and even political -
expertise. 
These two key features - an appeal to worst case scénarios and the inclusion 
of lay views - were paralleled in the Stewart inquiry into the safety of mobile 
phones, to quite a striking degree. In a soon to be published comparative 
study of national responses to perceived health risks from mobile phones, 
researcher Adam Burgess notes that; 'Almost by définition, what is a risk 
' issue' is itself determined by the extent and character of government 
reaction', continuing; 'There is also a more particular sensé in which officiai 
risk responses potentially animate and cohere diffuse anxieties' (35). 
According to this analysis, far from heading off potential accusations of 
complacency through a proactive strategy to 'keep ahead of public anxiety' 
(36), the UK government's precautionary response through the establishment 
of the Independent Expert Group on Mobile Phones led by Sir William 
Stewart, actually stimulated risk concerns, which increased subséquent to the 
inquiry. This is, according to Burgess, because 'even balancée! public 
information on negligible risks tends to increase anxiety, on the assumption 
that there must be something to worry about if the government is taking 
actiori. 
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In a manner akin to the Phillips inquiry, Stewart and his panel acknowledged 
that 'the balance of evidence does not suggest that mobile phone 
technologies put the health of the general population ... at risk', but 
nevertheless the study called for a £7 million programme of further research 
and for leaflets to be included in future purchases of mobile phones warning 
of the possible risks. This latter led one commentator to conclude that 'in its 
rush to be open about communicating risk to the public, the government has 
simply forgotten that there was no risk to communicate' (37). 
Whilst not identifying any risk, other than that of using a phone whilst driving a 
vehicle, these leaflets suggest that the best way to reduce risk is to use the 
phone less. They also advise taking note of the specific absorption rate (SAR) 
of phones, which measures their heating effect. This is despite all sides to this 
argument accepting that such heating is not the problem. It would suggest 
that recording anything that was easy to measure became the key concern 
irrespective of the fact that it did not relate to the still to be demonstrated 'non-
thermal effects. 
Again, the conclusions of the Stewart inquiry make remarkable concessions to 
the need to incorporate perceived public concerns and prejudice. Following 
the recommendations in the report it will now be the case that future research 
will be required to take account of non-peer reviewed and anecdotal evidence. 
Indeed, the inquiry itself went a considerable way to acknowledging and 
accommodating to such concerns by extending its remit beyond a review of 
the latest scientific knowledge on mobile electromagnetism to the non-
scientific terrain of concerns pertaining to the siting of masts or base stations. 
In a similar fashion the latest Royal Society study into the safety of genetically 
modified (GM) crops, elevates these same two features - the exaggeration of 
risk beyond the available evidence and the by-now almost mandatory 
concession to the inclusion of public concerns within such assessments. 
Despite the report finding that 'there is no reason to doubt the safety of foods 
made from G M ingredients that are currently available, nor to believe that 
genetic modification makes food inherently less safe than conventional 
counterparts' the Royal Society gave prominence to new hypothetical 
concerns in an attempt to improve its standing in the eyes of the public. This 
prompted a recent review of the study to comment that 'it would appear that 
the Royal Society has not become more hesitant about the safety of G M 
crops and food - just more hesitant about saying so ' (38). 
Despite some of the members of the working group that produced the report 
raising their concerns as to the 'extraordinarily selective' media coverage it 
elicited, it is the case that this emphasis was triggered by the Royal Society's 
own press release, which was in turn influenced by the hesitancy of the report 
itself. It would appear that the scientists concerned now want to have it both 
ways, saying to fellow scientists, government and industry that there is no 
reason to think that G M is unsafe, whilst assuring the public that safeguards 
should be strengthened. This incoherent approach is far more likely to 
backfire than reassure and recreate the trusting relationship they desire. 
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Many other examples of equivocation and obsessions with the inclusion of 
assumed public concerns by senior government officiais and scientists 
abound. Tney are now the norm rather than the exception. C a s e s range from 
the Royal Society report into 'Endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDCs) ' (39), 
through the European Commission's restrictions on phthalate plasticisers 
(40), to the officiai inquiry into the Bristol Royal Infirmary children's heart 
surgery unit (41). Variously they cite 'purported effects' or 'public concern' as 
their instigators before exploring the limited évidence available as to any real 
problem and concluding with some kind of cautionary comment or call for 
public engagement. 
The trend towards encouraging the public to décide on all matters scientific 
reached its logical dénouement with the refusai of parents to allow their 
children to be vaccinated with the M M R (measles-mumps-rubella) jab. 
Triggered by the exaggeration of a bold research paper that proposed a link 
between the vaccine and autism, the public understandably demanded to be 
able to opt for separate inoculations, which were not readily available through 
the UK National Health Service. Whilst highlighting the vast differential 
between a national immunisation programme and an uncorroborated study 
based on a dozen cases, the fact that if the measles élément of M M R was 
problematic then a separate measles jab might be too was rarely questioned. 
Instead, hoist by its own pétard of criticising scientists and the médical 
profession, as well as promoting the assumption of personal choice in a 
health-care market, the government were faced with the first significant 
outbreak of measles for many years in south London where vaccination rates 
had fallen significantly below those that could guarantee a herd immunity (42). 
The government then had to set about educating parents as to the real risks 
and issues involved, often in an exaggerated manner, despite having done 
much to undermine public confidence in science in the first place. 
But one of the real problems facing both government and scientists today is 
that the public tend to be bombarded with too much, rather than too little, 
information. And, having projected their own insécurités onto the public, it is 
not at all evident that the latter will trust reassurances coming from any 
proposed alternative System of régulation any more. The promotion of the 
virtues of the risk society as a new moral framework for the 'third way' society 
would appear to have its limitations. 
n 
Values and Costs 
Whilst science is necessary to inform démocratie decision-making within 
society, it is not in itself démocratie. The contemporary préoccupation with the 
need for 'public participation' within scientific decision-making threatens to 
erode this distinction and demoralize scientists. 
Rather than embracing uncertainty and change as did previous générations, 
today we appear to reject them and highlight the risks. What has really 
changed is not so much the scale of the problems that we face, but the 
outlook with which society pereeives its difficulties, both real and imagined. 
These issues, whilst différent, cannot really be described as greater than 
those facing previous générations, nor are they uniquely insurmountable. But 
our collective will and imagination to resist and overeóme them appears to be 
much weaker. 
The challenge to the old élites of society is possibly understandable but the 
form it has taken - an attack on expertise per se - is inexcusable. Dépendent 
on the particular inquiry concerned this challenge has been expressed in 
various forms, though largely reflecting a similar language. The B S E inquiry 
condemned the 'culture of secrecy in Whitehall ', whilst the Bristol inquiry 
under Professor lan Kennedy attacked 'club culture' within the medical 
profession and outside the world of science the Macpherson report into the 
murder of a black teenager, Stephen Lawrence, in a south London street 
challenged a 'canteen culture' within Britain's police force. 
Irrespective of thèse particular labels, the specific prescriptions have ail 
proven to be remarkably similar - the need for greater openness and 
transparency through the inclusion of members of the public or public 'values' 
into the decision-making process. But whilst consensus-seeking may go down 
well amongst woolly-minded bureaucrats in Whitehall and Brüssels, it is a 
process largely unsuited to the needs of scientific inquiry. 
Indeed, whilst civil servants, doctors and scientists have been denigrated, 
what has been less discussed is the extent to which alternative sources of 
authority have accordingly been elevated. It is ironie that those who would not 
trust scientific expertise now have to invest their faith in a new breed of 
expert, who are not required to submit their work for peer review or other 
ways of establishing the authenticity of their da ims, and whose 
pronouncements are not open to any kind of experimental vérification 
whatsoever. 
What's more ethics committees and special agencies have their members 
directly appointed by the UK government and are thus even less accountable 
to the public than politicians. While it postures as radical and démocratie, this 
outlook invites a more authoritarian style of government over a more fatalistic, 
nervous society. 
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Ciearly, there is a tension between those who wish to include the public in 
order simply to keep them informed or on-side (43), as opposed to those who 
genuinely nold that the public voice is a missing élément for establishing 
scientific objectivity or accountability. This latter view appears to présent a 
narrowly empirical model of science whereby truth, or an approximation to it, 
is to be reached through an averaging out process of competing interested 
parties. 
One significant difficulty for ail concerned is as to how to include an 
increasingly disengaged public into such processes. The da ims of various 
advocacy groups to being représentative of this wider audience has 
increasingly been questioned (44). At best such bodies have a passive 
membership comprising a few percent of any national population (45). 
Whether directly belonging to such a lobby, or being a hand-picked and 
carefully vetted outsider, such an approach remains broadly unsatisfactory, 
especially as there appears to be a remarkable convergence of views 
between officiais presiding over such processes and those of the public who 
participate within them. 
To get around thèse limitations, there has in récent years been much greater 
emphasis placed upon the use of quantitative research, such as poils and 
surveys, as well as qualitative research, including more in-depth interviews, 
focus groups and other stakeholder dialogue forums. The danger here is well 
documented. It includes projecting views and values through question-framing 
and/or selectively finding those seltsame views and values amongst the 
responses. Even identifying 'what is not being said' (46) requires prejudicial 
priorities amongst interviewers. 
Hence, there is a great danger that, rather than recording the wishes of the 
majority, the inclusion of public views or 'values' merely records a small 
subset of thèse, which researchers find reflected back at them. Indeed, in the 
past, much of this research would have been called public opinion. Opinions 
are open to being challenged, interrogated and altered. Labelling thèse as 
'values' seems to have been a conscious attempt to set them apart from 
further inquiry. 
Ironically, in many instances, it is now corporations, governments and the 
scientific establishment itself, which appear increasingly Willing to take on 
board public concerns into the decision-making process. The reasons for this 
may be varied, including a misguided attempt at obtaining greater stability 
despite the likelihood that policy determined according to populär préjudice 
will be far more precarious. Another clear and perverse motive or outcome is 
an unwillingness or inability to be held independently to account. This reflects 
an abdication of leadership and responsibility and a préférence to deflect, 
diffuse, shift or share the blâme should things go wrong in the future (47). 
Adhering to an increasingly cautionary and restrictive approach under the 
banner of inclusion may also preclude wider social changes that require 
ambition and expérimentation. 
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It is precisely because the appearances of nature are deceptive that we need 
the methods of science - which commonly yield findings which contradict 
populär impressions and established traditions. Sc ience is not about making 
us feel good. Many of its findings can be disconcerting, yet we owe much to 
those who took a stand against public perceptions and challenged prevailing 
préjudices. These principles are jeopardised by the philistinism of the 
contemporary political élite - a trend towards which many scientific authorities 
are, unfortunately, acquiescent. 
Far from adding to the richness of scientific inquiry, lay views tend to focus on 
the immédiate, rather than a more mediated or critical appréciation of 
available évidence. The ability to understand or transcend issues requires 
rather more diligence and discipline than inclusion and inspiration. To relegate 
the experienced and considered judgements of scientists to being just another 
point of view suggests that they merely represent a form of sectional interest. 
This forces an emphasis on quantity over quality in science that allows for 
manipulation through subjective impressions and vested interests. 
Re-labelling private views as public 'values', and insisting that thèse should be 
included into the policy-making process simply aggrandizes what remains 
personal opinions. These dilute the science, denigrate the scientists, and both 
patronize the public and pander to the conceit of those who da im to represent 
such 'values'. The élévation of opinion over professional expertise 
subordinates science to préjudice. Officiai récognition of thèse perceptions 
and beliefs then implicitly dévalue the insights acquired through detailed 
expérimentation and detached considération. This undermines the confidence 
of scientists and marginalizes excellence. 
Far from being egalitarian, this is an affront to a real democracy based upon 
reason. Real exclusion begins when préjudice or opinion are taken to be a 
sound basis for decision-making. Tragically, it would appear that many 
individuals and institutions within the scientific establishment hâve themselves 
abdicated their responsibility to judge and be criticized. Far from relieving 
them from pressure, this paralyzing diffidence will only further discrédit and 
demoralize their profession. 
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The Precautionary Principle in the 20th Century: 
Late Lessons front Early Warnïngs European Environment Agency. Earthscan Pub-lications, London, 2002. ISBN 18-5383-893-4 Issued under the auspices of the European En-vironment Agency ( E E A ) , Late Lessons from Early 
Warnings uses a séries of 14 case studies—in the main examining the action of syntheticchemicalson human health and the environment—lo argue thaï products and processes that at one time appeared essentially benign were later proven to be harmful. In particular, the authors suggest that had indica-tions as to possible problems been heeded in a pre-cautionary manner at the earliest opportunity, society would hâve been spared ensuing costs and difficultés. They conclude with a call to learn 12 "late tessons" to guide scientîfic and regulatory policy in the future-Thèse include the need to act more swiftly, to incor-porate "lay and local knowledge" as well as "wider social interests and values" into the decision-making process, and for scientists to show "more humility." According to the E E A News Release of 10 January 2002, "The report should help to im-prove mutual understanding between Europe and the 
United States on the use of the precautionary princi-ple in policy-making." Certainly, it already appears to be having an impact on such discussions and this looks set to increase further now that the report has been re-published as a book by Earthscan Publications. How-ever, whether something is actually true simply be-cause it is well presented and repeated often enough, or because society acts as though it were real, is the key point for consideration. The editors are alert to possible problems, choos-ing to highlight for themselves the limitations of having only explored "false negatives" (assumed harmless—found harmful), as well as rather self-consciously describing their authors as "active partic-ipants" and noting in passing the need to avoid "the luxury of hindsight." Nevertheless, there is a distinc-tion to be made between drawing our attention to these issues and acting upon them. One methodological problem of merely examin-ing "false negatives"—if that is indeed what all these cases are—is that the many instances of concern ex-pressed in the past that turned out to have no conse-quence in the present arc inevitably ignored.1 If sci-ence or society were truly to act at the first suggestion of any problem, it is unlikely that we would have wit-nessed much technological or social development. The report identifies, for instance, how "the possi-ble therapeutic value" of X-rays derived in part from "the increasing number of reports of radiation in-jury."2 This suggests not only that it is impossible to seek to mitigate against all error, but that to do so is to preclude our ability to learn. If we are not to act until we know, then we preclude action altogether, for knowledge is itself necessarily reliant on action in the first place. Far from abusing the advantages of hindsight, many of the authors appear simply to have projected modern day sensitivities into the past. The fact that many of the instances of fatalities recorded in this volume—which it is argued should have acted as "early warnings"—occurred during the first half of the last century seems to gloss over the historical reality of those times. Certainly, there were many inexcusably 
1 Point made by Professor Ortwin Renn to Dr. Malcolm 
MacGarvin, one of the report's authors, at the workshop. The Ap­
plication of the Precautionary Principle in the European Union, 
held May 9-10, 2001 at the Centre of Technology Assessment in 
Baden-Wiimemberg. Germany. 
2 European Environment Agency. (2001). Late lessons from early 
warnings: The precautionary principle 1896-2000 (p. 31). Envi­
ronmental issue report No. 22, ISBN 92-9167-323-4. Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
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dangerous activities practiced but this ignores the fact that the precautionary principle itself is very much a product of our times.3 One can also not help but won-der whether the statistics cited could have had much of an impact in a period that witnessed a Depression and two World Wars. Constant references to chaos, complexity, intra-ctability, irreversibility, and interdependence would seem to be used as a means for confusing and con-founding issues, rather than clarifying or providing insight. Similarly, the cliche that absence of evidence is not the same as evidence of absence, ignores the fact that absence of evidence is precisely the only evidence we can ever expect to accumulate for the absence of harm. For a collection of essays preaching the virtues of humility, it is striking that few of the authors leave much room for doubt as to their own conclusions and that these should all agree with one another. The conclusions are somewhat predictable, having been flagged up in the title and rehearsed on many previous occasions.4 It appears almost as if the out-comes were agreed a priori and that the studies and data were used in reverse as a means for confirming these. Much of what is described as "lay or local knowl-edge" is better categorized as personal opinion or popular understanding. This should not be aggran-dized by being labeled as public "values " but be open to being challenged, interrogated, and altered in the same way as the science they decry. Indeed, if it were agreed to put these views on a par with scientific 
knowledge, the scope for identifying "false positives" (assumed harmful—found harmless) would be vast. Of course, science has never been value free, but presenting it as the outcome of competing sectional in-terests tends to highlight quantity and perception over quality and transformation. Far from being egalitar-ian, real exclusion begins when prejudice or opinion are taken to be a sound basis for decision making. Finally, it is ironic for a publication that calls for greater participation and transparency in scientific decision-making processes that so many of the au-thors and reviewers should have come from a similar background and yet be reluctant to identify this in their biographies. Maybe this explains why the com-ment by the chair of the report's editorial team that "over-precaution can also be expensive, in terms of lost opportunities for innovation and lost lines of sci-entific enquiry" appears nowhere within the report. For all that, the report contains some useful empirical evidence. Unfortunately, rather than be-ing an intellectual milestone, it merely reflects many of the confusions and equivocations now common among political, corporate, and even scientific institu-tions.5 The report's initiator, David Gee, has issued a "challenge" for others to identify "false positives" that are "robust enough" under close scrutiny. It will be imperative to take up this offer as soon as possible and to be bold rather than humble in doing so. —BillDurodié New College University of Oxford 
3 The European Commission "Communicalion from the Commis­
sion on the Precautionary Principie," COM (2000) 1, ñrst ap-
peared in February 2000. However. most authors (for example, 
Timothy O'Riordan & James Camero». (19V4). Interpreiing ¡lie 
precautionary principie. London; Cameron.or Ragnar Lofslcdt & 
David Vogel. (2001). Thechangingcharacterof consumerand cn-
vironmental reguiation: A comparison of Europe and the United 
States. Risk Analysis, 21(3), 399-405) only trace its origins back 
totheearly 1970s. 
4See, for exumple, O'Riordan & Cameron. (1994). ¡nterpretinglhe 
precautionary principie. London: Cameron, or Slern & Fineberg 
(Eds.). (1996). Undersianding risk: Informing dzeisions in a demó-
crata- society- Washington, DC: National Academy Press, or 
Stirling. (1999). On science and precaution in the management of 
technological risk. Sussex: SPRU, Univcrsity of Sussex. 
5See, for example. Roya! Commission on Environmental Pollu­
tion. ( 1 2 Ist report: Setting environmental standards. Cm 4053. 
London, or House of Lords. (2000). Science and society. Select 
Committee on Science and Technology, Session 1999-2000, Third 
Report, HL Paper 38. London. 
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The True Cost of Precautionary Chemicals Regulation 
Bill Durodié* 
This articlc cxpIores the possible social costs of introducing an overly precautionary regulatory 
regime for chemicals. It begins by examining rcsearch by the U K Medical Research Council 
Institute for Eiwironment and Health (MRC-IEH) , which suggests that the rcsourcc impli-
cations of the proposals contained in the European Commission Whitc Paper "Strategy for a 
Futurę Chemicals Policy"*1' are unrealistic and cven unrealizable. The article then focuses on 
contcmporary debates pertaining to endocrinc disrupting chemicals (EDCs) and goes on to 
question whether a "right to know" is always necessarily a good thing. or whether in ccrtain 
instances it can lead to a socicty that feels morę sorry than safe.(2) Finally, problcms relating 
to the representation and inclusion of public values in decision-making processes are raised 
prior to concluding with a cali for an ambitious orientation toward social change rather than 
a self-limiting obsession with safety. 
1. INTRODUCTION The European Commission White Paper, "Strat-egy for a Future Chemicals Policy," presented on February 27, 2001, identified an "overriding goal of 
sustainable development" and raised as "a cause for concern" the impact of chemicals on human heallh and the environment. It proposed a new single system, to be called R E A C H , for the Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of CHemicals, which have "proven or suspected hazardous properties" and are produced in volumes greater than one ton per annum. ( 3' In the spirit of a récent article by Chauncey Starr for this journal,'4' as well as my own work in this area/5' this article will examine what Starr called "the social cost of fear réduction." Starr was concerned that "some of today's hypothetical fear-based issues could develop into long-term doctrines that will be politically enduring, difficult to modify, and seriously destructive," comparing these to historical situations 
"arising from the amplification of a minor popular concern into an apocalyptic dogma." My earlier piece similarly suggested that "bring-ing up a génération of people in fear of everyday prod-ucts,questioning the abilityof science to improve their lives, and hence doubling the desirability of innova-tion and change, bas a social cost which has yet lo be calculated." I do not atlempt to quantify these losses as part of a risk assessment modeling process, but nev-ertheless these social costs should be clearly identified in order to bc mitigated against or prevented. There is, of course, no doubting the need for elear prioritics and purposes in the régulation of chemi-cals. However this article seeks to explore possible downsides of the récent flurry of activity in this area.1 Society should continuousiy strive to ensure that the produets and processes it uses are acceptable witbin thelimits of the knowledge available to it at any partic-ular lime. Whether this is achieved through the pro-posals presented by the Commission, as well as the 
Address correspondcncc to Bill Durodié, New College, Univer-
sily of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3BN: wil1iam.durodie@new.oxford. 
ac.uk, or Centre for Risk Management, King's College London, 
London WC2R 2LS; bill.durodie@kcl-ac.uk. 
i HPV Chemicals (High Production Volume) program of ihe 
OECD, the Endocrine Disrupior Screening Program ofthe U.S. 
EPA, or The Chemicals Sludy of the UK RCEP. 
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identification of hidden problems and costs, is the pur-pose of this inquiry. Ultimately, these matters are settled through po-litical debate and contestation taking the form of support for a "scientific" risk assessment/6* or calls for greater social equity through the application of a "precautionary" principle/7' As the sociologist Frank Furedi has indicated, the fact that safety has now become such a dominant practical and moral frame-work for society is historically contingent/8' It re-mains crucial, therefore, for all those interested in social progress and transformation to identify all the outcomes of proposed actions, including their oppor-tunity costs, irrespective of the claims and purposes of those promoting them. 
2. TESTING IMPLICATIONS Predictably, many of the responses to the White Paper have focused on the economic costs to busi-ness of imposing such a framework. I will not dwell upon these, as representatives from industry will no doubt present their own views on that matter. How-ever, a distinct line has also emerged from the U K Medical Research Council Institute for Environment and Health (MRC-IEH), based in Leicester/9' In a report commissioned by a U K Government Ministry, the then Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, D E T R (now the Depart-ment for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, D E F R A ) , and published in April 2001, researchers from the M R C - I E H questioned the actual feasibility of the Commission's proposals. According to this report, the requirement to test all chemicals produced in volumes greater than one ton per annum, or roughly some 30,000 substances, by 2012 is entirely unrealizable for a number of reasons. First, they identify a lack of testing facilities avail-able to perform the task. There would appear to be only 16 contract research organizations (CROs) within the European Union both capable and will-ing to do so. One could add to this that it is unlikely, contrary to the speculation of some/1 0' that these numbers could rapidly increase due to a greater de-mand coming from regulators. This is because we have for some time been witnessing a year-by-year decline in the number of graduate chemists emerging from universities. Thus, according to this report at least, the time scale proposed by the European Commission for sim-ply achieving base-level testing is unrealistic. Narrow-ing the sample size down to the 10,000 chemicals pro-
duced in volumes greater than 10 tons per annum could allow such tests to be achieved by 2017 (some five years later than the proposed schedule); other-wise it would take until 2048 to complete the full set. What's more, such basic tests would not cover some quite contentious and increasingly high-profile con-temporary issues, such as investigating for neurotox-icity or endocrine disruption, let alone allowing time for other higher-tier testing (such as for avian toxicity) or verification of the results by member states, Implicit to all of this would be a quite dramatic cost in terms of the number of animals required to perform the necessary experiments. The M R C - I E H estimate these to be in the order of 8.4 million rodents (45.8 million with the inclusion of offspring) and a further 4.4 million fish. To give some perspective to these figures, the report indicates that since 1981 when regulations were introduced to ensure the testing of all new chemicals introduced into the market and to test existing substances on priority lists, roughly 870,000 vertebrates have been used for such notifications. In conclusion, the report suggests that the costs anticipated by the Commission for such purposes to be wildly inaccurate and produces its own estimate of almost 8.7 billion euros, excluding reporting and verification. Accordingly, while one might usually favor seek-ing to obtain the greatest possible amount of evidence in deliberating upon most matters, there would appear to be a clear need in this instance to maintain some sense of perspective and priorities. This is especially so as most of the chemicals now being required to be tested have been in use for a quarter-century or more and have effectively acquired billions of hours of exposure data through consumption or use. Whether a truly holistic sustainability strategy— as the Commission upholds from the outset—would prioritize the removal of minute traces of those chem-icals suspected of being toxic to humans or the envi-ronment from high-dose laboratory tests on rodents over, say, the provision of a clean water supply to many millions of people in the developing world is a moot point/"' A common answer to this is that we should follow the wishes of the majority or "public values" in such matters—on which more later. In the meantime, and in the interest of balance, it is worth pointing out that the M R C - I E H report has not been without its detractors. Foremost among these have probably been Friends of the Earth (FoE), who define themselves in their own literature as "the most extensive international environmental network in the world." According to their response, prepared 
True Cost of Precautionary Chemicals Regulation 391 
jointly with the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), and Eurogroup for Animal Welfare, the M R C - I E H study is "fundamentally flawed."' 1 2' This is, according to the FoE authors, because only the 10.000 higher-production volume (HPV) chemi-cals will be tested in vivo and further it can be assumed that much data already exists for these, if only pro-tected by corporate property rights. In addition the M R C - I E H report is held to have ignored the possi-bility of testing elsewhere in the world despite the evidence of similar programs in the United States, Canada, and Japan, as well as the fact that some prod-ucts may be removed from the market prior to testing due to existing concerns as to their safety. The document goes further, suggesting that nonanimal testing methods such as in vitro assays or computer modeling using techniques such as quanti-tative structure activity relationships (QSAR), as well as simply evidence of persistence or bioaccumulation, would mitigate against the "large, unmanageable, in-crease in animal testing at prohibitive expense" Although it is possible that the M R C - I E H re-port presents worst-case estimates—an approach not uncommon to that used by the environmental move-ment or more generally advocates of the precaution-ary principle—it would appear that the latter points pertaining to nonanimal testing arc open to signifi-cant doubt, which is not evident from, and despite the stated preference given in, the White Paper to pro-mote these "as far as practicable." For instance, the European Commission itself has expressed concerns as to the use of in vitro data. Its Scientific Committee on Toxicity, Ecotoxicity and the Environment (CSTEE) recently discussed toxi-cological test guidelines and testing strategies, con-cluding that "reliance on in vitro assays for predicting 
in vivo endocrine disrupter effects may generate false-negative as well as false-positive results. Thus the de-velopment of in vitro pre-screcning test methods is not recommended." f U' Similarly, Dr, Leonard Levy, when presenting evi-dence on behalf of the M R C - I E H to the U K House of Lords recently, suggested that the European Commis-sion had if anything "underestimated the resources required to undertake such a mammoth task."'1 4' It is clear that in vitro tests capable of replacing in vivo studies while retaining the same level of scientific as-surance as to the hazard profile of a chemical are sim-ply not available, and are highly unlikely to become available within the time frame set by the European Commission proposals/1 5' 
Further, Levy points out that "obtaining mean-ingful exposure data is not quite so simple as implied" and whatever existing data may be available, it is un-clear as to how long it would take to be released, brought together, and assessed as to homogeneity and scientific quality. Europe has the largest chemical in-dustry in the world and in consequence a significant proportion of the world's contract toxicology capac-ity. Collaboration with countries examining different endpoints or using alternative test protocols cannot be guaranteed. The fact that further testing at the more detailed Levels 1 and 2 would be required for at least 5,000 chemicals (taking up to one year and 2.5 years, respec-tively, compared to the eight months necessary for Base set testing), and that the number of chemicals to be tested could actually be as high as 65,000, suggests that if anything, given the current rate of progress, the M R C - I E H calculation appears very much a best-case estimate/16' In concluding this section then, we should note some dispute as to the feasibility of the testing re-quirements contained in the White Paper proposals. Irrespective of who, how, or when, they are likely to place severe pressures on existing facilities and fu-ture resources for a period significantly in excess of a decade. 
3. ENDOCRINE DISRUPTION Endocrine disruption—testing for which, it is worth reminding ourselves, is not included in the resource estimates described earlier—has recently solicited significant attention, discussion, and contro-versy. It is cited as one of the key causes for con-cern by the European Commission in its White Pa-per. Yet, in the words of one researcher: "The study of chemically-induced endocrine disruption in mammals is a relatively new field of endeavour, and it has been assailed by an unusual level of disagreement amongst investigators."'17' The endocrine system is held to be that complex of processes whereby a number of fundamental bod-ily functions are kept in check through the action of an appropriate balance of hormones. An endocrine disrupter is, accordingly, any chemical that interferes with the synthesis, transport, binding, action, or elim-ination of the natural hormones that are responsible for homeostasis, reproduction, development, and/or behavior/1 8' Chemicals with such properties have become known by the popular media as "gender-bender" 
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chemicals, helping to generate many sensationalist headlines that cannot help advance a reasoned dis-cussion of thèse matlers.'1 9' This is particularly so be-cause, while little is known as to their true extent, action, or effect, what is elear is that such substances oceur naturally, and are ingested in concentrations many millions of times greater, in the food that we eat, as weil as at even greater doses through oral con-traceptives and hormonal thérapies/2 0' The U K Royal Society's own investigation into endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDCs), concluded that "the limited information available suggests that intake of exogenous oestrogenic Compounds would contrïbute little to the total oestrogen exposure of the fétus and would thus pose little, if any risk tothedevel-oping reproductive system" and, further, that "it could be argued that some exposure to environmental, man-made chemicals with oestrogenic properties could be potentially bénéficiai rather than potentially harm-ful ." ' 2 1 ' The same report noted that secular trends in growth and puberty are "most easily accounted for by différences in nutrition." Far from adding up to form a "lethal cocktail," as some would have it, it is evident that some sub-stances may inhibit the activity of certain estrogens by preferentially binding to, or competitivcly occupy-ing, the estrogen receptor and preventing more potent molécules from exerting their fuli effect/22' Certainly, a lack of funding and research into the more positive attributes of EDCs will delay such potentially fruitful avenues of investigation and their benefits. From a scientific perspective, a key problem has been the irrcproducibility of rcsults presented by cer-tain researchers in the field. Possible reasons for this variability include the use of diets known to be high in phyto-estrogens, species variations as well as strain variations in rodents, and the use of subeutaneous in-jection as an expérimental exposure method. Ashby has remarked: "The strengest assay response may not always be the most relevant response for human or wildlife risk assessment purposes." Evidently, it will continue to be difficult to reconcile assay outeomes until there is agreement as to a particular constella-tion of expérimental conditions. The conséquences of piling worst-case assump-tions onto worst-case data have previously been well documented in the case of phthalates that are used as softening agents in P V C . f 2 3 ) This approach led to a ban on products for which the possibility of a baby exceeding the recommended exposure limits was rig-orously determined to be "so rare that the Statistical likclihood cannot be estimated."'2 4' 
The ban even extended to phthalates that had not exceeded the standard, conservative margin of safety and prompted the chair of the C S T E E , Professor Jim Bridges of the University of Surrey. to comment: "I don't think the science issaying at ail that there's an immédiate risk." Erring on the side of caution in this instance led to restrictions on essentially benign and bénéficiai products and their replacement by some for which there was simply less toxicological évidence available/2 5' Some researchers have postulated the possibil-ity of low-dose erfects below the usual dose-effect threshold. But as Herman Staudenmayer reccntly remarked in a paper on this issue, accepting the low-dose response paradigm means accepting that "less is more, and more can be nothing at a i l . " ' 2 6 ' Arguing that absence of évidence is not the same as évidence of absence is a circular argument that ignores the fact thaï absence of évidence is precisely the only évidence we can ever expect to accumulate for the absence of harm. Nevertheless, campaigners now argue that the use of ail EDCs, and even substances merely suspected of being such, should be banned altogether on precau-tionarygrounds. For this they propose that restrictions should be determined on the basis of hazard classifi-cation alone. rather than risk assessments. The dis-tinction is vital and one upon which the White Paper appears equivocal. In "The E U Chemicals Policy" section of the White Paper we are informed that testing require-ments will "dépend on the proven or suspected haz-ardous properties, uses, exposures and volumes of chemicals produced or imporled." This is further ex-panded upon in the section "Knowledge about Chem-icals," wherc the distinction between hazard and risk through exposure is made clear. However, later sections on "Classification and Labeling" and "Infor-mation to the Public" wouldpppear to restrict requirc-menls primarily to "hazardous properties." As every toxicologist knows, ail substances pro-ducc an effect—it is the dose that makes the poison. The fact that a substance contains a toxin does not make it poisonous; if this was not true, all foods, which inevitably contain sait, a known toxin at high doses, would have to be banned. Similarly, labeling products on the basis of hazard alone would lead, for instance, to products such as contact lens cleaning fluid and cer-tain toothpastes being identified as potentially explo-sive on the basis that in high enough concentrations hydrogen peroxide—the active ingrédient in thèse— is also used as a rocket propellant. 
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Everything we do exposes us to hazards. It is how we do things, as well as how often, that determines the risk. The emphasis, promoted by some, on what could be, rather than what is, removes human action, understanding, competence, and will from the equa-tion. It naturalizes issues, making them appear wholly external to, independent of, and hence unalterable by us. This lends itself to an unrealistic exaggeration of harm. Worse, if we prioritize too many chemicals for testing, short of banning them all, we would effectively have prioritized none and hence we would continue to expose ourselves to those that should have been real priorities for analysis in the meantime. 
4. SOCIAL COSTS So far, I have addressed certain technical and sci-entific issues emerging from the White Paper and the discussion based around it. My main concern, how-ever, is to focus on a far greater social or hidden cost that these proposals entail. Unlike the economic costs, which may indeed be quite significant, the so-cial impact is likely to be more important—if harder to quantify. One common assumption in much of the current debate on issues relating to scientific reporting and decision making is that the public have a "right to know" and should be informed whenever and wher-ever there is any scientific uncertainty associated with products and processes. This "right" is mentioned in the White Paper and was recently reiterated by Euro-pean Commissioner David Byrne, who is responsible for the Health and Consumer Protection Directorate (DG SANCO) . ' 2 7 ' Its emergence has, however, been criticized by others "as asudden and political response to (he BSE crisis"' 2 8 ' Aside from the obvious fact that there is al-ways uncertainty, this "right" would appear to suggest that consumers should be permanently bombarded by reams of information in order "to know" or "make informed choices." There is, accordingly, an inherent difficulty in legally enforcing such arrangements— How much information? Who would be respon-sible for providing it? Where should it be made available?—although no doubt an army of lawyers and other experts are waiting in the wings to present consultant reports on such matters. But we should first examine whether a "right to know" is necessarily workable or beneficial in practice. The British general practitioner and medical writer Michael Fitzpatrick has argued, in relation to contemporary obsessions with testing for prostate 
cancer among young men in particular, that: "When clinics are swamped with the worried well, the really ill will suffer, a trend that is already apparent in many areas of the health service."'2 9' Ironically, while prostate cancer is mentioned in the White Paper, it is neither particularly preva-lent among that particular age group nor readily de-tectable, giving rise to a significant percentage of false positives. It is also the case, as Fitzpatrick explains, that treatment for it is barely effective, requiring in-trusive procedures that bring both guaranteed pain and significant risk to the recipient. Another example pertinent to the issue of chem-icals regulation relates to the widely reported growth in cases of testicular cancer, particularly, again, among young men. Here there is evidence for a doubling in incidence over the past 20 years, although, notably, this was from an extremely low base and—due to more effective treatment rather than prevention—the number of fatalities has fallen to below 100 per an-num in the United Kingdom alone, less than a third of the total it used to be some 40 years ago. Fewer than 40 in every million men in their late 20s will suf-fer from it. To put this into perspective, one woman in 10 will suffer from breast cancer at some time in her life. There has been a wide range of theories proposed, ranging from genetic to hormonal, environmental, and even cultural, as to why such rates may have in-creased. The only certainty is that nobody knows, and that the public health proposal of regular testicular self-examination is of little avail. If 50,000 men tested themselves regularly over 10 years it might save one life based on cutting the death rate by 50%, which would be an unusually high figure. In addition, apart from the waste of time and attention involved, the high level of misdiagnosis is more likely to cause need-less and extreme anxiety.'30' The public campaign around testicular cancer seems more like a high-profile, low-resource cam-paign that promotes the idea that good healthcare is about self-awareness rather than the availability— or lack of it—of doctors and treatments. Yet, despite this, the White Paper, presumably from a precaution-ary perspective, chooses to highlight purported links to EDCs, while admitting that "the underlying rea-sons for this have not yet been identified." The explosion of the "worried well" inundat-ing doctor's surgeries with demands subsequent to "awareness" campaigns is one consequence. Whether doctors would choose to prioritize their lim-ited resources accordingly, however, is questionable. 
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Effectively, enhanced awareness through a purported "right to know" not only diverts society's assets from where they arc most needed, but could also leave us feeling far more sorry than safe. These campaigns effectively sentence many hun-dreds of people to years of needless worrying and in-trospection. The "right to know" leads, in certain situ-ations at least, to nothing more than the promotion of unnecessary, unfounded, and unassuageable lifelong anxiety, bitterness, and cynicism. In fact, there is growing suspicion that we are lit-erally worrying ourselves sick over an ever expanding number of agents and activities within contemporary society/31* This is despite continuing evidence point-ing to our improved health and longevity over the last 30 years/32' Even the incidence of most cancers—after a period of increase, due largely to the achievements of enhancing longevity and improving detection rates through screening—are in steady decline. Of significant concern to public health in the contemporary period has been reported rises in the incidence of minor or neurotic psychiatric disor-ders, mostly depression and anxiety/33' Although this may well be a subjective phenomenon—like the worried well—these conditions are "associated with an increased likelihood of consulting a general practitioner," and hence have implications both for resources and our general well-being. Among these disorders have been the rise of so-called diseases of modern life' 3 4 ' such as CFS/ME (Chronic Fatigue Syndrome or Myalgic Encephalomyelitis), A D D (Attention Deficit Disor-der), PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder), and, of greater relevance to this article, MCS (Multiple Chemical Sensitivity). These illnesses have often falsely been charac-terized as being "all in the mind." However, it is quite evident that the sufferers present real symp-toms. The key area of dispute is as to the source of these symptoms. Unlike other diseases, victims claim a wide and disparate range of effects, including, in the case of MCS, headaches, sore throats, itchy eyes, coughs, tiredness, backache, gastro-intestinal distur-bances, dizziness, and anxiety, among others. Patients also present a wide range of personal theories as to how they came to be il l . Professor Simon Wessely, Professor of the Epi-demiological and Liaison Psychiatry at the Institute of Psychiatry, King's College London, is one of the world's leading experts in the analysis of such syn-dromes. In his work he has explored the correlation between those countries where there is a heightened 
awareness of potential chemical toxicity and the inci-dence of psychosomatic symptoms/35' Accordíng to Wesscly, Sweden, one of the coun-tries al the forefront of restricting chemical use within Europe/ 3 6' with a policy goal of making its environ-ment "toxic-free" by 2020, and the country that led the Commission in the preparation of the Chemi-cals White Paper, has one of the highest levéis of self-reported sensitivities to chemicals in the devel-oped world. It would appcar, then, that too much risk awareness can quite literally make you sick. Staudenmayer used double-blind placebo-controlled (DBPC) experiments to confirm the key drivers of somatic symptoms to be: beliefs, sugges-tion, vigilance, social amplificatiún, anxiety, and stress. More recently, a team based at the University of Leuven in Belgium has investigated the extent to which warnings about environmental pollution can directly facilitate the acquiring of symptoms in relation to chemical substanees.'37' Participants who had been given warnings about environmental pollution reported more symptoms to benign odors than thosc who had not. Advances in clinical psychology on the under-standing and management of health anxieties have also established, through empirical investigations and other clinical triáis, that repeated attempts at reassur-ance can serve to drive anxiety rather than assuage 
i t.(3S) These findingsallpointtoanextremelysignificant conclusión with widespread consequences and rami-fications for risk communication, awareness-raising, and the "right to know." That is, that official recog-nition of, and responses to, perceived problems— either through advocacy groups, public officials, or the media—provide confirming models through which people understand and articúlate their anxieties and often become the driver of real problems/3 9' It will be crucial in the period ahead, particularly in the aftermath of the events of September 11,2001, to unravel the broader effeets on social psychology of continuously clevating risk awareness in the ñame of transpareney and an individual "right to know," as opposed to taking a more measured approach to risk communication in the interests of broader social advance, cohesión, and well-being. 
5. PROCESSES AND VALUES Therc have been growing calis from many quar-ters to include public views or valúes into scientific decisión making. In the United Kingdom these have 
True Cost of Precautionary Chemicals Regulation 395 
included the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution/4 0' the House of Lords/ 4 1 1 the Parliamen-tary Office for Science and Technology/42' and the authors of an Economic & Social Research Council publication/*3' A n earlier exemplar from the United States is a 1996 edited compilation by Stern and Fineberg/4 4' Much of this discourse echoes the work of Sheila Jasanoff in the United States and Brian Wynne in the United Kingdom who, in a variety of articles/45' have explored what they consider to be the disparate cul-tures of specialist science as opposed to that of the public in general. The sociologist Ortwin Renn in Germany has separately studied mechanisms for rec-onciling these assumed differences through negoti-ated dialogic processes/46' although it should be noted that the purported effectiveness of these aims and methods have not gone uncontested/47' The White Paper itself steers clear of identify-ing with this agenda explicitly, preferring to call for more information to the public. However implicitly, in its drafting, the Commission paid heed to the crit-ics, consulting with a significant number of stake-holders "and in particular the NGOs representing consumer interests." Ironically, one of the criticisms that could be made of the Paper has been a lack of consultation with the contract research organizations (CROs), who would be the agencies in the front line should the proposed testing schedule ever see the light of day. Clearly, there is a tension between those who wish to include the public in order simply to keep them in-formed or on-side/4 8' as opposed to those who gen-uinely hold that the public voice is a missing element for establishing accountability through a better bal-ance of scientific and public values. This latter view appears to propose a narrowly empirical model of sci-ence whereby objectivity, or an approximation to it, is to be reached through an averaging-out process of competing interested parties. One significant difficulty for all concerned is as to how to include what is perceived to be an increasingly disengaged public into such processes. The claims made by NGOs, such as environmental campaigners or consumer advocates, to being representative of this wider audience have increasingly been questioned/4 9' At best such bodies have a passive membership com-prising a few percent of any national population, rang-ing in the major economies of the European Union from 1% in Ireland to 10% in the Netherlands/5 0' Whether directly belonging to such a lobby, or being a hand-picked and carefully vetted outsider sitting on a 
government established committee, such approaches remain broadly unsatisfactory as both the motivations behind them and their representativeness are open to question. To get around these limitations, there has in re-cent years been much greater emphasis placed on the use of quantitative research, such as polls and sur-veys, as well as qualitative research, including more in-depth interviews, focus groups, and other stake-holder dialogue forums. The danger here is well doc-umented. It includes projecting views and values through question-framing and/or selectively finding these self-same views and values among the responses. Even recording what is left unsaid 1 5 1' requires preju-dicial priorities among interviewers. Hence, there is a great danger that, rather than recording the wishes of the majority, as was sug-gested earlier, the inclusion of public views or values may merely record a small subset of these, which re-searchers look for and find reflected back at them. In the past, such views would have been labeled as public opinion. Opinions are open to being challenged, in-terrogated, and altered. Labeling these as values, on the other hand, appears to set them apart from further inquiry. But we should first ask whether science truly ben-efits from the inclusion of "lay opinion" or "public values" into its processes and decisions. Although sci-ence is necessary to inform democratic decision mak-ing within society, it is not in itself democratic. Sci-entists do not simply record or measure—they as-sess, infer, and prioritize. To relegate the experienced and considered judgments of scientists to being just a sectional interest dilutes the science, denigrates and demoralizes the scientists, and both patronizes the public and panders to the conceit of those who claim to know or represent their "values."'5 2' Of course, science has never been value-free, but maybe it should continuously strive to become so and to preclude, rather than to include, external in-fluence. Those from outside its institutions who have made major contributions to its development did not achieve this by introducing personal views and val-ues but rather by pointing to the assumed values of the establishment that needed to be removed, prov-ing their case through evidence and hence convincing their peers. It is for those who wish to see more values brought in, or writ large, rather than ignored, to justify them-selves further. Far from being egalitarian, it is real exclusion that begins when prejudice or opinion are taken to be a sound basis for decision making. 
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Ironically, in many instances, it is now corpora-tions, governments, and the scientific establishment itself that appear increasingly willing to takeon board such public views and values into the decision-making process. The reasons for this may be varied, includ-ing the misguided belief that doing so will thereby obtain greater regulatory stability. This may prove to be very shortsighted as policy determined from opin-ion is likely to prove far more unpredictablc than that based on évidence. Another possible and more per-verse motive is an unwillingness to be held to account independently and a préférence to deflect, diffuse, shift, or share the blame should things go wrong in the future/5 3' 
6. CONCLUSIONS The European Commission White Paper "Strat-egy for a Future Chemicals Policy" comes at a time when favorability toward the chemical industry in general is at a low ebb/5 4' Ironically, over the last decade this coincides with a period when the industry has done much to put its house in order, ¡ntroducing a range of initiatives, including attempts to audit prod-uct use and disposai across the fui! life cycle. Red list discharges—which record émissions of more noxious substances—have come down by more than 95%, re-portable accidents to employées and contractors have halved, to levéis below those of many other industries, while output has continued to increase. The industry is understandably concerned about its image and henee is examining ways, largely to do with greater transparency, communication, and infor-mation provision to the general public, to enhance this. Yet, clearly, public perceptions bcar little rela-tion to thèse efforts and rather more to ignoring the recommendations of scientists when thèse suggest the évidence gives little cause for concern'5 5' and a gen-eralized loss of trust in industry, scientists, and politi-cians alike. But if the reason for the poor image is not entirely self-generated, then it will not suffice to com-bine improved performance with sensitive promo-tion, consultation, and communication. Accordingly, adhering to the increasingly cautionary and restric-tive approach advocated by a precautionary or sus-tainable agenda may prove to be a mere short-term palliative as opposed to the more profound changes in social attitudes that may genuincly be required. Thèse would include a more balanced approach to under-standing the necessity of risk-risk tradeoffs, as well as 
a generally more positive attitude to the inevitability of change and the dcsirability of social progress. It would be unfortunate if, in their genuine as-piration to recréate public trust in science and in-dustry, political initiatives such as the White Paper ended up fomenting further discontent. By raising the specter of problcms at a time when thèse are in decline, and positing widespread testing that may be neither achievable nor necessarily désirable, there is a danger of feeding the climate of risk aversion rather than assuaging it. Although it is good that we no longer accept a culture of unquestioning déférence toward science, business, or the state, we should be wary of creating a culture of unneecssary fear, which may prove to be just as Hmiting and incapacitating in its stead. Rather than embracing the opportunités latent within uncertainty and change as did previous génér-ations, today we appear to reject them and highlight the risks. What may really have changed is not so much the scale of the problems that we face, but the outlook with which society perceives its difficulties, both real and imagined. These issues, while différent, cannot really be described as greater than those facing pre-vious générations, nor are they uniquely insurmount-able. But our collective will and imagination to resist and overeóme them appears to be much weaker. Life has become safer as human society has pro-gressed. We could turn our back on inventiveness and ambition, andget used to living within the limitations imposed by the cautious moral code of our time—or we could do Ihe opposite. I suggest the latter would be a better legacy for future générations. 
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Limitations of Public Dialogue in Science 
and the Rise of New 'Experts' 
BILL DURODIÉ 
Introduction 
On 18 June 2003, just before the first Strand of the U K government's 
three-strand (scientific, economic and social) inquiry into genetically 
modified (GM) foods was to publish its conclusions,1 The Times ran a 
little-commented-on one-column inch Statement behind its front page, 
entitled ' G M exclusion', that read as follows: 
Lord Sainsbury of Turville, the Science and Innovation Minister, is 
to have no say on the policy over G M foods, the Government said. 
His place at any Whitehall meeting to discuss the issue is to be taken 
by Nigel Griffiths, Minister for Small Business and Enterprise. (The 
Times, 18 June 2003, p.2). 
N o doubt many of the detractors of G M will have welcomed this déci­
sion. But is it a good thing that the one minister who knows something 
about thèse matters should participate no further in the decision-making 
process? 
Those who would argue that this was the right move to make, because 
Lord Sainsbury, who owns the supermarket chain bearing his name, 'has 
an interest' in this debate, seem to assume that we cannot separate or 
distinguish subjective interests from objective judgements. Indeed, they 
believe that there is no such thing as objective knovvledge in the first place. 
But if that were truly the case, why would 'independence' matter at ail? 
This approach to thèse issues, which appears to be becoming increas-
ingly widespread nowadays, is nothing more than a recipe for institution-
alised ignorance. 
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C o n f u s i o n s 
There has, over the récent period, been a growing clamour to include 
what are held to be 'lay values' in the scientific decision-making process.2 
This often takes the form of a demand for public dialogue. But this 
confuses two distinct issues or trends that have emerged over the récent 
period - the démise of political participation or engagement in society, 
and a growing disillusionment with science and its conséquences. 
Public participation in science seeks in part to restore some limited 
measure of legitimacy to the former, by forcing dialogue in the latter. One 
of the leading authorities of this tendency, Professor Brian Wynne, of the 
University of Lancaster, has made his assumptions and intentions clear in 
one of his major essays on the subject, 'May the sheep safely graze?'. For 
him, the aim is to explore 'the démocratie possibilities of science and thus 
of the reconstruction of politics' (1997: 47, emphasis added). In this essay, 
I argue that this is an inversion and confusion of that which is truly neces-
sary. We need to restore the centrality of and reinvigorate political debate 
first, if we are to generate a healthy interest in science. 
In fact, the 'démocratie possibilities of science' are pretty close to zéro. 
The sun does not revolve around the earth irrespective of how many 
people would vote that it appears so to them, and no matter where they 
were located on the planet, their gender, their ethnicity or how wealthy 
they were. 
Science is an unashamedly elitist activity. But it is an élite that is open 
to ail those with the time, interest, talent and initiative to pursue and 
develop it. Science is not value-free, but it should strive to become so, rather 
than seeking to include 'unheard voices' into its deliberative processes. 
L i m i t a t i o n s 
Public participation in science, as currently pursued and promoted by a 
variety of organisations and institutions, is problematic for four main 
reasons; 
Demoralising Scientists 
First, by demanding the inclusion of so-called 'lay opinions', it effectively 
marginalises actual scientific évidence and thereby leads to the demoral-
ization of scientists themselves. But science is not 'just another point of 
view\ It may be culturaliy situated, but this does not mean that it is only 
contextually valid. 
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Notably, Brian Wynne argues, in relation to the perceived need to 
include 'local knowledge' in science, that 'It is important not to misunder-
stand this as a claim for intellectual superiority or even équivalence for lay 
knowledges' (1997: 74, emphasis added). 
So what are we meant to conclude? That we include the public just to 
confuse matters, or simply to be différent? 
This relativisation and marginalisation of science now occurs at the 
highest level. For example, the UK government's own inquiry into the 
purported adverse health effects of mobile phones, convened under the 
chairmanship of Sir William Stewart, concluded that in future 'non-peer 
reviewed papers and anecdotal évidence should be taken into account' 
(Independent Expert Group On Mobile Phones 2000: 102) as part of the 
process for reaching décisions on thèse matters. 
This effectively fetishises information and opinion over évidence and 
explanation. It reflects and prioritises a narrow, empirical obsession with 
the quantity of views expressed over their actual quality. However, 
emphasising the local over the universal leaves us with no basis upon 
which to evalúate opinions or to pass judgement as to what really matters. 
This approach limits and constrains the dynamism of science, further 
facilitating the démise in its popularity. Today we see major académie 
departments having to close as they attract fewer funds and fewer 
students. It has also led to a form of constant equivocation on the part of 
those who ought to be making décisions. Many reports into controversial 
scientific matters today seem to conclude 'it's safe, but*. By this means, 
politicians, regulators and sadly, increasingly some scientists too, try to 
have it both ways. In effect, on an issue like G M foods for example, they 
are saying; 
We would like to develop G M , for ail the possibilities it provides, 
and in order not to miss out on the potential of this technology. We 
think, based on ail the évidence we have available before us, that 
there is nothing particularly wrong with it. But as we need to be seen 
to have consulted widely in order to preserve our fragile démocratie 
mandate, let's hear what you, the public, have to say. And let's orga­
nise some further trials as if there were a problem, even if no-one 
wil l be able to agrée upon the results. 
This approach led one commentator, responding to the latest report 
from the Royal Society on G M , to remark that the scientists were no more 
hésitant than before about G M itself - they had just become more hésitant 
about saying so (Gilland 2002). 
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That may be understandable. After all, scientists have been on the 
receiving end of a lot of adverse publicity over the last decade, ranging 
over all manner of things from BSE (mad-cow disease), to G M , to mobile 
phones and more recently, the controversy surrounding the M M R triple-
vaccine.3 
However, whilst it may make those who seek to re-invent themselves 
in such a way, as 'science in society' communicators, popular - courted by 
parliament, research councils, the media and social scientists alike - it is 
also little more than an act of moral and intellectual cowardice. 
Rather than saving their image or reputation and somehow restoring 
public trust, this approach is both symptomatic of and could further 
entrench the very demoralisation they seek to combat. It may indeed 
discredit those who engage in such activities and simply bring the individ­
uals concerned, and their once august institutions, into further disrepute. 
Patronising the Public 
The second major difficulty with calls for public dialogue in science is that 
they pander to popular prejudice and patronise the public. By having to 
make science more 'accessible' in order to be 'inclusive', this ends up by 
diluting the detail, eroding the evidence and trivialising the theory. This is 
not access to science but access to science as simplistic morality tales for a 
nervous society. 
For instance, much has been made over the recent period of the 
supposed link between exposure to the sun and skin cancer. We teach our 
children from an early age, even in the U K where the sun hardly shines, 
to cover up when they go outside to play, or to put on some increasingly 
high-factor sun creams. It has been a major public health campaign around 
the world, so one could assume that it must be true. 
But in fact the evidence is not clear cut. Most moles are benign, and 
basal-cell and squamous-cell cancers, that occur on exposed areas and 
cause concern, can relatively easily be treated. The real killer; malignant 
melanomas - that people worry about most - commonly occur on unex­
posed areas of the skin, and have little to do with exposure to sunlight. So 
we end up exaggerating the risk of treatable conditions and worrying 
about things we can do little about, all in the name of being more 'aware'. 
A case, amongst many others that could be pointed to, of making 
ourselves more sorry than safe. 
Another way by which the public is patronised is the contemporary 
obsession with having to listen to the 'voices of victims' or their relatives. 
This approach took off in the U K at the time of the inquiry under the 
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auspices of Lord Phillips into the BSE fiasco.4 This placed relatives centre 
stage to discipline the industry and civil servants concerned, a trend that 
has since continued with the public inquiries into the Alder-Hey Hospital 
human body-parts 'scandai' and the Bristol Hospital child cardiology unit 
'cover-up'. 
But why should this be so? Whilst we can ail sympathise with, and 
respect, the loss of the bereaved, whether this be through the incredibly 
rare variant CJD (the human form of BSE that has kilíed just under 150 in 
almost a decade), or some other tragedy, such terrible events provide 
those involved with no particular or special insight into pathology, health-
care reform or any other área of expertise. 
In actual fact, the public are neither particularly insightful in such 
matters and ñor are they particularly stupid. They are quite often ignorant 
of the facts and usually unmediated in their responses to them, displaying 
an understandable proclivity to prioritise emotion over reason. We should 
accordingly neither condemn or dismiss them; ñor, however, should we 
celébrate their views or pander to them. The greatest respect you can pay 
anyone in any form of debate is to challenge their understanding with a 
view to transcending it or moving it on. 
However, even the Royal Society's own first 'National Forum for 
Science' sought 'to ensure the participants feel that they have participated 
in the debate' (Feedback and Evaluation Summary, emphasis added).5 
This prioritisation of feelings shows the extent to which the process in 
thèse debates is considered to be far more important than the content 
itself. For the advocates of public dialogue, inclusion ends up trumping 
insight at every turn. 
Ironically, the more gestures the authorities make in this direction, 
whether through the form of establishing 'citizens' juries', 'focus groups', 
'stakeholder forums' or 'consensus conférences', the more we see that the 
public actually disengages from the real process of political contestation. 
It is a wonder that those who promote thèse forms of so-called 'participa­
tive democracy' have yet to notice. 
Elevating New 'Experts1 
The third problem with promoting public dialogue in science, as currently 
proposed, is that it flatters those who claim to represent the public or truly 
know what public opinion demands. Thus, a new breed of self-appointed 
'expert' has now emerged in all manner of fields from parenting to pollu­
tion. Indeed, you increasingly need to be an expert in expertise in order 
to know who to believe nowadays. 
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I have already examined the new role played by relatives of victims. 
Apart from being patronised, these have also gained an undeserved but 
privileged place to set, determine or change important agendas. 
There also exist now all manner of self-defined 'ethicists' who sit on a 
plethora of scientific committees deliberating over the issues of the day. 
Indeed, one astute commentator recently remarked, at the time of the 
50th anniversary of the discovery of D N A , that it was amazing that Crick 
and Watson had managed to do what they did without first having to have 
it cleared by an ethics committee.6 
In these new arenas we can observe one of the more visible successes 
of recycling today. The clergy, 500 years on from debating Galileo, and 
often in difficulty filling their own places of worship, now seek to pontif­
icara again to us all over everything from G M to human embryos. They 
may be qualified to preach to the faithful, but certainly not to scientists 
and the rest of us as to the rights and wrongs of major issues. The problem 
is that their views are not rooted in, or disciplined by, experience, or any 
particular relevant expertise. 
We have also witnessed the inexorable rise of the risk managers. These 
believe that the solution to all of these debates is simply to quantify every­
thing. Here I have some sympathy with science's detractors, although they 
may not have fully understood that this phenomenon is itself merely a 
positivist reaction to the school of thought that holds that everything is 
'just an opinión' , 
There are also a growing number of social scientists who believe that 
they know what it is that the public wants, or at least that they have the 
means for extracting it from them. Brian Wynne has described his own 
technique as recording what gets said, as well as 'what is not being said'.7 
This would seem to provide him with tremendous latitude to conclude 
anything at all. Others seek to provide 'a voice' for those who do not have 
one - animáis, the environment, children or future generations. This abil-
ity to speak on behalf of the dumb, the inert, the innocent and the uncon-
scious, provides them with a tremendous unelected constituency as well as 
an incredible opportunity to project their own prejudices and views onto 
the debate. 
However, another problem with all of these new self-appointed 
voices of authority, whether they be relatives, ethicists, risk managers 
or social scientists, is: why should we believe them? It is often 
remarked that as a society our level of trust in politicians, corporations 
and scientists is at an all-time low. But why trust the new auditors? 
Who audits them?8 
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It is worth pointing out the extent to which the issue of 'trust' has 
become one of the key components within these debates, as there are two 
significant, but quite distinct, ways this term is used (Durodié 2003a). 
When I say that 'I trust you' to do something, this usually implies a degree 
of confidence in your abilities based upon my expérience of your compé­
tence at getting related tasks completed in the past. It is a kind of proba-
bilistic, rational calculation as to the outcome.9 
However, when somebody says 'trust me', they usually mean some­
thing eise. It is a paraphrase for 'let me be', in a situation where there is 
no prior évidence to go on. Trust, in this more authentic and stronger 
sensé, is a demand for freedom based on the suspension of reciprocal 
calculation. It nécessitâtes respecting the autonomy of others and as it 
inevitably occurs around an unknown it requires taking a risk. 
But if trust nécessitâtes risk, then the constant demand we face today 
to regúlate risks precludes the granting of trust, as well as narrowing the 
scope for genuine innovation. Sadly, today we demand constant reassur­
ances from those in authority, but we neither trust those who provide us 
with this, ñor allow them the latitude necessary actively to restore that 
trust. 
Deflecting Blame 
Finally, public dialogue in science deflects blame from those whom we 
ought to hold to account and, far from making matters more transparent, 
it ends up by further politicising the decision-making process. Public 
dialogue allows the authorities to claim that we were all consulted should 
things go wrong in the future, but it is also an abdication of responsibility 
and leadership by those best placed to decide. 
Nowadays, Doctors are increasingly expected to provide us with an 
'informed choice' in matters relating to how we are to be treated for 
particular conditions or ailments. This appears to challenge the tradi-
tional hierarchy of knowledge and to 'include' us in the process. 
However, it also allows those who ought to know best to avoid having to 
pass judgement themselves. For people who are i l l , there is rarely a good 
time to make such décisions and they can never be as informed as those 
who have spent a lifetime practising for such moments and rehearsing 
the options. 
Ironically, we now see this growing demand for science and scientists 
to be held to account, emanating from politicians and officiais who are 
increasingly not. This lets them off the hook and makes for bad science in 
the process. 
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Also, as so-called public panels are invariably vetted, approved and 
appointed by those in authority, this process allows for greater political 
interférence. The Bristol and Aider Hey inquiries mentioned earlier are a 
case in point. They may have appeared as an exercise whereby arrogant 
scientists and hospital consultants were made to listen to the public, but in 
fact the agenda had been set a long time before, in Professor Ian Kennedy's 
1981 Reith lectures The Unmasking of Mediane (Kennedy 1981). 
Professor Kennedy went on to be a major advocate and campaigner for 
reform of the médical profession and he headed-up the Bristol inquiry, the 
outcome and manner of which went on to influence that at Aider Hey. In 
fact, the so-called public, who intriguingly echoed almost precisely the 
government line on thèse matters, were unwittingly wheeled out to fulfil 
their rôle and even funded by those who sought the reforms they appar-
ently supported (Appleton 2001). 
Ironically, the demand for openness, transparency, accountability and 
elevating the centrality of uncertainty in ail things seems to corne from 
those who are most prone to continuously obfuscate and are the most 
prescriptive in their conclusions. They posture as radical and démocratie 
but actually they oppose real change and stifle innovation and ambition. 
Conclusion 
As the aspiration for real social change has receded, so science has been 
inflated in terms of import and impact, out of ail proportion. This has 
been both by those who see science as a danger as well as by those who see 
it as the solution to everything. Brian Wynne argues that the 'increasing 
dependence on the scientific has given science a new rôle ' . In fact, it is the 
failure of politics that has done so. 
We should not include 'lay values' or 'local knowledge' into science, 
peer review or anywhere eise, as there is no such thing. These are in fact 
mere opinions that need to be interrogated just as much as the scientific 
évidence itself. Labelling them 'values', as many now seem prone to do, is 
in fact a conscious attempt to set this debate off-limits by suggesting that 
we should not offend people's values.10 
But science is not about making us feel good about ourselves. It can 
reveal some quite disconcerting truths. lndeed, we owe a debt to those 
who, in the past, were prepared to put their heads above the parapet of 
perception, préjudice and power, in order to expose the real workings of 
the world. This was not done by accommodating to majority, or even 
minority, views. 
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Having said that, mavericks do have a role to play within science. But 
this is by ruthlessly revealing assumed values and eliminating them, rather 
than by importing a few more of their own into the debate. Above all eise, 
mavericks need to corrobórate their évidence and convince their peers." 
We should move away from our growing obsession with the impact of 
science upon society and begin to examine a bit more critically the impact 
of society upon science. This is especially so in a society that faces no 
greater difficultés, or complexities, than in the past, but that despite this, 
has lost its sensé of ambition, of the need to develop a broader vision and 
of the paramount importance of the will to explore and experiment, a 
society that appears so riddled by self-doubt and cynicism that it has 
become afraid of taking risks and henee unable to establish trust. 
Sadly, unlike in the past, when change largely coincided with periods 
of social optimism or mass political engagement, what we have today is a 
fear of change that stems from social pessimism and mass political disen­
gagement. It is this that wil l need to be addressed if we are to restore the 
primacy of science. Thus, irrespective of whether we benefit or not from 
a scientifically more literate public, the more important process of re-
engaging the public cannot be forced and wil l need to derive from advo-
cating a broader social vision. 
There has never really been what one could cali 'Science Wars', 1 2 
fought through to a conclusion. There may be no better time to start them 
than now. 
A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S This essay builds substantially on a short opinion pièce I originally had published in the 
Times Higher Education Supplement in April 2002 {Durodié 2002). This in turn sought to highlight one particular aspect of a paper I presented to the Demoralization: Morality, Authority and Power conférence, held at the Universiry of Cardiff School of Social Sciences 5-6 April 2002 (available at (http://www.cf.ac.uk/socsiynews/dmap/papers/Durodie.pdf))-The argument was then refined for a talk at the International Book Festival in Edinburgh that year, and this was subsequently reproduced on the Spiked web-site «http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/00000006D9F2.htm). In May 2003 I was invited by the Parliamentary Office for Science and Technology to présent my views on thèse matters as parr of the third anniversary célébrations of the publication of the influential House of Lords Science and 
Society report. In its current form, the article is the transcript of a talk I gave on 29 June 2003 to the Ideas, Intellectuaís and the Public conférence, organised by the London-based Institute of Ideas at Goodenongh College, London. I am grateful to all concerned for the opportunity they afforded me to help develop my views. 
NOTES 1. The three-strand inquiry coordinated by the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) was announced by Environment Secretary Margaret Beckett 
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on 26 July 2002 in response to advice from the Agriculture and Environment Biotech-nology Committee (AEBC). Further details can be found at <http://www.defra.gov.uk/ environment/gm/debate/index.htm). 2. See for example Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 1999; House of Lords 2000; Parliamentary Office for Science and Technology 2001; Hargreaves Sc Ferguson 2001. 3. M M R stands for Measles-Mumps-Rubella. A major debate over the safety of this vaccine was generated subsequent to the allegations by a surgeon, Andrew Wakefield, that it may be linked to a rise in autism amongst infants. For an excellent critique see M . Fitzpatrick ' M M R : the truth?', and other articles linked therefrom, at (http:// www.spiked-online.com/Articles/00000006DCD6.htm). 4. BSE stands for bovine spongiform encephalopathy, otherwise known as 'mad cow disease', a degenerative brain disorder held to have been caused by feeding animal protein to ruminants and to lead to cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, a similar and fatal condition amongst human populations. 5. Do We trust Today's Scientists?, National Forum for Science, Royal Society, London, 6 March 2002. 6. Dr Michael Fitzpatrick, speaking in the opening plenary of the Genes and Society Festi-val organised by the London-based Institute of Ideas at Battersea Arts Centre in London, 26-27 April 2003. 7. Comment made at the Risk, Democratic Citizenship and Public Policy conference, Brit-ish Academy, London, 6-7 June 2001 8. On this issue, see O'Neill 2002 or {http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith2002/). 9. This is defined as 'confidence' rather than trust by Seligman (2000) 10. I have previously argued this with respect to the proposed new European Commission system for regulating chemicals (Durodie 2003b). 11. Like Barry Marshall, the Australian junior doctor who hypothesised a link between 
Heliobacter pylori infections and stomach ulcers. He proved the link by administering both the complaint and antibiotic treatment to himself, not once, but twice for good measure. 12. This is to draw an analogy with the so-called 'Culture Wars' which occured on US campuses in the 1980s around the contents of the proper canon to teach students. These would also need to be reinvigorated and drawn through to a more progressive conclu-sion if we are to move forward as a society. 
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Letter to the Editor Regarding Chemical White Paper 
Special Issue 
Bill Durodic* 
In a recent speech al their annual science festival, the President of the British Association for the A d -vancement of Science referred no less than 16 times to how things appear, or how they are perceived.^ His argument was that Ihese public perceptions need to be incorporated into the risk management process for society to restore its trust in.the scientific decision-making process. In a similar vein, Michael Rogers in his article points to the "perceived need for a new regulatory 
framework for chemicals " referring us to the Eu-ropean Commission's review that indicated "wide­
spread public concern about the effects of chemicals on 
human health and the environment." Similarly, Inger Schorling suggests that for various diseases "a link to 
chemical exposure seems likely," and Ragnar Lofstedt alludes to "the image of a 'non-toxic society'," 1 was brought up to think that it was the role of science and the responsibility of scientists to expose the real relations behind the appearance of things. If the world were as it seems there would be no need for science, while public policy based upon appearance is little more than bigotry, In the long run this can have quite devastating consequences. Unfortunately, those in our society charged with pointing to the hidden depths behind the surface of things seem increasingly unwilling to challenge peo-ple's prejudices. Among these I would include politi-cians, regulators, and businesses who in some shape or form have come to rely on a popular mandate, rather than a principled position, for their own survival. Sadly, some scientists also have all too readily absorbed the modern dictate for "inclusivity" and 
* Address correspondence lo Bill Durodic, Senior Research Fel­
low. International Policy Inslitute, King's College London,Strand, 
London WC2R 2LS, UK; bill.durodie@kcl.ae.uk. 
"dialogue" in the vain hope of somehow relegit-imizing their activities. In fact, whether the public is truly concerned about many of these issues, as the Cambridge philosopher Onora O'Neill pointed out in her recent Reith Lecture series, actually re-mains to be determined.^ Their behavior suggests otherwise. The media have in their turn made much of these deliberations and confusions, although I would hardly blame them for this in the absence of informed scien-tific debate. After all, it should be part of the remit of any scientist to ruthlessly analyze and criticize the work of others in his or her field. For if we cannot trust the experts to do this we invariably fall back upon all manner of self-appointed journalists, ethicists. risk communicators, and, tragically in some instances, the relatives of victims, whose expertise in such matters is necessarily vague. I find it quite striking that none of the other ar-ticles in this issue seek to situate this drive to pan-der to an assumed public mood within its historical context. Things were not ever thus, and it is the ner-vousness and defensivencss of the elites in the face of their own evidence and electorates that should be the true cause for concern among committed rationalists and democrats. Jean-Philippe Montfort's article is a case in point, suggesting as it does that the Commis-sion's proposals are "not properly balanced" rather than fundamentally flawed. Forget chemicals, why not call for all food sub-stances to be tested, both alone and in combination with one another? After all, many of these display far greater activity as carcinogens and endocrine disrup-tors. Of course, the reason we should not is that food, along with many of the chemicals under scrutiny, has literally billions of hours of exposure data available through our everyday use and consumption. 
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Fetishising natural products over manufactured ones is hardly an excuse, ignoring as it does the extent to which food is essentially manufactured nowadays anyway. But also, such an outlook seems blind to the fact that nature itself remains by far one of the greatest risks we face on a daily basis and that our créations, on the whole, hâve reduced thèse risks for us. Ragnar Löfstedt seems to overlook this fact when pointing to the "unique side effecls" (all negative in his telling here) of industrialization. No doubl, industry will point to numerous prob-lems of définition in thèse articles. Who is to décide what is meant by "clean" "sustainuble" "flourishing" 
"balanced" "varied," "magnificent" and "safe"! And how will they décide? There is enough material here to keep an army of lawyers, bureaucrats. and consul-tants busy for a long time. Further, if industry is to provide the évidence in order to reducc the regula-tory bürden, then the fact that it is not trusted merely stores up problems further afield. But I want to corne back to the main point of my own essay, which is that it is the hidden costs of thèse dcvelopments, in terms of framing social responses to exploration and expérimentation, that may prove to bc the greatest. Mösl of the authors refer to the growth of allergies over the récent period without stopping to question why this may be so. ïn fact there is plenty of évidence to suggest that the définition of what counts as an allergy has been significantly expanded to in-clude what in the past would have been considered to be a mild intolérance. Further, there is much work from the field of psy-chosomatic medicine to suggest that social signais as 
to potential problems associated with chemicals lead to the development of real Symptoms. A case, as I have suggested, of society literally worrying itself sick. I refer the reader to a récent paper published by a team at the University of Leuvcn in Belgium in this regards.(3> Inger Schörling in particular seems keen to em-phasize the "complexities" "uncertainties," and "m-
detenninacies" wilhin science that lead, she suggests, to proof being "virtually unobtainable." This profli-gate terminological obfuscation does not seem to hold her back from her own convictions though, as with thèse "unobtainuble" proofs she nevertheless con-cludes that "exposure to chemicals undoubtedly con-
tributes" to the diseases to which she refers. It seems somewhat churlish, but nevertheless nec-essary, to remind her that in science, as in ail things, we can proceed to understanding what we do not know only from the basis of what we do know. What is? is a more fundamental question than What if? Otherwise, we base our actions to what we don't know as if we did know and thereby open the door to real risk and reaction. 
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Section 2 I n v i t e d c o m m e n t s 
Bill Durodié 
P r e d i c l i n g i h c l u l u r c is ; i thankless task. It is c a s i c r lo p l a y safe l l i a n l o 
accurately d i s c c r n long t c r m trends, a n d history is l i l l c r c d with cvenls 
a n d discovcries that transforrned s o c i c l y b u t n o n c c o u l d f o r e i c l l . In 
fací, fulurotogy i n v a r i a b l y iclls us i n o r e a b o u i w l i c r c w c are n o w . l l i c 
forecs a n d trends t h a i s h a p c us, i h u n i i c a n c v e r say a b o u t w h a l is to 
c o m e . C o m c m p o r a r y obsessions Icnd to be p r o j c c l c d forwards a n d 
a m p l i f i c d , w l i i l s l p o p u l a r p r e j u d í c e c a n p r c c l u d c focusing o n rnorc 
c o n i e n t i o u s or u n c o m f o r l a b l c analyscs oí' l l i c present. 
T h u s , a n a t t c m p l to n i a p out the 'drivers o f socictal c h a n g e ' (p. 366) 
over a 2 0 - y c a r p e r i o d to u n c a r t h the futurc o f risk m a n a g e m e n t 
s h o u l d be considered l o be cither f o o ü i a r d y or b r a v e . AL first sight it 
w o u l d a p p c a r that tliosc i n v o l v e d in this c o l i a b o r a t i v c rescarch 
p r o j e c l i n v o l v i n g the Journal of Risk Rtsearch¡ K í n g ' s C o l l c g e C e n t r e for 
R i s k M a n a g e m e n t , S h e l l I n t e r n a t i o n a l L i m i t e d , the U K H e a l t h a n d 
Safety E x c c u t i v c , Eléctricité de F r a n c o a n d the E u r o p e a i i í ' a l c n t 
O f f i c e are at the very lcast r i s k - l a k c r s . But , as they themselvcs s h o u l d 
note, appearances c a n be d e c e p l i v e . 
A s the slartitig poinl. for this e n d e a v o u r is nccessarily (he here a n d 
n o w , eme c a n salely assume thal i f this is not a c c u r a t c l y described a n d 
d e l e r m i r i c í l , then all lliat follows suilcrs a c c o r d i n g l y . L í n í ' u r U i u a l c l y , 
Rishvorhl 2020 utierkieaily repcats m a n y o f the assiimptious, aphorisms, 
p l a l i l u d e s a n d prejudices Lhal c u r r c n l l y i n f o r m i h c risk discaurse. T h e 
single key q u c s ü o n here s l i o u l d have b c e r i ; ' D o p c o p l e ' s p e r c c p l i o n s 
o f ri.sk, match the r c a l i l y of the dangers thcy f a c e í ' Y e i it. has not 
c l e a r l y been askcd. 
Instcad, wc are treated to i h c usual Hlany o f a s s u m c d p r o b l c m s from 
: t h c cíTccts of climatc c h a rige' (p. 370), t h r o u g h ' f i n a n c i a ! c o n t a g i ó n ' 
a n d 'nevv scourges such as U S E ' (p. 373), tu ' s w c l l i n g p o p u l a l i o t i s * l h a l 
' c r é a l e g r o w i n g dependeney' (p. 37fi), ' w o r k - r c l a l c d stress' (p. 391) 
a n d even U S ' h e g e m o n y (p. 375). T h e fací l h a l B r i l a i n was w a r m e r 
d u r i n g the R o m á n p e r i o d Lhan today is p r c s u m a b l y irrelevant, as is 
ihe sorry tale of thosc w h o d í c d f a l l i n g d o w n (he stairs over the last 
d e c a d e , a n d w l i o o u l n u m b e r l l i c h u m a n v i c l i m s o f m a d c o w diseasc. 
T h e riotion l h a l m o r e p c o p l e o n l l i c p l a n e l c o u l d o f í c r us m o r e 
s o l u i i o n s is not even envisaged. 
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A l o n g w i t h i h c usual risk suspects, words such as ' c o m p l e x ' or 
'non - l i n e a r ' are uscrl whenever diere is a need lo evade Lhe debate a n d 
as a cover for ignorance. W c Uve. wc are t n l d , i n ' a n era o f i n c r c a s i n g 
c o n n c c t i v k y a n d b e w i k l c r i n g c o m p l e x i t y ' (p. 372). N e v e r m i n d lhe 
i n d u s t r i a l a n d i n n o v a t o r y s l o w d o w n wc liavc witnessed sinec. the carly 
1970s, or oui* g r o w i n g sensé of a l i é n a t i o n a n d p o l i t i c a l purposelcss-
ness. A r g u a b l y , people tead far m o r e disconnected lives today t l i a n in 
previous g é n é r a t i o n s , as all m a n n e r of f o r m a l a n d i n f o r m a l networks 
have fallen by lhe waysidc. a n d i l is Lhis thai shapes o u r perceptions o f 
risk. It w i l l be a m a j o r lask over the c o m i n g decade to untangle lhis 
i n i s b - m a s h o f e o m p l i c i t y , confusion a n d p r é j u d i c e . 
C l e a r l y , the crisis oí confidence l h a l i n f b m i s ÜiLs agenda, w h l c h is often 
a n d quite wrongly presented as having ticen driven by cnvironmcnlalisi.s 
a n d c o n s u m e r activists, started from lhe very top oí' socicty. I l was 
w h e n lhe élite, c h a r g e d w i t h r u n n i n g o u r w o r t d . w i l h ail ils probletns 
a n d c o n i r a d i c l i o n s , l a c k e d their o w n vision for lhe future or a l t e r n a -
tives l o p i t c h thcmsclvcs a g a i n s l , thaï things began l o go w r o n g . T h i s 
manifested i t s c l f as an i n a h i l i t y to lead i h r o u g h a g r o w i n g reluctance 
lo a c c c p l rcsponsibilii .y . 
O u r leaders a r c all too awarc of die p r o b l c m s of socicty but lack 
insight a n d c o u r a g e as lo how thèse m i g h t be resolved. T h e fisc of risk 
consciousness rcpresenls acquiescence lo this imperfect wortd. It implies 
that socicty has p r o b l c m s that c a n n o i be solved, o n l v m a n a g e d . S u c h 
an outlook is c x p l i c i t l y stalcd in the RiskicorUi report: ' T h e i l l u s i o n d i a t 
we c a n c o n l r o l risk is b e i n g replaced by a r é c o g n i t i o n that wc c a n 
o n l y navigatc a n d adapt to risk' (p. 387). 
T h u s , l a c k i n g a v i s i o n of the future, thu élite have c o m e Lo v i e w their 
role as the m a n a g e m e n t of risk in the l iere a n d n o w . T h e stralcgy is 
not to solve l h e p r o b l e m s o f socieiy , b u l to c o n t a i n i h e m - o f l c n by 
an ever-closcr r é g u l a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l b e h a v i o u r . B u t this a p p r o a c h is 
fraught w i i h p r o b l c m s . I l is a n é g a t i v e p h i l o s o p h y ttial encourages 
passivity a n d w h i c h , r a l l i e r l h a n a t t e m p t i n g i o unité p c o p l e a r o u n d 
a v i s i o n or cause, tends lo scarc l l i c m by d r a w i n g attention to their 
i n d i v i d u a l v u l n e r a b i l i t y . 
A l s o . by s e t l i n g n p lhe rote oT p o l i t i c a l leadership as Ltie a b i l i t y LO 
c o n t a i n risk, i l exposes the inability of s o c i c l y ' s leaders lo d e l i v e r a safe 
w o r l d . T h i s encourages c y i i i c i s m a n d deepens doubts a b o u l the Icgiti-
m a c y o f the élite. T h i s l e g i t i m a c y hangs in the balance. W i l h n o v i s i o n 
a n d no p r o g r a m m e , therc is no rcason for o u r p o l i t i c a l leaders lo bc 
wherc they are except the w i l l o f the électorale. But Lhe électorale 
have become i n c r c a s i n g l y disengaged as risk averse politics s i m p l y 
lakes Lhe f o r m o f i c e h n i c a l m a n a g e m e n t fronted by d i f f e r i n g a n d 
f a i l i n g p c r s o n a l i l i e s . 
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M i s t r u s t cnsucs as fear has been used to foster c o h é r e n c e b u l ihe 
a b i l i l y to p r o l e c l is always f o u n d l a c k i n g . T r u s i i n g n o b o d y al the top, 
i n d i v i d u á i s ' actual isolation in ihe very opposite o f a n c i w o r k e d w o r l d , 
makes thein very exposed to every new scarc or p a n i c - whether it is 
issued by the a u t h o r i l i c s , c a m p a i g n g r o u p s or a n y b o d y eise. A n d the 
c y n i c i s m of poliiicians, means ihat i h e r e is l i u l e antidote for thèse 
p a n i c s . A scared society m a y c o n t i n u a l l y seek ofTicial reassurance, but 
increasingly, i l does not trust this a d v i c e . 
W h e r i it comes to l l i c issue o f trust, live r e p o r t lacks teeth. ' S o c i e t a l 
Irusl ' w e are i n f o n n e d , L is i m i l t i d i m e n s i o n a l a n d ils m a i n c o m p o n e n t s 
are considered to be Lransparency, c o m p é t e n c e a n d elficiency' (p. 393). 
In fact. trust quite sirnply comes f r o m a c t i o n a n d iL is fear o f action 
that precludes trust. A s a i l actions iiecessarily e n c o m p a s s the great 
bogey of risk managers; 'unforeseen conséquences1, then trust cornes from 
takJng risks. Instcad o f p a s s i v c l y a n d l i m i d l y a s k i n g ' W h o w i l l s o c i c l y 
trust tn Crame risks?' (p. 393), the reports a u l h o r s c o u l d m o r e b o l d l y 
h a v e asserted thaï ' w h o cakes risks, trusts s o c i c t y ' . 
T h e d e m a n d for trust today h i g h l i g h l s the g u l f b e l w e e n p e r c e p t i o n 
a n d realiiy as new technologies have i n v a r i a b l y i m p r o v e d a n d saved 
m o r e lives t h a u they have i m p a i r e d or d e s t r o y e d . P u b l i c scepticism o f 
this is s y m p i o m a t i c of a b r o a d e r disench a n i m e n t with social progress 
rather than the actual i m p a c t of d e v e l o p m e n t . It is an expression o f 
the conternporary world's difficulties i n a s s i m i l a t i n g c h a n g e r a l l i e r 
than c o m p l e x i t y , w h i c h tends l o be e x p e r î e n c c d a n d presented today 
as a negative, purposcless force b e y o n d h u m a n c o n t r o l . W h e n people 
rcact againsi c h a n g e , l l i c y ncccssarily c h a n n c l this t h r o u g h t a r g e l i n g 
specific innovations. 
In this, I find m y s c l f i n a g r e e m e n l with jnst a c o u p l e o f lines in ihe 
report: 'signal events o r catastrophes have gréa ter salience a n d ael as 
l i g h i n i u g rods a r o u u d w h i c h widespread dissaiislaction a n d disalfeciion 
c a n coalesce. As a resuit, risk lias b e c o m e a c o d e 1 (p. 381). 13ui here 
il is disengagement l h a l is ihe real p r o b l e m , r a l l i e r i h a n ' i t i c q u i l y ' . 
I n n o v a t i o n is ncccssarily a b o u t e n g a g i n g w i l h u n c c r t a ï t i t y . 'Chat is 
w h y cmpliasistng i m s l w i l l prove c o u u l e r p r o d u c t i v C a n d o n l y fuel 
d e m a n d s that cannot bc assuaged. If the i i t i d c r l y i n g cause o f l ! ic 
d e m a n d for trust is a socially d r i v e n scepticism to c h a n g e , then ils 
absence can have no t c c h n o l o g i c a l s o l u t i o n . 
T a u n d c r i l a n d this, it is w o r t l i e x p l o r i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n between trusL 
a n d confidence. A s Professor A d a m B. S c l i g m a n o f Boston Univci'sity 
argues i n onc of the most i l l u m i n a t i n g studios o f this question (77/c 
Problem oj Trust, P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i i y Press, 2000).. trust is not about 
expected outeomes. Il a t r u s l i n g act was based u p o n such calculations 
or on quantifiable r a t i o n a l expectations i l w o u l d not be an act of 
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trust at all . but a i l act o f c o n f i d e n c e . It is i h c suspension o f r e c i p r o c a l 
c a l c u l a t i o n that truly etiaracteriscs trusting rclationships. 
T h i s is the basis of a fundamental différence between trust in people a n d 
c o n f i d e n c e i n institutions or t e c h n o l o g i c a l Systems. W i i h regard to o u r 
interpersonal relationships wc act as free i n d i v i d u a l s a n d recognise in 
others their free agency as w e i l . But when we aci in p r e d e f i n e d ways, 
trust is not called for, n o r established. T l m s the origins of trust are rooted 
in o u r r é c o g n i t i o n o f the f r e c d o m of others to act freely. T h i s f u n d a -
mentally social act allows us to act outside of p i c d e l i n e d o r ascribed 
rôles, In short, trust is a f u n d a m e n t a l p a r i of r i s k - l a k i n g . 
T h u s trust is not only a incans of n e g o l i a i i n g risk. it irnplics risk. T r u s t 
is a m c a n s o f n e g o l i a i i n g that w h i c h is u n k n o w n . T h e i m p l i e d risk 
is c e n t r a l lo r e c o g n i s i n g others' c a p a c i t y to act auLotiornously a n d i n 
u n e x p e c t e d ways. If ail actions w e n : c o n s t r a i n c d or r e g u l a l c d there 
w o u l d bc no risk. o n l y confidence or a lack o f c o n f i d e n c e . 
T r u s t is thereforc q u i i e a rare c o m m o d i t y ; a n d because it is bascd 
o n free w i l l , trust c a n n o t b c d e m a n d e d , o n l y offered a n d a c c c p t c d . 
T r u s t a n d m i s t r u s i develop in r c l a t i o n s h i p to free w i l l a n d i h c a b i l i t y 
to exercise that w i l l w h e n e x i s l i n g n o i m s a n d social rôles no longer 
suffîcc. T r u s t as an aspect o f s o c i a l solidarity is very differenl l o c o n f i -
dence, w h i c h is bascd on m a r k e t exchange w h e r c b y rôles arc a s c r i b e d 
a n d outeomes expected. Transgressions are resolved t h r o u g h the legal 
System. 
A u t o n o m o u s a n d active engagement are the prerequisites of trust. S o 
the passive expectation that trust s l i o u l d be delivered is a n a t h e m a to 
ihe c s t a b l i s l u n e n l of real trust. S o c i e t y Loday however. is m c r c a s i n g l y 
being reorganised along the lincs of mistrusi. T h c r t is thus an overriding 
impulse to regulate so t h a ï sociely c a n be confident thaï aspirations, 
risk-taking a n d e x p é r i m e n t a t i o n are constraincd a n d l imited. T h e longer 
temi outeome o f ail this will be to have less innovation and d e v e l o p m c n l . 
as weil as f a i l i n g lo detiver trust. 
T h e way out o( this impasse is to re-engage people i n a p o l i f i c a l debatc 
lhaL challenges o u r culture o f fear. A s I have argued c l s c w h e r c , w c 
m a y need 'to rccrcatc c o n f i d e n t , c o m b a t i v e individuals belbre w c can 
aspire to h a v i n g p c a c c f u l , progressi\'e c o m m u n i t i c s ' (Times Higher 
Education Supplement, 28 \ f a r c h 2 0 0 3 , p. 26). 
S a d l y , w h e n we corne to e x a m i n i n g the three s p é c u l a t i v e , new-age 
scénarios p r e p a r e d for us by the Riskworld p e o p l e , the oui: s t r i k i n g 
absence is direct, p o l i t i c a l engagement. Instead ail we are offered is; 'the 
C o u n c i l o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l R i s k G o v e r n a n c e ' (p. 307), 'the e i i l a r g c m c n t 
of ihe E u r o p e a n U n i o n ' (p. 315) or 'self-organisation' (p. 321). 
Invited comments 601 
The projeelion of unrepresentative, unaccountablc quangos inlo thc 
fu ture, along with individual isolation, surcly reflects poorly nn thc 
world wc now inhabit. Getting vid of these clumsy bavricrs, arguiug Ibr 
real freedom and reinvigorating política) débale are thc most urgent 
tasks of all those who would gladly see thc back of our e.xaggerated 
risk obsessions. 
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The Timid Corporation - Why Business is Terrified 
of Taking Risk 
Benjamin Hunt, Wiley, U K , ISBN 0-470-84368 3 (hardback), 252 pages + xii This fascinating book, endorsed on its back cover by Professor Michael Power, co-director of the Centre for the Analysis of Risk and Regulation at the Lon-don Schoo) of Economies, and himself author of a sig-nificant book exploring similar issues,1 cannot come recommended highly enough. It should be debated by al! corporate managers and their staff. Benjamin Hunt, an independent Journalist and researcher. has written, among others, for The WaU 
Street Journal and the Financial Times. He has a straightforward thesis derived from primary research, case studies, and interviews. This is " that risk aver-sion has become institutionaii2ed in business" (p. 2), and further, that the source of this problem lies far closer to home than many seem prepared to recog-nize, as evideneed by " an unprecedented bout of self-
regulation (p. 4). Thus, " risk aversion is not just a temporary rnood." rather " risk aversion has become more of a permanent mindset" (p. 1), promoted, among others, by various types of consultants who see this devel-opment as * providing them with huge new revenue opportunities" (p. 30). This phenomenon was clearly in évidence subséquent to the terrible events of September 11.2001, A l l manner ofself-appointed risk consultants cmerged seeking to provide advice. busi-ness continuity plans, and supposed " security solu-tions" to ail forms of business, largely by encouraging them to imagine the worst and to speculate about the assumed conséquences of not doing so. Early on. Hunt relates an everyday taie of woe suffered by a legal executive attempting to attend a conférence he had been invited to give a présenta-tion at. Notwithstanding tedious concerns as to his physical security that probably arose. it is the moral or ethical dimension of the dilemmas raised by the Company that are enough to make you cry. Should the firm be seen to accept free flights and accommoda-tion? And, what about the content of the talk? What if 
it were misquoted, or appeared to endorse a particular technology? How might the firm's other suppliers re-spond? AH in ail, the barriers faced by this company in promoting itself to the world were almost entirely self-generated. So how did we get from the unashamed advocates of unfettered free-market idealism, such as Friedman and Hayek, to today's climate of nervous caution, where simple choices as to who to interact with and how, have become so problematized? Huntbeginshis analysis during the 1980s, the sup-posed heyday of dercgulation. He shows, as the jour-nalist Simon Jenkins and others have before him, 2 that Thatcherite and Reaganite rhetoric failed to hold back a vast regulatory tide. The reason for this was that instead of being economically motivated, as rég-ulation had been in the past, it increasingly became socially oriented. This re-regulation led to what one académie cited in the book has described as the re-placement of " the informai with the formai, the flexi-ble with the rigid. and the personal with the legaîistic" (p. 15). Despite the vulgar préjudices of the old left, busi-ness has never been merely about making money. Useful commodities have to be produced and con-sumed too. But more importantly. through the disci-pline of compétition, entrepreneurs have had to inno-vate, thereby also providing a leadership rôle within society. It is this capacity to push society forward while realizing their profits that in the past provided capitalists with moral purpose and authority. This begs the question as to how business leaders sustain themselves when returns are harder to come by, or society becomes more suspicious of change. In the early 1970s the slow-down of the postwar boom began to bite. as evideneed by the collapse of the Bretton-Woods agreement that triggered the oil crisis, and this found philosophical expression in the report 
Limits to Growth by the Club of Rome. This influ-cntial thinktank was assembled by, and largely con-sisted of, an increasingly disillusioned élite and their report wentso far as to describe in outline form what 
•Power, M. (1997). The Audit Society: Rituals ofVerification.Oxfor& ^Jenkins. S. (1995). Accountable to Nonc: The Tory Nationalization 
Oxford University Press. of Britain. London: Hamish Hamilton. 
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today has come to be known as the " precaucionary principie." More profoutidly though, since the end of the Cold War. and the brief flurry of market triumphalism witnessed then, just as their ideas nave had to stand the test of interrogation alone, the élite seems to have absorbed and assumed for itself a growing cultural mood of self-dcnial and self-doubt. This "Culture of Fear." as the sociologist Frank Furedi has coined it , 3 emphasizes rísk over opportunity and leads to an intense impulse to limit the impact of change by regulating the activities both of individuáis and of various groupings in society. It is this that has led, in effect. to the formal adoption of a precautionary approach. as much by the so-called hawks in the White House with respect to military matters, as by the bureaucrats in Brussels in relation to human health and the environment. Accordingly. business has become re-presented and increasingly accepts an image of itself as reck-less, abusive, and destructive. Despite lack of evidence as to widespread misdemeanors, every corporate scandal today, from Enron to Worldcom, becomcs reinterpreted as a morality tale that points back to an already assumed need to constrain the corporation. Yet, as Hunt indicates, there is nothing new about " cooking the books." ñor is there any real indication that such matters are any worse or more widespread today than in previous periods when fraud or insider deals have been discovered. Rcgardless. society's growing fear of change and consequential aversión to risk demands disciplining assumed miscreants. Henee, lacking any broader vi-sión for themselves today, businesses have been keen to be secn to introduce all manner of public checks and balances within their once prívate domains. In the ñame of accountability. responsibility, and trans-pareney, corporations have institutionalized a bewil-dering array of codes of conduct, ethical regulations. risk management procedures. stakeholder forums, good governance systems. corporate social responsi-bility, and sustainable development agendas. Whether this makes things any better remains to be determined. Indeed, Hunt points to a nurnber of adverse consequences to such developments. On the one hand, we witness an increasingly defensivo attitude toward investment and shareholders. on the other. there is a growing obsession with maintaining 
3 Furedl. F. (1997). Culture of Fear: Risk-Taking and the Morality 
of Low Exportations. London: Cassell. 
customer loyalty. brand ñames, and réputation. It is thèse thèmes that are then explored further in the book, The rise of the risk manager, from the tnargins to the mainstream, may be celebrated by those who read Risk Analysis as at least offering some bulwark of objectivity to the subjective impressionism of those who rail against change. However. it is worth noting how easily such intentions can be distorted to reflect the more conservative mood that prevails throughout society at large. Going along with, and even pandering to, popular préjudice, rather than challenging it head-on or seeking to transcend it. betrays a growing defensiveness and further helps foment the forces of reaction. Shareholders, too, have become preoecupied by issues of risk. This is both from the narrowly éco-nomie dimension, whereby they encourage restraint upon the ambitions of management in terms of inno-vation and expansion, and from a more socially ori-ented perspective, seeking to ensure against so-called unethical investment. In turn, managers have be-come preoecupied by shareholders and justify their décisions according to the increasing pressure they exert, or are held to exert. Hunt examines this in relation to the decisión by Shell not to dump the oil storage platform Brent Spar into the sea, suggesting that " Shell felt it had somehow to make amends, and clean up its act, even though it had not done anything wrong" (p. 71). In my own work I have touched on how major corpo-rates. such as Baxter Healthcare, have had to reori-ent their entire outlook for just such supposedly ethi-cal reasons.* Those, like Lee Raymond, ExxonMobil's chairman and chief executive, who has maintained the self-confidence and wherewithal to tell his critics, " If you don't like this corporation, take your money and get out of this stock," at his company's recent annual general meeting, are a dying breed.5 One of the book's strongest sections is its explo-ration of the concept of " brand value." Unlike the origins of branding, which stemmed from a need to differentiate between similar producís, Hunt points out that today, " brands are valued because they cré-ate a comfort zone around a firm and its produets" (p. 156). The aim is to lock in a relationshlp and establish loyalty. Thus. rather than innovating anew. shaping and developing new markets, as wcll as new 
' Durodie, B. (2000). Plastic Panics: European Risk Régulation In 
the Afíermath of BSE. In Retfiinking Risk and the Precautionary 
Principie. London: Buttenvorth-Heinemann. 
SMcNalty, S. (2003). Activists Hijack Exxon A C M . Financial Times. May 28 
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customers, firms who once had to take risks in order to establish themselves and the brands we are now familiar with have settled for a more limited approach to the future, consisting largely of brand protection and brand extension. The fact that as a consequence the pharmaceutical industry now employs* more peo-ple in marketing than in research* (p. 134) can surely only bode ill for the future. As Hunt points out, " the irony about the new obsession with the customer is that the customer is not served very well by it." Innovation tailored to assumed needs and projected demand is often more limited in scope than that unfettered by focus-group prejudices. He continues, " consumers did not take to the radio, car, aeroplane, television, computer or mobile phone because they were branded products" (p. 234). Indeed, as he states earlier in the book, " genuine innovation often has the capacity to con-fuse people" (p. 149). Sadly, what is considered to be innovative today, as expressed through glib reference to the explosion of patents, tends to be on a much smaller scale than the technological developments of yesteryear. Hunt refers to Harvard Professor Clayton Chris-tensen, author of The Innovators Dilemma, who has explored this theme more systematically than most. " In his view, companies that listen to customers too closely end up stifling growth opportunities. It is pre-
cisely by listening to customers that companies find it difficult to escape from stagnating markets and pur-sue new opportunities" (p. 150). Further, " Giving up on radical innovation in order to be reconciled with 'the new realities' has dangers in itself. It can leave firms more at the mercy of external forces and, para-doxically, leave them less able to adapt to change" (P-171). One outcome of these discussions is a contempo-rary obsession with the need to restore trust in busi-ness as much as in government and science. But, as I have argued elsewhere, the very attempt to do so in a conscious manner is unachievable.6 Ultimately, real trust, as opposed to confidence, requires respect for the autonomy of others and taking a risk by granting them the freedom they require to explore and exper-iment. Hence, attempting to regulate risk precludes the establishment of trust, as well as stifling innova-tion. Thus it is, in respect to all of these changes, that Hunt concludes on the rather bleak note that" a soci-ety that does not try to shape its future ends up being dictated to by its own anxieties" (p. 235). 
Bill Durodié Senior Research Fellow International Policy Institute King's College London 
6Durodie, B. (2003). lnvlied comments to Riskworld Scenarios. 
Journal of Risk Research, 5(4-6), 597-601. 
Facing the possibility of bioterrorism B i l l D u r o d i é 
The possibilité of bioterrorism has been met by significant 
financial outlays to map out public health responses. Thèse have 
included comprehensive audits of potential agents, as well as 
exploring mechanisms for counteracting their impact. 
Psychological intervention and communication have been 
identified as key areas requiring further work, as fear of infection 
could pose a greater strain on social resources than the 
pathogens themselves. Bioterrorism provides a powerful 
metaphor (or élite fears of social corrosion from within. 
Accordingly, a broader historical and cultural perspective is 
required to understand why individuals and societies feel so 
vulnérable to what remain largely spéculative scénarios. 
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Introduction In 2002, in the aftermath of anthrax attacks on politicians 
and the media the previous year that affected 22 people 
(five fatally) [1], the US government signed lég i s la t ion 
providing $Z.9 billion to enhance bioterrorism prepared-
ness, including public health and médica l s t ra tég i e s [2]. 
Unsurprisingly, thereforc, there is a vast and burgeoning 
a c a d é m i e l i teraturę on ail imaginable aspects of bioterror­
ism: ranging from the identification of potentiat agents 
and how to counteract them, through syndromie surveil­
lance and diagnosis, to c o n s é q u e n c e management in­
cluding treatment, isolation, risk communication and 
psychological intervention [.1,3]. Sevcral spéc ia l i se pub­
lications have been launched and numerous c o n f é r e n c e s 
held to discuss t h è s e issues. 
Many experts expressed the hope that, after years of 
neglect, by capitalizing on political concerns, fear of 
bioterrorism would allow the field of public health to 
corne of â g e [4—7]. Health tracking Systems designed to 
rieal with terrorist attacks are expected to also be of use in 
monitoring emerging infectious diseases more broadly 
and for identifying the roots of c h r o n i ć illnesscs [4]. This 
may be true, but it is also an indictment of scientific and political leaders that they only appear willing to develop a sense of common purpose in the aftermath of adversity. What is more, it remains to be determined whether it is as straightforward to reorient systems and staff developed and trained to target specific agents, to having to deal with more general ailments, as it would be the other way round. During this period, an outbreak of severe acute respira-tory syndrome (SARS) developed in South-East Asia and was transported to a few other locations worldwide. Researchers appear to have used this episode to confirm their own prejudices, either warning of a possible apo-calypse yet to come or using it as evidence of the need for, or efficiency of, the new health alert mechanisms put into place as a consequence of the focus on bioterrorism [7-9]. A less salutory interpretation of these events might sug-gest the very opposite — an over-reaction to a minor and predictable condition that, through the prism of the newly inflated sense of risk and warning systems, led to society inflicting considerable, yet unnecessary, damage on several regional economies and airlines. 
Biotcrrorism is defined as the release of biological agents or toxins that impact upon human beings, animals or plants with the intent to harm or intimidate [10-13]. Those pathogens perceived to be the most threatening, on the basis of infectivicy, virulence, lethality, pathogenicity, incubation period, contagiousness and stability, are known by Centres for Disease Control as category A agents 114-16] and are smallpox, anthrax, plague, botulism, tularemia and viral haemorrhagic fevers. Category B agents, which include the toxin ricin, are considered to be less easy to disseminate, have lower morbidity and mortality rates, and are less likely to challenge the public health system. Emerging pathogens are defined as category C agents. 
A lot of articles have outlined the properties of the prime suspects, focusing on dose, transmission, diagnosis and treatment. These reviews encompassed numerous jour-nals and books, as many professions are considered to be in the front-line of having to identify or deal with bio-tcrrorism ¡10,5 4,15,17]. Few writers, however, point to the difficulties in developing, producing and deploying biological agents [18], as evidenced by the failures of the Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, with biological agents almosta decade ago [11], In fact, such agents have rarely been used and there is a limired list of such incidents, dating back to the throwing of people infected with bubonic plague over the walls of Kaffa by the Black Sea in the mid-fourteenth century, through the purported 
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use of smallpox infested blankets by Lord Amherst against native American tribes in the mid-eighteenth century, to a growing number of incidents across the world over the course of the twentieth century [11,12,18). The effective use of chemical and biological weapons awaited proper scientific understanding and technical capabilities that only emerged from the late nineteenth century onwards. But, it is the advent of biotechnology over the past 50 years, and in particular the more recent, if overstated, possibility of genetically engineering agents to target specific biological systems at the molecular level, that is held to pose a new and significant challenge for the future [19]. Accordingly, there is an increasing amount of literature on the need to reaffirm and strengthen existing counter-proliferation protocols, such as the Biological Weapons Convention, to monitor the use and deployment of so-called dual-use technologies, which can mean almost anything, and to ensure greater scrutiny of scien-tists and the communication of scientific methodologies and data [11,12,19,20]. 
Another area presumed to be of concern to the manage-ment of such incidents is that of dealing with their psychological impact [3,21,22*.23-251. Weapons of mass destruction in general, and chemical and biological weap-ons in particular, are considered to be likely to produce adverse psychosocial consequences upon targeted popu-lations [26). despite a paucity of data in this regard [22"]. Limited, hurried and fairly superficial surveys conducted in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks purport to show significant levels of post-traumatic stress disorder, affecting both those who were immediately present, as well as those more indirectly exposed through the med-ium of television [21,23,24,27"). As a consequence, numerous strategy documents have been, or are being, prepared aimed at ensuring that politicians and emer-gency responders are aware of, and prepared ro deal with, these broader phenomena [28,29]. This article goes on to deconstruct some of the key concepts and assumptions within this debate. 
Putting bioterrorism in context Much of this discussion takes at face-value the notion of an impending threat posed by (usually) external male-factors [19], bent on undermining western democracies, as well as the extreme vulnerability of these societies to such attacks and the assumed fragility of their members [23,24). There is little attempt to identify possible inter-nal sources of discontent, in view of the fact that the West has greater access to, and capabilities in developing, such weapons [18]. Nor is there any general recognition that advanced economies are better placed to deal with the consequences and contain the potential of bioterrorism, a fact that significantly undermines their purpose to out-siders. More importantly, there is little understanding that our exaggerated sense of vulnerability and frailty 
is both historically contingent, predating 9/U quite sig-nificantly, and culturally determining, giving shape to and driving much of the biotcrrorism agenda [30",31"]. A notable exception to this trend is presented by King, a medical historian and epidemiologist, who identifies one of the casualties of these times as being 'a proper sense of history' [30"]. He notes that 'experts were using the threat of novel diseases' as a rationale for change long before the recent attacks, and that contemporary responses draw on 'a repertoire of metaphors, images and values' shaped by even older, more complex forces. He goes on to suggest that 'American concerns about global social change arc refracted through the lens of infectious disease', signifying a more broadly perceived 'loss of control' over contem-porary society. This important essay, shows that a major contribution to our proper understanding of these purport-edly narrowly scientific or military issues will come from some unexpected directions. 
Another of these is sociology. In his latest book, Furedi, explores the roots of a growing sense of social and indi-vidual vulnerability in what he coins 'therapeutic culture' (32"J. By increasingly framing problems through the prism of their emotions, people are actively incited to feel powerless and ill . Accordingly, 'the spirit of stoicism and sacrifice', along with la sense of common purpose, unity or a commitment to fight' are now rarely in evi-dence. A powerful consequence of this, along with dis-torted perceptions [331 and an increase in reported rates of depression, is provided by the phenomenon of mass psychogenic (or sociogenic) illness [22",27"], numerous instances of which became evident in the aftermath of the anthrax attacks [31',341. 
Essentially, psychogenic illness occurs when members of a group exhibit a rapid spread of the signs and symptoms of an illness, but the physical complaints have no corre-sponding organic aetiology [22*1. In extreme situations such cases can rapidly overwhelm existing healthcare resources, undermining the treatment of those directly affected or contaminated [21]. The arrival of television cameras or emergency workers wearing decontamination suits can act as the confirming trigger for this spread [27",31*]. So too can psychological interventions, such as debriefing, which also undermine constructive, pro-social and rational responses, including the expression of strong emotions such as anger [35-38], 
Thus, it is evident that social and cultural expectations as to behaviour shape professional interventions in an emer-gency or the aftermath of disaster, and that these are significant determining factors as to outcomes [39"). Accordingly, political and media presumptions that the public will panic, despite a categorical lack of evidence in this regard, are both false and ultimately debilitating [22\35,39",40]. Although trying to be helpful in this 
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regard, a forthcoming World Health Organisation document displays a confused outlook, arguing for the development of long-term professional psychosocial frameworks of support, but conceding that these cannot be imposed [28]. In an incisive critique Pupavac has exposed the limitations of, and false assumptions lying behind, such interventions [41"*]. In their study of Gulf War veterans, Stuart et al. 142] report a significant reinforcement of false beliefs in expo-sure to toxins among veterans receiving primary diag-noses of mental disorder. This points to the fact that psychiatrists can end up becoming complicit in shaping and creating individual and social ills [42-44]. Despite good intentions, it is difficult for the hitter not to reflect the broader social outlook that emphasizes vulnerability and human frailty. The extent to which this script is culturally constructed is made evident by Bleich [45*]: an Israeli population habituated to living with terrorist attacks displayed lower reported rates of post-traumatic stress disorder than those observed in the US post 9/11. 
All manner of technological fixes for dealing with the presumed problem of biotcrrorism, from new vaccines to regulations regarding the conduct and communication of science, are being proposed and examined. But, none of these address our corrosive, culturally determined con-cerns. Indeed, by suggesting the primacy of objective — scientific problems over subjective, social and political ones — an emphasis on technical responses ensues that tends to push people further apart, thereby encouraging them to be more suspicious of one another [46]. This separation can promote a preponderance of rumours and hoaxes, as well as reinforcing passive notions of suscept-ibility to apparently inevitable threats 121,26,33,47]. Real resilience requires bringing people together with a sense of common purpose [48*]. 
In this regard, numerous well-meaning contributions, emanating from several directions including the emer-gency planning community and risk managers and com-municators, suggest the need to provide more or better information as a necessary building-block for restoring public trust and confidence [8,11,21,35.49-51] and uncri-tically accept the supposed threats and fears. Information is necessary [26], but not sufficient to fundamentally address or assuage concerns; it cannot compensate for the demise of a more confident and purposeful culture. Indeed, if it fails to address the 'credibility gap', as Glass puts it [39*], or fulfil the 'need to find meaning1 referred to by Hassett in his important contribution [27"*], then information can readily become part of the problem rather than being a cure. 
Conclusions Many responses to the perceived threat of bioterrorism fail to address the social, cultural and historical context 
shaping such concerns [30",34J. Accordingly, there has been a tendency to seek quick technical fixes to assumed problems, rather than addressing more profound political and perceptual issues. Yet, developed societies had increasingly been living in fear of the consequences of social and technological change well before the recent terrorist attacks, and politicians had busily been reinvent-ing themselves as risk managers accordingly. Ironically, attempts to control or contain change, often for purport-edly environmental or moral reasons stich as the US ban on stem-cell research, could end up exposing us to even greater risks [35]. As the public are the real first respondcrs in any emer-gency or disaster, it is vital that they be fully integrated into, and engaged by, a set of broader social aims and values [48*]. The confidence derived from having a sense of purpose or mission, developed over a long-term, active, political engagement in society, cannot be short-circuited by technical means or information campaigns. Hence, although specialist simulations and exercises for dealing with bioterrorism incidents may be of benefit to emer-gency responders and political leaders [13,16,52,53], they are unlikely to achieve any broader resilience across society. Worse, by failing to address the cultural presump-tions and concerns that underlie the emergence of such issues, they may serve to truly corrode society from within. Restoring an appropriate and robust sense of confidence to deal with these matters will need to be a political, not a technical, project. 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Simon Wcssely from the Institute <if Psychiatry at 
King's College London for pointing me to many useful articles relating 
to die«: issues over the past few years. 
References and recommended reading 
Papers of particular interest, published within the annual period of 
review, have been highlighted as: 
• af special interest 
•»ot outstanding interest 
1. Beale AJ: Bioterrorism: what can we do? J R Soc Med 2002, 
95:479-480. 
2. Noji E: Medical preparedness and response to terrorism with 
biological and chemical agents: present status in USA. 
Int J Disaster Med 2003,1:51-55. 
3. Levy BS, Sidel VW (eds): Terrorism and Public Health: a Balanced 
Approach to Strengthening Sysíems and Protecting People. New 
York: Oxford University Press; 2003. 
4. Marmagas SW, King LR, Chuk MG: Public hearth's response to a 
changed world: September 11, biological terrorism, and the 
development of an environmental health tracking network. 
Am J Public Health 2003, 93:1226-1230. 
5. As h rat M: Europe's response to bioterrorism starts slowly but 
gathers pace. Lancet 2002, 360:733-734. 
6. Hayward M: Management issues surrounding the United 
Kingdom health services' ability to deal effectively with major 
incidents involving bioterrorism. J Nurs Manag 2003, 
11:197-207. 
7. Drexler M: Interview with David L Heymann, MD, representative 
for polio eradication and former Executive Director, 
Current Opinion in Biotechnology 2004, 15:264-268 www.sciencedirecl.com 
Facing the possibility of bioterrorism Durodié 267 
Communicable Diseases, World Heafth Organization. 
Biosecurity Bioterrorism 2003, 1:233-237. 
8. M'Ikanathg NM, Lautenbach E, Kunselman AR, Julian KG, 
Soulhwell BG, Allswede M, Rankin JT, Aber RC: Sources of 
bioterrorism information among emergency physicians during 
the 2001 anthrax outbreak. Biosecurity Bioterrorism 2003, 
1:259-265. 
9. Lowe TJ: Anticipating the worst is a good thing: SARS 
reinforces need for comprehensive emergency preparedness. 
Am J Nurs 2003. 103:120. 
10. Sawyer PP: Bioterrorism: are we prepared? Home Health 
Nurs 2003. 21:220-223 
11. Venkatesh S, Memish ZA: Bioterrorism — a new challenge for 
public health. Int J Antimicrob Agents 2003. 21:200-206. 
12. Morse SS: Biologîcal and Chemical terrorism. Tech Soc 2003, 
25:557-563. 
13. WHO: Heafth aspects of chemical and biologîcal weapons. 
Geneva: World Health Organization; 2002. URL: hllp:// 
www.who.tnl/emc/pdts/BIOWEAPONS_FULL_TEXT2.pdf 
14. O'Brien K, Higdon ML, Halverson JJ: Récognition and 
management of bioterrorism infections. Am Fam Physician 
2003, 67:1927-1934. 
15. Han SZ, Alfano MC, Psoter WJ, Rekow ED: Bioterrorism and 
catastrophe response: a quick référence guide to resources. 
J Am Dent Assoc 2003, 134:745-752. 
16. McCarthy M: USA moves qulckly to push biodefence research. 
_ancer 2002, 360:732. 
17. Roy MJ; Physician's guide to terrorist attack. Tolowa, 
New Jersey: Humana Press; 2003. 
18. Beeching NJ, Dance DAB, Miller ARO. Spencer RC: Biologîcal 
warfare and bioterrorism. BMJ 2002, 324:336-339. 
19. Petro JB, Plasse TR, McNulty JA: Biotechnology: impact on 
biological warfare and biodefense. Biosecurity Bioterrorism 
2003, 1:161-168. 
20. Secretary of State for Fgreign and Commonwealth Affaire: 
Stengthcnîng the biological and toxin weapons convention: 
countering the threatlrom biological weapons. London: Cm 
5484; 2002. URL: http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/ 
btwc290402.pdf 
21. Hall MJ. Norwood AE, Ursano RJ, Fullerton CS: The psychological 
impacts of bioterrorism. Biosecurity Bioîerrorism 2003, 
1:139-144. 
22. Alexander DA, Klein S: Biochemical terrorism: too awful to 
• contemplate, too serious to ignore. Br J Psychiatry 2003, 
183:491-497. 
Comprehensive literature survey and review including an overvIew of 
ma ES psychogenic illness. 
23. Schlenger WE, Caddell JM, Ebert L, Jordan BK, Rourke KM, 
Wilson D, Thalji L, Dennis JM, Fairbank JA, Kulka RA: 
Psychological reactions to terrorist attacks: findings from the 
national study of Amercians' reactions to September 11. 
J Am Med Assoc 2002, 288:581-58B. 
24. Lamberg L: In the wake of tragedy: studies track psychological 
response to mass violence. J Am Med Assoc 2003, 
290:587-589. 
25. Stein BD. Tanielian TL. Vaiana ME, Rhodes HJ, Burnham MA: The 
rote of schools in meeting communrty needs during 
bioterrorism. Biosecurity Bioterror 2003, 1:273-281. 
26. Saathoff G. Everly GS Jr: Psychological challenges of bioterror: 
containing contagion. Int J Emergency Mental Health 2002, 
4:245-252. 
27. Hassett AL Sigal LH: Untoreseen conséquences of terrorism: 
•• medically unexplained symptoms in a time of fear. 
Arch Intem Med 2002, 162:1809-1813. 
Excellent overview of psychiatrie problems arising from the lack of 
définition given to threats and social Isolation. Clear underslanding of 
the primacy of social faclors. 
28. WHO: Mental health of populations exposed to biological and 
chemical weapons. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2004. 
URL: http://www.who.int/mentaLhealth/prevention/ 
mnh_and_cbw_prepub_version.pdf 
29. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: NATO-Russia advanced 
research workshop on social and psychological consequences 
of chemical, biological and radiological terrorism. Brussels; 
2002. URL http /^www.nato.int/science-old/e/020325-arw2.htm 
30. King NB: The influence of anxiety: September 11, 
bioterrorism, and American public health J Hist Med 2003, 
58:433-441. 
Outstanding analysis from a social and historical viewpoint. Points to the 
need for more cultural interpretations of supposedly scientific problems. 
31. Hyams KC, Murphy FM, Wessety S: Responding to chemical, 
• biological or nuclear terrorism: the indirect and long-term 
health effects may present the greatest challenge. J Health Polit 
Policy Law 2002, 27:273-290. 
Prescient overview of the main issues providing a dear exposition and 
numerous examples of the problem of somatic symptoms. 
32. Furedi F: Therapy Culture: Cultivating Vulnerability in an Uncertain 
Age. London and New York: Routledge; 2004. 
Excellent Introduction to the way in which a therapeutic ethos now imbues 
most institutions in contemporary society and the impact this has on our 
views and aspirations. 
33. Halpem-Felsher BL. Millstein SG: The effects of terrorism on 
teens' perceptions of dying: the new world is riskier than ever. 
J Adolesc Health 2002, 30:308-311. 
34. Durodie B: Perception and threat: why vulnerability-led 
responses will fail. Security Monitor 2Q02.1:16-18. 
35. Perry RW, Kindell MK: Understanding citizen response to 
disasters with implications for terrorism. J Contingencies Crisis 
Man 2003, 11:49-60. 
36. Wessely S, Deahl M: Psychological debriefing is awaste of time. 
Br J Psychiatry 2003, 183:12-14. 
37. van Emmerik AAP, Kamphuis JH, Hulsbosch AM, Emmelkamp 
PMG: Single session debriefing after psychological trauma: 
a meta-analysis. Lancet 2002, 360:766-771 
38. Lemer JS, Gonzalez RM, Small DA, Rschof! B: Effects of tear and 
anger on perceived risks of terrorism: a national field 
experiment. Psychol Sci 2002, 14:144-150. 
39. Glass TA, Schoch-Spana M: Bioterrorism and the people: how 
• to vaccinate a city against panic. Clin Infect Dis 2002. 
34:217-223. 
Powerful illustration of the impact emergency managers have on deter­
mining social behaviour and outcomes. Argues forcefully for the need to 
engage the public well in advance of disaster. 
40. Durodie B, Wessely S: Resilience or panic? The public and 
terrorist attack. Lancet 2003. 360:1901-1902. 
41. Pupavac V: Pathologizing populations and colonizing minds: 
international psychosocial programs in Kosovo. 
Alternatives 2002, 27:489-511. 
Incisive critique of psychosocial interventions in conflict regions and the 
developing world, suggesting these to be based upon false assumptions 
and to produce adverse outcomes. 
42. Stuart JA, Ursano RJ, Fullerton CS, Norwood AE, Murray K: Belief 
in exposure to terrorist agents: reported exposure to nerve or 
mustard gas by Gulf War veterans. J Nerv Ment Dis 2003, 
191:431-436. 
43. Mahan CM, Kang HK, Dalager NA, Heller JM: Anthrax vaccination 
and self-reported symptoms, functional status, and medical 
conditions in the national health survey of Cuff War era 
veterans and their families. Ann Epidemiol 2003, 13:1-8. 
44. Mason BW, Lyons RA: Acute psychological effects of 
suspected bioterrorism. J Epidemiol Community Health 2003, 
57:353-354. 
45. Bleich A, Gelkopf M, Solomon Z: Exposure to terrorism, stress-
• related mental health symptoms, and coping behaviors among 
a nationally representative sample in Israel. J Am Med Assoc 
2D03, 290:612-620. 
www.sclencedirect.com Current Opinion in Biotechnology 2004, 15:264-268 
268 Science policy 
Excellent emplrical analysis of trauma suffered by Israeli résidents 
through terrorism. Concludes the impact to have been remarkably mod-
erate considering the degree ol exposure. 
46. Durodié B: Is real resilience attalnable? Security Monitor 2003, 
6:15-19. 
47. Dworkin MS. Ma X. Golash RG: Fear of bioterrorism and 
implications for public health preparedness. Emerg Infect Dis 
2003, 9:503-505. 
48. Durodié B: Sociological aspects of risk and resilience 
• in response to acts of terrorism. Worfo* Def Syst 2004, 
7:214-216. 
Overvlew of historical and social faclors atfecting cultural resilience. 
Suggests our response to terrorism invariably teaches us more about 
us than about the terrorists. 
49. Blendon RJ, Desroches CM, Benson JM, Herrmann MJ, 
Taylor-Clark K. Weldon KJ: The public and the smallpox threat. 
N Engl J Med 2003, 348:426-432. 
50. Fischoff B: Assessing and communicating the risks of 
terrorism. In Science andTechnology in a Vulnérable Worid. Edited 
by Teich A, Nelson D, Lita S. Washington: American Association for 
the Advancement of Science; 2002:51-64. 
51. Fischoff B, Gonzalez RM, Small DA, Lerner JS: Evaluating the 
success of terror rîsk communications. Biosecunty Bioterrorism 
2003, 1:255-258. 
52. Jarrett D: Lessons leamed: the 'pale horse' bioterrorism 
response exercise. Disâster Manag Response 2003. 1:114-118. 
53. Mitka M: Bioterror exercise tests agencies' mettle. J Am Med 
Assoc 2003, 289:2927-2928. 
Current Opinion in Biotechnology 2004, 15:264-268 www.sciencedirect.com 
Risk Analysis, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2004 Book Reviews 
Cellular Phones, Public Fears, and A Culture 
of Précaution Adam Burgess, Cambridge Urriversity Press, 2004, ISBN 0-521-81759-5 (hardback) and 0-521-52082-7 (paperback), pp. 301 + x Risk analysis today falls broadly into two oppo-site, methodological camps. Those who appeal to sci-entific évidence to explain or critique what they con-sider to be exaggerated public fears, and those who focus on sociological data to highlight people's per-ceptions and henceseek to justify a more precaution-ary outlook. While most recognize that risk contains both a materiał element and a perceptual element, there is rarely a meeting of ways in their methods of analysis. This is where Adam Burgess' contribution to the debate is to be warmly welcomed. Rather than falsely comparing the Statistical risk of one activity with an-other, as many in the scientific camp are prone to do-ing, Burgess, a lecturer in sociology at the University of Bath has produced an explicitly sociological analy-sis. But rather than taking people's perceptions at face value he seeks to explain how thèse perceptions came to be constructed in the first place, thereby, challeng-ing thèse and critiquing précaution. Focusing on people's perceptions has become the mainstay of governments, activists, the media, and even risk consultants. These suggest that our percep-tions of risksare as important, if not more so, than the actuality of the risks we face, as perceptions often dé-termine behavior. Thus, it is held, that irrespective of the basis for such fears in scientific " fact," their effects are real in social conséquence, leaving governments with little choice but to take such concerns on board and to regulate accordingly. This conciliatory approach benefits from appear-ing to take ordinary people's views very seriously and incorporating thèse into the decision-making process. In an âge when few participate actively in political life, it is commendably inclusive and démocratie in outlook. It is also a godsend to governments bereft of any broader dynamie or direction. But, as others have suggested elsewhere. assuming or adapting to popu-lar perceptions is as contemptuous of the public as dismissing them.1 It rnay also be more damaging. Burgess explores the advent and use of the " precautionary principle" in the European context, 
1 Durodié. B. (2003).Limitations of Public Dialogue in Science 
and the Rise of New 'Experts', Critical Review of [ritematiortal Social and 
Political Philosophy. Vol.6. No.4. Winter 2003, pp. 82-92 
Book Reviews 1067 
comparing it with the notion o f prudent avoidance* in the United States. These approaches, tie suggests, have led to the institutionalization of marginal con-cerns and create a lose- lose situation. Not taking pre-cautions is taken to show a lack of concern, while funding new research suggests either an attempt to influence the outcome, or the existence of a real prob-lem. Thus, irrespective of outcome, any action taken serves to drive public fears rather than assuaging them. He also demonstrates how it is that once one au-thority, region, or country has adopted a particular standard, others feel under pressure to follow suit. Indeed, the contemporary vogue for the devolution of power to regional authorities has accelerated this trend, as new bodies are at pains to prove their pur-pose and adopt a campaigning agenda to distinguish their role from that of centra! government. A l l this leads to a ratchet-like effect superimposing worst-case regulations onto worst-case assumptions. The role of the European Commission is particularly apt in this regards having established safety as one of its main 
" raisons d'etres."1 The book's greatest strength, however, lies in its international comparisons. Here, the extent to which social perceptions were distinctly constructed accord-ing to varying national priorities and agendas is most clearly exposed. Thus, the sheer size of the United States, combined with the availability of cheap con-ventional calls and the pre-existing confusion of me-dia and lobby groups made it much harder for activists to establish a coherence there. This was despite the long-standing debates there over the impact of elec-tromagnetic radiation. What's more, efforts to estab-lish a campaign against cellular phones became mod-erate by the specific responses to the Columbine High School shootings of Apri l 1999 and the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001. These events showed a ner-vous public the extent to which technology could pos-sibly serve a vital social function, thereby effectively undermining moves against it. In Europe, on the other hand, concerns focused on the siting of transmission towers, or base-stations. Thus, campaigns only really emerged when the masts, reflecting the shift from analogue to digital tech-nology, needed to be located in closer proximity to the users. As more masts were required in hilly or 
2 Durodie. B. (1999). Poisonous Dummies: European Risk Reg-
ulation after BSE. European Science and Environment Forum, 
Cambridge. Available at h I tp://w ww.scienceforum.net/pdfs/ 
Durodiel.pdf. 
mountainous regions, such as Scotland and Italy, than flat ones, such as the Netherlands, so the campaigns took on different intensities there. What's more, telecommunications towers had a different meaning in Northern Ireland, where they evoked memories of a "surveillance staLe" and the campaign against them was used by the authorities to unite the differ-ent communities, to Ireland itself. There, complaints largely emanated from non-Irish emigres searching for a rural idyll, and the issue threatened to chal-lenge the young, dynamic, and forward-looking image of a " Celtic Tiger" being promoted by the govern-ment. For other similar and rather evident reasons, in Finland, the home of Nokia, such campaigns never really got off the ground. The role of the media is most rigorously exam-ined in the U.K. case. Here, far from being a tabloid frenzy, concerns were first raised, and continued to be developed, by the high-brow broadsheet. The Sunday 
Times. Headlines such as " Mobile phones cook your brain" (April 14, 1996) and "Are we being told the truth about mobile phones" (December 20, 1998), re-flected one particular journalist's personal obsession. Indeed, the case is well made that once the issue hit the tabloids it also shifted from one newspaper to an-other as particular journalists changed jobs. In an in-terview with Cathy Moran of the Express newspaper, Burgess goes so far as to ascertain how her interest in the subject stemmed from her seeing it as a personal opportunity to do something" more worthwhile" than covering celebrity-driven trivia (p. 80). It is the interaction between this small number of " moral entrepreneurs," in lobby groups and the media, and governments with differing attitudes to the future that determined the shape concerns took in each country. Notably, this altered the original na-ture of any concerns expressed by the relatively few members of the general public to raise any issue in the first place. These originally focused on the aes-thetics of transmission masts, the impact they might have on property prices and the lack of consultation as to their deployment and positioning. It was insti-tutional influences that transformed these rather iso-lated " not-in-my-backyard" concerns into far more effective campaigns about the purported health ef-fects of the phones themselves, as well as their base stations. One development was that as ownership of mo-bile phones became both more democratic and more likely to occur among younger age groups, so the de-bate shifted from attacking " yuppie status-symbols" to focusing on the towers and their possible effects 
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upon children. The science, as is offen the case, was counterintuitive in this regard, The closer you are to a base-station, the less energy your phone requires to receive the signal. Thus the best place to site masts would be as near to children as possible. But like so many of thèse debates, a nervous elite ignored the real évidence in favor of hearsay and emotion, Thus it was that the then Education Minister, David Blunkett called for an " urgent investigation* of the placing of masts on schools, while the National Union of Teach-ers called upon the Health and Safety Executive for advice and the Metropolitan Police advised their of-ficers to restrict usage of the technology (p. 87). The conséquence, unique to the British response, was the establishment of the Independent Expert Group on Mobile Phones ( IEGMP) , under the chair-manship of the former Chief Médical Officer, Sir William Stewart. This initiative, launched at the be-hest of the then Minister for Public Health, Tessa Jowell, to *" keep ahead of public anxiety," is seen by Burgess as the paradigm inquiry of our precautionary times. It sought to avoid dealing with the scientists of the National Radiological Protection Board, includ-ing instead members with little specific expertise in the field. On one hand it concluded that there was no scientific évidence whatsoever of any härm, on the other it sought to give credence to public concerns by advocating further research and urging parents to lim iL their children's usage. Unsurprisingly, this attempt to have it both ways, satisfying both scientists and concerned parents alike, satisfied neither. It led to headlines such as " So are mobiles a risk or what?" in the Minor and similar confusion elsewhere. Through this process of demon-strating their sensitivity to what they presumed to be public concerns. or what Burgess calls " symbolic pol-itics" (p. 266), the authorities not only failed to clarify the matter, but made it worse as the number of cam-paigns grew in its aftermath. These feit encouraged by such officiai endo rsement and apparent récognition of their concerns. In fact, as Burgess indicates, parents might well have responded differently in surveys if the scale of the risk and money expended upon it had been put in the context of other options for protecting their children's health. In the case of mobile phones, no plausible scien-tific mechanism has been posited to explain any pur-ported ills. Indeed, much of the research produced has been to explain various associations after they had been noticed, rather than to understand their possible cause. This approach could equally well be applied to other products and processes that produce local-ized heating effects, such as laptops and electric blan-
kets. But apart from generating new fears, as Burgess points out, noting an effect is not the same as assum-ing härm. Regardless, as Furedi suggests elsewhere, " if society wants to treat electromagnetic fields as a cause of illness, they will be deemed a cause of i l l -ness."3 What's more, there is a danger in dealing with problems in this way that diagnosis becomes reduced to mere description and thus the possibiiity of resolu-tion becomes impossible. Risk consultants and sociologists suggest our per-ception of risk to be shaped by such factors as whether the risk is taken voluntarily, the extent to which it is understood, the fear it instils. our level of trust in au-thority and the impact it may have, particularly on children. Burgess' analysis suggests rather différent factors. These include, the degree of political engage-ment in public life, the confusion of roles and respon-sibilities between differing authorities, the growing sensé of isolation among the political, scientific, and commercial eiite and their attempts to combat a crisis of legitimacy by promoting public fears. Situating the rise of an obsession with the impact of science upon our lives into this context of a démise in broader social and political engagement in society, Burgess points lo the ultimate irony that " attempts to reform science have extended the rôle of science in policy much further" (p. 232). In the end, it was the sheer Utility of the technology that outweighed the fears that had been constructed and. as people conlinued to use their mobiles, so gradually the media lost interest. It remains, however, a salutary lesson in the social construction of fears that should be used to inform many similar épisodes that will undoubtedly émerge in the years ahead. - Bil l Durodie Senior Research Fellow International Policy Institute Kings College London 
3 Furedi., F. (2004), Therapy Culture: Cullivating Vulnerability in an 
Uncertain Age {p, 136). Routledge. 
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Animal-Rights Terrorism 
and the Démise of 
Political Debate 
Bill Durodié 
W inning over the many may be difficult buí remains essential for 
defeating the few. 
This summer, Ihe United Kingdom Home 
Ofíice launched a crackdown on animal-
rights protestors who intimídate or harass 
people associated directly. or indirectly. 
with expenments on animáis. The move 
lollowed aclion against the construction 
of an £18 million biomedical research 
facility at South Parks Road in Oxford. 
This had led the main contractor, Walter 
Liiy & C o Ltd, líke the concrete suppl iets 
R M C before them, to pulí out oí the 
project to replace and update the uníver-
sity's animal-testing facilities. 
Soth compan ies are subs id iar les oí 
Montpellier pie, whose execufive cars 
had been d a m a g e d with paint. The 
parent company 's ¡nvestors had also 
received spoof letters purporting to come 
from Ihe sénior managemenl team, and 
advising them lo wiíhdraw their interests 
in the company or risk being ¡dentified on 
a website run by activists. Why anyone 
would think that a company would 
threaten its own shareholders is not 
evident, but this led to a 20 per cent drop 
in the share price as some investors 
bailed out. 
Earlier in the year, Cambr idge University 
shelved its own plans to build a neuro-
scíence study centre, which would have 
housed a primate research laboraíory. 
This followed a similar campaign to that 
in Oxford, made worse by five years of 
delay in obtaining planning permission. 
Estimated costs for the íacility, including 
measures to protect ¡t, had spiralled from 
£24 million to £32 million. 
Nearby, Britaín's biggest animal testing 
laboratory, Huntingdon Life Sc iences, has 
become an almast permanent protest 
site There have been sporadic c lashes 
against the police charged with ptotecting 
the facility. Its director has been physically 
attacked, requiring hospital treatment, 
whilst other members of staff suffer 
continually from various forms of abuse. 
Over recent years, a small élément within 
animal-rights groups appears to have 
sta;ted targeting suppl iers, including 
¡unior staff and their families. as well as 
researchers, in their campaigns. They are 
held to use smear tactics and fhreals 
against staff and their children, bombard 
them and their families with malicious 
téléphone calis, post and e-mails, and a 
tiny number have gone on to damage 
property, use crude incendiary devices 
and launch physical assaults. 
Certainíy, there wouíd appear to have 
been a significan! increase in both the 
number and severity of incidents 
involving such campaigners. In the first 
few months of this year there were 54 
attacks on the homes oí company direc-
lors and employées. By May, Ihere had 
been 117 arrests, compared with 15 íor 
the same period in 2003. However, Ehese 
figures could also reflect more reporting 
of such incidents, as well as a growing 
willingness on behalf of the authorities to 
take action. 
The Home Office décision to tighten-up 
and strengthen existing police powers, 
however, may not satisfy scientists and 
bus inesses, who had been lobbying (or 
new, more spécif ie législat ion. The 
proposed eniorcement plans, which will 
include extending anti-stalking laws and 
making use of ant i -social behaviour 
orders to curb the act ivées oí the more 
extreme e lemen ls , lall lar shorl of 
bringing in the army to protect supplies 
and facilities, as some had called for in 
order to make the government show its 
support (or such research. 
Accordingly, this autumn, a leading City 
of London organisation, whose members 
control pension funds worth £650 billion, 
are set to take matters into Iheir own 
hands. They argue that the UK has 
already lost over £1 billion in investment 
as compan ies take their business else-
where, d i ssuaded by the unreceptive 
clirnate to their work here. It is c laimed 
that they will be announcing détails of a 
£25 million bounty for any information 
leading to the arrest of the purported ring-
leaders. Notably. this is more than the 
reward available from the CIA for the 
caDlure of O s a m a bin Laden, which 
currently stands at $25 million. 
So, are animal-rights activists, terrarists 
on a par with the likes of al Oa ' ida? 
Cerlainly they share a similar anti-human 
outlook. But it is a lso clear that those 
crit icising the protestors lack résolve 
in winning this debate . Despi te the 
horrendous-sounding nature o l some ot 
the incidents concerned, it remains the 
1 
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case Ihat Ihey are lew and far between. 
And there already exist laws to deal with 
criminal damage and assault. The police 
themselves have estimated íhat there are 
only 20-or-so hard-core animal-r ights 
acl ivists in the U K respons ib le for 
carrying out such direct action. 
If the protestors succeed it will have less 
to do with their own ruthlessness and 
organisation lhan with the defensiveness 
ol those they confront. A n d this lack of 
real resilience goes to the very heart of 
the issue itseli - a reluctance by sc ien-
tists, corporations and politicians to stand 
up for the benetits and necessity of 
animal research. For instance, some of 
the advócales of animal research had 
pointed to the fact that neither of the 
p roposed new facil i t ies in Oxtord or 
Cambridge would have led to an increase 
in the number of animal experiments 
conducted. This rather c o n c e d e s the 
point that there is a problem with such 
research in the first p lace. 
Others have suggested that by closing 
down facilities in the UK, experiments will 
simply be conducted abroad where, it is 
assumed, régulation regarding animal 
welfare is less stringent. Apart from the 
stereotypically racist undercurrent lo this 
line of argument, it also lends itself to 
consider ing that an imal , rather than 
human welfare, should be the priority. No 
number of expert or lay ethics commit-
tees can get away from ihe fact that some 
experiments involve putting Chemicals in 
animais' eyes or planting électrodes in 
their brains. So there is little room for 
squeamish évasion by posing as cham-
pions of animal welfare. 
No scientist enjoys us ing animais in 
experimenta! procédures, but nor should 
they be forced, by adapt ing to the current 
guidelines that emphasise a strategy of 
refinement, réduction and replacement 
(the so-cal led three Rs), to curlail the 
drive to explore and innóvate. Scientists 
themselves have been particularly poor at 
standing up against this sentimental tide 
ol régulation that would have precluded 
many of the insights and advances we, 
and they, benefit from today. 
Despite accusat ions by some that such 
experiments do not transpose to under-
standing the effects of drugs or other 
producís upon the human metabol ism, 
they have already led to treatments, 
vacc i res and cures for d iseases and 
condit ions such as pol io, leukemia, 
asthma and diabetes. They remain a 
necessary step to sifting out unexpected 
reactions and identifying future potentiali-
t és . And without thèse procédures there 
would be littfe hope for our future under-
standing of how to treat other human 
afflictions, such as cancer, heart d isease, 
multiple sc leros is , Park inson's and 
Alzheimers disease. 
So, it is not violence alone that forces 
some companies out of this market. For 
targeîed individuáis, the tactics of some 
activists may well be intimidating, but it is 
the reluctance o l government and the 
scientists and corporations involved to 
défend the principie of animal research 
that provides an opening for cranky, 
immature threats, as well as extremists. 
This situation is then lutther exacerbated 
by a slream of cancellations and conces-
sions by the authorities concerned. It is 
this moral and intelleciual cowardice that 
they seek to compénsate for through 
calis for legislative coerción. 
It was the government that stalled on 
giving the go-ahead to the Cambr idge 
primate centre and it was the Labour 
Party that withdrew its own pension (und 
investment from Hunt ingdon Life 
Sc iences, subséquent to being pres-
sured by the Political Animal Lobby. More 
recently. it was the chair of the sc ience 
and technology C o m m o n s Select 
Commi l lee who decl ined to appear on 
the B B C ' s f lagship Newsnight 
programme for fear of being targeted. 
Without forcing a broader public debate 
on the matter and engag ing wider 
support, the authorities will continué to 
lack real resil ience in the face of a handful 
of act iv ists and cave in too easily. 
Accordingly, those few who do raise their 
heads above the parape! are readily 
targeted and Uve their uves under siege. 
But the knee-jerk response, to secure 
society and its facilities from the outside, 
rather than winning the argument from 
the ínside, will oifer little long-term 
benetit. Ralher, we will all be losers from 
the assumpt ion that a solution lies in 
restricting the actions of a iew. 
Winning this fundamental argument 
could offer any government that is truly 
committed to engaging the public in a 
dialogue, a tremendous opportunity to re-
establish some of the essential bonds of 
soc ia l d i scou rse that have become 
eroded in recent years. It would also go 
s o m e way lowards chal lenging the 
profoundly ant i -human, ant i -modern, 
anti-Western views of the animal-rights 
lobby. These views are almost entirely 
Western in origin and go on to inform 
other, more extreme, nihilist terrorists. 
Sadly, so far the response of the various 
authorities to the purported threat posed 
to society by a tiny number of extremist 
campaigners, rather betrays their own 
sense of confusión and isolation. It is this 
cr isis of conftdence and insecurity 
amongst the élite of society, and their 
unwillingness to resolve this through prin-
cipled political debate that both under-
mínes them and encourages others. 
Worse, by seeking to short-circuit or 
bypass the internal process of political 
engagement with the external imposition 
of further rules and restrictions, they end 
up revealing a contempt for ordinary 
people on a par with that of any terrorist. • 
Bi l l Durodié is Director of the 
International Centre for Security 
Ana lys is at K ing 's Co l l ege London 
where he coord inates the E S R C -
funded Domest ic Management of 
Terrorist A t lacks programme. 
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The Rise of Risk 
Risk is an abstraction that representa the likelihood of specific outcomes. As such, risks appear largely externat to us - particular events occur whether we want them to or not. In effect, risks have always been around, however, that we conceive of something as being a risk, is a product of social progress and the évolution of human consciousness. The ability to discern patterns, and their limitations, in nature, in order to subject thèse to our actions, has enabled development. In turn, the meaning and history of risk have changed too. Our undcrstanding of risk reflects our own confidence - or lack of it - in human wil l and agency. Henee, it has gone through several qualitative transformations from randomness to chance and probability and, a more récent focus on uncertainty (1). In recent years, there has also been a phénoménal quantitative growth in références to risk. The word exploded into the académie literature in the 1990s, coinciding roughly with the translation into English of Ulrich Beck's sociológica! best-seller, Risk Society, in 1992 (2). Since that time, the number of conférences, courses, centres and Journals, focusing on, or making use of, the word risk, have expanded rapidly too. This development begs our understanding. Do we face more risks today? Have we become 
more conscious of the various risks that we face? Or, are thèse risks now of a qualitatively 
différent order? Beck, and the British sociologist, Anthony Giddens, err toward the latter of thèse possible conclusions. They suggest that society now faces new risks - those generated by ourselves. Accordingly, Beck and Giddens distinguish between what they consider to be 
natural risks and what they have come to define as manufactured risk (3). There are numerous problems with thèse distinctions, not least of which is trying to understand where one category ends and the other begins. For instance, it could be argued that humanity itself, has only come to exist in a self-conscious State through its séparation from nature, and henee most of the risks that impact upon us are necessarily mediated in unnatural ways. What's more, the widely-held assumption that natural products or processes are necessarily better for us than manufactured ones is simply wrong. Both of thèse writers, and many others besides, note a heightened consciousness of risk within contemporary society. This is often attributed to a loss of control over who determines what risks are acceptable for society, as well as the social distribution of costs and benefits. Fcw however, critically examine such perceptions. They tend to be accepted as a given. Accordingly, the solutions proffered revolve around the need to regúlate risk, rather than the need to understand perceptions. But it may be that, rather than living in a Risk Society, we now live in a Risk Perception Society. And if so, rather than taking risks at face value, it is their perception that ought to be the subject of sociological analysis and investigation. Unfortunately today, many seem to fetishise public perceptions, considering it almost rude to interrógate them. But, whilst dismissing people's views may well be patronising, so too is adapting or pandering to thèse uncritically. 
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The académie and social commentator, Frank Furedi, has noted that over récent years our use of the word risk has altered. Risk used to be considered, at least in part, as a conscious relationship. People could choose to take a risk, implying an active engagement between the human subject and objective reality. Nowadays, many références to risk are prefixed by the word at. We are now increasingly perceived of as being ai risk in numerous situations (4). This reveáis and reflects a growing sensé of human passivity, disconnection or impotence in the face of what are assumed to be implacable or inevitable external processes. A Further shift has been the growing tendency to focus more on hazard and uncertainty lhan on risk and probability. Hazard is understood to be the potential effect of a situation, process or product, such as its being unstable, corrosive or carcinogenic. Risk refers to the actual chance of something happening, taking account of real behaviour or exposure. This is often expressed as a probability. Everything that we do exposes us to hazards. It is how we do things, and how often, that determines the risk. So for instance, stairs are a hazard, but it is the likelihood of injury that is known as the risk. The latter wil l be a function of variables such as step height, lighting conditions, age and speed. The call, emanating from certain quarters, to regúlate specific situations on the basis of their innate hazardous properties is therefore, whether consciously or not, a call to remove human agency from the équation. In a similar vein, uncertainty refers to the difficulty of knowing what may occur in advance of expérience. It seeks to distinguish situations where we can base décisions upon data, from those where we can not. But that there remain unknowns to be determined in ail instances is hardly new. In fact, we can only move towards an appréciation of what we do not know by starting from what we do know. Unlike risk and probability, prioritising hazard and uncertainty, downplays our understanding, compétence and w i l l . These respective shifts; the quantitative explosion in référence to risk in ail possible walks of life, the focus on people's perceptions of risk over the actuality of the dangers they face, the shift in how we use the word risk from being a verb reflecting an active relationship to becoming a noun, used in a passive sensé, and the désire to prioritise invariant hazards and 
unhnown tmeertainties over the conscious choice or abilily to engage wiih risk and to defermine 
probabilities, appear to share similar roots. It is to this that 1 now turn my attention. 
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When Margaret Thatcher famously suggested in an interview that 'there is no such thing as 
Society' (5), she was, undcrstandably, derided by many. But today, it would appear thaï her 
Statement was almost prescient. In form at least, if not in content, there is now very little awarene5s of the extent to which many phcnomena are shaped and determined by social forces. Instead, there has emerged a growing emphasis on nature and individuáis as the presumed roots of most issues. Henee, science and psychology now occupy peculiar and privileged positions in contemporary life (6). Despite the fact that many perceived problems in the world today are shaped more by their social context and origins than by their scientific or psychological 
content, il is the latter that are increasingly scrutinised and held to account. From analyses of the impact of genetically modified organisms on the environment to studies of psychological orientations and préférences, from concerns about the conséquences of exposure to endocrine disrupting chemicals on early-years development to attempls to predict behaviour in a terrorist incident, such an outlook présents our world and our responses to it as being increasingly determined by impulses either entirely external to us, or so innately internai that there is little we can do about them. Ironically, at the same time as natural forces and individual behaviour are singled-out and assessed, they are also feared and monitored as potentially disruptive sources of risk to our lives. W h y is this? How did the démise of a broader understanding of ourselves, as well as many of the phenomena we observe as being broadly social in content, corne about? These are important issues to address, as they impact upon our sensé of the possibility of transforming the world. If things are largely scientifically or psychologically given, then there may be little point in trying to change things. It is the graduai érosion of any sensé of the nced for, and the possibility to achieve, social change lhat drives this outlook. In the past, radicáis sought to transcend the limitations imposed upon society by advocating widespread social reform. Science fed into, and fed off, this broader aspiration and dynamic. Science can transform society, but it is also a product of society - and a society that does not désire transformation, or fears the conséquences of change, is unlikely to develop as rapidly as it could otherwise (7). The emphasis often given as to the ability of science to effect social change is one-sided. It was the aspiration for social progress that gave humanity confidence in the power of its own reason in the first place - a factor that then proved of significant importance to the development of science. The Scientific Revolution represented the triumph of rationality and expérimentation over the superstition, spéculation, diktat and domination that had gone before. It was a practical battering-ram with which to challenge perception, préjudice and power. But science was also the product of a broader social dynamism - as well as becoming 
an essential contributor to it, 
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And, just as the initial dynamic behind science was social change, so social change - or more particularly the lack of it - could circumscribe it too. Initially this came from the vociferous rejection of the old religious and monarchical orders that had been supplanted. Then, with the advent of positivism, scientists themsetves sought to découplé science from the poHtical project to transform society. Businesses - subject to the internal imperative to innovate and compete against one another to realise profits - could harness science, with ail the instability and the constant flux this produced - but the social order of the market system as a whole was beyond challenge. Finally, over the course of the twentieth Century, a wider layer of society lost its faith in the progressive capabilities of scientific transformation. Two vvorld wars, separated by a dépression and followed by continuing poverly and conflict in the developing world generated doubts as to the possibility of universal human progress. Radicals, who had traditionally championed the liberatory potential of scientific advance, now viewed it with increased suspicion. It was clear for instance, despite the potential they offered, that the Manhattan Project and the Apollo Programme had initially been driven by the narrow needs of American militarism. Some now argued that aspiration i t s c l f - rather than its failure as evidenced in the collapse of confidence in social progress - was dangerous. Science was seen as the amoral steamroller of a dispassionate new modernity that crushed communities and tradition. What is so poignant about the modem disenchantment with science, is that it has emerged at a time when its achievements are without précèdent. But behind the current crisis of faith in science, lies a collapse of confidence in humanity, and hence in the desirability and possibility of social transformation (8). In parallel with the graduai disillusionment of society with science, has corne an equally significant process of disengagement of society from politics. This accelerated after the démise of the old Cold War divisions. For the majority of ordinary Citizens this formai aliénation has been exacerbated by a growing sensé of social disconnection at the level of informal attachments and associations with others. These social bonds bave been severely eroded over the last décade or so. The résultant underlying sensé of isolation and insecurity right across ail sectors of society has become a key élément shaping contemporary perceptions of risk. At the formai level, people in advanced Western societies are increasingly unlikely to participate in the political process. This effect is most striking among younger âge groups. Electoral turnouts are al an all-time low and in the few instances where thèse are high, emotional attachment appears to rule over reasoned argument. Few are active, or even passive, members of political parties or trade unions as their forcbears were, and there is little attempt to engage in - or raise the standard of - debate. When people do vote, it is often on 
a négative basis - against an incumbent, rather than for a replacement. This mean5 that there is very little loyaky, and accordingly predictability, in the oulcome of contemporary élections. Marginal events, largely disconnected from the actual process - such as a terrorist attack or daims as to the personal character traits of particular contestants - can have quite devastating impacts. Turnouts range between 10% and 60% depending on the type 
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of élection. But, as this is split between two or more major parties, the actual mandate of those put in office is even lower. What it means to belong to one of thèse bodies has irrevocably been altered too. In the past, trade union membership suggested a solidarity with members of a community that one might not even know - as well as a sensé of collective purpose and struggle in seeking to transform existing conditions. Today, it is more likely to represent a means to obtain individual perks, such as cheap car insurance, or personal security in relation to health and safely issues at work. Suggestion of redundancy is more likely to lead to a negotiated settlement than a form of group action. For the social élite, the political disengagement of the majority is potentially catastrophic, It exacerbâtes their own sensé of isolation and insecurity, as their démocratie mandate and political legitimacy become questionable. This has been made worse by a Ioss of vision and purpose. This became particularly pronounced through the démise of the old political framework, whereby the world was divided between the two competing visions of a socialist left and a free-market right. Today, the catégories of left and right have been expunged of their traditional associations and mcanings. Voters are unable to distinguish between the pronouncements of the varions major parties. Now, ail fight for what they believe to be the centre ground and are desperately seeking issues that may reconnecl w i l h , and re-engage, ordinary people. Foremost amongst thèse have been the environment, human health and security At the informai level, the changes in society are even more striking. Many have commented on the growing pressures faced by families, communities, and neighbourhoods. In his book on this thème, Bowling Alone, the American académie Robert Putnam also pointed to the démise of informai clubs and associations (9). Meeting up with friends occurs less frequently than previously too. In other words, people are not just politically disengaged but also, increasingly socially disconnected. This loss of social capital has occurred and been experienced within a génération. Not so long ago, for example, it was still possible across most urban centres, to send children to school on their own, assuming that other adults would act in loco parentis - chastising them if they were misbehaving and helping them if they were in trouble. Today, such a straightforward social arrangement can no longer be taken for granted. No-one ever signed a contract saying that they would look after other people's children. It was simply an unstated and self-evident social good. IronicaUy, this loss of a social sensé of responsibility makes the individual task of parenting harder (10). In a similar way, ordinary communities, at the turn of the last Century, invested a great deal 
of effort establishing and running their own inst itutions. These took a wide variely of forms from churches, to working mens clubs, schools and trade unions. It is almost impossible to find a similar process at work within society today. This is not to suggest some kind of golden-age of community activism. Clearly, past societies were also associated with a wide manner of activities and actualities we are quite glad to have seen the back of. However, the resulting érosion of social connectedness is significant. 
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Being less connected leaves people less corrected. It allows their subjective impression of reality to go unmediated or unmoderated through membership of a wider group or trusted community. The erosion of collective forms of social association, both in the formal sphere of political conviction and participation, as well as in the informal sphere of everyday life, has had a devastating impact upon how people view themselves and the world around them. Views and values which, in the past, would have been filtered and scrutinised through various layers of public and private insight and knowledge, come today to form unchallenged personal frameworks for understanding the world. Individual obsessions can grow into all-consuming worldviews that are rarely open to reasoned interrogation or debate. The sense that ideas are actually shaped through an interaction between material circumstances and social associations has been severely eroded. Today, what would once have been considered to be mere opinions, have become inextricably and existentially bound to one's emotional identity. Questioning these can be perceived as tantamount to a physical assault. Without a sense of the possibility of social solutions, and divorced from any trusted networks or webs of association by which to provide meaning and a sense of belonging and attachment for themselves, people are increasingly inclined to view events as random, out of control or inevitable. Social isolation and insecurity lends itself readily to problem identification and inflation. In part, it is this that explains our recent proclivity to emphasise or exaggerate all of the so-called risks that are held to confront us. From BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy, more commonly known as mad-cow disease) to G M O s (genetically modified organisms), from the assumed risks presented through excessive use of mobile phone to the purported link between the M M R (measles, mumps, rubella) triple-vaccine and childhood autism - all new developments are now viewed through the prism of a heightened and individuated consciousness of risk. Nor are our fears restricted to the realms of scientific and technological products and processes. Many age-old activities and agents have also now been reinterpreted through our growing sense of isolation and fear. Abduction, bullying, crime, doctors, the environment and food, form just the first few letters of an ever-expanding lexicon of new concerns. Even relationships and sex can now be viewed and assessed using an instrumentalist risk calculus - to the detriment of both. But, rather than the world changing any faster today than in the past, or becoming a more dangerous, unpredictable or complex place, it may be our diminished, more fragile and isolated, sense of self that has altered our confidence to deal with change and the problems it gives rise to (11). Far from it being the inevitable reflexive consequences of manufactured risk impacting upon us, it may be our alienated and distorted perceptions that lend themselves to identifying everything as a risk. Those who propose that we now inhabit a Runaway World (12), would be hard pressed to show how the pace of change today is any greater than say, over the sixty-five year period two 
7 
THE CONCEPT OF RISK 
centuries ago between the création of Richard Trevithick's first slcam locomotive and the advent of transcontinental railroads across the United States of America, or the pace of change over the same period a Century ago between the Wright brothers first powered flight and man walking on the moon. If anything, when considering the tumultuous social developments that accompanied thèse periods of technical innovation, change today appears somewhat attenuated in its impact. M u c h of the récent focus has been on the largely undelivered promises of biotechnology - a technology which, in its various stages is now passing its fiftieth anniversary - and the potential of the internet. But whilst the latter may have led us to being more networked virtually, the extent to which this has transformed the real world is less evident. Transfers of information alone do not effectuate change. Radically overhauling existing transport networks, a transformation not currently envisaged by many, would for instance, necessarily have greater social and scientific conséquences. In our technically networked world, we may be more aware - but we are also easier to scare, than previously. Bcing more isolated leaves us more self-centred, as well as risk averse. The démise of the social also leads to little sensé of the possibility that if there truly is a problem needing to be addressed then it is together - with others - that this can best be altered or challenged. In turn, thèse developments reduce the likelihood of our acting for some greater common good and end up making us less résilient, both as individuals and as a society. A i l of thèse developments have had a quite devastating and stultifying impact upon society. The breakdown of collectivities have, in the absence of any cohérent replacements, enhanced the sensé which isolated individuals have of themselves, as being frail and vulnerable. In turn, an exaggerated perception of risk lends itself to increasing demands for greater régulation and social control. Accordingly, people increasingly look to those in authority to enhance their sensé of security by mitigating the worst effects of the natural world and the actions of those who seek to change it. And in an âge characterised by an absence of political vision and direction, the politics of fear, or risk-regulation, have provided a reluctant and isolated élite with an agenda and a new, if limited, sensé of moral purpose. The authorities have willingly embraced this rôle. Latching onto the generaliscd climate of isolation and insecurity, politicians have learnt to repackage themselves as societal risk managers - particularly around the issues of health and security. In a quite remarkable transformation, radicals have reinvented the state as a mechanism of social protection. People who would once have sought to organise their own affairs and build their own institutions - in the absence of any sensé of social solidarity or their own ability to deal with problems collectively - now turn to the state to résolve matters. Even those environmental and consumer lobby groups with the most vehement anti-state rhetoric, look to the state to act as the ultimate régulator and enforcer. Politicians now pose as the people who will protect us from our fears and regulate the world accordingly. But the démise of any positive sensé of the possibility and desirability for social transformation has also led to a réduction in what it is that politicians actually offer the public today. The petty lifestyle concerns they focus on, reflected in incessant debates about smoking, smacking, eating and drinking are unlikely to inspire and engage a new génération 
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of voters (13). Nor - at the other end of the spectrum - do doom-laden prédictions relating to global warming and terrorism. Indeed, the more such concerns are highlighted, the more it becomes impossible for the authorities to satiate the insecurities they create. Hence, alongside disengagement and aliénation, has corne a concomitant disillusionment and mistrust in ail forms of auth.ori.ty, whether political, corporate, or scientific, as thèse invariably fail to live up to new expectations. This catastrophic corrosion of trust - in outlook if not in practice - has facihtated the replacement of healthy scepticism with unthinking cynicism. Accordingly, expertise is now perceived as elitist and knowledge as biased or unattainable (14). In many situations today, the public are encouraged, and have become accustomed to, assuming the worst and presuming a cover-up. This has generated new demands for the attribution of blâme and compensation. Image and rumour now dominate over insight and reason. Myths and conspiracy théories abound, encouraged by the same people who demand the inclusion of presumed public perceptions in decision-making. Focusing on people's perceptions has become the new mainstay of governments, activists, the média, and even risk consultants. Thèse suggest that our perceptions of risks are as important - if not more so - than the actuality of the risks we face, as perceptions often détermine behavior. Thus, it is held, that irrespective of the basis for such fears in scientific/act, their effects are real in social conséquence, leaving governments with little choice but to take such concerns on board and to regulate accordingly. It is this outlook that the former Chief Scientific Advisor to the U K government, Sir Will iam Stewart, reflected at the end of his chairmanship of the government's own inquiry into the purported adverse health effects of mobile phones. He concluded that in future 'anecdotal 
évidence' should be taken into account as part of the process for reaching décisions (15). Such a conciliatory approach benefits from appearing to take ordinary people's views very seriously. In an âge when few participate actively in political life, it seems commendably inclusive and démocratie. It is also a godsend to governments bereft of any broader dynamic or direction. But, assuming or adapting to popular perceptions is as contemptuous, and as patronising, of the public, as dismissing them outright. It may also be more damaging. 
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The World Health Organisation ( W H O ) deFinition oF health is 'a statc oj complete mental, 
physical and social well-being' (16). After Us adoption in the preamble to the W H O Constitution in 1946, this was largely subsumed to the pursuit of more tangible goals, such as eradicating disease and treating illness. Its return as a key référence point to contemporary debates about health is not a measure of the inhérent strengths of the concept, but rather of the decline of other, more socially-oriented approaches and outlooks for enhancing social well-being. For societies with a diminished sensé of the import and impact of social forces upon them, public health and public safety have been reconceptualised as a multiple of individual well-being and personal security. Henee, despite drawing attention in a limited way to the social aspects of health, the W H O définition feeds into more narrowly subjective orientations and privatised worldviews. As the British General Practitioner and medical writer and commentator, Michael Fitzpatrick, has pointed out, health became politicised at precisely the same time as the world of politics was suffering a dramatic decline (17). Fitzpatrick notes that people in Western societies live longer and healthier lives than ever before, yet seem increasingly preoccupied by their health. He suggests that the search for a personal sensé of well-being is unrealisable despite, and largely because of, the barrage of government and other public health campaigns that encourage people to assume individual responsibility for their health. More recently, Furedi has pointed to the fact that the concept of well-being itself, necessarily presumes ils opposite - that is, that the natural order of things is for people to be i l l (18). Henee, the requirement in contemporary health campaigns for constant vigilance to stave off illness. Conspicuous awareness has become a defining posture of our times. This contemporary focus ignores the real gains in public health achieved over the last Century and a half. As the medical consultant a n d author, Raymond Tallis, has indicated, much of this was attributable to developments beyond the remit of medicine. Increasing prosperity, better nutrition, éducation, public hygiène, housing and many other factors played their part. It is this that allowed the proportion of deaths that occur between the ages of 0 and 4 to decline from 37 per cent in 1901 to 0.8 per cent in 1999. As a conséquence, 'Nearly two thirds oj the 
increase in longevity in the entire history oj the human race has occurred since 1900' (19). Tallis suggests that once public hygiène and a welfare stale had been established, the contribution of scientific medicine - both to the extension of our quantity of life, as well as to the quality of it - has been proportionately greater. But infectious diseases, that had been the main cause of prématuré mortality a n d the most susceptible to scientific interventions, have declined i n their significance. As a resuit, contemporary Western societies now face différent health problems. Heart attacks, strokes and cancer are the major killers, whilst arthritis, diabetes and asthma are the major causes of i l l health. A n d , as Fitzpatrick explains, in dealing with this new pattern of disease and disability, modem scientific medicine appears to offer diminishing returns. 
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Neverthelcss, 'in real terms the health oj even the poorest sections oj society is better than at any 
time in history: indeed the health oj the poorest today is comparable with that oj the richest only 
twenty years ago'. Henee, Fitzpatrick suggests that recent trends to denounce scientific medicine as a form of paternalistic authorUarianism, fall wide oí the mark. Seven in ten children with cáncer are now cured, compared with fewer than three in ten in the mid-1960s, mainly due to the development of new drugs. As American sociologist, Paul Starr, noted in a Pulitzer prize winning contribution, 'Just as medicine used to be uncrilically given credit jor 
gains in health that had other causes, so medicine was now disparaged without prudent regard jor 
its benejits (20). At the same time however, pseudo-scientific and blatantty unscicntific approaches for dealing with the fceling of illness - as if this were the same as a disease - have been extended inlo those áreas of our lives that actually require social solutions. Fitzpatrick is particularly critical of the rise of C A M (complementary and alternative medicine) in this regards. Coinciding with the wider loss of faith in science these alternatives may make sense to individual patients who find conventional medicine ineffective and conventional practitioners unsympathetic -but for doctors to collaboratc with such praclices suggests a denial of expertise that reflects a far broader loss of nerve within the profession itself, and 'a capitulation to irrationalism'. Medical intervention today has also increasingly spread into áreas that would once have been considered to be lijestyle issues, such as eating and drinking, as well as into the once private realm of sexual habits and perceptions of abuse. That this should be so, begs examination. As indicated earlier, in exploring the growth to contemporary prominence of the concept of risk, we should be alert to many initiatives being driven more by social context and political consideralions, than by scientific content. Aside from the indisputably elear and robust evidence l inking smoking to lung cáncer, few -if any - of the many health concerns raised recently - including that of secondary inhalation of tobáceo fumes - present anywhere near so transparent a picture. Despite a multitude of examples and volumes of advice, epidemiology fails to support most pronouncements about health, for the simple reason that the data suggesting causal linkages, rather than mere association or correlation, remains disputed at the highest level and ukimately unpersuasive. In the 1960s Austin Bradford H i l l and Richard D o l i , whose pioneering work categorically demonstrated the dangers of tobáceo, proposed a series of criteria which would allow epidemiologists to judge whelher an association was likely to be causal (21). The association should be strong, graded, independent of confounding variables (such as class, gender, race and oceupation), it should be consistent - having been observed in different types of study and with different populations - reversible and plausible. Smoking met all of these - but few associations betwecn illness and disease today and their supposed risk factors meet any. That people have gone along with a number of such health campaigns - from covering-up in the sun, to not smoking in pubs and monitoring the calorics and units of alcohol they consume - henee appearing to support the requisite lifestyle changes, rather than denouncing or opposing them, may well be a symptom of their passive sublimation, rather than the healthy, active and engaged endorsement that is usually presumed by government and activists. 
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It seems likely that much or what passes as public health concerns and research today is -consciously or not - part of the broader agenda of issues serving to reconnect an isolated elite with the public by addressing their assumed insecurities. Unable to show conclusive evidence for a l ink between particular problems and their presumed causes, governments have fallen back on advocating preventative strategies of restraint in relation to purported risk factors for which the available evidence falls far short of demonstrating a causative role. In this, the parallels with our distorted and exaggerated sense of threat pertaining to matters of security in the world, subsequent to the terrorist attacks of the 11 th of September 2001, are quite striking. 1 have noted elsewhere the parallels between the so-called principle of precaution in relation to environmental matters and the principle of pre-emption in relation to international security (22). To these we can now add the principle of prevention in relation to health. As isolated individuals, we are constantly encouraged to consider the worst that might happen, and to act as if this were true. This explains to some extent the attention now paid to basic public health problems in the developing world. But, rather than advocating development or targeted intervention, as would have been the case in the past, in order to ensure the provision of clean water, and the eradication of Malaria and Aids , the focus -distorted through contemporary Western sensitivities and insecurities - is on containment and prevention, as perceived through the narrow prism of our collective personal security. Prevention is, of course, better than cure - but only when it can be shown that the probability of what one seeks to prevent is rather high, and the effectiveness of any proposed cure can be guaranteed. Otherwise, prevention readily becomes a mantra and a problem in itselF. Prevention is of necessity, required to be general in application and long-lasting - cure can be both specific and discrete. Nor does providing a cure require a moral judgement on anybody's part. O n the other hand, if your primary focus is on prevention, then it is morally wrong not to take what are presumed to be the appropriate corrective measures. In many, if not most, public health debates encountered today, both domestically and abroad, few, if any, of these essential mitigating circumstances relating to prevention are met. Yet, the presumption that they are, and the moralising actions that ensue, dominate. Despite widespread misgivings and concerns among leading scientific and medical professionals in relation to various cancer screening programmes, for instance, both government advice and non-governmental campaigns continue to prioritise awareness and screening over the development of more effective treatments and cures. The overall result of these interventions is to promote a new form of dependency, or help-
seeking behaviour by the public, from appropriately informed experts and professionals. This may be packaged in the language of choice, but the clear message is that people are expected to make the right choice, otherwise they may require a more prolonged period of support. This outlook reflects the broader cultural changes identified earlier. And these developments have been bought-into by medical professionals, health officials, regulators and politicians alike, as well as by the general public. 
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How did this state of affairs come about unchecked? After all , as early as the 1970s a number of radical critiques of médicalisation had emerged (23). Developed in the United States, these all shared an understanding of the importance of individual autonomy. Their strength lay in their insight into the potential loss of freedom that accompanied the process of médicalisation. Their weaknesses lay in their inability to connect this to broader social trends. Those who developed these ideas, like feminists and the radical, Ivan l l l i c h , encouraged cynicism in science and its achievements and attributed too central a role to medicine and medical professionals in the overall process (24). The British medical sociologist David Clark has noted that 'at the time when lllich was writing, 
the mid-1970s, a much more unitary and optimistic view of medicine was in evidence than exists 
today'. By contrast, 'the modern medical system is pervaded with doubt, scepticism and a mistrust 
of expert claims' (25). Others too, have identified a growing equivocation on the part of the medical profession regarding their own expertise and deference towards their patients, as by far a bigger problem than an assumed 'club culture' (26). Yet, the caricature of the arrogant, distant and unsympathetic consultant persists. In fact, recent studies about particular new illnesses indicate that doctors are not central to these developments. In other words, as US academic Peter Conrad suggests, médicalisation is a 'sociocultural process that may or may not involve the medical profession' (27). The American military sociologist Wi lbur Scott has emphasised the role of anti-war campaigners in the 'invention' of PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder), for instance (28), and in a similar vein, Conrad and Deborah Potter have noted how it is adults with so-called A D H D (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder) who diagnose themselves (29). PTSD is foremost amongst the ever-expanding list of syndromes and sensitivities that people have become conscious of today. Its origins relate to the experience of US veterans after Vietnam. These suffered not so much from defeat in south-east Asia, as from rejection upon their return home (30). Shunned as pariahs and branded psychopaths, the PTSD label offered moral exculpation and access to compensation. But whereas older conditions such as shell 
shock and battle fatigue had been held to be specific, relating to a soldier's background and psyche, the new diagnosis was applied more generally, assumed to derive from the fundamentally traumatising experience of war. Originally framed as applying only to extreme events, PTSD spread rapidly to encompass relatively common happenings such as accidents, muggings, verbal or sexual harassment, and even workplace disputes. It finally entered the official Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1980. In 1952 the D S M only recognised 60 categories of abnormal behaviour, by 1994 this had expanded to 384 (plus 28 'floating' diagnoses). Furthermore, it is now increasingly suggested that many, if not most, people in society suffer from mild forms of familiar conditions such as depression and anxiety, obsessional compulsive disorder and autism. A i d agencies also 
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commonly consider entire populations to suffer from PTSD in advance of any detailed analysis (31). Ironically, most veterans diagnosed with PTSD have had no combat experience, pointing to a self-justifying reconstruction of current problems through a narrative of past trauma. Research also suggests that PTSD is more serious and more common among international relief and development personnel, than for the locals they seek to support (32). These facts indicate the category to be culturally constructed and its causes amplified through our particular Western obsession with risk and stress, often in pursuit of remediation or recognition. U is not just medical categories that are social products. Concepts of the person, or what is 
normal or acceptable behaviour in different circumstances are unique to particular cultures at particular times too. Hence, many more people present symptoms of stress and depression to their doctors today than a generation ago (33). This has been due both to a widening of the definition of such disorders, as well as the substitution of values such as resilience and composure by vulnerability and disclosure. The trend to médicalise or psychologise problems reflects the more fragile individualism of our times. It is important to understand that médicalisation is not foisted from above onto unwill ing putative patients. Rather, the demand for diagnosis is often generated from below. Indeed, there has been very little criticism raised from either the public or experts alike as to the growing notion that a significant percentage of the population experiences or exhibits mental and physical health problems that have not been diagnosed and are insufficiently recognised. The demand for recognition has become one of the dominant themes of our times. Active campaigns exist to raise awareness of and recognise specific new illnesses, including PTSD, PND (post-natal depression) - including amongst men - M E (myalgic encephalomyelitis or chronic fatigue syndrome), M C S (multiple chemical sensitivity), IBS (irritable bowel syndrome) and RSI (repetitive strain injury). It would appear that what is now emerging in society is a form of human subjectivity that positively embraces the sick-role. Indeed, the NHS (National Health Service), branded a 
'National Sickness Service' by the recent report into health by the former head of NatWest bank Derek Wanless (34), has gradually moved away from emphasising cure towards offering recognition to those who suffer, thereby facilitating the notion of sickness as an identity that merits recognition, rather than a problem that needs a solution. It was the American sociologist Talcott Parsons who, in the 1950s, first theorised the concept of the sick-role as being, not just a biological state but a social state too (35). As such, his innovative analysis proposed that individuals held two rights and two obligations. Their rights were that they should be allowed exemption from the performance of their normal social obligations, as well as being excused from responsibility for their own state. Hence, a sick person could not simply be expected to pull themselves together and get well by an act of wi l l . On the other hand, once exempted from their responsibilities, sick people also needed to be taken care of. This constituted their obligations. Firstly, that they should be motivated to get 
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well as quickly as possible, and secondly that they should seek technically compétent help and co-operate with médical experts. This would usually imply establishing a relationship with a physician. In this sensé doctors played a complementary rôle to that of the sick person. For Parsons, the primary function of thèse relationships was to control the disruptive effects of illness in socicty. This was achieved through the obligations of the patient to co-operate with the médical task, thereby preventing the development of a déviant subculture. In this sensé, the social System ensured passage from illness to Wellness. But thèse rights and obligations could only be fulfilled in a society where there were shared assumptions about social order and the desirability of individuals returning to their ascribed social rôles. In other words the sick rôle was predicated on the assumption that everybody understood that they should get well and indeed, would want to get well . People needed to know what their normal social rôles were and understand the desirability of fulfilling thèse. Today, thèse shared assumptions have broken down. The steady décline of shared meanings and values has led many to live in a state which Parsons would have identified as déviance. People no longer necessarily undergo the process of getting well . What takes place instead is the génération of an illness identity, which is recognised through contemporary public health sensibilities thereby providing legitimacy to a new, incapacitated rôle. This has allowed the sick rôle to become semi-permanent, resulting in a reciprocal suspension of responsibilities. People in this position cannot be expected - and do not expect - to perform their normal social rôles. Soldiers who can't fight, students who can't sit exams and people who can't work, have increasingly become a feature of our times. These new identities are encouraged through the diminishing of social expectations in the individual, the récognition of sickness as an unavoidable identity, and the promotion of help-seeking. H is this that Furedi refers to as Therapy Culture (36). And as the therapeutic ethos and its concomitant relationships extend into more and more areas of life, so similar problems become reproduced elsewhere. Now, parents, partners and colleagues are no longer expected to be able to perform their social rôle either. This social construction of illness, under the guise of the new public health may be costly, but it is a small price to pay for governments that seck to reconnect with the people. People who are self-consciously i l l are far less threatening and far easier to manage than those with the social-consciousness to be active and demand more. Hence, in 2002, the number of days lost from work through stress reached 33 mil l ion , passing for the first time the number of days lost through strikes in the U K in 1979, the year that included the winter of disconient. But, this stultification of the conscious, subjective and active élément in society raises différent problems in relation to promoting national resilience in the face of a presumed global war on terrorism. It also lends itself to the exaggeration of the threat posed by presumed public health problems elsewhere, and hence to the promotion of a counter-productive and prescriptive security framework for understanding international health issues. Security fears, public health campaigns and contemporary préoccupations with illness have also encouraged people back into a relationship - directly or indirectly - with the state. In its 
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t u r n , systematic government interférence in healthcare has eroded the boundary between politics and medicine. This has been a long and graduai process. In the mid-19705, it was a Labour government that first took up the cause of prévention. The then health minister David Owen, as a former hospital doctor, would have been familiar with the radical critique of conventional medicine. But the White Paper Prévention and Health: Everybudy's Business was feit by many to be too hectoring in tone (37). The strategy made little impact as Owen was an unpopulär minister in an unpopulär government that was brought down in the wave of militant trade unionism that culminated in the winter oj 
discontent. In the USA, where government concerns with escalating health care costs were greater and trade unionism weaker, the doctrine of individual responsibility won greater approval, 
C o n n e c t i n g with a growing interest in self-help and consumerism. In a paper anticipating subséquent trends, American sociologist Irving Zola identified medicine as 'becoming a major institution o/ s o d a ¡ control' (38). This was not that evident at the time, due to the more independent and confident form of individualism that stil l pertained. Despite launching what was claimed to be the biggest health campaign in history - in relation to AIDS - it was not until 1992 with the Health of the Nation White Paper, that the Conservative administration launched a comprehensive health promotion programme (39). In tune with the times, this identified ten risk factor targets to tackle matters such as smoking, diet, teenage pregnancy and blood pressure. Politicians had also learnt by then, that if a policy directed at changing individual behaviour was going to make an impact on the public, then it was necessary to foster intermediary institutions between the state and the people. The number of such intermediarles has been expanded significantly since the 1997 élection victory of New Labour. The government appointed Tessajowell as the first minister of public health and made the promotion of hcalthy living a central thème of policy - not just for the Department of Health, but across other ministries. The confusing multitude of supposedly independent groups within the sector has allowed ministers to deflect accusations of running a nanny state, despite many of thèse being funded by government, promoting government agendas, or proposing state action as a solution to particular perceived risks and problems. The greater impact of officiai health promotion campaigns over récent years reflects the enhanced sensé of individual isolation and vulnerability that now pertains. This has bccn augmented by the many former activists who relreated from public activity to pursue political objectives through their professional work, often in éducation and health. Far from undermining the System, since abandoning their once radical goals, they have rather strengthened it with an infusion of more culturally attuned énergies. Through the re-definition of poverty as social exclusion and the promotion of social inclusion to make people feel good about themselves, health promotion has now become redefined as a means for redressing inequality rather than the other way round. As a result, general practitioners, midwives and other professional w h o have :û relationship with people that 
reaches deep into their personal, private space', have increasingly been enlisted to take on more 
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socially orienter! goals beyond merely treating their patients. They are encouraged to take a more active interest in their patient's lives to the probable détriment of both the patient and their professional relationships as instead of scrving patients' needs, they now serve the demands of government policy. Fitzpatrick concludes, 'h* is rather ironie that, ajter seeking to take over the management aj the 
social as well as the medical problems oj the neighbourhood, many GPs complain ojhigh levéis oj 
stress (not to mention a growing inclination among their patients to assault them).' The solution, he proposes, lies in restoring the centrality of treatment over prévention, as well as reminding those doetors concerned about restoring public trust, that this was íirst established through a commitment to medical science and the determined defence of i l , along with their autonomy, against anti-scientific préjudices and political i n tere feren ce. 
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Since the l l t h of September 2001 there has been much focus placed upon the need to enhance social resilience, undersiood as society's ability to recover or withstand adverse conditions or disrupüve challenges. Politicians, emergency planners and others talk incessantly of the need to build, engender, improve or enhance resilience in society (40). Unfortunately, much of this debate is framed in the fashionable, but l imiting, language of risk management. Sénior officials regularly point to the central role they attribute to risk reduction. This, in keeping with the times, is understood in narrowly technical terms, as consisting in the main of horizon scanning, investment in equipment, training, business continuity planning, new legislation and the like. But this reveáis the absence of any broader purpose and direction in society at large. After al l , risk reduction is a means, not an end. In the past, society was not so much focused on reducing risk as upon enhancing capabilities towards some wider goal. Risk-reduction was a by-product of such activities. Presumably, pcople are prepared to risk their lives fighting fires or fighting a war, not so that their children can, in their turn, grow up to fight fires and fight wars, but because they believe that there is something more to Ufe worth fighting for. It is the catastrophic absence of any discussion as to what that something more might be, that actually leaves us fundamentally unarmed in the face of adversity today. In that regards, risk management is both insufficient as an approach, as well as beíng unambitious. Combined with the contemporary cultural proclivity to speculate wildly as to the likclihood of adverse events and the demand for high-profile - though not necessarily effective -responses and capabilities based on worst-case scenarios, we may end up distracting our attention in a way not warranted by a more scientific assessment and prioritisation of the various risks that we face as a society. The incessant debate as to the possibility and consequences of an attack using chemical, biológica!, radiological and even nuclear weapons, is a case in point. Whilst it is widely accepted that the probability of a chemical, biological, radiological and cven nuclear terrorist attack is low, it is assumed that this can not be ruled out. It is often suggested that although groups such as A l Qa'ida may have relatively poor capabilities in such techniques, their intention to develop these is nevertheless clear, and if they did , the consequences might be devastating. Like the new public health this, in essence, captures the logic of our times; 'Never mind the 
evidence, just Jocus on the possibility'. It is a logic that allows entirely vacuous statements such as that of an official after the supposed discovery of the chemical agent r ic in at a fíat in North London, who was reported as saying; 'There is a very serious threat out there still 
that chemicals that have not been Jound may be used by people who have not yet been identified' (41). 
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But undiscovered threats f r o m unidentified quarters have allowed an all-too-real reorganisation of everyday life. The US government has provided S3 bil l ion to enhance bioterrorism preparedness. Developed nations across the globe have Felt obiiged to stockpile smallpox vaccines following a process, akin to knocking over a line of dominoes, whereby one spéculative 'What if?' type question, regarding the possibility of terrorists acquiring the virus, led to others regarding their ability to deploy it, and so on. Health advisories to help GPs spot the early signs of tularemia and viral haemorrahagic fever have cascaded through the U K s urgent alert System. And homes across the land have received the government's considered message for such incidents; 'Go in, stay in, tune in' (42). Like ail social fears, there is a rational kernel behind thèse concerns. But this is distorted by our contemporary cultural proclivity to assume the worst. It is the fear of bioterrorism that is truly contagious, and it is a fear that distracts us from more plausible sources of danger, diverting social resources accordingly, and exposing us all to greater risk. U is also a fear that has bred a cynical industry of security advisors and consultants, out to make a fast buck by exploiting public concerns, and thereby driving those concerns still further. For instance, rather than view the récent outbreak of SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) in south-east Asia as being a fairly limited, familiär and essentially predictable condition - in view of the close proximity between people and fowl in that part of the world - an army of health and security advisors sought to use it as an example of just the sort of threat they had been predicting. The épisode confirmed their own préjudices - either warning of a possible apocalypse to corne, or serving as évidence of the need for, or efficiency of, the new heallh alert mechanisms they had helped put in place as a conséquence of the fear of, and focus on, bioterrorism. In fact, it was their own reactions, amplified through the prism of societies inflated sensé of risk, which lead them to inflict quite considérable, yet entirely unnecessary, damage to several regional économies and airlines. There is a long history of bioterrorism incidents (43). At best, thèse are tactical devices with limited conséquence, but not stratégie weapons. The advent of biotechnology and the more récent, if overstated, possibility of genetically engineering agents to target biological Systems at a molecular level is now held to pose a new challenge (44). But few commentators point to the difficulties in developing, producing and deploying biological agents, as evidenced by the failures of the Japanese cuit, A u m Shinrikyo, in this regards o n l y a décade ago. It was this that led them to settle for the rather more limited i m p a c t produced by the chemical agent sarin, despite their resources and scientific capabilities. The Tokyo subway attack that ensued had rather more impact upon our fevered imagination than in reality. As with the anthrax attacks, that targeted politicians and the media in the US in 2001, this incident suggests that bioterrorism is more likely to originate amongst malcontents at home, due to greater access and capabilities in developing such weapons there. Advanced économies are also better placed to deal with the conséquences of bioterrorism, a fact that significantly undermines their purpose, especially to outsiders. Nevertheless, suicidai foreign malefactors 
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bent on undermining western democracies continue to be presented as the greater threat. Recognising the extremely low probability and limited consequences of such incidents, some experts point to the longer-term psychological impacts as being the more important (45). There is an element of truth to this. Psychological casualties are a real phenomenon. In certain emergencies these can rapidly overwhelm existing healthcare resources and thereby undermine the treatment of those more directly affected. But they can also become a self-fulfilling prophecy. And by increasingly framing social problems through the prism of individual emotions, people are encouraged to feel powerless and i l l . The arrival of television cameras or emergency workers wearing decontamination suits act as powerful confirming triggers for the spread of mass psychogenic illness (46). So too can psychosocial interventions, such as debriefing subsequent to an incident (47). These can undermine constructive, pro-social and rational responses, including the expression of strong emotions such as anger (48). Hence, despite good intentions, psychiatrists can become complicit in shaping social ills. This is because few are prepared to question the dominant cultural script emphasising social and individual vulnerability, and the need for professional intervention and support. Rather than critically questioning the framing of the debate, many now simply accept the possibility of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism as a given (49). There is little understanding of how our exaggerated sense of risk is both historically contingent, predating 2001 quite significantly, and culturally determining, giving shape to and driving much of the agenda. The medical historian and epidemiologist, Nicholas King , has noted that 'experts were using 
the threat oj novel diseases' as a rationale for change long before any recent incident, and that contemporary responses draw on 'a repertoire oj metaphors, images and values' (50). He suggests that 'American concerns about global social change are refracted through the lens oj 
injectious disease'. This coincides with the view of others who see bioterrorism as providing a powerful metaphor for elite fears of social corrosion from within (51). Despite incidents since 2001 pointing to the preferred use of car bombs, high explosives and poorly deployed surface-to-air missiles, the authorities have, through their pronouncements, encouraged the media to hype weapons of mass destruction. This is despite any terrorist's capabilities being rather limited compared to our own and the consequences being more likely to devastate them than us. We have stockpiled smallpox vaccines, but notably, have run out of influenza jabs. A n d , in the extremely unlikely eventuality of an incident occurring, we assume that the public wil l panic and be unable to cope without long-term therapeutic counselling. In an age readily gripped by morbid fantasies and poisonous nightmares, few surpass the pathological projection of our own isolation much better than the fear of bioterrorism. A l l of this rather begs the question as to who is corrupting civilisation the most. The fantasy bombers or the worst-case speculators? 
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A heightened consciousness of risk, both amongst ordinary people, but also the élite of society, has been driven by a broader process of social fragmentation and isolation. In turn, the insecurities this has created have been addressed by various social leaders, keen to restore a sensé of purpose and legitimacy for themselvcs in the post-Cold War world order. These parallel processes have encouraged a significant degree of risk amplification in relation to numerous contemporary issues. Foremost amongst thèse are those pertaining to the environment, as well as personal health and security, which have also served as conduits for politicians and others to restore their connections to the public at large. The accompanying loss of any perception as to the possibility, and desirability, of transforming the world through social, rather than individual or technical processes, has further facilitated an exaggerated sensé of the importance and conséquences of psychological and scientific risks in the world. Many of thèse phenomena were clearly in évidence prior to the terrorist events of the 1 Ith of September 2001. The latter however, a l l o w e d a broader distortion of contemporary sensitivities to occur by encouraging a fatalistic sensé that there are people out there who simply want to destroy everything. This in turn, has fed into our already heightened sensé of individual vulnerability and insecurity. Unfortunately, many of the proposais raised to deal with such matters, projecl our current existential obsessions onto the world stage. Accordingly, the notion of health promotion, as opposed to treatment and cure, for tackling world poverty is now largely assumed without debate. Also, the assumption that individuals simply need to be provided with information to make the right choices goes unquestioned. What's more, if people are not choosing to lead healthy lives then it becomes possible to condemn them morally for failing to do so. Help-seeking from appropriately qualified experts is now de rigeur, as is the notion that a significant fraction of the population - up to two-thirds by some accounts - is suffering from some mild form of psychological condition or other illness. Whereas in the past governments would have hesitated to intrude directly into the private lives of their populations, today such concerns have been overthrown as the distinction between what is public and what is private has increasingly been eroded. What's more, the new processes of médicalisation and psychologisation - which have led to various claims for officiai récognition by specific groups - is now oUen promoted more informalty through non-governmenlal lobbies and patients' associations. Bizarrely, it would become a problem for governments today if ail of their proposed health targets were met. They would thereby lose their means of maintaining a connection with the populace. Of course, with the constant expansion of médical catégories, sensitivities, 
S y m p t o m s and syndromes, there is little chance of such a state of affairs coming to pass. On the other hand, by encouraging a sensé of vulnerability, or the notion that to be well is either odd, or something that needs constant vigilance, they have raised new problems in an 
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age characterised by the equally false and exaggerated perception of the threat posed to society by terrorism. Social resilience rather requires the need to promote a more confident and assertive form of individualism, contrary to the fragmented, isolated and insecure sense of individuation that now pertains. How governments seek to square this circle in the coming years w i l l be quite interesting. Sadly, one consequence of contemporary Western obsessions is to constantly project our perception of problems onto others around the world. An optimistic and confident, if arrogant, imperialism has been replaced by a pessimistic, doom-laden environmentalism and public health-ism, that are no less prescriptive in their pronouncements for those upon the receiving end. But if we are best to serve the people of the developing world, rather than impose our apocalyptic outlook upon them, then it is high-time that we promoted real development and sought to separate once and for al l , the concepts of health from the prescriptions of policy. Global health security targets communities, However, in the absence of real communities in the early years of the twenty-first century, this can only ever mean targeting large numbers of isolated individuals in a manner mediated through a range of caring professionals. Hence, it becomes a moralistic imperative to conform, rather than a consciously determined strategy to enhance what is in the best interests of society as a whole-Public health and public safety often come into conflict with individual health and personal security. One may need to be obtained at the expense of the other. The recent furore in the U K over the individual rights of parents to obtain separate inoculations for measles, mumps and rubella for their children, in the light of speculative concerns raised by one hospital doctor as to the rather remote - and as it proved unfounded - possibility of the M M R triple-vaccine being linked to childhood autism, is a prime example. 
Public health should never be considered to be a private matter. But the prevalent outlook that promotes individual consumer choice through the new government White Paper 
Choosing Health: Making Healthcare Choices Easier suggests the opposite (52). The consequence in relation to the M M R debacle was that - as vaccination levels descended below the threshold required to guarantee herd immunity - limited outbreaks of previously contained diseases emerged across the U K . On the other hand, public health needs to rest on a secure scientific footing, if it is not to be replaced by a fanciful wish-list of presumed risk-associations, driven by the burgeoning preventative paradigm of our limes. The latter can only lead to the denigration of science, as well as to the demise in the reputation of those who seek to prioritise their immediate popularity and image over more reasoned but possibly unpalatable insights. Current developments are likely to prove disastrous for both patients and doctors alike. And in their third-world incarnation these simply represent the projection of contemporary Western prejudices and morbid fantasies. Despite the fact that more people than ever across the globe enjoy better health today, the 
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intense awareness of health risks means that more people feel more i l l , as well as unduly concerned as to what outsiders may bring. This results in an ever-increasing burden of demand on the health care and security Systems that ail Western societies expérience growing difficulty in meeting. And when health becomes the goal of human endeavour it acquires an oppressive influence over the life of individuals and when people are ruled by the measures they believe may help to prolong their existence - it is the quality of their lives that is diminished. Our contemporary conceptualisation of risk bas been quite disabling in this regards. 
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The Limitations of Risk Management 
dealing with disasters and building social resilience 
This art ic le exp lores the signi f icance of soc ia l res i l ience in the light of the events 
of the 11 th of S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 1 , It examines the way in wh ich evolving cul tural 
contexts a l ter ou r percept ions of r isk and d isas ter . It a r g u e s tha t the con tem-
porary d o m i n a n c e of technical ly focused risk m a n a g e m e n t led r e s p o n s e s is 
limiting and may se rve to undermine the ord inary h u m a n bonds tha t make us 
truly résil ient. A polit ical debate over soc ieta l va lues is requ i red if we a re ta re-
engage the public in o rder to achieve this and henee deal appropr ia te ly with 
d isas te rs and t e r r o r i s m . 
s 
Bi l l Du rod ié , Di rector of the Interna-
t ional C e n t r e for Secur i ty Analysis, 
King's Col lege London 
ince September n t h 2001 a good deal of focus has been placed upon the concept of resil-ience, understood as the ability to withstand or recover from adverse conditions or disruptive challenges. Polit icians, emergeney planners and others, talk of the need to 'build', 'engen-der', 'improve' or 'enhance' resilience in society (Durodié 2003).1 Unfortunately, much of this debate is framed in thefashionable, but limiting, language of risk man-agement and risk communication. Sénior officials regularly point to the central role they attribute to risk reduction. This is understood in narrowly technical terms as consisting of horizon scanning, investment in equipment, traíning, business conti-nuity planning, new legislation and the like. 2 This outlook actually reveáis a certain absence of purpose and direction in society at large. After all, risk reduction is a means, not an cnd. In the past, people were not so much focused on reducing risk as upon enhancing capabilities towards some wider goal. Risk reduction was a by-product of such broader purposes and activities. It is also worth noting, that in recent times, the concept of risk itself has gradually altered from one that captured possibility and engagement in the active sense of 'taking a risk', to one that increas-ingly reflects a growing sense of doom and distante from events, as evidenced in growing reference to the passive phrase of 'being at risk'. Risk used to be a verb. Now it has become a noun. This reflects a wider form of disengagement that has oceurred across society at large. Gradu-
ally, our sense of wil l and agency have been removed from the équation. Risks are now con-ceived as being entities in their own right, only minîmally subject to human intervention (Furedi 
1999). If risks are conceived of as being inherently and implacably out there, coming our way, then the best we can do is to identify them and prépare to deal with them. 
Social Responses In fact, how we as individuals, and as a society, define and respond to risks and disasters, is only partly dépendent upon causal agents and scale. Historical ly evolving cultural attitudes and outlooks, as well as other social faetors, play a far greater rôle. In objective terms, risk may be defined as a function of hazard and probability, but that some product or event is perceived of as a risk, or is treated as a disaster, dépends on subjective faetors. This human élément is missing from mecha-nistic risk calculus. Technical définitions of risk and resilience not only omit key éléments of understanding and response - such as our degree of trust in authority, in other human beings and in ourselves - but may also serve to further undermine such faetors, which are crucial in responding effectively. There is, for instance, a contemporary cultural proclivity to speculate wildly as to the likelihood of adverse events and to demand high-profile responses and capabilities based on worst-case scénarios.3 In the end, this only serves to distract attention and divert social resources in a way that may not be warranted by a more pragmatic assessment and prioritisation of all of the risks that we face. 
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Technique and technology certainly help in the face of disaster, although the fact that par-ticular societies both choose and have the capac-ité to prioritise such éléments, is also ultîmately, socially determined. More broadly, it is possible to say that resilience - loosely defincd as the abil-ity of individuals and society to keep going after a shock - is most définitely a function of cultural attitude or outlook. Cultural values point to why it is that, at cer-tain times and in certain societies, a widespread loss of life fails to be a point of discussion, whilst at other times or in a différent society, even a very limited loss can become a key cultural référence point. This evolving context and framework of cultural meanings explains such variations as our widespread indifférence to the daily loss of life upon our roads, as opposed to, for instance, the shock and national mourning that ensued across the globe from the loss of just seven lives aboard the Challenger spacecraft in 1986. The loss of Challenger represented a low-point in the cultural assessment of human technological capabilities. It was a blow to our assumption of steady scientific and technological progress that no number of everyday car accidents could repli-cate. It fed into and drove a debate that continues to this day regarding our relationship with nature and a presumed human arrogance in secking to pursue goals beyond ourselves. Hence, emergencies and disasters, including terrorist attacks, take on a différent rôle dépend-ent upon what they reprcsent to particular socie-ties at particular times, rather than solely on the basis of objective indicators, such as real costs and lives lost. In this sensé, our response to ter-rorist incidents, such as that which occurred on September n t h 2001, teaches us far more about ourselves than about the terrorists.4 On the whole, the history of human responses to disaster, including terrorist attacks, is quite heartening. People tend to be at their most co-opérative and focused at such times. There are very few instances of panic (Durodié and Wessely 
2002). The récent earthquake and isunami in the Indian Océan serve as a salutary reminder of this. Amidst the taies of dévastation and woe, numer-ous individual and collective acts of bravery and sacrifice stand ont, reminding us of the ordinary courage and conviction that are part of the human condition. 
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People often corne together in an emergency in new and largcly unexpected ways, re-affirming core social bonds and their common humanity. Research reveals communities that were consid-ered to be better off through having had to cope with adversity or a crisis (Furedi and Roberts 
2004). Rather than being psychologically scarred, it appears equally possible to be enhanced. In other words, whilst a disaster, including a ter-rorist attack, destroys physical and economic capital, it has the potential to serve as a rare opportunity in contemporary society to build up social capital. 
^Qur response to terrorist incidents teaches 
•ùs|jfarrpore about ourselves than about the 
/terrorists." 
u u 
Of course, terrorists hope that their acts will lead to a breakdown in social cohésion. Whether this is so, is up to us. Civilians are the true first respon-ders and first line of defence at such times. Their support prior to, and their reactions subséquent to any incident, are crucial. Disasters act as one of the best indicators of the strength of pre-existing social bonds across a community. Societies that are together, pull together - those that are apart, are more likely to fall apart. Whilst there is much empirical évidence pointing to the positive éléments of ordinary human responses to disaster, it is usually after the immédiate danger has subsided that the real values of society as a whole corne to the fore. It is then that the cultural outlook and impact of social leaders and their responses begin to hold sway. These détermine whether the focus is on reconstruction and the future, or on rétribution and the past. A more récent development has been the trend to encourage mass outpourings of public grief, minutes of silence or some other Symbols of 'conspicuous compassion'.5 Sadly, despite the variety of ways in which it is possible to interpret and respond to différ-ent emergencies, the onus today seems to veer away from a célébration of the human spirit and societal resilience, towards a focus on compen-sation and individual vulnerability. If we are to understand thèse contemporary préoccupations 
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a n d perceptions of risk and disaster, as well as thc consequential growth of narrow risk management solutions, we need to get to the sociological roots of our subjective outlooks. 
Social Bonds The key élément shaping our perceptions of risk and the management of most policy issues today is a sensé of isolation and insecurity that affects every laycr of society. For the vast majority of ordinary Citizens this takes the form of political disengagement and social disconnection. Forthe élite it is driven more by a sensé of illegitimacy and purposelessness. Atboth the formai and informal levéis of social engagement, we can see that social bonds have been severely eroded o ver the last decade or so. We should be alert to this having quite dramatie conséquences. At the formai level, people i n advanced West-ern societies are increasingly unlikely to particí-pate i n the political process. This effect is most striking among younger age groups. Electoral turnouts in many countries are at an all-time low and in the few instances where thèse are high, emotion appears to rule over reason. Few 
are active, or even passive, members of political parties or trade unions as their forebears were, and there is little attempt to engage in , or raise the standard of, debate. When people do vote, it is often on a negativebasis - against an incumbent, rather than for a replacement. At the informai level, the changes are even more striking. Many have commented on the growing pressures faced by communtties, neigh-bourhoods, and families. In his book on this thème, 'Bowling Alone', the American académie Robert Putnam also pointed to the démise of informai clubs and associations (Putnam 2000). Meeting up with friends, occurs less frequently than previously, too. In other words, people are not just politically disengaged but also, increas-ingly socially disconnected. This loss of social capital has occurred a n d been experienced within a génération. Not so long ago, for example, it was still pos-sible across most urban centres, to send children to school on their own, assuming that other adults would act 'in loco parentis* - chastising them if they were misbehaving and helping them if they were in trouble, Today, such a straightforward 
social arrangement can no longer be taken for granted. None of us ever signed a contract saying that we would look after other people's children. It was simply an unstated and self-evident social good, This loss of a social sensé of responsibility makes the individual task of parenting harder. Being less connected, also leaves people less corrected. It allows their subjective impression of reality to go unmediated or unmoderated through membership of a wider group or asso-ciation. Without a sensé of the possibility of social solutions, personal obsessions grow into all-consuming worldviews that are rarely open to reasoned interrogation or debate. In part, it is this that explains our récent proclivity to emphasise or exaggerate ail of the so-called risks that are held to confront us (Furedi 1997 and 2002). 
yBeingyless connected, also leaves people iless-corrected." 
Rather than the world changing any faster today than in the past, or becoming a more dangerous, unpredictable or complex place, it may be our diminished, and more isolated, sensé of self that has altered our confidence to deal with change and the problems it gives rise to (Heartfield 
2002).6 In our technically networked world, we may bc more aware - but we are also easier to scare than previously. Being more isolated leaves us more self-centred, as well as risk averse. In turn, thèse developments reduce the likelihood of our acting for some greater common good and end up making us less résilient, both as individu-áis and as a society. From BSE (mad cow disease) to GMOs (genet-ically modified organisms); from mobile phones to M M R (measles-mumps-rubella triple-vac-cine), ail new developments are viewed through the prism of a heightened and individuated con-sciousness of risk.7 Nor are our fears restricted to the realms of science and tcchnology. Age-old activities and processes have been reinterpreted to fit our new sensé of isolation and fear. Bullying, sun-bathing, and even sex have joined an ever-growing panoply of concems, along with maverick doctors, crime, food, and paedophiles. Worse, this state of affairs has been exac-erbated bv the various authorities themselves, 
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which suffer from their own existential crisis of isolation and insecurity. As we no longer vote, so ruling parties appear increasingly illegitimate and divorced from majority concerns. A less than 50% turnout when split two or three ways produces governments with at best a 20-25% mandate. The real figure as reflected by demographics, negative voting, and actual local élection results is often well below this, languishing around the 
10-15% mark. This crisis of legitimacy has been further accentuated by a certain lack of purpose that has set in since the dissolution of the old Cold War divide. Then, an ideological divide separated a supposedly socialist Left from a free-market Right. The démise of the Left exposed the Right's own lack of ideas and dynamism. 8 Now ail pallies fight for the centre ground and desperately seek issues that wil l re-connect with voters. Latching on to the gênerai climate of fear and insecurity, politicians have learnt to repackage themselves as societal risk managers around issues such as security, health and the environ-ment. They pose as the people who will protect us from our fears and regulate the world accordingly. But the petty lifestyle concerns they focus on, as reflected in incessant debates about smoking, smacking, eating, and drinking are unlikely to inspire and engage a new génération of voters. Nor will doom-laden prédictions relating to ter-rorism and global warming. Indeed, the more such concerns are high-lighted, the more it becomes impossible for the authorities to satiate the insecurities they drive. Hence, alongside disengagement and aliénation, has corne a concomitant disillusion ment and mis-trust in ail forms of authority, whether political, corporate, or scientific. Healthy scepticism has increasingly been replaced by unthinking cyni-cism. In many situations today, the public tend to assume the worst and présume a cover-up. Rumour and myth abound over évidence and reason. 
Social Resiliencc The list of measures commonly discussed as being necessaiy to enhance social resilience in the aftermath of September n t h 2001 consists, amongst others, of the need for better surveil-lance and intelligence, new détection équipaient and protective clothing, more effective models 
for predicting behaviour, alternative modes for imparting information through 'trusted' sources, as well as new structures of government and inte-grated response Systems. 9 These are all largely technical in character, reflecting an alienated sensé of risk as being external to us. Hence, even when discussing prévention, the assumption is that we are merely anticipating and building capacity for 'inévitable' challenges.1 0 In the words of some senior officiais, it is 'only a matter of time', or 'when, not if , a ter-rorist atrocity wil l occur in the United Kingdom using some kind of crude chemical, biological, or radiological device.1 1 The notion that it may be possible to shape conditions, or set the agenda, with a vievv to obtaining more désirable outeomes or altering our social mindset, independently of external forces, is rarely entertained-Unfortunately, much of the rhetoric regarding the war on terror, far from being robust and reso-lute, reveals an almost resigned fatalism towards future events. There is no sensé of changing how people will respond, simply a sensé of preparing them to respond. This defensive responsiveness in turn can only further encourage, not just terror-iste, but a whole host of other malcontents, loners, hoaxers, and cranks in their activïties. At best, our strategy is on e of re-acting to the pre-sumed actions of others. They drive - we follow, or mitigate. Despite occasional références to the need to 'défend our way of life' or 'our values', very little effort has been put into identifying what thèse might be . i a They tend to be assumed, or glossed over, in some cursory fashion. At best, tolérance, which is the virtue of putting vip with other pcople's values, gets misconstrued as a value. No doubt, because societal aims and cultural values are deeply contested and debating thèse might appear to be divisive at a time when we need to act in unison, it is easier to face the other way. But this flagrant lack of clarification as to who we are, what we believe i n , and where we are headingas a society, fundamentally undermines any technical attempt to be résilient. Real resil ience, at a deeper social level , dépends upon identifying what we are for, not just what we are against. That way we can ori-entate society and seek to build upon it, not just anticipate what is coming and seekto respond. It 
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is precisely by establishing our aims and values and then pursuing these, that we stand the most chance of winning hearts and minds, not just at home but also amongst the disaffected abroad. This is not to deny the need for a small layer of highly-trained Professionals in society to deal with the problem of terrorism in the here-and-now. But the debate about who we are and what we are for is not some abstract philosophical issue waiting for présent hostilities to bc over. It is most urgent and necessary right now. Without an eye on the ends, just as much as on the means, we may take décisions that drive us further from our goals than we appreciate. What we do in the présent is inevitably shaped by our existing values, as well as the form of soci-ety we seek to créate. There are already many signs that some of the actions that have been taken thus far have served to further exacérbate the deep mistrust and cynicism in government and authority that is already quite widely feit. Worse, despite good intentions, encouraging people to be 'alert', rather than alarmed, may well further erode the very social bonds of ordinary human trust we will need to dépend upon if wc are truly to be résilient as a society.1 3 None of these serve to shore up ordinary social bonds and henee real human and societal resil-ience. By encouraging the dominant paradigm of risk management in our understanding both of terrorism, as well as how to respond to it, we are encouraging a suspicion of others that effectively pushes people further apart and accentuâtes existing trends towards social atomisation. We have created a new bureaucraey but, as the figures show, we have failed to address the underlying insecurities (Durodié 2004a). Above all we have focused solely upon the form that terrorism now takes in the modern world - that relating in some increasingly tan-gential way, to AI Qa'ida - and largely ignored its content - a vehement anti-Americanism, that rejects modernity and progress. This latter reveáis the real complacency of the dominant responses. One hardly needs to leave the West, to discover a whole host of other voices also expressing a hatred for America and enlightcnmcnt values. This division is internal rather than external. Islamist terror is merely its most visible manifestation. But once Stupid White Men had become a best-seller on both sides 
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of the Atlantic, we should have been alert to a certain degree of cultural self-loathing at home (Moore 2001). Timothy McVeigh and the A u m Shinrikyo cuit pointed to our ability to créate home-grown nihilist terrorism. And it is well worth reminding ourselves that the 19 hijackers from September n t h 2001 had themselves ail spent considerable time in the West, imbuing our values - or lack of them - and had largely been educated here. 
y'Snce^Stupid White Men had become a 
best-seller on both sides of the Atlantic, we 
should'have been alert to a certain degree 
of cultural self-loathing." 
Cultural confusión as to who we are, what we are for, and where we are going wil l undermine our attempts at instituting social resilience. Society today is less coherent than it was a generation or more ago, it is also less compliant, but above all it is less confident as to its aims and purposes. This will not be resolved by training ourselves to respond to dísasters, but by a much broader level of debate and engagement in society, not just relating to terrorism and other crises, but to far broader social issues. Presumably, people are prepared to risk their lives fighting fires or fighting a war, not so that their children can, in their turn, grow up to fight fires and fight wars, but because they believe that there is something more important to life worth fighting for. It is the catastrophic absence of any discussion as to what that something more impor-tant is, that leaves us fundamentally unarmed in the face of adversity today. In that regard, risk management is both insufficient as an approach, as well as being fundamentally unambitious and therefore, dispiriting. 
Social Solutions Historical comparisons of disaster, such as responses to the Second World War 'Blitz'. or to past episodes of flooding and epidemic disease, reveal a number of important lessons for today.1 4 Not least, is the extent and depth of social bonds and engagement at those times. During the war, there was also a clear sense of the need to cany on with normal life and eveiyday roles and respon-
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sibilities, rather than developing some kind of shelter-mentality, (Jones at el. 2004), as is now encouraged. However, the most striking change over the last fifty years has been in how we assume that ordinary human beings wäll react in a crisis. Beyond the grossly distorted belief in the likeli-hood of panic lies a more subtle, yet unspoken shift in cultural assumptions, that in itself under-mines our capacity to be strong. That is, that in the past, the assumption on the whole, as born out by actual human behaviour, was that people were résilient and would seck to cope in adverse circumstances. Today, there is a widespread presumption of human vulnerability that influences bothi our discussion of disasters well before they have occurred, and that seeks to influence our responses to them long after. A new army of therapeutic counsellors and other assorted Professionals are there to 'help' people recover (Furedi 2003). This présupposes our inability to do so unaided. Indeed, the belief that we can cope, and are robust, is often presented as outdated and misguided, or as an instance of being 'in déniai' (Furedi and Roberts 2004). In some ways, this latter élément, more than any other, best exemplifies and clarifies some of the existing confusions and strugglcs that lie ahead. If self-reliance is old fashïoned and help-seeking actively promoted, for whatever well-intended reason, then we are unlikely to see a truly résilient Society émerge. This cultural shift is reflected in the figures that reveal that whereas in the United Kingdom, in the period of trade union militancy and unrest known as the 'winter of discontent' of 1979, there were 29.5 million days lost through strikes, in 
2002 there were 33 million days lost through stress.'5 We have shifted from being active agents of history to becoming passive subjects of it. This may suit social leaders lacking a clear agenda or direction, lt may indeed be easier to manage the sick than those who struggle. But it also precludes the possibilité of encouraging and establishing real resilience, résolve and purpose across society. The standard way of dealing with disaster today is one that prioritises pushing the public out beyond the yellow-tape perimeter put up by 
the authorities (Glass and Schoch-Spana 2002). At best the public are merely exhorted to display their support and to trust the professa on als. Effec-tively, we deny people any rôle, responsibility, or even insîght into their own situation at such times. Yet, despite this, ordinary human beings are at their most social and rational in a crisis. It is this that should be supported, rather than subsumed or even subverted. Handling social concerns as to the possibil-ité of a terrorist attack is no easé feat. In part, this is because social fears today have little to do with the actuality, or even possibilité, of the presumed threats that confront us. Rather, they are an expression of social isolation and mistrust, combined with an absence of direction and an élite crisis of confidence. The starting point to establishing real resil-ience and trulé effective solutions will be to put the actual threat posed into an appropriate con-text. This means being honest as to the objective évidence, as well as being ableto clarify the social basis of subjective fears. The incessant debate as to the possibility and conséquences of an attack using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons is a case in point (Durodié 2004b). Whüst Western societies have debated such nightmare scénarios as if they were real, terrorists have continued to display their proficiency i n , and proclivity to use, conventional weapons, such as high explosives, carbombs, and suvface-to-air missiles. 
Y^rdïnary human beings are at their most 
'Social and rational in a crisis. It is this that 
ish7qûld/be supported, rather than subsu-
fime'd or even subverted." 
Above-all, if as a society, we are to ascribc an appropriate cultural meaning to the events of September n t h 2001 - one that does not enhance domestic concerns and encourage us to bccome ever-more dépendent on a limited number of 'expert' Professionals who will tell the public how to lead their lives at such times - then we need to promote a far more significant political debate as to our aims and purposes as a society. Changing our cultural outlook is certainly a daunting task. It requires people in positions of 
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authority to clarify and agrée on a common direc-tion and then to win others to it. The reluctante to engage in this fundamentally political process and the clear préférence to concéntrate instead upon more limited, technical goals, leaves us profoundly ill-equipped for the future. It speaks volumes as to our existing State of resilience and may serve to make matters worse. 
Bizarrely, few of the authorities concerned consider it to be their responsibility to lead in this matter. Nor do they believe such cultural change to be a realistic possibility. Yet, in the eventuality of a major civil emergency, they hope that the public will pay attention to the risk warnings they provide and alter their behaviour aecordingly. By then Jt will be too late. 
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S o m e e v e n s u g g e s t t h a t t h e s e s h o u l d c o r n e f r o m a 
variety of ethnie b a c k g r o u n d s i n o r d e r to "connect' w i t h 
d i f f é r e n t c o m m u n i t i e s . B o t h of these o u t l o o k s h i g h i i g h t 
the w i d e s p r e a d c o n t e m p o r a r y b e l i e f that the m e d i u m 
itself is m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n the message. But elevating 
style over substance rather reveáis the absence of any 
real content. 
1 0 L o n d o n ' s M e t r o p o l i t a n P o l i c e C h i e f C o m m i s s i o n e r , 
S i r J o h n S t e v e n s , d e s c r i b e d a n attack o n L o n d o n as 
' i n e v i t a b l e ' o n 16 M a r c h 2004, a few days after t h e 
M a d r i d bombings. 
1 1 A i l phrases used by E l i z a M a n n i n g h a m - B u l l e r , the Head 
of the U K Security Service i n her first p u b l i c speech to 
a c o n f é r e n c e at the R o y a l U n i t e d Services Institute i n 
W h i t e h a l l o n 17 J u n e 2003. 
1 2 Phrases used by U K P r i m e M i n i s t e r , T o n y B l a i r , i n 
his speech available at; h t t p : / / w m v . r u i m b e r - i o . g o v . u k / 
o u t p u t / P a g e t 7 3 i . a s p at the L o r d M a y o r ' s Banquet on 11 
N o v e m b e r 2002. H e subséquent!} ' made s i m i l a r remarks 
i n a local constituency speech, f a i l i n g each time to clarify 
what he actually m e a n t . In a s i m i l a r v e i n , U S Department 
of H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y s u p r e m o , T o m R i d g e , c o n s i s t -
ently referred to W e s t e r n values as b e i n g ' freedom' a n d 
'democracy' in a speech given at K i n g ' s College L o n d o n 
o n 8 N o v e m b e r 2002. 
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'3 'Alert , not a l a r m e d ' is the preferred slogan of the Police 
a n d other s e n i o r politicians a n d officiais i n the U K . As a 
phrase, this is entirely general a n d vague, as opposed to 
specific a n d p r a c t i c a l . 
d o m i n a n t l y L o n d o n , by the G e r m a n Luftwaffe d u r i n g the 
Second W o r l d W a r . 
1 5 T h e f i g u r e s a r e a v a i l a b l e o n - l i n e a t ; h t t p : 
/ / w w w . wsws.org/articles/2004/mar2004/mine-
mo5.shtml. M ' B l i t z ' m e a n i n g l i g h l n i n g , is the term used to refer to 
the aerial b o m b a r d m c n t of B r i t i s h towns and cities. p r e -
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ABSTRACT This short reply to criticism of an original paper demónstrales how the crides 
themselves refiect the limitations originally pointed to. Public dialogue in science is about 
form not contení. Nervous ojjlcials, and sadly a few scientists themselves, feel that they need 
to be seen to consult on such matters with ordinary people. They are creating a new system 
of patronage in the process. An army of self-appointed Communications experts also go so 
far as to suggest that this makes for better science. This projeets a narrow utilitarian or 
instrumentalist model whereby science should serve certain pre-determined social goals. 
This debases science, discrediting its institutions and accentuating the very problem they 
seek to solve. 
K E Y WORDS; science, society, dialogue, expert, risk, uncertainty, trust, public , values 
In the spirit o f dialogue, Roland Jackson, Fiona Barbagallo and Helen Haste have written a reply to my essay 'Limitations of Public Dialogue in Science and the Rise of N e w "Experts"* (Durodié 2003). I am grateful for this, not just because their response offers me an opportunity to expand further on these matters, but also because it reflects some of the problems I raised. Jackson et al . focus their discussion on the 'context, purposes and practice of public dialogue'. This reflects an absence of much discussion as to what the dialogue should actually be about thereby confirming one of my original points. That is, that for the advocates of public dialogue, process is far more important than content. Quantity and access arc prioritised over quality and insight. What is most striking however, is how limited their description of the context is. In my original piece I concluded that 'as the aspiration for real social change has receded, so science has been inflated in terms of import and impact, out of all proportion'. This is a vital point. It partly explains why scientific development is now increasingly viewed as a risk. A s Jackson et al . must know, science, as well as transforming society, is itself a product o f society. Indeed, the scientific revolution was born in a period of dynamic social change, becoming in its turn a contributor to that change. It derived from a 
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wider process of social transformation and reflected a faith in humanity itself, rather than merely in science. ït is the démise of such aspirations, as weit as the actions associated with them, which has encouraged today the advent o f an increasingly alienated sensé of dependence upon a supposedly deterministic science. This has been bad for society and bad for science too. Science's aims and methods have suffered from the corrupting influence of being tailored to explain, or address, essentially social processes and phenomena. If it is true, as Jackson et al . suggest, that 'there is a risk o f a strong reaction' i f research outcomes are found to be 'at odds with the values or expectations' of the public, then presumably clarifying what the public's values truly are should be the primary task. A n d referring, as they do, to 'publics' rather than the public, simply begs the question as to quite how many publics there are and which of thèse we should pay attention to. Both thèse processes are political rather than scientific matters. Jackson et al . allude several times to the need to locate their proposais within the 'wider political process'. It therefore seems somewhat remiss of them to fail to point to the noticeable démise, both quantitative and qualitative, o f broader debate and engagement in worldly affairs over the contemporary period. Aside from the continued poor turnout in the U K gênerai élection, politics, as I am sure most would agrée, should be about more than mere voting. It requires a debate as to vision and principles, as well as contesting and acquiring the means to realise thèse. Dialogue in relation to scîence-related issues, or 'dialogue o n ' , as they w o u l d have it , appears a poor Substitute for this more ambitious and active, participatory rôle in shaping social consciousness and society as a whole. It rather seems to reflect the lowering of horizons born of an âge when the désire to transform the w o r l d through mass political engagement is, in their own words, 'perhaps an ambition too far'. But just as the initial dynamic behind science was social change, so the absence of this circumscribes science too, as well as shaping an exaggerated sensé of science's impact upon us. Ironically, it was always radicals who understood the potential o f science to upset vested positions of préjudice and power. Accordingly , science was traditionally championed by the left as a practical battering-ram with which to challenge supersti-tion and diktat. But the left also lost their faith in science, initially through their conflation of it with post-war American militarism, and more recently through their attempts to harness environmental ideals, in order to provide themselves with a sensé of purpose, as wel l as a constituency, in the post-Cold War world order. Accordingly , the suggestion that I 'wish for a past golden âge when experts were experts, authori-ties were automatically respected by tradition and everyone knew their place', is simply baffling. Rather, it is those who would wish to see science instrumentally harnessed to 'address societal needs ? in an âge when our sensé of what is possible, or désirable, has been so diminished, who are the real conservatives. For those who have given up on the désire for social transformation, believing this to be too ambitious, then maybe teaching scientists 'how to talk' appears a more achievable goal. Sadly, within the context of diminished aspirations that they them-selves reflect, shape and drive, this can only serve to further undermine expectations, 
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as well as corrupting the individuals, ideals and institutions they purport to be helping. For instance, rather than talking to the public as to the possibility of a link between the M M R triple-vaccine and childhood autism, science and society would have been better served, in the fïrst instance, by a more robust internal debate. It was this failure that propelled the debate into the public sphère, where few were qualifïed to comment upon, or interpret, the évidence. Instead a cultural mood attuned to constant spécula-tion as to worst-case scénarios determined the direction of much of the discussion, seriously impairing the U K vaccination programme. This proclivity to assume negative outcomes is encouragea by Jackson et al . when they talk of the need to take into account science's 'inhérent uncertainties'. They seem not to envisage the possibility of positive solutions to uncertainty, and this potentially limitless task, of accounting for the unaccountable, fails to highlight that science has always been replète with contradiction. What is new today is a broader crisis o f confidence in dealing with uncertainty, and a concomitant absence of direction, that has afflicted both society at large, and science in conséquence. This loss of nerve, in the face of what has always been an inevitably uncertain future, has led to a wholesale corruption of the aims, principles and standards of scientific inquiry. It is this debasement, rather than a mere disheartening, that I sought to draw attention to when alluding to 'the demoralization of scientists' in my original essay. ït is a wonder that those who prioritise communication over content should have failed to appreciate this distinction. Another area of confusion arises from their own définition of dialogue. That they should place such store by this word is itself quite telling. Jackson et al . describe dialogue as 'a context*, before suggesting that it Tocates scientific developments in a wider social context'. A context within a context then? G i v e n , as indicated above, that their grasp of context itself seems rather limited, this can not bode too well for the analysis that ensues. Dialogue is variously described as 'an open exchange and sharing', something that 'enables' inclusion and seeks to 'recognise' other factors. A s dialogue 'does not remove authority' from science or 'somehow set public opinion as equal 1 , there appears to be no requirement to act upon it, just to 'respect' and 'acknowl-edge\ Adopting the therapeutic language of our times, dialogue is no longer a means to an end, but rather an end in itself. So much for the possibility of real change then. In fact, history rather suggests that when the public truly désire to be involved in decision-making then there is little that can hold them back. They certainly do not require to be 'empowered' by those in power, or those with good intentions. Such narrow, goal-oriented support, for ' improving confidence' or 'reducing conflict' , constitutes a patronage o f a more profound kind than merely being condescending to others, as it appears is the only way in which Jackson et al . understand the term patro-nise. Ironically, whilst preaching the virtues of humility i n science, Jackson et al . confidently tout the input and relcvance of social scientists who 'can and should offer valuable specialist expertise'. Notably, this claim to authority is not associated with any calls for public dialogue in the social sciences. This inadvertently accepts the 
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input o f such experts as having no real and lasting impact upon the world in the way that they believe science does. Somewhat more ominously they propose that dialogue is somehow necessary to secure science's 'licence to practise'. In this narrowly instrumentalist model of science, 'public consent' replaces royal assent in determining whether, on the basis of providing certain tangibly perceived 'benefits', scientists should be allowed to pursue their inquiries. In fact, science's 'licence to practise' derives from its results. Many of these are not envisaged, nor can they be, when scientists first experiment. To demand otherwise is to confuse open-ended inquiry with a form of methodologi-cal prescription better known to social scientists writing funding applications. N o doubt Jackson et ai . are more familiar, and possibly more comfortable with the latter. Certainly, they are at ease with projecting their own prejudices onto the public. In their speculative discussion about nanotechnology, a nascent area of science yet to impinge upon popular consciousness in any way, these dialogic communicators quite literally, and unashamedly, speak on behalf o f the public. They begin their statements with such phrases as, 'The public is l ikely to want to see. -. ' , and even, Tt w i l l want to a s k . . . ' . It seems as though those who speak the loudest o f the need for evidence-based uncertainty and humility are amongst the least able to practice it. Whilst suggesting that the inclusion of non-scientists might lead to 'a broader range of options' being discussed, they also appear blind to the fact that dialogue about 'benefits, concerns and moral issues' can actually narrow the scope of discus-sion. A s the notion that it is possible, even desirable, to shape or lead public opinion, is entirely absent from their description of dialogue, this approach can only mean adapting to the lowest common denominator, or contemporary prejudices and fears. Consensus and compromise may appeal to woolly-minded bureaucrats in White-hall and Brussels, but science is poorly served by it. L i k e it or not, policy-making necessitates a conflict in society between groups with competing aims. Indeed, whether scientific inquiry is best advanced by demanding a dialogue with the public is one of those conflicts. That the champions of inclusion over experimentation should now include the chief executive of the British Association for the Advancement of Science speaks volumes as to the position of some amongst the scientific elite within this debate. In conclusion, it should be noted that I do not oppose education or public discussion about science, simply the notion that this should inform the direction of science itself. Politicians and officials who promote dialogue in science in order to relate to the public , and scientists who need the prop of relevance and inclusion to justify themselves, impoverish both their fields of activity. They reflect elites who have lost the confidence to get on with what they purport to promote. It is high time they were prised apart. 
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C H A P T E R 1 3 
C U L T U R A L P R E C U R S O R S A N D 
P S Y C H O L O G I C A L C O N S E Q U E N C E S O F 
C O N T E M P O R A R Y W E S T E R N ReSPONSES T O 
A c t s o f T e r r o r 
Bill Durodié 
g j j l his chaptcr explores what the response to the terrorise attaclcs of September 11, 2001, teaches us about Western society today. There has been a wealth of research examining the purported cultural background and psychology o f the perpetrators of those events (Hoffman, 1999; Reich, 1998). That focus has two main rationales: (1) to identify and deal with potential terrorists and (2) to begin to tackle what are considered to be the root causes of terrorism—usually held to stem from poverty and disaffection across the T h i r d World (von Hippel , 2002). These approaches offer a somewhat predictable and reassuring explanation o f events. They locatc the prob-lem o f terrorism elsewhere—in the minds, actions, and cultures o f others. A t best, those posïng a threat are understood to be rcacting in an adverse way co what are held to have been the injustices committed against their forebears during an earlier âge of imperial domination. Here, I wish to consider the extent to which some of the issues may be far closer to home, and more contemporary, than we Üke to envisage. In part, this is due to the particular way in w h i c h Western societies perceive and dcal w i t h anything that involves risk nowadays (Furedi, 1997/2002a). If anything, the actual threats posed could be conceived of as weaker today than those presented throughout most o f the C o l d War, yet society appears to react as i f they were stronger. W h y is this? A n d what does this tell us about ourselves? A focus on our inercasingly-exaggerated perceptions of risk and the adverse conséquences this brings, both to the people of che T h i r d W o r l d and for Western societies, is a missing element to our analysas of ter-rorism that we ignore at our perd. Ultimately, if our responses are shaped, in part at least, through the prism of our own domestic fears and insecurities, then the actions taken wil l prove limited or inef-fective and may serve to confuse matters more. A mystifying mychology is created, 
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which in its turn demands totemic gcstures to teassure the public. This process read-îly becomcs a self-fulfilling fantasy which—far from assuaging our concerns—will only drive them further. 
I n v e r t i n g Q u e s t i o n s Just as thcrc are two sides to every coin, so occasionally we need to invert the ques-tions we ask of socîety if we are to obtaîn a more balanced and productive take on issues. For example, the tecent fashion to re-examine Samuel Huntingtons work The 
Clash of Civilisations and Remaking of World Order (1998), in the light o f 9/11, would do well to be moderated with an equally vigorous examination as to the pos-sibility o f a clash within civil ization, radier than becween diffeting cultures. T h i s would nced to address the radicalizatîon of Muslims within Western societîes, but more importantly, for those wanting to get to the real roots o f this phenomenon, to assess and analyze the largely Western origins of anti-Western ideas. In this vein, cather than recording so-called anti-American sentiment across the world today (The Pew Global Attitudes Project, n.d.), EBwe would do well to exam-ine how such attitudes have developed doser to home. After ail , more anticapitalist protestors corne from Seattle than from Gaza. The rejection of once core social val-ues, such as ambition, success, and development, and their représentation as arro-gant, selfish, and dangerous, rcachcs its apogée in relation to the United States— the most advanced capitalist nation. This rejection is reflected in a growing self-loathing évident in A m e r i c a n culture and that o f other Western societies, as expresscd, for instance, in Oscar-winner Michael Moore's best-seller Stupid White 
Men (2002). Another assumption worth exploring in a more rounded way is that of the need to understand why it is that a small proportion of Asian youth appear to be attracced to fringe islamist organizations. It may prove more productive to ask why it is that a small élément of Asian youth, and quite a few others as well , fail to find any sensé of solidariry or purpose within Western society (Durodié, 2004a). Surely, it is an indictment of our own culture that its lack of direction and dyna-mism fails to attract and inspire ambitious young people. It is not the magnetism of those who supposedly seek to restore a twelfth-century caliphate in the twenty-first century that should concern us. Rather, it is a failing of our own society that it does not projccc clcarly a vision of its own future to argue against those who would have us live in the past. It fails, thereby, to command ioyalty or ro impart any sensé of mis-sion or meaning. Instcad of examining the presumed culture and psychology of those who perpe-trate acts o f terror, this chapter focuses upon those selfsame factors in relation to our societies and to ourselves. To what extent are we truly facing a new phenomenon, encompassing new technologies with unforeseen conséquences? Or , is it we who have changed—including our individual attitudes to danger, the cohérence of our institu-tions, and our sensc of social solidariry and resilience? 
Cuhural Precursors and Psychological Conséquences of Contemporary Western Responses to Acts of Terror 
D i m i n i s h c d S e l v e s 
The extent to which once core social affiliations and bonds have been eroded with-out replacement over récent décades is striking. We should be alert to the possibility of this producing some unexpected conséquences. At the formal level, people in advanced Western societies are increasingly unlikely to participate in the political process. N o r are they as likely to be active—or even pas-sive—members of political parties or trade unions in the samc way that their fore-bears were. There is, of course, more to democracy than merely casting your vote, but even when people do vote, it is often on a negative basis—against an incumbent rather than for his or her replacement. These trends are also most marked among the young. A t the informai level, some changes are even more notable. M a n y have com-mentée! on the growing pressures faced by communities, neighborhoods, and fami-lies. In BoivlingAlone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, the U.S. aca-démie Robert Putnam pointed to the démise of informai clubs and associations (2000). Meeting with feiends occurs less frequently than prcviously, too. T h i s loss of, what has sometimes been coined "social capital," has occurred within a remark-ably short period o f time. A génération ago it was quitc normal to send children to school on their own, assuming that other adults would act in loco parentis—chastîsîng them if they misbe-haved and helping them if they were in need. Today, across many urban areas, this can no longer be assumed to hold. None of us ever signed a contract saying that we would look after other peoples children. It was simply an unstated and self-evident social good. Sadly, this érosion of communal bonds has, in its turn, made the job of parenting harder still (Furedi, 2002b). So, as weil as being Uberated by the érosion of traditional rules and structures over récent décades, we should note that, without anything to replace thèse, we have also become more isolated from one another and less effective in conséquence. Far from this érosion of old community values necessarily giving rise to a new, confident indi-vidualism, what we have seen is the émergence of a disconnecting process of individ-uation. In the past, social networks and norms may have imposed arbitrary or authoritarian structures and rules upon people, but they also provided meaning, con-ferred identity, and facîlitated basic processes, without which we have become greatly diminishcd as individuals (Furedi, 2004a). Being less connected has also left people less corrected. It has allowed their subjec-tive impressions of reality to go unchecked, unmediated, or unmoderated through membership of a wider group or association. In the past, when confronting difficul-ties, people would , through their social networks, have been encouraged to view things more objectively, or at leasr from a différent perspective. They could also have envisaged a collective solution to their problems. Nowadays, personal obsessions readily grow into all-consuming worldviews that are rarely open to reasoned inter-rogation or resolution. We may be more aware than previous générations, but we are also casier to scare, as we are increasingly alone in facing life's challenges. Notably, 
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it is this erosion of informal social bonds that has led to their having to be replaced by more formal processes of blaming and claiming (Furedi, 1999). Thus, a narrowly self-oriented personality and culture have emerged alongside a growing sense of isolation and insecurity. In some ways, we have replaced a culture of unthinking deference with one of unnecessary fear. It seems that confident i n d i -viduals need a coherent society to fall back on, just as much as a coherent society requires confident individuals upon which to build. 
R i s k A v e r s i o n Above all, though, this process of individuation has encouraged an exaggeration of the threats and challenges posed by everyday life. This has manifested itself as a grow-ing obsession with, and aversion toward, all manner of risks, both new and old. Risk has become a dominant prism for viewing the world today, as evidenced by the num-ber of courses, conferences, and journals now devoted to the concept. This outlook emerged gradually but was catapulted to prominence through the breakup of the C o l d War order, coinciding with the publication of German sociologist Ulcich Beck's book, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992). The AIDS-awareness campaigns of the 1980s were an early indicator of changing perceptions of risk. In the United K i n g d o m , these changing perceptions became much clearer in the debacle over bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), more commonly referred to as "mad cow disease" (Durodie, 1999). Since that time there has been a steady stream of risk-related issues impinging upon public consciousness. These have included campaigns against the presumed adverse consequences of intro-ducing genetically modified organisms into the environment and concerns over the use of mobile phones held to have possible effects on the brain through so-called nonthermal radiation (Burgess, 2003). More recently the M M R (measles-mumps-rubella) triple vaccine was accused by some, despite a lack of confirming evidence, to be linked to autism in infants (Fitzpatrick, 2004). Nor has it been just scientific and technological risk-related matters that have been brought to prominence. Age-old activities and problems have also been reinterpreted and reorganized around a heightened consciousness of risk. B u l l y i n g in schools, sunbathing, child abduction, untrustworthy general practitioners (GPs), and the very food we eat have al l , at one time or another, formed part of a growing panoply of issues one can point co of having fears raised about over recent years. Risk management as a discipline has therefore become a major discourse and organizing activity, in both the public and the private sector (Power, 2004). Risk managers sit on the board of major companies (Hunt , 2003). Even relationships are now increasingly viewed through the distorting and stultifying prism of risk. Despite concerns raised as to the broader implications and consequences o f this, there is an almost unstoppable trend to reinterpret all issues—whether personal, social, or scientific—in this way. 
Cultural Precursors and Psychological Consequences of Contemporary Western Responses to Acts of Terror 5 But, rather than the world changing any faster today than in the past, or becoming a more dangerous, unforeseeable or complex place, it may be our diminished, and more isolated, sense of self that has altered our confidence in dealing with change and the problems it gives rise to (Heartfield, 2002). M o r e on our own and self-absorbed than previous generations, with an exaggerated sense o f threat, it has become normal for people to look for, and expect, professional support in dealing with what would once have been considered to be everyday difficulties. A n all-regu-lating, blame-attaching response to problems and issues ensues that has, in its turn, helped shape a new, more l imited , political framework and agenda for a period largely devoid of any broader social vision. In part, this is because a more positive social and cultural orientation toward change declined over che course of the twentieth century. Radicals who would once have promoted science and technology as a means for challenging vested authority and power came to associate these with postwar American mil i tarism (Durodic , 2002). Combined with the political defeat and exhaustion of the left, best symbol-ized internationally by the end of the C o l d War, this helped foment a more conserva-tive outlook. In their turn, the various components of the old right, briefly triumphal about these developments, soon fell out with one another. The only force to have held them together was the threat posed to theit interests by the Soviet bloc externally, and organized labor internally. The convergence of left and right reflects the absence of any broader sense of mission or agreed direction for society. The management of risk fulfills the need for a new organizing principle. Politicians, concerned as to their legitimacy, have then sought to repackage themselves as societal risk managers. They have also increasingly pursued the center ground, seeking technical, rather than political, means to enhance turnout in elections. But the demise of any polarized or principled political debate also fed declining intetest and engagement in the public sphere. More limited aspirations—to promote voting by anyone, for anyone, and to micromanage the economy, focusing particu-larly upon privatized concerns such as education and health—have not inspired a new generation of voters. Attempts to include the public more in certain decision-making processes by various means have merely reflected and reinforced declining electoral participation rates (Durodié, 2003). Furthermore, while a nervous and atomized public is held to expect greater regu-lation of risk by the authorities in order to feel protected, there is no way of ever sati-ating this assumed demand. Rather, the failure to do so appears to confirm a growing sense of human limitations and low expectations. It also feeds suspicion of the very authorities—political, corporate, and scientific—that would need to be trusted in order to transcend contemporary difficulties, as well as further undermining social bonds. Increasingly, through these processes, people have learned and been encour-aged to assume the worst or presume a cover-up, even before any crisis has truly emerged. 
6 Interventions 
C u l t u r a l A s y m m e t r y 
Ir is within this broader cultural context that we need to situate the events of Sep-tember 11, 2001. Far from being the trigger to a period of insecurity and policy change, these events were a catalyst for wide-ranging trends that lay just beneath the surface of Western society. For the first time, 9/11 allowed Americans en masse to view and perceive of themselves as victims on the world stage. They hardly needed much encouragement. Victims—people who are known by what happens to them— as opposed to heroes—people who are known for what they do—are a key reference point o f our times. T h e fact that the attacks were unprecedented in scale and occurred in the United States simply allowed the domestic soul-searching to begin. We should be clear that the real driver for this was the growing sense and exagger-ation of risk, caused and accentuated by the individuation o f society deriving from a concomitant loss of confidence and purpose. Notably, there has been a shift in con-ceptualizations of risk in recent years that parallels the demise of active participation in the political sphere. The classical notion of risk comprised an active formulation of "taking a risk," which envisaged positive, as well as possibly negative, outcomes. Contemporary use, however, focuses more on the notion of "being at risk," a largely passive viewpoint that externalizes threat as somehow being inherently and inevitably out there (Furedi, 1997). This historical shift, however, retains an important cultural dimension. Accord-ingly, there arc some who retain an understanding of risk-as-opportunity rather than becoming transfixed by risk-as-thrcat. It was this cultural asymmetry toward risk tak-ing, far more than the resource asymmetries other commentators have focused on, that was crucial in facilitating the events of 9/11. In another age, individuals armed with box cutters might not have been able to achieve what they did. If we are to pre-vent similar incidents from happening again, we need to become conscious of quite how much we have changed as individuals and as a society over the short period since the end of the Cold War. These changes increasingly play a determining tole in world affairs. Some commentators have described this shift as the advent of what they call an "age of anxiety," ot "culture of fear." This culture stems from and further encourages a focus on the personal and the private over the political and the public . Indeed, political life increasingly focuses on personal issues as a consequence. This narrow, privatized introspection emphasizes feelings over facts and image over insight, lead-ing to the advent o f what has also been labeled the "therapeutic society" (Furedi, 2004b). A n y sense of a collective good, or the need to maintain one's composure, has been replaced by an increasingly narrow and self-obsessed emotionalism that pours itself out because it fails to perceive any common good worth believing i n — still less fighting for. Accordingly, those who do believe in something—no matter what—appear as fanatics to contemporary sensibilities and are labeled "fundamentalist." Ironically, their sense of the possibility and need for social solidarity and sacrifice—irrespective of their limited aims—are important elements of resilience we would do well to learn 
Cultural Precursors and Psychological Consequences of Contemporary Western Responses to Acts of Terror 7 from, rather than seek to eliminate. Furthermore, getting obsessed with—or seeking to moderate—the passions and aspirations of others evades the urgent need to resur-rect our own beliefs and capabilities. Another measure of how much it is we who have changed can be found by exam-ining the literature on human responses in disasters going back over 50 years. In the past, it was generally assumed that people and systems were fairly resilient and could cope. W i t h few exceptions this was found to be true (Quarantelti, 1998). Today, experts tend to assume that individuals and institutions cannot manage without pro-fessional support in a crisis. Accordingly, it is now presumed that humanity and soci-ety are always vulnerable and in need of long-term, i f not lifelong, assistance. For nearly 50 years the Western allies stood face to face against an enemy known to have a formidable nuclear arsenal, stocks of, capabilities i n , and a significant research program into, chemical and biological weapons. Yet now, in an age when concepts of belief, truth, and sacrifice have been so eroded that they no longer hold any purchase, and when confronted by those who are prepared to commit suicide for their cause, we move to reorganize the world as i f we had never faced a greater threat. Surely this tells us more about ourselves than about the enemies we face? 
P s y c h o s o c i a l I m p a c t s September 11, 2001 is testimony to the remarkable strength and widespread prev-alence of human resilience. As in most disasters, the orderly evacuation of the W o r l d Trade Center reflected a tendency toward spontaneous, rational, and cooperative behavior (Furedi, 2004). Yet, the political presumption of social vulnerability and concomitant need for professional support was not long in the offing. Indeed, the dust had hardly settled from the Twin Towers when a veritable army of counselors, psychologists, and other assorted therapists descended on New York to offer their help. Unsurprisingly, according to their own methods and determinations, these expects found an elevated incidence of post-traumatic stress disorder ( P T S D ) — a term not even listed in psychiatric diagnostic manuals until the 1980s. They also assessed sig-nificant rates of depression across the entire population (Schuster et al . , 2001). This was even among those who had been "exposed" to these events only through the medium of television. In this regards, it is worth noting that the very act of searching for, and highlighting, this supposed evidence, itself derives from and ultimately rein-forces a culture that effectively encourages people to label themselves as being i l l . As Tel-Aviv based psychiatrist, Professor Avi Blcich, has indicated the reported incidence of trauma appears peculiarly elevated. This is especially so when contrasted to the significantly lower levels among an Israeli population who have suffered terror-ist attacks on an almost daily basis over a protracted period (Bleich, Gelkopf, & Solo-mon). A l l this reinforces the points made as to the determining role of cultural and historical factors in shaping our presumption of vulnerability. But the notion of frail individuals still prevails, shaping both policy and attitudes. Hence, even the Fire Department o f New York—whose firefighters on September 11 had been the heroes 
8 Interventions 
of the hour—subsequently reinvented themselves, according to the dominant social outlook, as forgotten victims in need of support and compensation. By the time the anthrax attacks occurred, Americans had become focused on security issues in general, and their own insecurity in particular. Hence, despite tar-geting politicians and the media, these incidents led to an unprecedented response right across society. This was manifest by the number o f people who handled their mai l , quite literally, with gloves, as well as in the demands for ciprofloxacin that inundated doctors across America, from those keen to have what was held to be nec-essary to treat themselves in the highly unlikely eventuality of being exposed. In the first two weeks of October 2001 alone, there were some 2,300 false anthrax alerts across the United States. A number o f these incidents led to cases of what is described in the psychiatric literature as mass psychogenic illness, or in more popular terms, people quite literally worrying themselves sick. One notable case occurred on the Maryland sub-way where 35 people had to be hospitalized after developing real symptoms includ-ing drowsiness, irritability, nausea, and vomiting, subsequent to theit concerns being alerted by the smell of a strange substance, which later turned out to be window cleaning fluid (Hyams, Murphy, 6c Wessely, 2002). M a n y other similar incidents occurred. This was not that first time that mass psychogenic illness or something similar has been observed in populations. It is worth reminding ourselves that due to their fears, combined with a lack of knowledge as to how to use the equipment they had been provided w i t h , a small number of Israelis suffocated themselves to death on their own gas masks during the first G u l f War. The figure was more than had died from being hit by one of Saddam Husseins Scud missiles (Hyams et al . , 2002). A n d , while they eventually habituated themselves to the new citcumstances, this same popula-tion also suffered from an increased incidence of coronary problems in the early days of that conflict. Whether based on a real threat or not, such responses can pose real strains upon society and its resources in an emergency. A n incident in Goiana, in Northeast Brazil , in 1987, where an inappropriately discarded hospital cesium source was stolen by youths is patticularly apposite in this regard. Once the incident became known, it led to 100,000 people presenting themselves to the authorities for examination and treatment. Emergency workers had to commandeer a football field to sort out the worried-well from the truly exposed, who numbered in the end no more than 244, of which only 54 merited treatment. The point is that people's concerns, genuine or otherwise, arc shaped by the pur-poses and beliefs o f their society and, more particularly, those o f their social and political leaders. This can have a real impact on the demand for resources and hence the ability o f the authorities to cope with any particular incident. By the time an emergency actually occurs, it is too late to change such outlooks. Hence, while the numerous training exercises we now witness may serve some l imited purpose for the authorities, they will have little impact upon social resilience itself. 
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D r i v i n g C o n c e r n s 
The actions of political leaders and emergency responders at critical rimes, espe-cially in the initial stages of any incident, send out important signais to the rest of society as to how they are expected to behave. This can drive public concerns rather than assuaging them. Ambulance personnel, for instance, are trained in an emer-gency, to calm trauma victims down irrespective of the state of their injuries by downplaying the latter, as such actions save lives. Contemporary culture, however, is suspicious of expertise and demands a degree of openness and transparency that increasingly precludes the application of such professional judgment. Fevv have questioned whether sending people in füll chemical and biological weap-ons suirs to handle the numerous incidents of white powder scares that occurred in the aftermath of the anthrax cases was necessarily the most appropriate action to take. A n d , in a similar vein, questions could be asked about the U . K . government's déci-sion to place armed police outside mainline railway stations in London in the after-math of September 11 or about tanks and troops outside Heatbrow Airport subsé-quent to an allegcd tip-off as to the possibility of a surface-to-air missile attack. Some commentators have suggested that, far from reassuring the public , such steps are counterproductive and project an image of a society that appears to have lost control, or any sensé of perspective and proportion. More récent épisodes con-cerning the systematic cancellation of flights to Washington, D . C . , from London and che release of information surrounding the supposed foi l ing o f a plot to use the little-known chemical osmium tetroxide in an explosive device seem to confirm this trcnd. This points to a growing confusion, or érosion of the divide, betwecn whar ought to remain private intelligence and what is worth putting into the public domain, based upon an assessment o f peuples abilities to take effective action based on the information providcd. The British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, countenanccd against raking action "on the basis of a gênerai warning," in a speech delivered on November 11, 2002, at the Banqueting House in London (2002, p. 1731). He indicated that this could lead to "doing their [the terrorists'j job for them" (p. 1731). Yet, the authorities perceive themselves as being under a great deal of pressure to be seen to be acting. Whether their perceptions of the public mood are accutate, or the actions they take are truly effective, remains to be determined. Phrases such as "alert, not alarmed," together wich the assumption that a terrorist attack is a matter of "when, not if," or indeed that an attack is "inévitable" are about as gênerai and unspecific as it gets. Such rhetoric présumes itself to be challenging an assumed complacency toward the issue of terrorism and is presented as resolute and robust. But the generalized sensé o f "being at risk" or "vulnerable" that they project reveals an almost resigned air o f fatalism toward future events. The use of language to prépare, or alert, the pub-lic, also smacks of blâme avoidance rather than determined résolve. It exaggerates the significance o f terrorism to society and, in effect, encourages all manner of potenùal terrorists, as well as hoaxers, loners, and cranks to have a go. It also ignores the 
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understanding the public has that determined individuals will always be able to get through, no matter how many technical barriers have been erected against them doing so. Continuously issuing warnings or information that turns out to be factually incor-rect, out of date, or too vague to act upon has a number of consequences. First, it can literally make people i l l . This need not be as dramatic in form as instances of mass psychogenic illness, but it has helped to foment a vaguer underly-ing anxiety about life and a gradual, passive disengagement from it, which could be tremendously disabling for those seeking to b u i l d up social resilience. T h i s is reflected in the large number of surveys that—irrespective of their self-reported basis and the changing basis fot assessment—point to increasing levels of stress, depres-sion, and trauma in the aftermath of various incidents. Second, the more likely scenario is that over a period of time, people grow used to ignoring such statements. Again , this could clearly have dramatic consequences. Recent polls suggest that on the whole people are going about their everyday lives ignoring the threat o f terror in a pragmatic and resolute fashion. However, this insouciance is likely to be more representative of a growing, broader cynicism and mistrust of authority that now prevails throughout Western societies, rather than reflecring any deeply felt inner commitment or resolve. T h i r d , constant warnings readily lead to a self-fulfilling demand for the authorities to do something—distracting them and us from real risks and diverting social resour-ces accordingly. Among other problems, this generates a situation best characterized as information overload. The demand for the public to be vigilant and report any unusual activity, combined with existing and new agencies' tasks to sift through these vast amounts of potential intelligence material, clogs up the system, triggering para-lysis by analysis, and fails to identify and act upon more plausible threats and risks. Banks, now required to report any "suspicious" transaction to identify possible instances of money laundering, report a similar trend toward not being able to see the forest for the rrees. Sadly, as no serious local authorities can afford not to have revised their emergency plans and procedures in the light of these developments, it almost seems that i f they do not assess themselves as potentially being on a terrorist hit list, then they cannot be taking their responsibilities seriously. A climate has been created whereby what-ever measures the government, security, and emergency services take, there is an insa-tiable appetite for more and demands emerging from all quarters, both public and private, to the effect that not enough is being done. The problem is that many of the measures being put in place are totemic gestures rather than rational strategies. It is also worth noting the significant element o f commercial interests in such mat-ters. Security is big business and indeed, due to our exaggerated sense of insecurity, one of the fastest growing sectors today. Accordingly, there are numerous risk and security consultants, as well as scientists and engineers, of varying abilities and dis-tinctions, who have a financial interest in maintaining both social and individual concern in these matters. These have encouraged companies to develop so-called "business continuity strategies" o f dubious worth , focusing particularly on the 
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11 integrity of their information Systems and the ptesumed cost of not doing so. A l l this has led to an inévitable, if perverse, rise of a certain degree of wish fulfill-ment. One senior executive recently remarked to me that the supply side for respira-tory or gas masks was all ready and waiting; what he needed now was for the demand to be "stimuiated." 
W h a t I f ? As all issues are now examined through rhe prism of risk, there is a growing cultur-al proclivity to err on the side of caution. This emphasizcs the negative aspects of par-ticular situations, assuming far-fetched scénarios and acting as i f these were true. Extrapolating from worst case évidence, or even uncorroborated data, has become the norm. This has led to a distinctive shift over récent years from asking scientific "What is?" type questions that call for specific évidence to asking more spéculative or anticipatory "What if?" type questions. The latter appeals to a more général, emo-tionally driven response. But once we start focusing upon W h a t if?, an inexorable logic develops. For instance, once we have asked, "What i f there were groups or individuals out there who might want to use a biological agent against us?", then we are led through a con-voluted séries of further presumptions, "What if they had access to such an agent?", "What i f they were wil l ing , and capable, of deploying it?'\ and so on. Despite the absence of évidence, and the numerous cumulative assumptions, there is little choice, lest they be accused of complacency, but for the authotities to begin to prépare our capacity to cope with such an attack. Thus it was that smallpox, a disease recognized by the World Health Organization as having been eradicated in the 1970s, has corne back to the fore. Despite the two known repositories of the virus, in the United States and the former Soviet U n i o n , having had no reported breaches of securiry ït was possible to speculate otherwise. In fact, smallpox w o u l d not pose particularly great problems, but vaccines were demanded so that public health agencies could establish a protective ring around any incident, just in case. But, the W h a t i fs? did not stop there. After all , " W h a t i f those dispersing the agent had made a point of doing so in a variety of places including airports to ensure effective W o r l d w i d e dispersai?" Then, clearly vaccine stocks needed to be sufficient to cover entire populations. In time, we would need to begin a process of actually inoc-ulating first responders and then, in the interest o f access and transparency, making the vaccine available to any other person who may wish to have it. Unsurprisingly, what started as a spéculative discourse and set o f scénarios on one side of the Adantic spread like a real disease across to the other side. Other nations followed suit. The next logical step is to ask the same questions w i t h respect to the many other vïruses and micro-organisms chat could bc identified as posing équiva-lent or significant risks, such as ebola, tularemia, Lassa fever, Marburg fever, e-coli , and botulinum, to name but a few. 
2 Interventions 
Once the What if? questions have started, if is quite literally like knocking over a line of dominoes, cxcept that each step can cost mill ions, as well as infhcting a tre-mendous social cost on entire populations who efTectively grow accustomed to living in fear. Interestingly, the fear of bioterrorism has tremendous purchase over contem-porary society because it also acts as a powerful metaphor for élite concerns as to the cotrosion of society from within (Durodié, 2004b). Rather than analyzing such issues at face value, or in their own terms, as a récent report by the Royal Society did in relation to chemical and biologîcal agents (2004), a broader historical and cul-tural perspective is requîred to understand why individuals and socictics feel so vul-nerable to what remain largely spéculative scénarios. 
I n s t i t u t i o n a l D i s t r a c t i o n s Spéculation dominâtes the news after every high-profile arrest or incident. But rather than blaming the media for this, as many are prone to doing—thereby feedîng a regulatory response—we would do well to examine the actions and Statements of other key public institutions and individuals, ahead of such crises. For instance, after the supposed discovery of the Category B agent ricin in a flar in north London, The Financial Times reported an officiai as saying, "There is a very serious threat out there still that chemicals that havc not been found may be used by people w h o have not yet been identi f ied" ( H u b a n d , B u r n s , & K r i s h n a , 2 0 0 3 ) . ^ This Statement of the obvious remains true whether there is a war on terror or not. But a banner headline stating "Chemical Weapons Factory Discovered in a London Fiat" helped set the tone of the debate. Yet, while the media are guilty of uncritical reporting, thereby enhancing social presumptions, we should be clear that thcy alone do not set the tone. This latter rather reflects élite fears and the broader cultural perspective that inclines toward believing rhe worst. Ironically, as more discretely reported in The Sunday Times at a later date, this par-ticular story transpired to be largely false (Leppard, 2003). Analyses by scientists from the U . K . government's chemical weapons establishment at Porton D o w n found no évidence of r ic in manufacture. Yet this aspect of the story was never officially reported or retracted by the authorities, and so the public assumption that it was true has remained. Presumably, it was feit to be a useful vehicle for keeping the public vigilant. The media both reflect our cautionary climate and, in certain instances, help to amplify it. But it is nervous politicians and officiais who are the real drivers as—lack-ing any vision of their own—they are unable to separate themselves efTectively from the broader culture. In the United K i n g d o m , for instance, the newly established Health Protection Agency has issued numerous public health advisories through its "cascade system" to facilitate GPs in the presumed, anticipated task of having to identify the first signs of a chemical or biological attack. This focus not only diverts resources from where they could best be used within the health service, it efrectively helps to establish the context and content for futute discussion. Worse, the failure to use specific expertise and to assess the real threat 
Cultural Precursors and Psychological Conséquences of Contemporary Western Responses to Acts of Terror 13 appropriatcly posed distracts us from the real risks we continue co face, both from terrorism and from other everyday life. As has continuously been demonstrated, real terrorists prefer to use more reliable weapons such as high explosives and car bombs. Leading scientists continue to identify nature as by far a greater threat to humanity than prcsumcd acts of biological terrorism—although this danger too is prone to being exaggerated. There is lîttle récognition given to the fact that advanced économies are better placed to deal with the conséquences and conrain the potential o f such incidents. Racher, contemporary obsessions prevail , as can be seen by examining new funding prioricies and programs, which díctate an unwarranted dis-tortion o f social resourccs and reseacch priorities toward so-called "weapons of mass destruction." 
P s y c h i a t r y L c s s o n s Overall , governments have sought to assuage public concerns through che provi-sión of what rhey consider to be appropriate and accurate information. Ironically, this approach, advocated by the new gurús of risk management and communicacion, may serve to make maccers worse by feeding the insaciable appetite for fear. It is widely contradicted by a wealth of literature emerging from the field o f psychiatry that suggests che provisión of información alone—outside an understanding o f con-text and the sense of one's abilicy co shapc this—can be a potcntially fucile and coun-terproductíve exercise. It is not so straightforward to reassure anxious people. Even when concerns are correctly identified and targeted, the evidence suggests thac—while che more extreme manifesracion o f sympcoms may abare temporarily—without tackling the deeper underlying concepts behind them, problems can soon re-emerge, manifesting them-selves in an exaggerated form (Durodié & Wessely, 2002). The bottom line is the need to challenge peoples core bclicfs about a situatíon head-on. But increasingly over recent years, we have become unwil l ing to do so. As a society we prioritize consensus seeking over confrontation. The latter appears too dismissive, or judgmental, to contemporary sensitivities. Furthermore, this is not a task that can be achieved by individual psychiacrists or cherapists, even in the rare instances where chese are not affected by the prcvailing norms and valúes, [f the sur-rounding culture continúes to provide signáis and messages reinfotcing concerns, then the expert is likely to be ignored or questioned anyway. The bese that can be achieved in such circumstances is to habitúate people to the world they now live in by encouraging an acceptance o f uncertaínty. But doing so serves to confirm the dominant social script establishing concern abouc cerrorism. The real rask would be co remind people rhat there is far more to life than terrorism. This has not been addressed by the authorities so far. It requires a focus on ends well beyond dealing with immediate problems. This is a political task that, far from dis-tracting us from contemporary issues, should inform the very solurions we seek to put ¡n place. 
14 Interventions 
By taking a broader, longer-term view, we w o u l d become more conscious of the extent to which trau m a itself is a social and hisrorical construct. The widely used ter-minology of post-traumatic stress disorder did not émerge into professional circles until the mid-1980s. At the time, this was to explain the particular problems faced by certain Vietnam vétérans in the United States. These suffered nor so much from their defeat in Southeast Asia, as from rejection by their own communities upon their return home. Shunned as pariahs and labeled psychopaths, the P T S D category eventually ofTered moral exculpation and access to compensation. But whereas oldct conditions such as "shell shock" and "battle fatigue" had been held to be specific, relating to a soldier's background and psyché, the new diagnosis was applied more generally—assumed to dérive from the funda-mentally traumatizing expérience of war. Originally framed as applying only to extreme events, P T S D spread rapidly, like a disease, to encompass relatively common happenings such as accidents, muggings, verbal or sexual harassment, and even workplace disputes. It finally entered the offi-ciai Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental Disorders in 1980 (American Psychi-atrie Association), and aid agencies now commonly assume w h o l e populations to suf-
fer from it in advanec of detailed analysis. Ironically, most vétérans diagnosed with P T S D have had no combat expérience, pointing to a self-justifying reconstruction of current problems through a narrative of past trauma. Research also suggests that P T S D is more serious and more common among international relief and development personnel than for the locals they seek to support (Pupavac, 2002). These facts indicate the category to be culturally con-structed and its causes amplified through our particular Western obsession with risk and stress, often in pursuit of rcmediation or récognition. Studies of those exposed to a range of natural and man-made disasters consistently show that beliefs held prior to an event coupled w i t h one's understanding o f it account for variation in S y m p t o m s far better than the particular characteristics or severity of the expériences encountered. Accordingly, we should also be wary, as indicated earlier, of the figures regularly cited for incidence o f trauma among the U .S . population post-9/11- These point to the extent to which even apparently objective data, such as that measuring people's anxieties in the aftermath of terrorist incidents, are themselves a cultural construct based upon assumptions of human vulnerability and their ability to cope. As Furedi (2004c) has noted, in the past, the dominant social script or narrative w o u l d have been one more focused on social and individual resilience and initiative. 
T e c h n i c a l F i x a t i o n s Despite ail the évidence poincing to the urgent need for greater clarity of purpose and direction, most activity since September 11 has focused narrowly upon the tech-nical means to combat terror. The standard fare of conférences and papers revolves around the assumed need for better intelligence, more surveillance, new détection equipment, protective clothing, and computer models to predict behavior. W h e n 
Cultural Precursors and Psychological Conséquences of Contemporary Western Responses to Acts of Terror 15 the public is engaged, it is at the more basic level of idencifying means for effeccively communicating predetermined messages and information or to exhort the need for further vigilance under the banal and general slogan of "alert, not alarmed." It is abo the case that whatever the government does in thèse regards there is an insatiable appetite for more. This comes from the posturing of opposition pol i t i -cians, from the practical demands of emergency responders, as well as from the com-mercial interests of security providers and consultants, who ail appeal to the publics understandable concerns. Some propose the création o f a U.S.-style Department of Homeland Security. Others too, inured by years of cynicism and mistrust in author-ity, are now inclined to assume the worst and presume a cover-up. The urgent need to engage in a broader debate as to social aims and direction, based upon clearly principled beliefs and the désire to engender among the popula-tion a sensé of purpose that would truly make it résilient to acts of terror, is contin-uously put off for some other time, or not even considered. Yet, it is this sensé of mis-sion in the world that, having broken down at home, leaves us incredibly unarmed in the face of the l imited threat posed by the likes of al Qaeda and, failing that, what increasingly become labeled as their "sympathizers." If the war on terror was ever hoped to help society rediscover a sensé of unity and purpose, then what we are actually witnessing could not be any further from such goals. Far from bringing people togerher, it has proven deeply divisive and revealed the deep cracks that currently run through society and its institutions. Furthermore, technical barriers or solutions to the problem of terror make things only worse as they encourage people to become ever more suspicious and mistrustful as to the activity of their neighbors—rather than bring peopíe together as the times require. Resilience is not a technology that can be bought. Rather it is an attitude reflecting wider patterns of social developmcnt and outlook. Accordingly, attempts to develop technical solutions to the problem of terrorism simply end up reflecting and reinforc-ing existing values. Focusing on the means and losing sigbt o f the ends builds only lack of direction into the System. Prcsumably those who are willing to risk their lives fighting fircs or combating other emergencies do so not so that their children can go on to do che same, but for some broader purpose. It is this of which we seem to have lost sight. 
R e a l R e s i l i e n c e The concept of "resilience"—the ability to withstand or recover from adverse con-ditions—has come o f age subséquent to the terrorist attacks of September 11. Politi-cians, emergency planners, and other officiais now talk o f the need to " b u i l d , " "engender," "împrove," or "enhance" resilience in society. Unfottunately, by framing the discussion in che fashionable language of "risk," an élément of passivity and inevi-tabiliry has been built into the solutions proffered. The U . K . Cabinet Office describes the aim of "bui lding resilience" in terms of reducing susceptibility to challenges "by reducing the probabîlity of their occurrence and their likely effects" (Cabinet Office, 2003). The notion that it may be possible to 
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shape conditions, ouclooks, and perceptions in advance, by setting a clearer political agenda, is not particularly considered. Henee, despite inhérent éléments of resilience, sociecy contïnuously seems to downplay such factors, becoming fixated on more immédiate problems and undermined by self-doubt. In rcality o f course, people and Systems continue to display a remarkablc degree of resilience given the chance (Furedi, 2004). Those directly affected by the events of 9/ 11 have had little chotee but to get on with their lives and, with few exceptions, that is what they have done. It is also the case that the total financial cost of thèse events, both structural and in terms of compensation, amounted to less than 1 percent of the U.S . gross domestic product in any one year. To put this into perspective, it is worth noting that the Enron saga that followed cost a great deal more. Building on such spontaneous responses, rather than undermining them, requires promoting a clearer sensé of who we are and what we are for. This would necessitate truly engaging the public in a political debate as to aims and values. It would also force a need to be more judgmental of others than contemporary society allows. A n d in turn, this w o u l d emphasize the need for collective purpose over individual security in order to achieve prederermined social goals. Sadly, a focus on knowing, engaging, judging, and acting is not so straightforward today. Despite this being the real roie and responsibility of those in positions of author-ity, there is good reason to anticipare their reluctance to do so. If we were to charac-terize résilient people as having a greater sense of whom they are and of what they can achieve together, along with a willingness to judge others and take action accordingly, it is quite possible to question whether the authorities in the United K i n g d o m , the United States, or anywhere eise nowadays would view such a project with any degree of optimism. Résilient people are not necessarily easy to manage. They demand more from rhosc in authority than maybe these latter are W i l l i n g , or able, to provide. Accordingly, it is Hkely, for the foreseeable future at least, that there wil l be much talk about the need to engender social resilience, but very little by way of effective action. It is far casier to make glib références to the need to défend "our way of Ufe," "our values," or even "freedom and demoeraey" than it is to provide real content to such concepts through a concerted campaign to re-engage the public in political dis-course. Indeed, few of the authorities concerned with c ivi l defense ot homeland security consider it their responsibility to lead o n such an agenda. There is, of course, a reason as to why these matters are not being addressed; that is, there is a failure to recognize that the problem has anything to do with the domes-tic situation at a l l . Terrorism is usually pereeived as being a problem relating to others, out there. The notion that an absence of direction ac home may somehow drive our perception of Terrorist acts, as well as undermining resilience and encourag-ing the perpetrators themselves, is a novel one for diose in authority. Indeed, there is an even more direct relation between us and the terrorists; that is, terrorism often reflects the dominant forms of social understanding and values it emerges within. W h e n society asserted the need to recognize the independent sover-eignty of nation-stare, terrorists fought politically motivated national libération struggles. Now, on the other hand, we live in an age when political debate—beyond 
Cultural Precursors and Psychological Conséquences of Contemporary Western Responses to Acts of Terror 17 the confines of the personal—is weak, or nonexistent. One conséquence of this is the advenc of terrorists without stated aims or goals. Furthermore, this nihilistic lashing out against modernity is unrestrained by any sensé of moral purpose and draws encouragement from the broader self-loathing évident in Western culture. Giving it a name, such as al Qaeda, tather misses the point. Its perpetrators are as likely to be found at home as anywhere else. They include T i m o t h y M c V e i g h , the Oklahoma bomber, the A u m Shinrikyo cuit, who planted the chemical agent sarin on the Tokyo subway in 1995, and even the 9/11 hijackers themselves who, far from being poor kids from the Gaza strip, were relatively wealthy and well educated. They had ail spent some considérable time attending Western universiries and, ultïmately, reflected our own dominant norms and values. This points to a final problem relating to the war on terror; that is, even if Osama bin Laden and ail his acolytes were captured or killed tomorrow, still the problem of terror would not have gone away. This is because a key driver to our perception and response to these events has been our own insecurities. A n d these are not about ro go away. Furthermore, by advertising how vulnérable we feel and how frail we have become in relation to any activ'ity, at any time, in any location, we have effectively educated a new génération of the future disaffected, whether terrorists, animal-rights activists, hoaxers, loners, or cranks, as to how easy it is to undermine our society using little more than plastic knives and bags of sugar. The sorry truth that lies at the heart of the war on terror is that the West is at war with itself. The acts of September 11, having been perpetrated by outsiders, served as a useful distraction from addressing where the problems really lie. In fact, those indi-viduals proved so effective because in many ways they reflect our own nihilist culture. It is just that, consciously or not, they have captured this better than we do ourselves. 
C o n c l u s i o n s From the preceding discussion a number of tentative conclusions can be drawn: 
1. A focus on our own sociecies' psychology and culture is a missing élément necessary for understanding both our response to récent acts of terrorism and the particular salience we airribute to rhem. 2. More research is required ro explore the largely Western origins of antihuman, antimo-dern, and anti-Wcstcrn ideas, as well as how these then become adopted by others. 3. The érosion of social bonds in our society has left a weak, self-centcred form of indi-vidualism rhar may be less capable of wiihstanding difficulties or of perceiving of a greater common good or purpose, 4. A proper understanding of risk perception has to take into accounc the determinmg influence of social factors, such as political disengagement and stasis, as well as being grounded in scienrific évidence. 
5. The key asymmetry used by terrorists is thac of our respective attitudes toward risk taking. We must reassert the inevitability of risk in ail activity and highlight the fact that without taking risks nothing can be gained. 
Interventions 
6. Government should neither make fatalistic Statements about terrorism nor offer the promise to protect us from all risks. Above ail, there shouid remain a clear distinction between private intelligence and public information. 7. The public is the primary rarget of terrorism and, accordingty, the real fírst responder. Its attitude and values in advance of such incidents are key to shaping outcomes. 8. People and Systems are already résilient. Contrary to popular perception, in an emergency, the public rarely panics—displaying both rational and prosocial behavior—and vital processes continue to function. 9. Real resilience is an attitude, or mind-set. It derives from the quiet confidence of liavmg a broader common purpose, combined wich a willingness to judgc others and to act when necessary. 10. Building real resilience requires re-cngaging the public in an active sensé, building from rheir sponcaneous coopérative responses, rather than bypassing thèse using technical means. 11. Technical solutions, when used as an end in themselves—as opposed to a means to a broader end—can push people apart, promoting mistrust and suspicion and thereby fur-ther corroding social bonds. 12. Countercerrorism stratégies and national resilience need to be guided by, and embedded within, a broader framework of aims and values for the whole of sociery. 13. There is an urgent need to restore the centrality of a principled and positive polirical agenda for society that opposes the use of fear as a vehicle for winning arguments or building coalitions. 14. Social leaders need to focus society on a broader vision, beyond the immediacy of ter-rorism. It is only through this thar they may hope to secure real loyalty and active engagement in achieving their purposes. 
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'Gulf War Syndrome' B i l l D u r o d i é * 
The Resilience Centre, Cranfield University, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham, 
Swindon SN6 8LA, UK 
Fifteen years since the events that are held by some to have caused it. Gulf War Syndrome continues 
to exercise the mind and energies of numerous researchers across the world, as well as those who 
purport to be its victims and their advocates in the media, law and politics. 
But it may be that the search for a scientific or medical solution to this issue was misguided in the 
first place, for Gulf War Syndrome, if there is such an entity, appears to have much in common with 
other 'illnesses of modernity', whose roots are more socially and culturally driven than what doctors 
would conventionally consider to be diseases. 
The reasons for this are complex, but derive from our contemporary proclivity to understand 
humanity as being frail and vulnerable in an age marked by an exaggerated perception of risk and a 
growing use of the 'politics of fear'. It is the breakdown of social solidarities across the twentieth 
century that has facilitated this process. 
Unfortunately, as this paper explores, our inability to understand the social origins of self-hood and 
illness, combined with a growing cynicism towards all sources of authority, whether political, 
scientific, medical or corporate, has produced a powerful demand for blame and retribution deriving 
from a resolute few who continue to oppose all of the evidence raised against them. 
Sadly, this analysis suggests that Gulf War Syndrome is likely to prove only one of numerous such 
instances that are likely to emerge over the coming years. 
Keywords: Gulf; war; syndrome; illness; health; risk 
1. PREAMBLE 
We are on average as resilient as the culture we Jive in 
expects us to be. 
(Summerfield 2006) 
Illness is a private experience. But, although we 
perceive it subjectively, as individuals, we have come to 
conceive of it as often having an objective, or real, basis. 
So, while the experience of being ill is unique and 
intensely personal, we also understand some illnesses 
to have certain common or more general 
characteristics. 
Our appreciation, both as individuals and as a 
society, of the linkages and interactions between these 
internal factors and their external influences is 
imperfect. Hence, the identification and treatment of 
illness, as well as how we address and organize these 
processes, depend on the state of the society we happen 
to find ourselves in. 
All of these contributory elements are historically 
contingent and, in some instances, politically con­
tested. And, it is not just the connection of effects with 
causes, or the definition and remediation of illness that 
are culturally determined. So too are the assessment 
and recognition of what is normal—and even of what is 
an individual. 
•w.durodic@cranfield.ac.uk 
One contribution of 17 to a Theme Issue "The health of Gulf War 
veterans', 
How we expect people to behave varies according to 
cultural values and social settings. For instance, when 
someone hopes or is determined to get well, when they 
trust those who look after them or have confidence in 
their knowledge and expertise, then the experience of 
illness is different to when these conditions do not 
apply. 
This means that illness is also a social phenomenon 
and—like an individual—a product of its time. If we do 
not grasp the mood and dynamic of those times 
accurately, then we are unlikely to understand either 
the patient or the problem. It is this tension that lies 
at the heart of the debate surrounding Gulf War 
Syndrome. 
2. BACKGROUND 
After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, 
approximately 700 000 US troops and 50 000 British 
troops, along with smaller detachments from other 
Western allies, were deployed to the Persian Gulf over 
the period spanning September 1990 to June 1991. 
This consisted of a five-month build-up culminating in 
a 39-day air war followed by a 4-day ground war in 
February 1991 (Hyams et al. 1996). 
The Iraqi death toll was estimated at around 
180 000, brought about by everything from hi-tech 
'smart' bombs to low-tech bulldozers used to bury Iraqi 
conscripts alive in the desert, By contrast, far fewer 
casualties than expected occurred among Coalition 
forces—467 were injured among US units, although as 
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690 B. Durodie Social construction of Gulf War Syndrome many as 40 000 had been predicted (Straus 1999)— and morbidity rates were low compared to those in previous conflicts (Writer et al. 1996)—around 150, many of which resulted from 'friendly fire' and other mishaps. Despite the relatively light toll of casualties however, in the years following their return from the Gulf War, troops from America, Canada and Britain have complained of a wide range of symptoms, which many have attributed to their experience in Kuwait and Iraq. Notably, similar symptoms were not reported by French, Saudi, Egyptian, Syrian or Moroccan troops, nor by native Kuwaitis (Hyams 2005). Nobody seems to have enquired about any such complaints among surviving Iraqi soldiers. The range of symptoms presented by Gulf War veterans is vast. The most common are chronic fatigue, joint and muscle pains, defects of memory and concentration, anxiety and depression, insomnia, skin rashes, chest pain and breathing problems. Others include sensory symptoms, loss of balance, diarrhoea and other gastrointestinal complaints, bladder dysfunc-tion, sweating disorders, burning semen sensation, acute allergies and accelerated tooth decay. Some have claimed that genetic abnormalities in the children of veterans are a delayed consequence of the war. Undoubtedly, some Gulf War veterans have become i l l , but incidence of disease—with the disputed exception of motor neuron disease among U S veter-ans—matches that afflicting ordinary individuals over time—and often at a lower rate. It is only the reporting of symptoms that was markedly higher among Gulf War veterans—roughly somewhat over twice as likely— than among equivalent military cohorts. Unfortunately, as it is both relatively easy and quite common to confuse the symptoms of illness for a disease, this has led many to assume—or be encour-aged to assume—a putative cause for their condition. It is this that has been labelled Gulf War Syndrome by some. However, almost every scientific, epidemiologi-cal and medical study conducted since has found no evidence of an all-encompassing or unique syndrome. Nevertheless, a large number of possible causes have been put forward as potential agents for such a syndrome at various times. These are as diverse as the symptoms and ailments they seek to explain. They include exposure to depleted uranium, chemical and biological weapons, organophosphate pesticides and insect repellents, multiple immunizations, indigenous infectious diseases, nerve gas prophylaxis, toxic fumes from burning oil wells and even the wearing of protective clothing. While some have sought to blame the psychological stress of war, others have pointed out that the campaign was a short and successful one and interviews have failed to confirm any excessive pressures. In any case, proponents of Gulf War Syndrome generally prefer some notion of toxic exposure—which appears in their minds to confer greater medical legitimacy—as opposed to psychological explanations. What is clear is that the resulting debate and confusion has helped to poison relations between military personnel and their political leaders, as well as exacerbating a sense of mistrust and frustration with 
the health care system and the judiciary. Authoritative dismissals of specific illnesses are unlikely to curtail a wave of claims from purported victims and their legal advocates for—as one commentator noted early on— 'Gulf War Syndrome has shifted from medicine to politics' (Greenbcrg 1996). 
3. CHRONOLOGY Anecdotal reports of disorders affecting U S troops who fought in the Gulf first surfaced in the months after the end of the conflict, as veterans began to approach Veterans Affairs (VA) offices about health issues. US authorities expected these to focus on air pollution in Kuwait, although by November 1991 attention shifted to the incidence of leishmaniasis, a disease caused by parasites sometimes carried by sandflies. This led to a ban on blood donations by U S servicemen who had served during Desert Shield/Storm—a decision revoked in January 1993 once the number of cases detected had been found to be low (Ministry of Defence 1997). In January 1992, unexplained chronic illnesses were reported among Gulf War veterans from an army reserve unit in Indiana, U S A (DeFraites et al. 1992). The idea now emerged that U S Gulf War veterans might be suffering from unusual or unexpected health problems. By September 1992, the House of Repre-sentatives VA Committee was taking testimony on vaccination issues, while the V A Persian Gulf War Veterans Registry dates from November 1992. The Department of Defense Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program was not established until June 1994. By the beginning of 1993, however, there was still little widespread interest on these matters in the U K . According to the then Ministry of Defence Surgeon General, Peter Beale, 'when troops returned to the U K the daily sickness rate did not increase*. It was only some 18-24 months later that his services 'became aware of a campaign by lawyers to recognise a specific Gulf illness' (Beale 1997). In January 1993, a US Gulf War veteran wrote to the Queen describing his illness and asking if U K Gulf War veterans were also sick. The Ministry of Defence were asked to reply and indicated that no British Armed Forces personnel suffered from the symptoms described. A similar letter from another U S Gulf War veteran addressed directly to the Ministry of Defence was answered in the same way in March 1993. Then, on 7 June 1993, an item broadcast on the B B C television programme Newsnight highlighted the health concerns of U S Gulf War veterans (Unwin et al. 1999). The first Parliamentary Questions followed within days of the programme being aired and a follow-up item on Newsnight appeared on 5 July 1993, featuring the then Armed Forces Minister, Jeremy Hanley M P and some British Gulf War veterans. As, at that stage, the Ministry of Defence had no record of any Service personnel, or ex-Service personnel, suffering from unexplained illnesses acquired during Operation G R A N B Y — the British name for the deployment to the Gulf—the Minister, when pressed, responded by asking for anyone who 
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Social construction of Gulf War Syndrome B. Durodié 691 believed chat they were ill as a result of serving in the conflict to write to him personally. Despite the publicity, the initial response to this appeal was limited—only 220 Gulf War veterans came forward in the first 18 months—effectively less than 0.5% of the cohort by the end of 1995. Nevertheless, as early as October 1993, a consultant physician, Wing Commander Bill Coker, had been appointed as the single access point for all referrals. The process was by now sufficiently well established to be known as the Gulf War Medical Assessment Programme. This provided clinical diagnosis to pre-senting patients with treatment to be handled by standard procedures according to whether the individ-ual was still serving or had returned to civilian life. The programme was not engaged in research or charged with reporting back to the Ministry of Defence, although clearly the data it collected would eventually form important sources of information. For some reason, interest in the programme picked up somewhat over the course of 1996 and hence, according to Peter Beale, 'numbers increased so that by January 1997, 1100 had been registered'. This figure has risen steadily since, reaching almost 3000 in September 2001 (Chalder et ai. 2001) over 10 years after the original conflict. In 1996, with initial funding from the U S Department of Defense, researchers from the Guy's, King's and St Thomas's Medical School in London established the Gulf War Illness Research Unit. This was to provide a more rigorous analysis on a random sample—over 4000—of the Gulf War cohort, with appropriate comparisons of equivalent cohorts who had not been deployed to the Gulf. After an initial pilot phase, questionnaires were sent to all participants in August and September 1997, Repeat mailings to non-responders were done between November 1997 and June 1998, with follow-up ending in November 1998. The ourcome of this research, reported in The Lancet in January 1999—while demonstrating for the first time a significant increase in the subjective experience of symptoms—confirmed the negative response of the numerous surveys that had by then been conducted in the US . The latter included expert reports by the military, the National Institutes of Health, the Rand Corpor-ation, the Institute of Medicine and a number of prestigious universities, as well as a study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The mandate of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses (the then President, Bill Clinton, took a close interest in these matters) had been extended in 1996, because the U S government refused to accept its verdict that it could find no evidence of Gulf War Syndrome. The Committee returned the same conclusion a year later. Regardless, a number of veterans and their advisors, buoyed-up by sympathetic media reporting as to their plight, have remained thoroughly unconvinced as to this weight of evidence, as well as that which has ensued since which, to date, has cost in excess of S300 million to conduct in the U S alone (Clauw 2003). In concluding this section, it is worth quoting more extensively from one of the leading American 
r e s e a r c h e r s w i t h r e g a r d s t o t h e i s s u e o f m i s t r u s t t h a t 
h a s n o w a r i s e n ; 
A l l é g a t i o n s of a cover-up are c o m m o n responscs to 
d i f f i c u l t i e s d e m o n s t r a t i n g a w a r - r e l a t e d s y n d r o m e . 
F r o m the m é d i c a l Standpoint, this e x p l a n a t i o n is the 
least p l a u s i b l e because it is b a s c d o n the premise that 
n u m e r o u s private a n d g o v e r n m e n t health Professionals 
w o u l d p a r t i c i p a t e i n a c o n s p i r a c y . I n r e a l î t y , a 
c o n c e r t e d c l i n i c a l a n d research p r o g r a m has b e e n 
established i n three c o u n t r i e s to identify the causes o f 
v é t é r a n s ' illnesses a n d p r o v i d e m é d i c a l care. P h y s i c i a n s 
a n d researchers have h a d n o incentive to hide the t r u t h 
because w h o e v e r finds answers to thèse health q u e s -
tions w i l l reeeive s u b s t a n t i a l p r o f e s s i o n a l r é c o g n i t i o n 
a n d p e r s o n a l g r a t i f i c a t i o n f r o m h e l p i n g v é t é r a n s . 
( H y a m s & R o s w e l l 1998, p. 339) 
4. CONTEXT The purpose of this paper is not to review the medical evidence, which is examined elsewhere in this journal, but rather to explore other determining factors—in the main social, cultural and political—to the debacle. Many researchers now believe the standard medical and scientific avenues of investigation have been rigorously researched and that it is time to move elsewhere in searching for an explanation (Wessely 2001). None of this is to suggest that there do not remain a disproportionate number of veterans who are genuinely i l l , or at least perceive themselves as such. It is worth noting from the outset that the Gulf War of 1991 occurred at a time of unprecedented change in the history of the twentieth century. It was the first post-Cold War conflict and the period immediately preceding this, as well as that which ensued, have been marked by remarkable transformations in social, cultural and political values, perceptions and mores. For instance, in a recent book reviewing the controversy in the U K surrounding the introduction of the M M R (measles, mumps and rubella) triple-vaccine, the medical commentator and general prac-titioner, Michael Fitzpatrick, identifies these times as having been marked by a 'resonance for an apparently endless series of health scares' (Fitzpatrick 2004). These have included anxieties expressed about issues from mobile phones to toxic chemicals and genetically modified organisms. In particular, Fitzpatrick shows that concern as to the introduction of the new vaccine predated the publication in The Lancet of the now infamous paper suggesting a possible link between M M R and child-hood autism by Andrew Wakefield and his colleagues at the Royal Free Hospital in North London in February 1998. So, while inoculation rates declined steadily subsequent to this event, Fitzpatrick points to the fact that this 'was not the only factor'. He and others suggest that a heightened sense of individual insecurity was already finding expression in a popular mood of risk aversion and a culture of litigation affecting broad layers of society (Furedi 1999). Tracing the full origins of this changing social climate would require considerably more space than is available here. Nevertheless, a growing number of fears expressed across a wide range of issues, both 
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692 B. Durodié Social construction of Gulf War Syndrome scientific and social, serve as a useful marker. One of the most significant of these—the debate surrounding the possibility of the transmission of bovine spongiform encephalopathy, commonly known as 'mad cow disease', to humans in the form of variant Creutz-feldt-Jakob disease—gained particular notoriety at the time of the announcement in the House of Commons by the former British Health Secretary, Stephen Dorrell, in March 1996 that there may be such a link. Coinciding with, and feeding into, the rise in registration of former veterans to the Gulf War Medical Assessment Programme, the affair was held to symbolize the breakdown of trust in politicians, scientists and industry, and in part was undoubtedly responsible for cementing the downfall of the then Conservative administration at the general election the following year. It is worth noting, however, that this episode too, serves more as a confirmation of existing trends rather than being their cause. Famously, as early as May 1990, the then Agriculture Minister, John Selwyn Gummer, had been widely ridiculed for publicly attempting to feed his young daughter Cordelia a hamburger in order to placate concerns as to the safety of British beef. Clearly then, awareness of these issues focusing more on image than insight, as well as a growing mood of mistrust and cynicism in authority were evolving well before the Gulf War. The reasons for this are complex, but they relate in part to a number of processes that have been widely commented on and that evolved gradually over the course of the latter half of the twentieth century. These include a gradual process of disengagement from political life, a disconnection in the web of social existence and growing disenchantment with science. These were propelled to the fore and accelerated considerably through the period of transformation and confusion surrounding the end of the Cold War. A number of social commentators have described the mechanisms whereby the breakdown of existing forms of collectivity and systems of social meaning left the public feeling more isolated and insecure than previously. Harvard professor Robert Putnam has described this process as an erosion of'social capital' (Putnam 2000). Worse, those in positions of authority also appear to have suffered from a similar existential crisis, combined with an absence of any evident political direction and conviction (Laidi 1998). 
5. RISK In 1992, the book 'Risk Society', by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck, was translated into English (Beck 1992). Beck's ability to discern some of the changing contours of the political landscape trans-formed this into an unexpected best-seller. Originally published in 1987, Beck sought to suggest that the world was now confronting the limitations of the industrial age. For Beck, and others, such as the British sociologist Anthony Giddens, risk had become reflexive or, in other words, humanity now had to deal with the new 'manufactured risks' of its own creation. Certainly, more and more social problems have begun to be examined through the prism of risk. But 
the question remains whether this is due to people having to confront a growing number or quantity of risks, a transformation in the type or quality of risks, or whether they are somehow simply more conscious of risks. Elsewhere I have argued that it may be more productive to understand these issues as deriving not so much from a risk society, but rather as revealing a 'risk perception society' (Durodié 2005). The gradual erosion of collective forms of social association, both in the formal sphere of political participation, as well as in the informal sphere of everyday life, has had a remarkable impact upon how people view themselves and the world around them. As the academic and social commentator Frank Furedi has noted, even the way we use the word 'risk' has been transformed to reflect this growing disengagement. A word that was often used as a verb with positive connotations, as in 'to take a risk', has increasingly become a noun understood largely in negative terms, as in 'to be at risk' (Furedi 1997). Our understanding and use of the word 'risk' reflects our own confidence—or lack of it—in the potential of human will and agency to transform society. Increas-ingly divorced from social solidarities and trusted networks, which used to provide a framework of meaning, people become inclined to view events as out of control or inevitable. Being disconnected from society allows subjective impressions of reality to grow unchecked, or unmediated, through active member-ship of a wider group or trusted community, lending itself to problem identification and risk inflation. These developments have had a quite devastating and stultifying impact. The breakdown of social collectivities has, in the absence of any coherent replacements, enhanced the sense which isolated individuals have of themselves, as being frail and vulnerable. It should be noted that this social transformation is additional to, distinct from and more recent than, the usual psychological variations that have been noted by many as determining how an individual perceives risk—such as whether an activity is undertaken voluntarily or can be controlled and the degree of understanding or dread that people have of it (Slovic 2000). A n exaggerated perception of risk also lends itself to increasing demands for greater regulation and social control. Accordingly, people have increasingly looked to those in authority to enhance their sense of security by mitigating the worst effects of particular products and activities, as well as legislating against those they hold responsible for these. Lacking any broader vision or direction of their own, the elite have willingly embraced this new agenda (Furedi 2005), repackaging themselves as societal risk managers—particularly around the issues of health and security. The erosion of social forces also enhances the sense that people have of the significance of scientific and technological developments upon their lives, way beyond their true impact and importance. Over the course of the twentieth century, groups who had previously grasped the progressive capabilities and liberatory potential of scientific advance for driving social transformation now viewed this with growing suspicion. But behind the crisis of faith in science lies 
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Social construction of Gulf War Syndrome B. Durodié 693 a collapse of confidence in humanity, driven by a breakdown of social networks. Ironically, this mcans we now expect scientists to be held accountable by politicians and committees who increasingly are not. Being less connected also leaves pcople less corrected. Views and valúes which, in the past, vvould have been filtered and scrutinized through various layers of knowledge and insight, come today to form unchallenged personal frameworks for understanding the world. Individual obsessions often grow into all-consuming worldviews that are rarely held to reasoned interrogation or debate. Today, what would once have been considered to be mere opinión or anecdote can become inextricably and existentially bound to a person's emotional idenrity. In such a climate, confronting people with robust evidence that might contradict their perceptions is felt by many to be patronizing. Such an approach could damage the fragüe mándate of those in authority. Henee, a more inclusive process of risk management and a demand for public dialogue also appear to have become the norm (Durodié 2003<a). Unfortunately, the more such concerns are high-lighted and treated at face-value, the more difficult it becomes for the authorities to satiate the insecurities they thereby give credence to. Recognition of social concerns readily becomes their driver. Henee, along-side disengagement and alienation has come a con-comitant disillusionment and mistrust in al] sources of authority, whether political, scientific or corporate, as these are invariably unable to live-up to the new expectations they themselves have helped to shape. This corrosión of trust—in outlook if not in practice (O'Neill 2002)—has also accelerated the replacement of healthy scepticism by an uncritical cynicism. In numerous situations today, the public have become aecustomed—and encouraged—to assume the worst and presume a cover-up. Many policy advocates have become risk entrepreneurs in this regard. But a focus on worst-case scenarios also lies at the heart of the precautionary approach that is now held by governments to be a necessary aspect of effective risk management procedures (Durodié 2004). This encourages the rise of rumours and conspiracy theories in those situations where people do not consider their views, opinions and claims to have been addressed adequately. Finally, these developments have also fed into new demands for the attribution of blame and compen-sation. The vast majority of veterans, while expecting war pensions to which they are entitled, have been loathe to pursue such litigious avenues, seeing them and the media campaigns that surround them as antíthetical to military culture. Nevertheless, there is a powerful expectation for redress across socicty that also attaches blame for misfortune, irrespective of the weight of objective evidence to the contrary. 
6. SYMPTOMS Numerous surveys confirm that many people who consult their doctor present symptoms which cannot be explained according to recognized disease categories. It appears that such complaints are especially common in 
public services—the armed forces and the police, health, education and local government. The common features of these occupational groups today arc low morale and a widespread sense of being overworked, underpaid and undervalued. Nor is Gulf War Syndrome a problem unique to the military. Its symptoms overlap with numerous other similar supposed syndromes, such as multiple chemical sensitivity, irritable bowel syndrome, chronic fatigue disorder and repetitive strain injury (Wessely 2005). Many of these are likewise blamed on possible environmental hazards that are difficult to assess or quantify, such as low-level radiation, chemicals, food additives, pesticides and pollution (Aceves-Avilla et al. 2004). This has even led some to propose that these syndromes should be labelled 'illnesses of modernity' (Petrie & Wessely 2002). New syndromes can give everyday symptoms a medical-sounding label and so make them a legitimate explanation for illness, absence from work and claiming benefits. They also offer a target for litigation and a potential source of compensation, both moral and financial. Notably, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of American psychiatry expanded its list of abnormal behaviours from 60 in 1952 to 384 (plus 28 'floating' diagnoses) in 1994. Foremost among this ever-expanding list of new syndromes has been post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Originally framed as applying to particular individuals in extreme circumstances—the category P T S D was advocated and fought for by anti-war lawyers and psychiatrists wanting to offer moral exculpation and financial compensation to veterans of the Vietnam war (Shephard 2000)—it has expanded rapidly ever since to encompass everyday happenings such as accidents, verbal harassment and workplace disputes (Summerfield 2000). A common feature of these syndromes is the perception of damage to the so-called immune system, resulting from vaccinations, toxins or radiation. But the immune system is more a physiological concept than an anatomical entity. In that sense it appears to have become a metaphor for the heightened sense of individual vulnerability people now sense in the contemporary period (Martin 1994). In addition to misunderstood symptoms, causes are sometimes misdiagnosed. Veterans can fall prey to the 
post hoc fallacy, confusing correlation with causation. Just because one event occurred after another event does not mean it is a result of that event. Careful study has demonstrated that some veterans carried illnesses before they ever set foot in the Gulf. A striking example of this was the case of American army reservist Michael Adcock, the first death widely attributed to Gulf War Syndrome. He died in 1992 of lymphoma, which his family blamed on whar had happened to him in the Gulf, and testified to that effect before Congress (Fienberg 1999). In fact, Adcock had started to show symptoms of lymphoma 6 days before deployment to rhe Gulf. As lymphoma usually takes more than 10 years to develop, it effectively excludes any link to the Gulf War. There are numerous other examples of misguided diagnoses. Irrespective of this, the number of veterans 
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694 B. Durodié Social construction of Gidf War Syndrome receiving payments for P T S D has grown rapidly frorn approximately 120 000 cases in 1999 to 216 000 in 2004. Now, the U S government is wanting to revicw 72 000 cases in which vétérans have been diagnosed with severe P T S D , claiming that mistakes and fraud have inflated the numbers (Benjamin 2005). Predictably, and understandably under the circum-stances—considering how expectations have been raised and society gradually reorganized around such syndromes—numerous outraged vétérans and their supporters have seen this as a callous attempt to curtai] expenditure. They arc unlikely to be satisfied by any outcome other than that which they have already assumed, Nevertheless, it is also worth noting that, for whatever reason, more days are now lost at work from people sclf-reporting themselves as suffering stress than were lost by people going on strike at the height of the period of trade union militancy in the late 1970s (Marsden & Hyland 2004). This shift from an active engagement in society—however disagreeable it may have been for the authorities at the time—to virtual passivity, reflects the changing patterns of political and social engagement described earlier. There could hardly be a better index of how our cultural outlooks and expectations have shifted over recent times. 
7. ADVOCATES In a world marked by the démise in political participation, Organization and debate, individual campaigners can have a disproportionate impact on particular issues. Some commentators have also noted 
how, in the absence of a cohérent political opposition, the media have increasingly tried to assume this role. Both these phenomena are evident in the Gulf War Syndrome story. Apart from those who helped establish the category of P T S D there are many other instances of interested parties impacting on the debate significantly. For instance, subséquent to the Newsnight programme that helped establish concern about Gulf War Syn-drome in the U K , the Today newspaper decided to turn this into a major campaign and carried a series of articles on various aspects of the subject. The standard of their reporting varied widely and at the time this forced the Ministry of Defence to become reactive to media activity as some of the underlying concepts were not well understood and serious misconceptions could arise. This kind of campaigning journalism is not restricted to Gulf War Syndrome though. It too is a product of the new political and social landscape, as has been rigorously examined elsewhere in relation to campaigns relating to mobile phone radiation (Burgess 2004). Other policy advocates, including members in both the Houses of Parliament, have raised a seríes of Parliamentary Questions relating to the possibility of illnesses among vétérans and their families having been driven by organophosphate poisoning. In doing so, they have sought to harness these developments onto their pre-existing campaigns and concerns, effectively pro-viding the latter with a new lease of life in a manner akin to the activity of many other campaigners. 
Factual errors by both the U K Ministry of Defence and the U S Department of Defense in answering questions combined with concessions brought about by a sensé of the need to countenance any possibility of exposure to toxic agents, no matter how implausiblc, simply made things worse. The impact of this over-zealous désire to be seen to be open and transparent, as well as engaging in a dialogue with families as to their concerns was evident in relation to the possibility of U S troops having been exposed to nerve gas and other chemical agents as a conséquence of the post-war démolition of an Iraqi munitions dépôt at Kamisayah in March 1991. Officiai estimâtes of those affected were steadily increased from none to 400, then 5000, 15 000 and possibly substantially more. Yet even now there remains serious doubt as to whether any troops at ail had been in the vicinity of this incident. Under-standably, such shifts, regardless of evidence, have simply enhanced the sensé of those who thought the facts were being kept away from them in the first place and simply served to Compound the mistrust surrounding these issues. Finally, as with other similar debates, a small number of maverick scientists and interested entrepre-neurs also helped fuel matters. Regardless of their dubious credentials and publication track-record, as well as the inability of other scientists to replicare their results, govemments regularly leapfrogged the usual scientific research process and standard funding procédures, allotting some of them substantial grants in their desperation to corne up with any solution. Predictably, this only served to fuel some of their bizarre claims. And sadly, vétérans and others who would profess to have lost their faith in the ability of scientists and clinicians to be objective and understand their concerns were nevertheless quite prepared to place their trust in these rival experts, so long as they confirmed their claims. Unfortunately, as wide layers of society now appear to consider expertise and expéri-ence to be elitist and knowledge to be biascd or unattainable, such beliefs are to be expected. 
8. CONCLUSIONS Every conflict seems to have its own syndrome. But, the internai battles fought over the récognition of Gulf War Syndrome suggest far deeper problems for society. Military morale dépends on a sensé of mission and domestic support (Durodié 20036), but nowadays principled values and beliefs are noticeably absent. In an age marked by a breakdown of solidarities, troops also have a far more individuated expérience of war. Perceptions of risk, sickness and stress loom in their minds, as well as those of their Commanders and other officiais at home. When everything around them suggests that war will make them il l , it is not surprising that claims of post-conflict illness are on the rise. As a society we also now fecl less able to justify individual sacrifice in the name of a collective aim. With a growing absence of any sensé of what it is that they are being asked to fight for, pain and illness arc less likely to be accepted and endured. What's more, as the définition of disorders widens, while the primacy of 
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v a l u e s s u c h as r e s i l i e n c e a n d c o m p o s u r e a r e e r o d e d , 
m a n y m o r e p e o p l e p r e s e n t s y m p t o m s t o t h e i r d o c t o r s 
t o d a y t h a n e v e r b e f o r e , o f t e n i n p u r s u i t o f financial 
r e m e d i a t i o n o r m o r a l r e c o g n i t i o n . V a l u e s , b e l i e f , 
p u r p o s e a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e i m p o r t a n t i n f i g h t i n g , 
w i n n i n g a n d s u r v i v i n g w a r . I t is n o t c o u r a g e a n d a b i l i t y 
a l o n e t h a t d e t e r m i n e s u c h m a t t e r s — b u t r a t h e r c o n v i c -
t i o n a n d w i l l . 
I n t h e m e a n t i m e , m u c h o f w h a t p a s s e s f o r p u b l i c 
h e a l t h c o n c e r n s a n d r e s e a r c h t o d a y f o r m s p a r t o f a 
b r o a d e r a g e n d a — c o n s c i o u s l y o r n o t — s e r v i n g to r e c o n -
n e c t a n e r v o u s e l i t e w i t h t h e p u b l i c b y a d d r e s s i n g t h e i r 
p r e s u m e d i n s e c u r i t i e s . U n a b l e t o d e m o n s t r a t e a 
c o n c l u s i v e l i n k b e t w e e n p a r t i c u l a r p r o b l e m s a n d t h e i r 
a s s u m e d c a u s e s , g o v e r n m e n t s f a l l b a c k o n a d v o c a t i n g 
p r e v e n t a t i v e s t r a t e g i e s o r r e s t r a i n t , as w e l l as e n d l e s s 
r e s e a r c h i n t o p u r p o r t e d r i s k f a c t o r s t o d e m o n s t r a t e 
t h e i r c o n c e r n . 
B u t , f a r f r o m b e i n g s c i e n t i f i c a l l y d r i v e n a n d 
m e d i c a l l y r e s o l v a b l e i t s e e m s e v i d e n t t h a t it h a s b e e n 
t h e v a r i o u s s o c i a l a n d c u l t u r a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s o u t l i n e d 
p r e v i o u s l y t h a t h a v e s h a p e d t h e s e c h a n g e s , as w e l l as 
t h e i n d i v i d u a l s w h o a r e a l s o a p r o d u c t o f t h e s e t i m e s as 
a r e t h e i l l n e s s e s t h a t t h e y n o w p r e s e n t . 
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What can the Science and Technology 
Community Contribute? 
Bil l D U R O D I É Royal Military College of Science 
Abstract. This Chapter explores the rôle attributed to science and technology in combating the global war on terror in an âge when social bonds have been erodcd and D U T sensé of the need for social solutions diminished accordingly. One conséquence of this is the exaggeration of risks presented by science and by terrorists to the point of ignoring the more mundane and probable thrcats that confront us. Prioritising technical means to build social resilience over cultural change is also likcly to be counter-productive by further fragmenting the ordinary human bonds that actually make society truly résilient. A political debate over societal values is required if we are to re-engage the public and deal appropriately with all-manner of disasters, including terrorist attacks. 
1. Introduction Science and engineering have always played a part in war. The advent of new technologies has only increased this potential rôle. The global war on terror is no différent to other vvars in that regards. Many proposed options for dealing with terrorism have an explicit technological angle. These include, the need for better intelligence and surveillance, the development of new instruments for detecting chemical, biological and radiological agents, specialist clothing and equipment for emergency responders, and computer models for predicting behaviour or orchestrating responses. It is understandable, even commendable, that well-meaning experts and Professionals should wish to get involved. Further, a significant amount of social resources are being diverted to tackling the problems raised. Accordingly, those with an eye on sources of funding to explore new areas of inquiry are likely to be interested. Indeed, beyond the explicit development of technical capabilities, the war raises numerous implicit issues for scientists and engineers to deal with. Who has access to the technologies they develop? And, how much should be made available in the public domain? Before diving in off the deep end, however, those of a more critical disposition - as any true scientist should be - would do well to examine the broader context within which these events and issues have occurred and how they have been framed. Things are rarely as they seem. The primary task of ail concerned ought to be to grasp the underlying essence of what is going on Failing to do so could lead to the development of proposed solutions that, at best, merely contain perceived threats, at worst, exacerbate them significantly, not least by undermining our own capabilities to be résilient in the long run. Many perceived problems in the world today are driven more by their social context than by their scientific content. Scientists and engineers need to be alert to this, not least because science occupies a peculiar position in contemporary life. A diminished sensé of the significance of, as well as the désire and ability to shape, social forces, has led to an increased focus on the importance and impact of science upon our lives. In response to this 
élévation and exaggeration of science, society has increasingly become preoccupied with science as a potential source of new risks. This has led to the highlighting and fetishisation of purported scientific and technological solutions to what remain essentially social problems, as well as a concomitant and distorted perception of threat from anything remotely scientific in content. A récent publication from the Royal Society, the United Kingdom's leading scientific institution, is quite apposite in this regards [1]. The report; Making the UK Safer: Detecting and 
Decontaminating Chemical and Biological Agents, is undoubtedly rigorous in scope and methodology. However, it is the unquestioning acceptance of the social context that needs examining. In it, some of the UK's leading scientists take at face value the notion that; "Récent global events have given greater prominence to the threat of chemical and biological agents being used malevolently against civil targets", and further that; "Science, engineering and technology are central to reducing this threat". Both of these assumptions would benefit from interrogation. Indeed, questioning the axioms of a debate ought to be the first step in making it truly objective. Otherwise we may be left with a technically compétent, but ultimately unscientific report. It is not just the job of social scientists, but scientists too, to question whether this purported "greater prominence" is real. Assuming that it is, scientists true to their tradition would then start by asking what this fact represents. Whether this is a media construct, or a more deeply held social concern, across différent layers of society. If it is the latter, it ought to be considered that such a concem may have little relation to the actual probability of the threat they fear. The fact that something is possible, may cause alarm, but is the best way of assuaging this to assume those fears to be real and then seek to mitigate their outcomes, or alternatively, to interrogate those fears? Ultimately, the Royal Society report may be of use to a highly limited number of technical specialists who, in the extremely unlikely eventuality of such a situation arising, would be charged with dealing with it. However, it is not obvious what its use is beyond that, in the public domain. Surely, publication of the report itself could now serve to confirm people's exaggerated perceptions of threat? It has certainly contributed to the "greater prominence' that it originally sought to address. People might assume that i f the U K ' s leading scientists are investigating such matters then their presumptions are more likely to be true. 
2. Science and Society The emphasis often given as to the importance of science for effecting social change is one-sided. Science can transform society, but it is also a product of society. Its advances and remit, as well as being shaped by material reality, are circumscribed by the nature and values of the society within which it develops. The ambition and imagination of that society - or lack of these - is important here. Hence, whilst the world of antiquity yielded many intellectual insights, constrained by its social structures, these proved to be of little practical conséquence [2]. It was only when the largely static feudal order dissolved, through the development of trade, that new demands were raised on individuals and society. A marriage of intellectual activity with practical needs encouraged innovation and, through the accumulation of wealth, challenged the old social order. As well as delivering remarkable achievements, social and scientific developments raised expectations as to what was possible [3]. This was about more than simply an advance in scientific knowledge - it was part of a wider shift in attitudes and beliefs. 
The aspiration for social progress gave humanity confidence in the power of its own reason - a factor that then proved of significant importance to the development of science. The Scientific Revolution represented the triumph of rationality and expérimentation over the superstition, spéculation, diktat and domination that had gone before. It was a practical battering-ram with which to challenge perception, préjudice and power. But science was merely the product of a broader social dynamism, as well as becoming an essential contributor to it. Just as the initial dynamic behind science was social change, so social change, or more particularly the lack of it, could circumscribe it too. Initially this came from the vociferous rejection of the old religious and monarchical orders it had supplanted. Then the advent of positivism consciously sought to restore order by decoupling science from wider political aspirations to transform society [4]. This reflected the inhérent limitations and world view of the new industrial élite who derived their wealth and influence from simple mechanical processes linking cause and effect by uniform rules. However, over the course of the twentieth Century a wider layer of society lost its faith in the progressive capabilities of scientific transformation. Two world wars, separated by a dépression and followed by continuing poverty and conflict in the developing world generated doubts as to the possibility of universal human progress [5], Radicals, who had traditionally championed the liberating potential of scientific advance, now came to view it with increased suspicion. They also associated the Manhattan project and the Apollo programme with American militarism. Some now argued that aspiration itself - rather than its failure as evidenced in the collapse of confidence in social progress - was dangerous [6]. Science was seen as the amoral steamroller of a dispassionate new modernity that crushed communities and tradition. What is so poignant about the modem disenchantment with science, is that it has emerged at a time when its achievements are without précèdent. Behind the current crisis of faith in science, however, lies a collapse of confidence in humanity, and hence in the desirability and possibility of social transformation [7]. The defeat of the old Left extemally, symbolised by the dis intégration of the former Soviet Union and its satellite states, and the taming of the Left intemally, symbolised in the UK. through a séries of political defeats over the course of the 1980s, now led it to make new alliances, including with the environmental movement - traditionally the préserve of the romantic Right - in order to boost its numbers, and leading it to shape a new, more individual or consumer-oriented agenda. A t the same time, the diminished sensé of the possibility of shaping social factors also made science appear to play a more important rôle in determining things. 
3. Social Erosion In parallel with the graduai disillusionment of society with science, has corne an equally significant process of disengagement of society from politics. For the vast majority of ordinary C i t i zens this has been exacerbated by a growing sensé of social disconnection. At both the formai and informai levels of social engagement, social bonds have been severely eroded over the last décade or so. The résultant sensé of isolation and insecurity across society has become the key élément shaping perceptions of risk. At the formai level, people in advanced Western societies are increasingly unlikely to participate in the political process. This effect is most striking among younger âge groups. Electoral turnouts are at an all-time low and in the few instances where these are high, emotion appears to rule over reason. Few are active, or even passive, members of political parties or trade unions as their forebears were, and there is little attempt to engage 
in , or raise the standard of, debate. W h e n people do vote, it is often on a negative basis -against an incumbent, rather than for a replacement. A t the informal level , the changes are even more striking. M a n y have commented on the growing pressures faced b y communities, neighbourhoods and families. In his book on this thème, " B o w l i n g A l o n e " , the A m e r i c a n académie Robert Putnam also pointed to the démise o f informal clubs and associations [8]. Meeting Up with friends, occurs less frequently than previously too. In other words, people are not just polit ical ly disengaged but also, increasingly socially disconnected. This loss o f social capital has occurred and been experienced within a génération. Not so long ago, for example, it was still possible across most urban centres, to send children to school on their o w n , assuming that other adults would act in loco parentis -chastising them i f they were misbehaving and helping them i f they were in trouble. Today, such a straightforward social arrangement can no longer be taken for granted. None o f us ever signed a contract saying that we would look after other people's chi ldren. It was simply an unstated and self-evident social good. T h i s ktss o f a social sense o f respunsibility makes the individual task o f parenting harder [9]. In a similar way, ordinary communities, at the turn o f the last Century, invested a great deal o f effort in establishing and running their o w n institutions. These took a wide variety o f forms from churches, to w o r k i n g men's clubs, schools and trade unions. It is almost impossible to find a similar process at work within society today. This is not to suggest some k i n d o f golden-age o f Community act ivism. C l e a r l y , past societies were also associated with a wide manner o f activities we are quite glad to have seen the back of. However , the resulting érosion o f social connectedness is significant. B e i n g less connected, leaves people less corrected. It allows their subjective impression o f reality to go unmediated or unmoderated through membership o f a wider group, association or trusted Community. Without a sense o f the possibi l i ty o f social solutions, personal obsessions grow into all-consuming worldviews that are rarely open to reasoned interrogation or debate. In part, it is this that explains our récent proelivity to emphasise or exaggerate all o f the so-called risks that are held to confront us [10]. Rather than the w o r l d changing any faster today than in the past, or becoming a more dangerous, unpredictable or complex place, it may be our diminished, and more isolated, sense o f seif that has altered our confidence to deal with change and the problems it gives rise to [11]. Those who talk o f a " R u n a w a y W o r l d " [12], would be hard pressed to show how the pace o f change today is any greater than say, over the sixty-five year period two centuries ago between the création o f Richard Trevithick's first steam locomotive and the advent o f transcontinental railroads across the United States o f A m e r i c a . Al ternat ively , note the pace of change over the same period a Century ago between the Wright brothers first powered flight and man Walking on the moon. I f anything, change today appears somewhat attenuated. M u c h o f the focus recently has been on the largely undelivered promises o f biotechnology - a technology now passed its fiftieth anniversary - and the potential o f the internet. But whilst the latter may have led us to being more networked virtually, it has not driven m u c h change in the real world . Radically overhauling existing transport networks, a transformation not currently envisaged, would most l ikely have greater social and scientific conséquences. In our technically networked w o r l d , wc may be more aware - but we are also casier to scare, than previously. B e i n g more isolated leaves us more self-centred, as w e l l as risk averse. In t u m , these developments reduce the l ikel ihood o f our acting for some greater common good and end up making us less résilient, both as individuals and as a society. 
From BSE to GMOs; from mobile phones to M M R , ail new developments are now viewed through the prism of a heightened and individuated consciousness of risk. Nor are our fears restricted to the realms of science and technology. Age-old activities and processes have been reinterpreted to fit our new sense of isolation and fear. Bullying, sun-bathing and even sex have joined an ever-growing panoply of concerns, along with maverick doctors, crime, food and paedophiles. Worse, this state of affairs has been exacerbated by the various authorities themselves, who suffer from their own existential crisis of isolation and insecurity. As we no longer vote, so ruling parties appear increasingly illegitimate and divorced from everyday concerns. A less than 50% turnout when split two or three ways produces governments with at best a 20-25% mandate. The real figure as reflected by demographics, négative voting and actual local élection results is often well below this, languishing around the 10-15% mark. This crisis of legitimacy has been further accentuated by a certain lack of purpose that has set in since the dissolution of the old Cold War divide. Then, an ideological divide separated a supposedly socialist Left from the free-market Right. Far from the démise of the Left revealing the 'End of History" [13], it actually exposed the Right's own lack of ideas and dynamism. in an âge when social change has been problematised, the pursuit of profit through innovation no longer bestows moral authority as easily. Now ail parties fight for the centre ground and desperately seek issues that mitigate change and will re-connect with voters. Latching on to the gênerai climate of fear and insecurity, politicians have learnt to repackage themselves as societal risk managers around issues such as security, health and the environment. They pose as the people who wil l protect us from our fears and regulate the world accordingly. But the petty lifestyle concerns they focus on, as reflected in incessant debates about smoking, smacking, eating and drinking are unlikely to inspire and engage a new génération of voters. Nor will doom-laden prédictions relating to terrorism and global warming. Indeed, the more such concerns are highlighted, the more it becomes impossibb for the authorities to satiate the insecurities they create. Hence, alongside disengagement and aliénation, has corne a concomitant disillusionment and mistrust in ail fonns of authority, whether political, corporate, or scientific. Healthy scepticism has increasingly been replaced by unthinking cynicism. In many situations today, the public tend to assume the worst and présume a cover-up. Rumour and myth abound over evidence and reason. 
4. Creating Fears At a récent forum in London, a member of the security service informed an audience of bankers that, whist it was true that the probability of a chemical, biological, radiological and even nuclear terrorist attack was low, this could not be ruled otit. It was suggested that groups such as A l Qa'ida may have relatively poor capabilities in such techniques but their intention to devclop these was clear, and if they did the conséquences might be devastating. This, in essence, captures the logic of our timcs; "Never mind the evidence, just focus on the possibility". It is a logic that allows entirely vacuous statements such as that of an officiai after the supposed discovery of the chemical agent ricin at a flat in North London, who was reported as saying; 'There is a very serious threat out there still that chemicals that have not been found may be used by people who have not yet been identified"[14]. Yet undiscovered threats from unidentified quarters have allowed an all-too-real reorganisation of everyday life. The US government has provided $3 billion to enhance 
bioterrorism preparedness [15]. Developed nations across the globe have felt obliged to stockpile smallpox vaccines following a process, akin to knocking over a line of dominoes, whereby one speculative I£What if?" type question, regarding the possibility of terrorists acquiring the virus, led to others regarding their ability to deploy it, and so on. Health advisories to help GPs spot the early signs of tularemia and viral haemorrahagic fever have cascaded through the UK's urgent alert system. Homes across the land have received the government's considered message for such incidents; "Go in, stay in, tune in" [16]. Like all social fears, there is a rational kernel behind these concerns. Yet this is distorted by our contemporary cultural proclivity to assume the worst. It is the fear of bioterrorism that is truly contagious, and it is a fear that distracts us from more plausible sources of danger, diverting social resources accordingly, and exposing us all to greater risk [17]. It is also a fear that has bred a cynical industry of security advisors and consultants, out to make a fast buck by exploiting public concerns, and thereby driving those concerns still further. There is a long history of bioterrorism incidents of which the anthrax attacks on politicians and the media in the U.S. in 2001 were but the latest [18]. Corpses infected with bubonic plague were thrown over the walls of Kaffa by the Black Sea in the mid - fourteenth century. At best, these are tactical devices with limited consequence, but not strategic weapons. It is the advent of biotechnology and the more recent, i f overstated, possibility of genetically engineering agents to target biological systems at a molecular level, that is now held to pose a new challenge [19], Few commentators point to the difficulties in developing, producing and deploying biological agents. This is evidenced by the failures of the Japanese cult, A u m Shinrikyo, in this regards only a decade ago. It was this that led them to settle for the rather more limited impact produced by the chemical agent sarin, despite their resources and scientific capabilities [20]. The Tokyo subway attack that ensued had rather more impact upon our fevered imagination, than in reality. As with the anthrax attacks, this incident suggested that bioterrorism is more likely to originate amongst malcontents at home, due to greater access and capabilities in developing, such weapons there. Advanced economies are also better placed to deal with the consequences of bioterrorism, a fact that significantly undermines their purpose, especially to outsiders. Nevertheless, suicidal foreign malefactors bent on undermining western democracies continue to be presented as the greater threat. Recognising the extremely low probability and limited consequences of such incidents, some scientists point to the longer-term psychological impacts as being the more important [21]. There is an element of truth to this. Psychological casualties are a real phenomenon. In certain emergencies these can rapidly overwhelm existing healthcare resources and thereby undermine the treatment of those more directly affected [22]. Yet they can also become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Indeed, by increasingly framing social problems through the prism of individual emotions, people have been encouraged to feel powerless and il l [23]. The arrival of television cameras or emergency workers wearing decontamination suits act as powerful confirming triggers for the spread of mass psychogenic illness [24]. So too can psychosocial interventions, such as debriefing subsequent to an incident [25], These can undermine constructive, pro-social and rational responses, including the expression of strong emotions such as anger [26]. Hence, despite good intentions, psychiatrists can become complicit in shaping social ills. This is because few are prepared to question the dominant cultural script emphasising social and individual vulnerability, and the need for professional intervention and support. Rather than critically questioning the framing of the debate, many, Like the scientists of the Royal Society mentioned earlier, now simply accept the possibility of chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism as a given. There is little understanding of how our exaggerated sense of risk is both historically contingent, predating 2001 quite significantly, and culturally determining, giving shape to and driving much of the agenda. One medical historian and epidemiologist, has noted that "experts were using the threat of novel diseases" as a rationale for change long before any récent incident, and that contemporary responses draw on "a répertoire of metaphors, images and values" [27]. He suggests that "American concerns about global social change are refracted through the lens of infectious disease". This coincides with the view of others who see bioterrorism as providing a powerful metaphor for elite fears of social corrosion from within [28]. Despite incidents since 2001 pointing to the preferred use of car bombs, high explosives and poorly deployed surface-to-air missiles, the authorities have, through their pronouncements, encouraged the media to hype weapons of mass destruction. This is despite any terrorist's capabilities being pathetic compared to our own and the conséquences being more likely to devástate them than us. We have stockpiled smallpox vaccines, but notably, have run out of influenza jabs. In the extremely unlikely eventuatity of an incident occurring, we assume that the public wil l panic and be unable to cope without long-term therapeutic counselling. In an age readily gripped by morbid fantasies and poisonous nightmares, few surpass the pathological projection of our own isolation much better than the fear of bioterrorism. A l l of this rather begs the question as to who is corrupting civilisation the most. The fantasy bombers or the worst-case speculators? 
5. Cultural Responses In fact. how we, as individuáis and as a society, define and respond to disasters, is only partly dépendent upon causal agents and scale. Historically evolving cultural attitudes and outlooks, as well as other social factors, play a far greater role. In objective terms, risk may be defined as a function of hazard and probability, but that some product or event is perceived of as a risk, or is treated as a disaster, dépends on subjective factors. This human élément is missing from mechanistic risk calculus and technical solutions. Technical définitions of risk and resilience not only omit key éléments of understanding and response - such as our degree of trust in authority, in other human beings and in ourselves - but may also serve to rurther undermine such factors, which are crucial in responding effectively, The contemporary cultural proclivity to speculate wildly as to the likelihood of adverse events and to demand high-profile responses and capabilities based on worst-case scénarios may, in the end, only serve to distract attention and divert social resources in a way that is not warranted by a more pragmatic assessment and prioritisation of ail of the risks that we face. Technique and technology certainly help in the face of disaster. Ultimately, however, the fact that particular societies both choose and have the capacity to prioritise such éléments, is also socially determined. More broadly, it is possible to say that resilience - loosely defined as the ability of individuáis and society to keep going after a shock - is most definitely a function of cultural attitude or outlook. It is not an item that can readily be purchased. Cultural values point to why it is that, at certain times and in certain societies, a widespread loss of life fails to be a point of discussion, whilst at other times or in a différent society, even a very limited loss can become a key cultural référence point. This evolving context and framework of cultural meanings explains such variations as our widespread indifférence to the daily loss of life upon our roads, as opposed to, for instance, the shock 
and national mourning that ensued from the loss o f just seven lives aboard the Challenger spacecraft in 1986. The loss of Challenger represented a low-point in our cultural assessment of our own technological capabilities. It was a blow to our assumption of steady scientific and technological progress that no number of everyday car accidents could replicate. H fed into and drove a debate that continues to this day regarding our relationship with nature and a presumed human arrogance in seeking to pursue goals beyond ourselves. Hence, emergencies and disasters, including terrorist attacks, take on a différent rôle dépendent upon what they represent to particular societies at particular times, rather than solely on the basis of objective indicators, such as real costs and lives lost. In this sense, our response to terrorist incidents, such as that which occurred on September 1 l t h 2001, teaches us far more about ourselves than about the terrorists [29]. On the wholc, the history of human responses to disaster, including terrorist attacks, is quite heartening. People tend to be at their most co-operative and focused at such times. There are very few instances of panic [30]. The récent earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Océan serve as a salutary reminder of this. Amidst the taies of dévastation and woe, numerous individual and collective acts of bravery and sacrifice stand out, reminding us of the ordinary courage and conviction that are part of the human condition. People often corne together in an emergency in new, and largely unexpected ways, re-affirming core social bonds and their common humanity. Research reveals communities that were considered to be better off through having had to cope with adversity or a crisis [31]. Rather than being psychologically scared, it appears equally possible to émerge enhanced. In other words, whilst a disaster, including a terrorist attack, destroys physical and economic capital, it has the potential to serve as a rare opportunity in contemporary society to build-up social capital. O f course, terrorists hope that their acts will lead to a breakdown in social cohésion. Whether this is so, is up to us. Civilians are the true first responders and first line of defence at such times. Their support prior to, and their reactions subséquent to any incident, are crucial. Disasters act as one of the best indicators of the strength of pre-existing social bonds across a community. Societies that are together , pull together - those that are apart, are more likely to fall apart. Whilst there is much empirical evidence pointing to the positive éléments of ordinary human responses to disaster, it is usually after the immédiate danger has subsided that the real values of society as a whole come to the fore. It is then that the cultural outlook and impact of social leaders and their responses begins to hold sway. These détermine whether the focus is on reconstruction and the future, or on rétribution and the past. A more récent development has been the trend to encourage mass outpourings of public grief, minutes of silence or some other S y m b o l s of "conspicuous compassion". Sadly, despite the variety of ways in which it is possible to interpret and respond to différent emergencies, the onus today seems to veer a w a y from a célébration of human spirit and societal resilience, towards a focus on compensation and individual vulnerability. In large part this is driven by a narrowly technical view of risk a n d resilience. 
6. Technical Resilience Since September l l l h 2001 much focus has been placed upon the concept of resilience, understood as the ability to withstand or recover from adverse conditions or disruptive challenges. Politicians, emergency planners and others, talk of the need to "build", "engender" "improve" or "enhance" resilience in society [32]. 
Unfortunately, much of this debate is framed in the fashionable, but limited, language of risk management and risk communication. Sénior officials regularly point to the central role they attribute to risk reduction. This is understood in narrowly technical terms as consisting of horizon scanning, investment in equipment, training, business continuity planning, new legislation and the like [33], This outlook itself reveáis the absence of purpose and direction in society at large. After all , risk reduction is a means, not an end. In the past, society was not so much focused on reducing risk as upon enhancing capabilities towards some wider goal. Risk reduction was a by-product of such broader purposes and activities. Presumably, people were prepared to risk their lives fighting fires or fíghting a war, not so that their children could, in their tum, grow up to fight tires and fight wars, but because they believed that there was something more important to life worth fighting for. It is the catastrophic absence of any discussion as to what that something more important is, that leaves us fundamentally unarmed in the face of adversity today. In that regards, risk management is both insufficient as an approach, as well as being fundamentally unambitious. [t is also worth noting, that in recent times, the concept of risk itself has gradually altered from one that captured possibility and engagement in the active sense of "taking a risk", to one that increasingly reflects our growing sense of doom and distance, as evidenced in growing reference to the passive phrase of "being at risk". Risk used to be a verb. Now it has become a noun. This is a reflection of the wider passive disengagement across society at large and further drives this by gradually removing our sense of wi l l and agency from the equation. Risks are now conceived as being entities in their own right, only minimally subject to human intervention [34], They are inherently and implacably out there, coming our way. The best we can do is to identify them and prepare to deal with them. Even when discussing prevention, the assumption is that we are merely anticipating and building capacity for "inevitable" challenges [35]. In the words of some sénior officials, it is "only a matter of time", or "when, not i f a terrorist atrocity wi l l occur in the United Kíngdom using some kind of crude chemical. biological or radiological device [36]. The notion that it may be possible to shape conditions, or set the agenda, with a view to obtaining more desirable outcomes or altering our social mindset, independently of external forces, is rarely entertained. Unfortunately, much of the rhetoric regarding the war on terror, far from being robust and resolute, reveáis an almost resigned fatalism towards future events. There is no sense of changing how people will respond, simply a sense of preparing them to respond. This defensive responsiveness in turn can only further encourage, not just terrorists, but a whole host of other malcontents, loners, hoaxers and cranks in their activities. At best, our strategy is one of re-acting to the presumed actions of others. They drive - we follow, or mitígate. Despite occasional references to the need to "defend our way of life" or "our valúes" [37], very little effort has been put into identifying what these might be. They tend to be assumed, or glossed over, in some cursory fashion. At best, tolerance, which is the passive virtue of putting up with other people's valúes, gets misconstrued as an active valué. No doubt, because societal aims and cultural valúes are deeply contested and debating these might appear to be divisive at a time when we need to act in unisón, it is | easier to face the other way. Yet this flagrant lack of clarification as to who we are, what we believe in and where we are heading as a society, fundamentally undermines any technical attempt to be resilient. Real resilience, at a deeper social level, depends upon identifying what we are for, not just what we are against. That way we can oriéntate society and seck to build upon it, 
not just anticípate what is comíng and seek to respond. It is precisely by establishing our aims and values and then pursuing these, that we stand the most chance of winning hearts and minds, not just at hörne but also amongst the disaffected abroad. This is not to deny the need for a small layer of highly-trained Professionals in society to deal with the problem of terrorism in the here-and-now. Yet the debate about who we are and what we are for is not some abstract philosophical issue waiting for présent hostilities to be over. It is most urgent and necessary right now. Without an eye on the ends, just as much as on the means, we may take décisions that drive us further from our goals than we appreciate. What we do in the présent, including the science and tcchnology we develop, is inevitably shaped by our existing values, as well as the form of society we seek to créate. There are already many signs that some of the actions that have been taken thus far have served to further exacérbate the deep mistrust and cynicism in government and authority that is already quite widely feit. Worse, despite good intentions, encouraging people to be "alert", rather than alarmed, may well further erode the very social bonds of ordinary human trust we need to dépend upon if we are truly to be résilient as a society. As identified earlier, the usual list of measures taken to enhance social resilience since September l l t h 2001 consists amongst others of the need for better surveillance and intelligence, more effective models for predicting behaviour, new détection equipment and protective clothing, alternative modes for imparting information through "trusted" sources, as well as new structures of govemment and integrated response Sys tems. None of these serve to shore up ordinary social bonds and henee human and societal resilience. By encouraging the dominant paradigm of risk management in our understanding both of terrorism, as well as how to respond to it, we are encouraging a suspicion of others that effectively pushes people further apart and accentuâtes existing trends towards social atomisation. We have created a new bureaucracy but, as the figures show, we have failed to address the underlying insecurities [38]. Above all we have focused solely upon the form that terrorism now takes in the modem world - that relating in some increasingly tangential way, to A l Qa'ida - and largely ignored its content - a vehement anti-Americanism that rejects modemity and progress. This reveáis the real complacency of the dominant responses. One hardly needs to leave the West, to discover a whole host of other voices also expressing a hatred for America and progressive enlightenment values. This division is internal rather than extemal. Islamist terror is merely its most visible manifestation. Once "Stupid White Men" had become a best-seller on both sides of the Atlantic we should have been alert to a certain degree of cultural self-loathing at home [39]. Timothy McVeigh and the Aum Shinrikyo cuit, pointed to our ability to créate home-grown nihilist terrorism. It is well worth reminding ourselves that the 19 hijackers from September l l t h 2001 had themselves all spent considerable time in the West, imbuing our values - or lack of them - and had largely been educated here. Terrorism in every age reflects the dominant values of the most advanced societies. In the age when Western countries advanced and defended the sovereign rights of independent nation states, terrorists fought national libération struggles. Today, in an age when it is not so clear what we truly believe in, we find terrorists that declare no aims and profess no responsibility for the carnage they créate. Maybe it is time we examined ourselves more deeply rather than the final outeome of such values. Cultural confusion as to who we are, what we are for and w h e r e we are going w i l l undermine our attempts at instituting social resilience. Society today is less cohérent than it was a génération or more ago, it is also less compliant, but above all it is less confident as to its aims and purposes. This will not be resolved by training ourselves to respond to 
disasters, but by a much broader level of debate and engagement in society, not just relating to terrorism and other crises, but to far broader social issues. 
7. Social Solutions Historical comparisons of disaster, such as responses to the Second World War "Blitz", or to past épisodes of flooding and épidémie disease, reveal a number of important lessons for today. Not least, is the extent and depth of social bonds and engagement at those times. Düring the war, there was a clear sense of the need to carry-on with normal life and everyday rôles and responsibilities, rather than developing some kind of "shelter-mentality" [40], as is now encouraged through talk of Stockung-up on batteries and fresh water. However, the most striking change over the last fifty years lias been i n how we assume that ordinary human beings wi l l react in a crisis. Beyond the grossly distorted belief in the likelihood of panic lies a more subtle, yet unspoken shift in cultural assumptions, that in itself undermines our capacity to be strong. That is, that in the past, the assumption was -on the whole born out by actual human behaviour - that people were résilient and would seek to cope in adverse circumstances. Today, there is a widespread presumption of human vulnerability that influences both our discussion of disasters well before they have occurred, and that seeks to influence our responses to them long after. A new army of therapeutic counsellors and other assorted Professionals are there to "help" people recover [41]. This présupposes our inability to do so unaided. Indeed, the belief that we can cope, and are robust, is often presented as outdated and misguided, o r as an instance of being " in déniai"'. In some ways, this latter élément, more than any other, best exemplifies and clarifies some of the existing confusions and struggles that lie ahead. If self-reliance is old fashioned and help-seeking actively promoted, for whatever well-intended reason, then we are unlikely to see a trufy résilient society émerge. This cultural shift is reflected in the figures that show that whereas in the United Kingdom, in the period of trade union militancy and unrest known as the "Winter of Discontent" of 1979, there were 29.5 million days lost through strikes, in 2002 there were 33 million days lost through stress [42]. We have shifted from being active agents of history to becoming passive subjects of it. This may suit social leaders lacking a clear agenda or direction. Jt may indeed be easier to manage the sick than those who struggle. Yet it also precludes the possibility of encouraging and establishing real resilience, résolve and purpose across society. The standard way of dealing with disaster today is one that prioritises pushing the public out beyond the yellow-tape perimeter put up by the authorities [43]. At best the public are merely exhorted to display their support and to trust the professionals. Effectively, we deny people any rôle, responsibility or even insight into their own situation 
at such times. Yet, despite this, ordinary human beings are at their most social and rational in a crisis. It is this that should be supported, rather than subsumed o r even subverted. Handling social concerns as to the possibility of a terrorist attack is no easy feat. In part, this is because social fears today have little to do with the actuality, o r even possibility, of the presumed threats that confiront us. Rather, they are an expression of social isolation and mistrust, combined with an absence of direction and an élite crisis of confidence. Debates about the accessibility of technology and the reporting of science in the public domain have to be understood in this context, rather than being accepted and deliberated upon in their own terms. The starting point to establishing real resilience and truly effective solutions wil l be to put the actual threat posed into an appropriate context. This means being honest as to the 
objective evidence, as well as being able to clarify the social basis of subjective fears. Engaging the public in a political debate over societal values may be a longer-term goal than dealing with any imminent terrorist threat, but it is necessary to inform our approach as a society. The incessant debate as to the possibility and conséquences of an attack using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons, is a case in point [44]. Whilst Western societies have debated such nightmare scénarios as i f they were real, terrorists have continued to display their proficiency in, and proclivity to use, conventional weapons, such as high explosives, car bombs and surface-to-air missiles. Above-ail, i f as a society, we are to ascribe an appropriate cultural meaning to the events of September l l l h 2001 - one that does not enhance domestic concerns and encourage us to become ever-more dépendent on a limited number of "expert" Professionals who wil l tell the public how to lead their lives at such times - then we need to promote a far more significant political debate as to our aims and purposes as a society. Changing our cultural outlook is certainly a daunting task. It requires people in positions of authority to clarify and agrée on a common direction and then to win others to it. The reluctance to engage in this fundamentally political process and the clear préférence to concentrate instead upon more limited, technical goals, leaves us profoundly ill-equipped for the future. It speaks volumes as to our existing State of resilience and may serve to make matters worse. Bizarrely, few of the authorities concerned consider it to be their responsibility to lead in this matter. Nor do they believe such cultural change to be a realistic possibility. Yet, in the eventuality of a major civil emergency, they hope that the public will pay attention to the risk warnings they provide and alter their behaviour accordingly. By then it will be too late. 
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Home-grown nihilism - the clash within civilisations 
Terrorism reflects a wide spectrum of causes and beliefs. Individuais who trained in camps 
in Afghanistan have différent motivations from those who act out of a sensé of 
vengeance in the Gaza strip. Some groups may hold global pretensions, but most have a 
more limited, regional focus. 
What concerns us here, however, is what it is that propeis young men from Birmingham, 
Burnley, Leeds or Luton - individuals with no tangible connection to Afghanistan, 
Palestine, Iraq, Bosnia, Chechnya or anywhere eise much beyond thèse shores - to choose 
to be, or to support, terrorists. 
Our ability to understand this objectively is crucial; otherwise we may impute meanings 
and motivations to those involved solely on the basis of their own statements, or of our 
préjudices. We would then fail to grasp any broader dynamic involved and may end up 
making matters worse. 
The search for meaning 
On 11 May 2006 the British government published the Report ofthc Officiai Account of 
the Bombings in London on 7th Jufy 2005.G6This document examïned what was known of 
the terrible events that had occurred the previous summer and that led to the loss of 52 
innocent lives, in addition to those of the four perpetrators. 
The préface to the report describes it as a "narrative", and that is an apt and telling 
description for what follows. The document présents a step-by-step account of what 
happened, wherc and when it happened, by whom it was carried out and even how, but 
- despite investigations lasting almost a year and a section devoted to the issue - little 
explanation as to why. 
Yet it is precisely the why that should be of most interest. Without understanding why, 
there is little hope of precluding such incidents from happening again in the future. In 
addition, not being clear as to why allows ail manner of self-appointed experts, pundits 
and commentators - according to their pre-existing political persuasions - to project their 
own pet theory on to the situation with a view to shaping ensuing policy. 
66 HC 1087 (Norwich: HMSO, 2006) 
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Most common among these purported explanations has been the presumption that the 
attacks formed some kind of retribution for the British government having supported the 
US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. 6 7 But oddly, the assumed ring-leader, Mohammad Sidique 
Khan, made no specific mention of Iraq in his so-called martyrdom video released soon 
after the bombings. 
Others suggest the bombers to have been part of a resurgent and radical global Islamist 
movement or extremist conspiracy. Accordingly, the presumed influences of madrasas, 
mosques and mullahs have come under extensive scrutiny. Alternative explanations and 
justifications have been sought in the supposed social and economic backgrounds of the 
conspirators,68 as well as their psychological profiles and educational performances. 
Much has been made of the fact that two of the four had travelled to Pakistan, but the 
report indicates that who they may have met there "has not yet been established". There 
may be some evidence that these two learned their techniques there from an individual 
who also taught one of the failed bombers of 21 July 2005. But it is also clear that they 
only sought this support and endorsement after deciding to act and that neither group 
knew of the other. 
In fact, the Official Account describes the backgrounds of the perpetrators of the London 
bombings as "unexceptional", their purported links to al-Qaeda as lacking "firm evidence", 
and their methods and materials as, respectively, requiring "no great expertise" and being 
"readily available". 
Bombers did not represent a wider communi ty 
We should not take the assertions of the bombers to have acted on behalf of other 
Muslims at face value. They had not sought the views of other Muslims and did not 
represent these in any way. A parallel Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 
2005, issued by the Intelligence 8t Security Committee, also notes that the claimed 
responsibility for the attacks by Ayman al Zawaheri was "not supported by any firm 
evidence? 9 
67 Such a view has become mainstream across the political spectrum, migrating from George Galloway's tirade against 
Tony Blair upon being elected M P for the Respect Party in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets in 2005 to the 
authors of "Riding Pillion for Tackling Terrorism is a IHigh-risk Policy", a paper in the Chatham House publication 
Security, Terrorism ft the UK ISP/NSC briefing paper 05/01 (London: RIIA, 2005) 
68 Briggs, R, Fieschi, C and Lownsbrough, H Bringing it Home: Community-based Approaches to Counter-terrorism 
(London: Demos, 2006) 
69 Cm 6785 (Norwich: HMS0 , 2006) 
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By interpreting the available information according to their own preferred and uncritical 
models, many analysts have, in effect, been doing the terrorists' thinking and talking for 
them. They have helped to fil! the vacuum of information and confusion otherwise left 
behind. These purported explanations may, in their turn, encourage and even serve as 
justifications to others intent on action. But are they right? 
We will never know exactly what motivated t-he London bombers. Those truly responsible 
are no longer around to inform us. Yet many of the purported explanations seem to seek 
to excuse them of this responsibility. The publication of a rather limited "narrative", rather 
than of an in-depth political analysis, shows how difficult it has been for the authorities 
to establish the motives and drivers of those concerned. It suggests that much of the 
superficial spéculation is not supported by any hard évidence. 
There is little to indicate that Khan or his collaborators Shehzad Tanweer, Jermaine Lindsay 
and Hasib Hussain were particularly pious or held any deep appréciation of the Koran; 
still less that they had direct relations to anyone in Palestine, Bosnia or Iraq. They did not 
bother to ask their families, friends or neighbours what they thought about such matters. 
That is why thèse were so deeply shocked by their actions. 
The bombers met in the local gymnasium rather than the local mosque, they went on 
outdoor activities together and, the day before the attacks, one of them played that 
quintessentially English game - cricket - in his local park. In the end, they acted alone -
in isolation - a form of private gesture against a worîd they appeared to feel little 
connection with, let alone ability to influence. They took part in the ultimate "not in my 
name" protest - a trend and slogan manifested by many other interest groups nowadays.7 0 
In other words, contrary to the populär image of an organised, global network of 
religiously inspired fanatics, determined to create mass destruction, the actual évidence 
points to a small group, operating in isolation, using rudimentary tools and looking to 
rationalise their rage through religion. 
Pointless and meaningless acts 
The real truth, then, about the London bombings may be that they were largely pointless 
and meaningless. This would suggest a problem entirely opposed to that presented by 
70 "Not in my name" was the slogan used by many of those opposed to the Iraq war of 2003. Faisal Oevji points to a 
growing usage of such non-pol i t ical Statements by a wide vancty of groups encompassmg environmental protestors 
and others in Londscapes oftheJihad: Militoncy, Morolity, Modernity (New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2005) 
120 
T H E S M I T H I N S T I T U T E 
politicians and officiais, media and other commentators alike. The bombers were fantasists 
- wannabe terrorists - searching for an identity and a meaning to their fives. They hoped 
to find it in a global cause that was not their own, but that appeared to give expression 
to their nihilistic sensé of grievance. Islam was their motif, not their motive. 
This interprétation may offer little solace to the relatives of those affected. Their demands, 
as well as those of others, for a public inquiry into the matter appear more like a desperate 
attempt to find a more substantial explanation or to attribute blâme where, for now at 
least, none can be found." 
That is hardly surprising, as the désire to understand the causes of, or to attach some kind 
of meaning to, adversity is a strong one. It can be deflating or confusing to discover that 
some event did not have the profundity originally attached to it, or that it was largely 
pointless. Nevertheless, we could all learn from the mother of Theo van Gogh, the Dutch 
filmmaker murdered by a similar, self-styled radical Islamist, who indicated in relation to 
her plight: "What is so regrettable ... is that Theo has been murdered by such a loser, such 
an incohérent person. Murder or manslaughter is always a terrible thing but to be killed 
by such a figure makes it especially hard."7 2 
Recognising the random and unpredictable character of her loss ensures it is not endowed 
with portentous meaning. It does not lead to a demand to reorganise society around the 
presumption of similar events occurring again. To do so would be to normalise extremes 
and thereby to marginalise what is normal. This would effectively "do the terrorists' job 
for them",7 3 by institutionalising instability. 
The usual rejoinder to this is to argue that terrorists "only need to be lucky once", 7 ' whiíe 
governments and their security agencies must counter them at all times if they are not 
to lose the public's support But the évidence from 7 July 20O5 rather suggests this 
perception not to be true. Most people sought to go to work the following day rather 
than blame the authorities. 
An absence of meaning is not just disorienting, it can be debilitating. In his book Mon's 
71 This is not to belittle the genuine grtef of all those concerned, or indeed their understandable désire for support. 
72 Cited in De Telegraaf, 26 July 2005. Available at: http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/23285701/ 
Moeder_Van_Gogh:_enigejLi iste_straf.html 
73 A common warning from the Prime Minister, the head of the security service and many others 
74 A phrase attributed to the IRA after failing to assassinate the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher 
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Search for Meaning, the Holocaust survivor and philosopher Viktor Frankl wrote: "Man is 
not destroyed by suffering; he is destroyed by suffering without meaning."' 5 It is our 
failure to place things into an agreed framework that can readily make random events 
assume catastrophic proportions, thereby inducing a sense of fear and terror. In a similar 
vein, French political scientist Zaki Laidi has suggested that the dissolution of the old -
Cold War - world order was what in particular helped to create what he has termed 
"a world without meaning"' 6 Accordingly, there is now a growing search for meaning 
and identity in society. 
Within an assumed framework of meaning, or in pursuit of agreed goals, adverse events 
are understood and can be withstood - as was the case during the IRA's terror campaign 
on mainland Britain. Today, in an age when nothing is, or appears, so obvious any more, 
such incidents accentuate our uncertainties. 
The causes of radical isation 
To some, what is happening was supposedly predicted. The idea of a "clash of civilisations", 
taken from the title of Samuel Huntington's book," assumed that future conflicts would 
increasingly pit East against West in a fundamental conflict over values. This thesis 
benefited from renewed interest in the aftermath of the attacks upon America in 
September 2001. But few have inquired critically into the true ideological origins of those 
perpetrating acts of terrorism in the name of Islam. 
Others have been more circumspect in their pronouncements, but in essence the core 
assumption remains. In a speech on security to the Foreign Policy Centre in London 
early in 2006," British Prime Minister Tony Blair argued in reference to the on-going war 
on terror: 
This is not a clash between civilisations. It is a clash about civilisation. It is the age-old 
battle between progress and reaction, between those who embrace and see opportunity 
in the modern world and those who reject its existence; between optimism and hope on 
the one hand, and pessimism and fear on the other. 
75 frankl, VE Man's Search for Meoning (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959) 
76 Lai'di, Z A World Without Meaning (London: Taylor 8t Francis, 1998) 
77 Huntington, SP The Clash of Civilizations ff the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon Et Schuster, 1996) 
78 Speech at the Foreign Policy Centre, London, 21 March 2006. Available at: http://fpc.org.uk/events/past/231 
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But the ïdeas and protagonists Tony Blair apparently had in mind in his "clash about 
civilisation" are ail foreign in their origins, or, at least, externally oriented and focused. He 
continued: "The roots of global terrorism and extremism are indeed deep. They reach right 
down through décades of aliénation, victimhood and politicai oppression in the Arab and 
Muslim world." 
In a similar vein, the recently released British government document Countering 
International Terrorism: The United Kingdom's Strategy'9 identifies the need for a "battle 
of ideas, challenging the ideological motivations that extremists believe justify the use of 
violence". This key strand of the strategy is described in terms indicating its having been 
solely conceptualised as affecting, or targeting, Musîims or Muslim communities. 
So while most politicians and officiais have slowly reconciled themselves to the fact that 
many of the perpetrators of contemporary acts of terror are Western-born or educated, 
the assumption remains that what drives them is a foreign ideology or agenda that 
only Musîims can understand or address - a point reasserted by the Prime Minister in 
subséquent eomments to the House of Commons liaison committee, 8 0 and by the Home 
Secretary, Dr John Reid.8 1 
But is the problem really a "clash about civilisation", or even, as the Home Secretary 
proposed, that we are having to manage the conséquences of some kind of conflict 
within Islam? In some ways it seems we rather face a more profound culturaî crisîs 
domestieally. To recognise the problem assuch would be discomfiting for Western leaders 
and societies. It would require understanding the extent to which many of the ideas that 
inspire the nihilist terrorism we witness today are often home grown and inculcated. 
Common explanat ion is poorly grounded 
While conceding that many of the perpetrators and conspirators are increasingly turning 
out to have been Western in their origins, most, including Tony Blair, still présume their 
guiding influences to have been reactionary ideas and idéologies from the East. Hence, a 
lazy empirical approach has been employed to identify so-called "risk factors" that may 
79 Cm 6888 (2006) (Norwich: HMSO) 80 Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence to the House of Commons liaison committee, 4 July 2006. Available at: http://wwvv.publications.parliament.Uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmliaisrVuc709-iii/uc70902.h 81 Speech to Muslim groups in east London, 20 September 2006. Available at: http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/ sp-muslim-group-20-09-06 
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lead individuals to become "radicalised".82 But this approach assumes a conclusion and 
then goes in seareh of the évidence to corroborate it. It is profoundly unscientific. 
Above ail, it ignores the dominant social context within which most such individuals find 
themselves - that is, advanced Western societies. 
Unsurprisingly, many researchers find their préjudices confirmed by using this method -
that is what is wrong with it. Accordingly, an impoverished background, or having listened 
to the inflammatory rhetoric of an obscure cleric, are factors that appear to be confirmed 
in the minds of thèse researchers as "radicalising" influences. Ail agrée that a deep sensé 
of injustice as regards affairs in the Middle East is also key.83 
But one could equally propose that being a billionaire, driving a white Mercedes or 
running the family business are significant risk factors. Certainly all three have featured in 
Osama bin Laden's life. Starting with an answer and then joining up the dots ischild's play. 
It offers no insight beyond assumed conclusions. 
The trial in London of the so-called "Crawley Group", accused of plotting further terrorist 
atrocities after acquiring a large quantity of ammonium nitrate fertiliser, is quite apposite 
in this regard. Their list of alleged intended targets ineluded shoppers, drinkers, football 
supporters and "slags" in nightclubs.8" The notion that thèse are major problems requiring 
to be regulated appears to reflect the ideas of certain policy makers and their exaggerated 
fears of social disorder in some sectors of soeiety, rather more than verses from the Koran. 
So, could paying too much attention to contemporary commentators be a radicalising 
factor too? 
As the académie Marc Sageman has pointed out in the most authorïtative study of 
people associated with al-Qaeda,S 5 there are no clear radicalising influences or pre-
disposing risk factors that can be identified. If anything, thèse individuals are likely to a 
have a middle- or upper-class, secular background and to be reasonably well educated. 
That would put many of the critics and commentators at risk of becoming radicalised too. 
82 There ¡5 3 burgeoning literature on the causes of so-called radicalisation, emerging from a wide variety of 
organisations, very little of which is peer-reviewed. 
83 Towords a Community-bascd Approach to Countcr-terrorism, WPS06 / 5 (2006). Available at: 
http://www.wiitonpark.org.uk/document5/confcrences/WPSO6-5/pdf5/WPSO6-5.pdf 
84 "Gang 'Planncd to Bomb London Nightclub'" in The Guardian, 25 May 2006 
85 Sageman, M Understonding Terror Networks (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) 
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In particular, though, the individuals concerned were rarely recruited from above but 
rather seem actively to have sought out terrorist networks or sects that they might join. 
Some only eonverted to Islam after this. This would seem to confirm their désire to be part 
of something, but more importante it raises the issue as to why they were unable to find 
that something eloser to home. 
Wha t in the West is radical ising individuals? 
The key is not what it is that attracts a minority from a variety of baekgrounds, ineluding 
some who are relatively privileged, to fringe Islamist organisations, but rather what it 
is about our own societies and culture that faits to provide aspirational, educated and 
energetic young individuals with a clear sensé of purpose and collective direction through 
which to lead their lives and realise their ambitions, so that they are left looking for this 
elsewhere - ineluding, for some, among various arcane and distorted belief Systems. 
In some ways the nihilist criminals that detonated their rudimentary devices in London in 
the summer of 2005 appear to reflect the sentiments of other disgruntled individuals and 
groups across the developed world today. Their acts seem more akin to the Columbine 
high-school massacre and other such incidents, where usually respectable young men, 
born and educated in the West, décide for various reasons - or none that we can work out 
- to kill themselves and scores of civilians. 
Their ideas and influences appear to have far less to do with imams and mullahs, and far 
more in common with the dystopian views of numerous commentators who criticise 
Western society today. Indeed, a recently published compilation of Osama bin Laden's 
writings reveals how frequently he is inclined to cite Western writers, Western diplomats 
and Western thinkers.86 At one point he even advises the White House to read Robert Fisk, 
rather than, as one might have supposed, the Koran. 
It would be remiss to ignore the growing influence of a significant degree of what some 
have identifiée! as a culture of self-loathing in the developed world. If one wants to 
discover anti-American views coherently expressed, or people who reject the benefits of 
science, progress and modernity, then one need not look far to find them. Such opinions 
are ail around us. 
86 Bin Laden, 0. Lawrence, B (ed) and Howarth, J [transi] Messages to the World: The Statemenls of Osama bin Laden (London: Verso. 2Û05) 
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Indeed, less than two days had passed after 9/11 when Seumas Milne first used the term 
anti-American in a Guardian newspaper article, entitled "They Can't See Why They Are 
Hated".87 On the same day, the Reverend Jerry Falwell, pastor of the 22,000-member 
Thomas Road Baptist Church of Lynchburg, Virginia, told US television viewers that God 
had given America "what we deserve".88 Aside from such extremes, many others point to 
continued American intransigence over issues such as global warming and human rights 
as purported explanations for what happened. 
Cultural se l f - loath ing is widespread 
It may be unpalatable or unpleasant to recall or recognise that a significant number of 
people, not all of whom were Muslim, were not that saddened to see the Twin Towers 
in New York going down. A sense that America had it coming was quite widespread in 
some supposedly respectable quarters, where a barely concealed Schadenfreude was 
in evidence. Many - including those in positions of authority or charged with defeating 
terrorism - are inclined to caricature contemporary culture as decadent and degenerate, 
or corrupt and selfish. 
But this reflects a broader view of human action in the world. Increasingly, Western 
intellectuals have come to portray this as being largely negative.6 9 Now mainstream 
milieus depict ambition as arrogant, development as dangerous and success as selfish. 
Within certain circles in America, too, power has become presented as egotism, freedom 
as illusory and the desire to defend oneself as the act of a bully. 
Western society today is replete with individuals and institutions that appear determined 
to criticise and undermine human achievements. Even environmental agendas have 
been turned into sorry moral tales of human hubris, rather than an identification and 
celebration of the need for greater ingenuity. 
Reflecting these trends, the President of the Royal Society called one of his latest books 
Our Final Century: Will the Human Race Survive the Twenty-First Century??0 while the 
Professor of European Thought at the London School of Economics ft Political Science is 
comfortable describing human beings as being little more than a plague upon the planet 
87 Milne, S They Can't See Why They Are Hated" in The Guardian, 13 September 2001 
88 Cited in "God Gave US 'What We Deserve', Falwell Says" in Washington Post, 14 September 2001 
89 Bookchin, M Re-enchanting Humanity: A Defense of the Human Spirit against Anti-Humanism, Misanthropy, 
Mysticism ft Primitivism (London: Cassell, 1995) 
90 Rees, M (London: Wil l iam Heinemann, 2003) 
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in his book Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humons Et Other Animais* A récent édition of the 
prestigious UK science journal New Scientist speculated positively as to what the earth 
would be like without humans (and presumably without New Seientist) being there.92 
Nor are such ideas limited to those of a few académies. Surely, when Michael Moore's 
Stupid White Men became the best-selling book on both sides of the Atlantic - selling 
over 300,000 copies in the UK in its first year of publication alone - a few bright minds in 
the security world and beyond should have noticed the growing depth of cynicism and 
disillusionment in society and their potentially adverse conséquences?93 
It is this cultural malaise and pessimistic outlook that forms the backdrop, and inevitably 
shapes, eontemporary terrorism. Increasingly, it appears that this is sustained by two 
éléments - the radical nihilists who are prepared to lose their lives and those of others 
around them in their misguided détermination to leave their mark upon a world that 
they reject, and the nihilist intellectuals who help frame a public discourse and culture 
of apocalyptic failure and rejection. 
Conclusion 
Instead of imagining the root causes of terrorism in the UK as emanating from overseas, 
or reflecting some foreign ideology, it is time for us to recognise their domestic 
dimension. This is not, as some suppose, driven by social deprivation or exclusion, nor 
is it the conséquence of a few influential individuals. 
Rather it appears to reflect a broader sensé of aliénation and confusion that has gripped 
the modem world. Many today are in search of an identity and a meaning to their lives 
as the oid networks and affiliations that used to provide thèse in the last Century -
national, religious and secular - have been eroded. 
The uncertainty of our times has led many to view human action with concern, 
encouraging a destructive misanthropy that has been acted upon by some who view 
themselves as particular victims. It is this dominant dystopian culture, which is our own, 
that needs to be addressed if we are to defeat terrorism. 
91 Gray, J (London: Granta, 2003) 
92 "Earth Without People: What If Wc Al l Disappeared Tomorrow?" (14 October 2006) 
93 Moore, M Stupid White Men... et Other Sorry Excuses for the State of the Notion! (London: Penguin, 2002) 
127 
T H E S M I T H I N S T I T U T E 
128 
